Looking for suttas or EBTs as a basis for some newer teachings

The Watercooler
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I’m reading an interesting work derived from a D.Phil thesis by Jungnok Park, titled “How Buddhism Acquired a Soul on the Way to China” published by the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies. The book deals with an interesting topic as you may surmise from the title.

The work touches upon the evolution of Buddhist soteriology, epistemology and ontology thoroughly while limiting its scope to the topic of the title. The author describes how the concepts of the dharma-body (dharma-kaya), and the tathagata-garba were developed and considered.

What’s interesting as a layperson is that some of these concepts appear to go against what the Buddha himself taught, for example, tilakkhana, specially anatta.

Page 140 has an overview of these concepts:

The dharma-body is not attained by Buddhas through practice, and ordinary beings possess the same dharma-body from the beginning. It is not to be produced, not subject to change, and not to be purified; but it is always of such a kind (tathathā).

Further, there is an overview of the tathagata-garba

The idea that all living beings are possessed of the nature of a Buddha is called the theory of tathāgatagarbha (the embryo of a Tathāgata): there is no difference in suchness among all [living beings]; for it is the self-nature of purity and [it is] Tathāgata. Therefore all living beings are said to possess the tathāgatagarbha.

The author indicates that this leans towards the interpretation of a permanent “self” in the way these concepts evolved and adapted.

I’m trying to investigate whether there were any kernels of ideas in the EBTs that may have led towards these types of thinking or concepts, or whether these were due to external influences. I haven’t been able to find anything like this in the EBTs and the only reference to the “Dhamma-body” is in DN27 which Bhante Sujato had also commented upon in another discussion here. I’m unable to find any more about this concept, and literally nothing like a predecessor to, or a seed of an idea of the tathāgatagarbha in the EBTs. Thanks in advance to anyone who can point me in the right direction.

[Moderators, please advise/move/remove if you consider this out of place & unrelated.]

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I think you’ll have a difficult time finding any direct reference to a dhamma-body in the Pali canon as Venerable @sujato says. It might be that some of the Agamas contain it, but I’m not sure of that at all. Some of what you ask relies upon a definition of EBT, but the way it is used on this forum I think makes it unlikely you’ll find such a word as dhamma-body used in this way.

However:

The Nibbana is not attained by Buddhas through practice, and ordinary beings possess the same Nibbana from the beginning. It is not to be produced, not subject to change, and not to be purified; but it is always of such a kind (tathathā).

Sometimes Nibbana is described as being attained and sometimes it is deemed problematic to describe it as such for those who study mostly EBT. Sometimes Nibbana is described as possessed and sometimes it is deemed problematic to describe it as such for those who study mostly EBT. Generally, speaking it is not controversial to describe Nibbana as, “not produced, not subject to change, and not to be purified” but always suchness. Hard to say something categorical here, but that is generally the mood I detect on this forum.

That isn’t to suggest that what some adherents of the Chinese traditions regard as “dharma-body” are necessarily the same as what some adherents of studying mostly EBT regard as Nibbana. However, perhaps there are some who equate like this or in another fashion?

Dharma-body and Nibbana are just words and what meaning people ascribe to them varies with the perspective of the person or (loose) group using it. It is hard to nail down any specific usage and say that is what is meant. Even here on this forum you’ll find seemingly endless debates about Nibbana - what it is, what it isn’t, if it’s possessed, if it’s not, if it’s unconditioned, if it’s the absence of conditions, if it’s only fully realized at death, if it’s fully realized in life, etc, etc.

Rather than searching for something categorical to say about Dharma-body or Nibbana it probably matters more how the views formed around these words alter practice and that is a much more difficult question without knowing the minds of those who perceive “dharma-body” or “nibbana.” :pray:

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For these are terms for the Tathāgata: ‘the embodiment of principle’ (dhammakāya), and ‘the embodiment of divinity’ (brahmakāya), and ‘the manifestation of principle’ (dhammabhūto), and ‘the manifestation of divinity’ (brahmabhūto).
DN 27

“For a long time I’ve wanted to go and see the Buddha, but I was physically too weak.”
[The Buddha:] “Enough, Vakkali! Why would you want to see this rotten body? One who sees the Dhamma sees me. One who sees me sees the Dhamma. Seeing the Dhamma, you see me. Seeing me, you see the Dhamma.”
SN 22.87

In the early Mahāyāna literature, such as the early Prajñāpāramitā, the characters say that if something is spoken from a realization of Dharma, then it is spoken by the Buddha, because the Buddha is the Dharma. We already see kernels of this idea in some of the āgama literature, as above. For them, “The Buddha said this” didn’t need to mean some decaying body said some words. This made room for new ideas and scriptures to be considered ‘buddhavacana’ despite not being found in the common āgama literature that all Buddhists would have been familiar with.

