K.R. Norman on the "unborn" and "deathless"

There is an argument in philosophy that it is logically impossible for the past to be infinite. The point is often made merely as a subsidiary in a larger argument which is trying to prove god exists. See, for example: https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3600/Kalam.pdf

I am not sure if the argument is valid or not. Maybe it is possible for the past to be infinite? In which case samsara is unborn. It is one of those particular types of arguments in which to really engage with the debate would get boring fast.

I think we are explicitly told by the Buddha not to waste our time on this particular questiom! :laughing:

This means that there is no death in his world, this is the end of death (like the kingdom of heaven).

All hangs on my information received from certain Bhikkhu, that he wasn’t a Buddhist. If so, if this is the case, reading what he says about the third noble truth in hope that it may be helpful to understand it, is exactly what you said not very good cognitive strategy
 Of course as far as Pali grammar goes, the article may be of some interest.

Yeah, that could be
 but why not mention that in the sutta? Instead he talks about his rebirth as a Brahmā (which is not synonymous with the Pure Abodes, right?)

That would contradict the basic points of Buddhist Cosmology, which holds that rebirth in heaven is also temporary.

1 Like

Isn’t that what we call death?

If puthujjanaship necessarily precluded one from forming an accurate conception of nibbāna at the sutamaya and cintamaya levels of understanding, how would anyone ever cease to be a puthujjana?

Venerable Bhante

To the question, is samsara born, answer is Yes. But here the term samsara has to be replaced with the word Dukkha. Dukkha is pancaupadanakkanda. Pancaupadanakkanda is born. Otherwise samsara cannot be described in terms of born or not-born.
Pancaupadanakkanda to be born in future lives is termed Anuppanna dukkha. In theravada, Anuppanna (not yet born) is also considered Uppanna (born) because the potential of being born in future is not yet eradicated.

With due respect, y’all are missing the fairly simple point.

It’s irrelevant whether samsara in some abstract philosophical sense can be considered “born”.

The word “birth” (jāti) is used in the suttas in a specific and clearly defined way to mean “the birth of beings in the different orders of beings”. That’s what it means here, as it does in hundreds of other cases.

In Brahmanism, amata means “immortal”. Obviously it doesn’t have the same meaning in Buddhism. and all Norman does really is work out the implications of this consistently.

2 Likes

So the a- prefix here being more like “beyond” or “without” than “not”?

Ah, okay. So you’re taking Brahmā Sahampati as just being mistaken here? That works for me! :grin:

I mean that’s getting semantic, but “free of birth” would work.

I dunno, just that the sense is different in different contexts so that should be borne in mind.

The reason I thought of posting this was a recent book by Venerable Analayo, Signless and Deathless, where he writes:

Despite this, later in the book the venerable himself reads other passages with “quite affirmative connotations”, arguing nibbana is an experience beyond the six senses. He says: “At the same time, however, the passage does provide quite an emphatic affirmation of that possibility [of freedom from birth etc.]. Its highlight on something completely apart from birth and constructions is comparable to the description of a sphere apart from all other experiences.” Anyway, don’t want to argue that here.

To add to Norman’s arguments, Iti43 also sheds light upon the matter. In the verse it equates nibbāna (which it earlier calls asaáč…khata and “the escape from that [conditioned things]”) to “the cessation of all painful things, the stilling of conditions”. This is the effective meaning of asaáč…khata, then: not the presence of some unconditioned “thing”, but the cessation/stilling of the conditioned.

2 Likes

It is also used as the manifestation of the khandha’s and the obtaining of the sense bases (SN12.2)

I think jati can be seen literally, but also more esoterically as something that happens in this very life. In this very life mind takes birth as a peta-like mind, an animal like mind, a deva like mind etc. For example in jhana it is said that it corresponds to the mindstate of deva’s. I believe it is not wrong to say that that moment it takes birth in a deva like existence.

Both, birth in this life and birth after this life are also related. If the mind in this life easy and often takes birth as a deva, the chance is big that this also happens at death. And when one takes birth as a dog or as a ox in this life and develops strong dog or ox-like habits, one will be born among dogs and ox, or even in hell when one holds the view that such practices can lead to heaven.

This relationship between birth/bhava in this life and after life is the understanding of how rebirth works. This is also why i believe it is useful to see how becoming, birth, bhava, decay and death also happens in this very life. There is no real need to take it all literally, i feel.

The grasping here and now of greed, hate etc is just the beginning of a process of becoming and taking birth of the mind in a certain state, and that also ends again.

Mind that is limitless, the mind of a Buddha, has no bhava, i believe. It cannot be said to be human. The idea that we are now humans, is, i believe, what a Buddha sees as a conventional truth, and it is merely based upon identification with khandha’s. It is not some absolute truth about ourselves.
A Buddha can show this.

This dimension beyond any bhava is, i believe, called the unborn, deathless. It is like a total empty undefined openess, where things are not yet fixed, have no meaning, sign, characteristics.

