In (edit: Speci Relativity) Physics, nowadays it’s held true that non-causal observation of time is a possibility, meaning someone can observe your future and then your past.
Does this mean, Sarvastivadins were correct? What are the implications of this?
@Jayarava once mentioned the problem of kamma at a distance:
Jayarava's Raves: Why Did Buddhists Abandon Buddhavana?
I think Buddhists noticed certain problems in early Buddhist doctrine and responded. In particular I noted that there was a problem I called “action at a temporal distance”. Let’s say that I make a great donation to a Buddhist monastery and earn a vast amount of merit (puṇya, aka “good karma”) in the process. Some Buddhist texts say “I am the heir of my actions”, i.e. the person who experiences the consequences is the same as the one who acts. And this can stretch across lifetimes. This is the main theme of the Jātaka and Avadāna literature and one of the main ways that Buddhists talk about morality.At the same time, however, most readings of the doctrine of dependent arising say that I am not the same person from moment to moment, let alone from lifetime to lifetime. So the one who experiences the consequences is not the same as the one who acts, but only arises in dependence on their actions.
If the action of giving is a discrete event which lasts for a few seconds (maybe) and then ceases, how can that be the condition for some effect in the future given dependent arising? The standard formula is
This being, that becomes. When this arises, that arises.
This not being, that does not become. When that ceases, this ceases.I argued that this means that the condition has to be present for the effect to arise, and if it is absent the effect ceases or never arises in the first place. The Theravādins in academia disagreed with this extremely enough to reject my article outright, but it is undoubtedly how proponents of sarvāstivāda understood it.