The transition being something like:
Buddha → Buddha = Teachings he gives → Buddha = Principles which those Teachings point to.

Because every sentient being operates under the laws of Dhamma, and the Dhamma is considered all-pervasive and always true, some might have began saying that all beings have the “Buddha” in them in the above sense of Buddha = Dhamma in the abstract. Obviously, then, over time this could be taken in different directions by different people.

For example, if impermanence is an eternal law that every being is subject to (dhammaniyāmatā), and if the Buddha is the laws of Dhamma, then could we say that every being has an eternal ātman which is the Dharmakaya of the Buddha? m This is the kind of word-play and concepts tossed around in this genre of literature. In some schools, ‘Tathāgatagarbha’ was matched with a kind of pure consciousness considered to be underlying every sentient being or perhaps the universe.

It was also in reaction to a concept that developed in some schools / strands of Buddhist thought: icchantikas. These were people who were considered basically to not have the karmic potential to attain awakening; they were doomed to samsāra. So the Tathāgatagarbha counter-acts that idea.

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Rather than looking too far out, it’s best to look around. A good example is Ishvara - Lord God, which is completely absent in Pāli Canons, but part of the general Brahmanical culture. Go to the East and you find AvalokitESHVARA.

Mahabrahma would be the closest thing to Ishvara, which is a completely deluded god who learns dhamma from Buddha, as opposed to being an overseer god.

In Pāli Suttas, there’s a clear cessation of six-sense base and five-aggregates. Yet in Lotus Sutra, this exposition is explained as a placeholder teaching for people on the path to Budhahood.

A lot of things Buddha refuted or refused to talk about, for example Self, is found in other schools. Zen, for example, talks about the true self, similar to tathagata-garba, Buddhanature, which is kind of like both potential for enlightenment and emptiness bundled up together.

The closest thing to eternalist ideas in Pāli source, and a cause for a lot of discussion, is the term viññāṇa anidassana. This could be translated both as consciousness not landing (appearing) or also unlanding consciousness. Certain theravāda schools even, like Thai Forest tradition, of which Ajahn Thanissaro is a part of, use this seldom used and cryptic term to explain that nibbāna is a type of consciousness.

It’s not hard to understand why. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Buddha did talk about complete cessation of all six senses and all aggregates. How do you think people would react to it? The fact that there’s rebirth in this life is proof that people are afraid of non-existence. People crave existence. So it’s only natural that people would try to find loopholes and find something that crosses over, even if that something is beyond logic or exposition.

Either way, as for specifics of dhammabody, buddhanature and similar pseudo-eternalist views, one should look within the Brahmanical tradition, to see many such views that Buddha spent his life trying to refute. :slight_smile:

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I just want to address this.

There’s a sutta that says perception feeling and consciousness are together, not separated.

So when there’s perception there’s feeling.

The perceiving nibbāna in AN10.6 is not cessation of perception and feeling.

The former has perception the latter no perception.

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There’s different types of consciousness.

There’s Hindu Swamis out there instructing that Brahma-Nirvana for example is a type of God-Consciousness. But that is the tip of the scale with regards to consciousness and Nibbana coming together, and it’s not a Buddhist perspective per-se. Yet not attaching to words like dry dictaphones, there may be a Way to talk about Nibbana for some non-traditional Buddhist Teachers as a type of Spiritual Consciousness. I think it has to do with the modern sphere and influence of Hinduism becoming more and more popular in the world.

Buddha’s philosophy will prevail, but every Dhamma has a meaning.

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What’s interesting about Jungnok Park’s work is that although this Brahmanical influence is taken into consideration, his research provides significant details that show how the the rich and multi-faceted concepts of the “Shen” (神) developed in the Chinese strands of Buddhism as a permanent agent of perception, and quite independently and took on a life of its own, so to speak.