But Brahma doesn’t know this, as far as I understand

1 Like

Certain teachers say this must not be understood as a mere cessation, a nothingness, nothing. To counter this idea often the word emptiness is used. In a total emptiness there is no condition, but it is also not nothing.

Maha Boowa also never speaks about the citta as some ‘thing’. I believe he does not mean it that way.
But people cannot stop to reify and imagine it must be a thing. Then they start to think it is an eternal thing. Then they start to judge that this is an atta. Then they start to think this is a-Dhamma and an eternalist view and so it derails. It all derails due to the urge to conceive that what cannot be conceived.

The sutta’s speak of an unsupported reality.

*There is, mendicants, that dimension where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no wind; no dimension of infinite space, no dimension of infinite consciousness, no dimension of nothingness, no dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; no this world, no other world, no moon or sun. There, mendicants, I say there is no coming or going or remaining or passing away or reappearing. It is not established, does not proceed, and has no support. Just this is the end of suffering.” (*Ud8.1)

Bhava is an establised reality, it is has a support. What Buddha describes here, i believe, is our birthright. It is for free and is never absent. It can be overlooked, ignored, not seen. But it cannot be absent.

That is what i believe, but i am a looner here :slight_smile: The forums dreamer.

Perhaps Iti 44 should be amended as it currently has:

Those who have fully understood the unconditioned state—
Ye etadaññāya padaáč asaáč…khataáč,
their minds freed, the conduit to rebirth ended—
Vimuttacittā bhavanettisaáč…khayā;
attained to the heart of the Dhamma, they delight in ending,
Te dhammasārādhigamā khaye ratā,
the poised ones have given up all states of existence.”
Pahaáčsu te sabbabhavāni tādino”ti.

Iti 44

@sujato is there a reason to add state here when the same is just described as ‘the unconditioned’ in 43?

There is a reason that the Nibbana must be realised each for themselves - there is the obstacle of language. Language is framed in terms of concepts (including even grammar which is an expression of the most basic concepts we take for granted - including ‘I am’) which must themselves be transcended. The Buddha has pointed where to look - so LOOK - through Samadhi ‘eyes’
 Yes that is a misleading word - but the best approximation that can be had.

Not an answer - but something to contemplate :slightly_smiling_face: :pray:

4 Likes

I believe loner is the word you’re looking for. A looner is something else altogether.

:laughing:

:balloon: :balloon: :balloon:

4 Likes

This reads confusing. I read in a sutta the unconditioned is the destination of the Noble Eightfold Path and also read in a sutta the Noble Eightfold Path is a path of gradual stilling that reaches the destination. It does not read as though “stilling” is the “unconditioned”. I read in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s MN 115 about the unconditioned element. “Stilling” sounds like a mental process rather than an element. When our minds have ignorance, they engage in “conditioning”. The stilling of this conditioning is something done by practice of the Noble Eightfold Path. It cannot be the same as what is unconditioned because the practice of the Noble Eight Path is also a type of inverse conditioning or de-conditioning. I remember once watching a video by a young handsome Australian monk named Sujato and this Sujato criticized another older monk who taught the clear mind without mental impurities is “unconditioned”. Sujato, who also had knee pain at the time, kept crying out: “No, no, the mind is conditioned; the mind is not unconditioned”.

That is a very good question, as I see it, puthujjana guided by Dhamma instructions, and trying to practice it, gradually removes his wrong ideas about the things as they are, untill in fact his understanding isn’t in contradiction with Dhamma, and at this point the arisnig of the eye may happened.

Perhaps I expressed myself not very clearly, my main objection is that Norman was outsider puthujjana, not merely puthujjana who strives to understand the Dhamma. I can elaborate my position:

Pali is a very specific language, perhaps the only language in the world where the best scholar can be corrected by one who in fact doesn’t know the language. And I don’t mean the obvious explanation: namely certain texts in Suttas deal strictly with the right view,† so in order to translate such texst into other languages one simply has to see the Four Noble Truths. With such direct and private knowledge even without much knowledge about Pali, just from context, right meaning of the word could be deducted, while the best Pali scholar without the right view has at his disposal only purely grammatical considerations.

†[
 it is possible to regard the Suttas as the product of the Buddha’s ‘personal’ experience. The Buddha is dhamma-bhĆ«ta, ‘become Dhamma’, and the Suttas are an account of Dhamma.
In the Suttas, however (unlike in a novel, where the emphasis is in the other direction, upon the particular), the Buddha expresses, for the most part, what is universal in his experience—i.e. what can be experienced by anyone who makes the appropriate effort in the appropriate conditions. So it is that the Buddha says ‘He who sees the Dhamma sees me’ 
 The sekha—no longer a puthujjana but not yet an arahat—has a kind of ‘double vision’, one part unregenerate, the other regenerate.) As soon as one becomes a sotāpanna one is possessed of aparapaccayā ñānam, or ‘knowledge that does not depend upon anyone else’: this knowledge is also said to be ‘not shared by puthujjanas’, and the man who has it has (except for accelerating his progress) no further need to hear the Teaching—in a sense he is (in part) that Teaching. (From Nanavira Thera Letters)]

That should be obvious and I don’t mean that.