While the early concept of “Shen” in Daoism is described in the book as an agent of thought and not something permanent, this concept appears to have been co-opted and infused with new meaning in some of the Chinese sutras. As an example, the author quotes one translation of the Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra that states:

Since the mind is attached to existence, [the body] arises dependent on conditions. Doing [karmic] actions repetitiously, one receives extraordinary suffering. Once one has been born, one must die; once one has died, one must be reborn. Although one comes and passes away through birth and death, [one’s] jingshen does not cease. Therefore [you] should not [cry] like this!

The interpretation is extraordinary, since the term jingshen here indicates something permanent.

To your point @Dogen the author goes into detail on how the Chinese translators interpolated some phrases to indicate a permanent agent in samsāra, but he also covers in detail how the pre-Buddhist Chinese ideas of the self (Shen, and other concepts such as the hun [魂] and po [魄]) evolved and played a significant part in the later narratives, infusing and being infused with ideas from Daoism among others.

All in all, a very thoroughly researched book and fascinating to study.

Yes we see Avalokiteshvara relics here in Singapore more in the museums and art galleries, though we find the GuanYin / Kuan-Yin everywhere here.

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Hello Venerable! :pray:

Yes, maybe that is the exact reason why AN 10.6 & AN 10.7 is considered “paradoxical”?

The same principle also applies to conscioussness, yet DN 11 and MN 49 is also Nibbāna, beyond ‘The All’.

Of course it is, read it very carefully and you will see that it is impossible to place this immersion in any plane of existence:

“They wouldn’t perceive the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.

And they wouldn’t perceive this world in this world, or the other world in the other world.

And yet they would still perceive.”

The only choice one has is the unconditioned element beyond all planes of existence where one can obviously still perceive; according to both The Buddha and Sāriputta.

Truly beyond ’The All’, just like DN 11 & MN 49 also is also beyond ’The All’.

:dharmawheel:

Becoming 100% unconscious/unaware never has and never will be considered Nibbãna.

This is just the view of the Ajahns on this forum, Na Uyana and SBS.

Others clearly disagree with this view but are then accused of being “eternalists’.

But eternalism is tied to feelings while Nibbāna is not.

In a nutshell eternalists are not wrong per se since what they claim is based on actual experiences/feelings.

The same applies to the 6 types of annihilationists who believe in rebirth who say that it is not the ’same’ that is reborn and one instead becomes ‘another’.

This is also not wrong per se but based on experience/feelings.

  • If the view of BSWA, Na Uyana & SBS was the goal of the practice The Buddha would have spoken more frequently about Asaññasattāvāso and called it a mini version of Nibbāna, or warn disciples not to mistake Asaññasattāvāso for Nibbāna.

But there is no mentioning of Asaññasattāvāso in the suttas in that way at all.

So if a meditator truly believe that the goal is to extinguish as in having no awareness, they will instead during meditation gravitate to Asaññasattāvāso - which is a state in Rupa Loka where one only has a form but no mind at all.

And then just patiently wait for the body to die and end up in Asaññasattāvāso
which they are/were certain was/is the unconditioned.

But it is not the goal of the practice.
:pray:

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There’s knowledge that it’s not the same because of the destruction of the fetters for the arahants.

This is the classical Theravada position. Just so happens that you get only these sample size from this forum.

Really, you’re just willing to say cessation of perception still got perception, a contradiction. You’re willing to embrace a contradiction.

Anyway, there’s no issue for one to have perception of nibbāna, as in AN10.6, AN10.7, maybe the consciousness unestablished in DN11 and MN49 maybe the same perception of nibbāna, but then, notice that in DN11 there’s cessation of consciousness afterwards, which is referring to the total cessation of parinibbāna.

The cessation of perception and feeling is also the same total cessation internally, just with externally body still alive.

There’s either experience or no experience, cessation of perception and feeling is of no experience, the perception of nibbāna is still an experience.

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Again, sanna is not perception. Sanna is the mental ability that is able to distinguish the specific characteristics of a sense object that is sensed by vinnana. Sanna does not do the sensing/perceiving/feeling. Sanna distinguishes the details/specifics of a sense-object. It can label it/name it, and later recognise it.

The example is used of different kinds of wood. A carpenter is able to see the specifics of the different kind of wood, the different structures, smells etc. Can name it…oak, maple etc. It is not that sanna does the perceiving.