The point is that Suttas describe things as they are, certain truths about putthujjana experience which are timeless, things which were like this ten thousands years ago and which will not change after another ten thousands of years. They are already in our experience, so in order to clearly see them, supported by the Dhamma, reflecting on our experience we can see them, even without ceaseing to be puthujjanas. In other words apart linguistics examinations we have to examine consequences of certain translations on existential level.

The good example is “asmimāna”. It is a very important word, since cessation of asmimāna is recognised by Suttas as nibbana here and now.

I have met with the three rendering of the term, namely:

“I am”; “(I) am”, and “am”.

The third translation is made by very well known scholar, Bhikkhu Nanananda. But even without Pali knowledge one who practice Dhamma, reflect on it, can see that his translation is the worst of all. And it is so because he as a Pali scholar, at least in this particular case limited himself to purely linguistic considerations, without examining the existential consequences of his translation.

He insisted that translation asmimāna as “I am” is too strong. I am not in position to disagree with it, also Ven Nanavira seems to agree with him*. But when English speaking puthujjana reflects about himself, about his existence or being he thinks “I am” not “am”. Now if he is informed that nibbana is the cessation of “am”, he is wholly justified to insist, that it means that certain noumenal “I” still is present in nibbana. Perhaps that idea could find some enthusiasts, but I don’t think ven Nanananda was on of them, he simply haven’t recognised all the consequences of his translation on the existential level. And he was practicing Buddhist. So what about scholar who not only was limited to linguistics considerations, but who also didn’t boder to practice Dhamma (and reflecton on Dhamma is the part of practice)?

Also I didn’t say that reading Norman cannot be useful, I only wanted to emphasize Suttas message:

“Cunda, that one who is himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is impossible 
 MN 8

Certainly I don’t believe that this or that monk has a right view, but apart that I can be wrong, I don’t see how I can demonstrate it to general public. But in this particular case if Norman even didn’t take a refuge in the Buddha and Dhamma, I found it slightly ironic that he wanted to teach us about nibbana. :grin:.

My memory isn’t great and my time is limited, so I prefer rereading Suttas, than to read non canonical sources written by outsiders.

“Householders, if wanderers of other sects ask you thus: ‘Householders, what kind of recluses and brahmins should not be honoured, respected, revered, and venerated?’ you should answer them thus: ‘Those recluses and brahmins who are not rid of lust, hate, and delusion regarding forms cognizable by the eye, whose minds are not inwardly peaceful, and who conduct themselves now righteously, now unrighteously in body, speech, and mind—such recluses and brahmins should not be honoured, respected, revered, and venerated. Why is that? Because we ourselves are not rid of lust, hate, and delusion regarding forms cognizable by the eye, our minds are not inwardly peaceful, and we conduct ourselves now righteously, now unrighteously in body, speech, and mind. Since we do not see any higher righteous conduct on the part of those good recluses and brahmins, they should not be honoured, respected, revered, and venerated. (
)

  1. “Householders, if wanderers of other sects ask you thus: ‘But what are your reasons and what is your evidence regarding those venerable ones whereby you say about them: “Surely these venerable ones are either rid of lust or are practising for the removal of lust; they are either rid of hate or are practising for the removal of hate; they are either rid of delusion or are practising for the removal of delusion”?’—being asked thus, you should answer those wanderers of other sects thus: ‘It is because those venerable ones resort to remote jungle-thicket resting places in the forest. For there are no forms cognizable by the eye there of a kind that they could look at and delight in. There are no sounds cognizable by the ear there of a kind that they could listen to and delight in. There are no odours cognizable by the nose there of a kind that they could smell and delight in. There are no flavours cognizable by the tongue there of a kind that they could taste and delight in. There are no tangibles cognizable by the body there of a kind that they could touch and delight in. These are our reasons, friends, this is our evidence whereby we say about those venerable ones: “Surely these venerable ones are either rid of lust, hate, and delusion, or are practising for their removal.”’ Being thus asked, householders, you should answer those wanderers of other sects in this way.” MN 150
  • asmimāna – conceit ‘(I) am’.

(‘Conceit’, māna, is to be understood as a cross between ‘concept’ and ‘pride’ – almost the French ‘orgueil’ suitably attenuated. Asmi is ‘I am’ without the pronoun, like the Latin ‘sum’; but plain ‘am’ is too weak to render asmi, and aham asmi (‘ego sum’) is too emphatic to be adequately rendered ‘I am’.) Nanavira Thera

1 Like

Haha, yes, loner :slight_smile:

1 Like