For example, if one sees a woman, is it not sanna that sees that woman. But is it sanna that recognises this woman as…my mother. There can go a lot wrong with sanna, while people have no problems perceiving. People with Alzheimer or other brain disease might see people but just not recognise them anymore as ‘my son, daughter’. There are even more bizarre things going wrong with recognising.
That is about sanna.

In sannavedayitanirodha there is no sense object nor base to distinguish. I believe that this moment sanna is not supported anymore. There is nothing to distinguish, label. Most likely, i believe, the nature of mind reveals now as a non-dual awareness.

Probably that explains why there is still perception when sanna and vedana are absent. And also that non-dual awareness is not a vinnana. It is not a sensing awareness and also not with feelings.
Of this, i believe, Sariputta said: that is bliss, this pure knowing is bliss, the absence of feeling and sanna.

Why does classifical theravada turn Nibbana into something that also ceases? (make it part of sankhata)

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let’s skip translation to English then. see saññā is in AN10.6, AN10.7, but then sannavedayitanirodha is nirodha of saññā.

Different states.

Nibbāna is not a something, but the cessation of all.

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And what does that mean? Nirodha of sanna? It believe sanna very closely relates to signs. Nirodha of sanna probably refers to the signless.

I have always learned that Theravada teaches Nibbana is one of the 4 paramattha dhamma, together with rupa, citta and cetasika. All this can be known or experienced.

MN1 also teaches that Nibbana can be directly known.

“He directly knows Nibbāna as Nibbāna. Having directly known Nibbāna as Nibbāna, he should not conceive himself as Nibbāna, he should not conceive himself in Nibbāna, he should not conceive himself apart from Nibbāna, he should not conceive Nibbāna to be ‘mine,’ he should not delight in Nibbāna. Why is that? Because he must fully understand it, I say.

It is clearly not something one can only conceive or think of afterwards or something like that.

So, even if we see Nibbana as the cessation of all khandha’s, that cessation can be directly known. This is also the message of AN10.6, i feel.

“Ānanda, it’s when a mendicant perceives: ‘This is peaceful; this is sublime—that is, the stilling of all activities, the letting go of all attachments, the ending of craving, fading away, cessation, extinguishment.’

It is also the message of various buddhist meditation masters that the cessation of khandha’s does not represent an total absence, a blacking out, a mere cessation, an absence of everything.

AN10.7 seems to relate to a state in which mind still perceives but does not construct a notion of a world (no sanna), but one abides in a state with only perceptions arising and ceasing. Still a stable state.

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Yes, this state is known for the ariyas. Then the knower, the consciousness which knows, the perception etc, all ends at the end. And cessation of perception and feeling is a temporary “taste” of that end.

The signless still has 6 sense contacts functioning according to MN121

Furthermore, a mendicant—ignoring the perception of the dimension of nothingness and the perception of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception—focuses on the oneness dependent on the signless immersion of the heart.
Puna caparaṁ, ānanda, bhikkhu amanasikaritvā ākiñcaññāyatanasaññaṁ, amanasikaritvā nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññaṁ, animittaṁ cetosamādhiṁ paṭicca manasi karoti ekattaṁ.
Their mind becomes secure, confident, settled, and decided in that signless immersion of the heart.
Tassa animitte cetosamādhimhi cittaṁ pakkhandati pasīdati santiṭṭhati adhimuccati.
They understand:
So evaṁ pajānāti:
‘Even this signless immersion of the heart is produced by choices and intentions.’
‘ayampi kho animitto cetosamādhi abhisaṅkhato abhisañcetayito’.
They understand: ‘But whatever is produced by choices and intentions is impermanent and liable to cessation.’
‘Yaṁ kho pana kiñci abhisaṅkhataṁ abhisañcetayitaṁ tadaniccaṁ nirodhadhamman’ti pajānāti.
Knowing and seeing like this, their mind is freed from the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, and ignorance.
Tassa evaṁ jānato evaṁ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati, bhavāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati, avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati.
When they’re freed, they know they’re freed.
Vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṁ hoti.

They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’
‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ, nāparaṁ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti.

They understand:
So evaṁ pajānāti:
‘Here there is no stress due to the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, or ignorance.
‘ye assu darathā kāmāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, ye assu darathā bhavāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, ye assu darathā avijjāsavaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, atthi cevāyaṁ darathamattā yadidaṁ—
There is only this modicum of stress, namely that related to the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
imameva kāyaṁ paṭicca saḷāyatanikaṁ jīvitapaccayā’ti.
They understand: ‘This field of perception is empty of the perception of the defilements of sensuality, desire to be reborn, and ignorance.
So ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ kāmāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ bhavāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ avijjāsavenā’ti pajānāti, ‘atthi cevidaṁ asuññataṁ yadidaṁ—
There is only this that is not emptiness, namely that related to the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
imameva kāyaṁ paṭicca saḷāyatanikaṁ jīvitapaccayā’ti.
And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present.
Iti yañhi kho tattha na hoti tena taṁ suññaṁ samanupassati, yaṁ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṁ hoti taṁ ‘santamidaṁ atthī’ti pajānāti.
That’s how emptiness manifests in them—genuine, undistorted, pure, and supreme.

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Maybe again my pretention, but sometimes we must follow our own judgements, right? I do not believe there is really something like a supramundane citta. Such is mere an invention that functions in a theory. But in reality, i believe, citta is citta.

Generally speaking citta is blinded for citta as long as rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara, vinnana obsesses it. When this obsession weakens citta becomes more aware of her own dispassionate, empty, signless, undirected stable nature. Until it breaks with the obsession with what has the nature of coming and going and change, it only thinks in terms of instability, coming and going, impermanence. It is only aware of sankhata.

I feel this has become an obsession in buddhism. Everywhere i see, i only see buddhist who are obsessed with formations and temporary states and totally deny, ignore, reject, the stable element in their lives.

I believe the composers of the sutta’s were not in agreement on the nature of Nibbana and parinibbana. Probably there were the same disagreements we see now among buddhist.
If buddhist must now create a Canon…what would happen? Probably some choices would be made that do justice to all these different views. Probably such has happened? I think it is not likely that composers were all in agreement.

My personal choice is that Nibbana is not really of two natures, one with suffering and one without.

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Venerable, :pray:

It is not the “classical/traditional Theravada” position.

This excellent reply was posted to you yourself 4 months ago:

So the view of the ajahns on this forum, Na Uyana and SBS is not really classical/traditional Theravada at all, but the view of the Sautrāntika.

  • A view that no other school shared with the Sautrāntika.
  • Of course, how else could Nibbāna be described as atakkāvacaraṁ, beyond the scope of logic?

The escape from that is peaceful,

Tassa nissaraṇaṁ santaṁ,

beyond the scope of logic, everlasting,

atakkāvacaraṁ dhuvaṁ.

  • Speaking of contradictions, where would you place the immersion mentioned in AN 10.6?

Kama Loka?

Rupa Loka?

Arupa Loka?

Where is this actually taking place?
(Whatever plane of existence you answer with, is a contradiction)
:pray:

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It isn’t the case that nibbāna is nothing.

It isn’t the case that nibbāna is something.

Such deliberations are fabrications of mind.

We should stop thinking and talking now, but that is the nature of mind, to speculate and explore. Realising there’s things beyond its scope and grasp, is the way to nibbāna.

All khandas, all six-sense base, all deliberations, every instance of verbs we can conjure up, disappear. We could call the result peace, but saying that disturbs its peace.

But it’s not something. Nor is it nothing. It is what it is.

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Everything is nothing. :black_heart:

Remember?

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Nothing/Something are both based on feelings and preferences while in Samsara.

These feelings/preferences are rooted in craving, since ‘Feeling is a condition for craving’.

‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’”- MN 136

It is thanks to this attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all, that one can finally uproot craving for good:

“Craving is given up by a mendicant, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future.”

While the Sautrāntika claim nothing, all other schools like traditional Theravada do not claim something, only that Nibbāna involves light since this is found in various suttas.

Hence Ven. Dhammapāla saying the light is the sabhāva of nibbāna, meaning it is real and not metaphorical. (DN 11, MN 49, Ud 1.10 etc.)

This is of course not proliferating the unproliferated, if so then both Sāriputta & The Buddha himself are also guilty of doing just that. :wink:

And any sane buddhist would refrain from claiming such things about The Buddha.

So even if all the schools, except the Sautrāntika, agree that Nibbāna involves light, this attainment is still 100% atakkāvacaraṁ.

Impossible to even imagine such an attainment that involves no feelings, perfect stillness and luminosity.

So I totally agree, no way of talking or thinking about it. :+1: