You are certainly right that it means this, but I would say it is also a universal statement that all form is “not-self.” In practice you begin with yourself. As calm and insight deepens, you directly experience how certain aspects of your five khandhas disappear, and you consequently see them as non-self. Over time you broaden this to include all five khandhas. Eventually this results in stream-entry. You start with the personal and move to the universal.
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Factors of stream entry:
- association with spiritual friends
- absorbing the true dhamma
- yonisomanasikara (‘contemplation + discussion?’)
- practice that culminates into seeing five aggregates - Samatha and Vipassana (…and the Path is born…)
With metta
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Thanks Bhante for replying. Yes, that is how I see the distinction. It does not seem possible that in the latter’s formulation of “saṅkhārā anattā”, the word anattā is functioning as an adjective. For an adjective, won’t we need “saṅkhārā anattāno”? Unless Bhante is toying with the reading that the anattā predication of the Five Aggregates is a mixture of the attan and atta stems?
Intuitively, I am most tempted to draw the equivalence. But, since I’ve not set myself to the task yet of writing out a formal proof for such equivalence, I satisfy myself with stating that -
“form is not-Self” is logically inferrable from “form is without Self”.
As for Harvey, I find his stand difficult to understand. He is clearly familiar with the Buddha’s declaration that there is no Self (MN 22, discussed at p.28), but yet he assumes that there is a conventional self that survives post-mortem (p.38). He premises this on the understanding that the Annihilationists reject the idea of rebirth, and thus denied self in that sense. Perhaps that is the weakness in his argument, in not taking into account the variety of Annihilationism in SN 12.17 where the Self of one life is destroyed, to be succeeded by a new Self in the next life.
The difference between annihilation view (there is no self) and anatta doctrine is mentioned in SA 105:
Seniya, you should know that there are three kinds of teacher. What are the three?
“There is a teacher who has the view that [only] in the present world there truly is a self, and he speaks according to his understanding, yet he is not able to know matters of the afterlife. This is called the first [kind of] teacher that appears in the world.
“Again, Seniya, there is a teacher who has the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and he also has the view that in the afterlife there [truly] is a self, and he speaks according to his understanding.
“Again, Seniya, there is a teacher who does not have the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and he also does not have the view that in the afterlife there truly is a self.
“Seniya, the first teacher who has the view that in the present world there truly is a self and who speaks according to his understanding, he is reckoned as having the view of annihilation.
“The second teacher who has the view that in the present world and in the future world there truly is a self, and who speaks according to his understanding, he has the view of eternalism.
“The third teacher who does not have the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and who also does not have the view that in the afterlife there [truly] is a self ― this is the Tathāgata, the arahant, the fully awakened one, who in the present has abandoned craving, become separated from desire, has made them cease, and has attained Nirvāṇa.”
Interestingly, there is no parallel of this sutta in Sutta Pitaka of Pali canon, but this sutta is quote in Kathavatthu of Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka (Kv 1.1):
“There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, but not a self in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a self either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world.”.
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[quote=“Sylvester, post:22, topic:4902”]
It does not say 一切法非我 (all dharmas are not-self), which is untraceable on SC’s database.
[/quote]If I am not mistaken, “not self” and “no self” are two valid readings of 無我, are they not? They are listed as such in my handy dandy dictionaries I am beholden to, in the extries for 無.
非 has an added layer of meaning, “contrary to/opposite”, but 無 can also mean “no” or “non” or “not” as much as it can mean what it seems to usually mean: “without”, “lacking”?
Indeed they are. For example, in SA 58 the question 若色無我 corresponds to the Pali proposition “iti kira rūpaṃ anattā”, where it is clear this means not-Self.
While a comparison to the Indic text may resolve the nature of the “無我” or “非我” in a particular Chinese text, occassionally, the Chinese text itself resolves the issue when it contains both “無我” and “非我”. In this situation, it is quite likely that each phrase denotes different concepts, namely without-Self and not-Self respectively. Eg MA 62, where 無我, 無我所 (anattā anattaniya) lies adjacent to 空我, 空我所 (suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena) thereby suggestive of waxing syllables synonyms at work, whereas 非我 pops up in the context of the Aggregates. It seems reasonable to surmise that 無我, 無我所 should be read in a privative sense, since (i) 非我 is used to indicate the more common sense of not-Self, and (ii) the proposition fits neatly into the waxing syllables framework with the privative “empty”.
We’re not so lucky with this trope 一切法無我, in that I have not found a Chinese text that uses both propositions in the same sutra. That leaves the Indic testament, for which I gave a Sanskrit citation. If the Skt says sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ (“all things are without-Self”, rather than “all things are not-Self”), is there any reason to read its Chinese translation to mean anything other than “all things are without-Self”?
[quote=“Sylvester, post:34, topic:4902”]
whereas 非我 pops up in the context of the Aggregates
[/quote]I’ve never actually encountered 非我 in the collections hosted at SuttaCentral, I’ll have to take a look for the term, very interesting though, that this distinction exists even in Chinese translation. [quote=“Sylvester, post:34, topic:4902”]
We’re not so lucky with this trope 一切法無我, in that I have not found a Chinese text that uses both propositions in the same sutra. That leaves the Indic testament, for which I gave a Sanskrit citation. If the Skt says sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ (“all things are without-Self”, rather than “all things are not-Self”), is there any reason to read its Chinese translation to mean anything other than “all things are without-Self”?
[/quote]“Lack/lacking” and “without” are the two most common readings of 無 in Buddhist Chinese, I think, but I am hardly an expert.
Compare here from SA 176:[quote]何等法無常？
Which ranks [of] dharmāḥ [are] lack[ing/without] constancy?[/quote]無常, “lack constancy”, “without constancy”, is definitely expressing anicca here, IMO, and “lacking/without,” as a reading, differentiates 無 from 不 on terms of what sorts of words they can negate, perhaps, in that 無(我/常) has the potentiality of meaning “without X” whereas other forms of negation (非 & 不, for example) cannot fill this function.
To think of 無 as having multiple readings is a bit of an Englishism, or perhaps an Academicism if such a thing were to exist, 無 still persists as a feature of modern Chinese in a way very similar to older historical usages, it has multiple “readings” but it also, in a sense, means all of these things at once without some other kind of qualifier (空?). Other forms of negation lack the ability to mean “without/lacking” (不 must negate negate verbs and adjectives, i.e. it means “not” often, and 非 most often means “contrary to/opposite”, which is a bit tricky because it sort-of implies that there is a self that one can be “contrary to”). All in all 無 is the best usage in Chinese, and matches what is being said about the Indic texts.
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Could you explain this, please?
Is Nibbana means moving from personal to universal?
When you contemplate the five khandhas as void of self, you start with your personal experience. This is what is meant in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta when it says that you contemplate ajjhattaṃ, “with reference to yourself.” As this contemplation deepens, in conjunction with a deepening of samādhi, you also contemplate the khandhas of other people. This is the bahiddhā aspect of satipaṭṭhāna. Eventually you have the insight that all khandhas, whether your own or those of others, are void of self. This is when the insight becomes universal, and it is at this point you become a stream-enterer. This universalisation is what is meant by ajjhattabahiddhā in satipaṭṭhāna, as I see it.
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I agreed to that point. As far as I know this the equivalent of equanimity in fourth Jhana. Seen the not-self nature of this mental state is the Sotapanna.
What a wonderful explanation, Bhante! Viewed this way, it now becomes clear how the 4 Sublime Abidings become integrated with the bojjhangas.
Bhante, I have a niggling uncertainty. Will Ariyas develop satipatthana differently from non-Ariyas? The former have Right View personally, while the latter do not.
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I would say yes. Once you know the Dhamma personally it becomes relatively simple to abandon the hindrances. One of the explanations of how to develop the bojjhaṅgas starts off with the recollection of the Dhamma (SN 46.3), being the satisambojjhaṅga, the awakening factor of mindfulness. If you have seen the Dhamma for yourself, as the noble ones have, it is easy to see how this will lead to joy and then samādhi. For most people the recollection of the Dhamma is not so straightforward, because they only have an approximate idea of what it refers to, at best. So the ariyas can often just skip satipaṭṭhāna and go straight to the joy connected with the Dhamma. Everyone else, however, needs to be more systematic in their treatment of the hindrances, and this is where satipaṭṭhāna comes in.
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Thank you very much, Bhante!
Hi Bhante,
Can you explain how this relates to stream-entry in the texts? And also what ajjhattabahiddhā in satipaṭṭhāna is? Thanks.
Well, stream-entry is seeing sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, “all conditioned phenomena are impermanent,” sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, “all conditioned phenomena are suffering,” and sabbe dhammā anattā, “all things are void of self.” What you are seeing is a universal condition, not just what relates to you personally. To gain such universal insight you start with yourself, then contemplate others, and finally make the inferential breakthrough that this refers to everyone. Ajjhattabahiddhā, “internal and external,” seems to imply such a universalisation.
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Thanks. Can you point to where the early texts define stream entry like that?
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I suspect Bhante has had to adjourn to lunch, so let me take a stab.
I think the 3 realizations above form part of the First Noble Truth. Stream Entry gives the first personal vision into the 4 Noble Truths - SN 55.5. I can’t recall a sutta which defines Stream Entry in terms of the 3 realizations but one can infer as such from perhaps SN 25.1 - 10 wrt impermanence.
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@Sylvester has made the important point that the stream-enterer has direct knowledge of the four noble truths, which includes seeing the the five khandhas as suffering. Seeing them as suffering implies seeing them as impermanent and void of self.
Here is another useful quote from the suttas:
AN 1.268:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is such a possibility.
AN 1.269:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is such a possibility.
AN 1.270:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider anything as a self; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider something as a self; there is such a possibility.
A person accomplished in view is any noble person, including the stream-enterer.
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AN1.270 translation:
270. Bhikkhus, it is impossible that a person come to right view should think that any thoughts are his possession. It is possible that an ordinary person should think that thoughts are his possession.
Why Anatta translated as possessions?
It’s just a bad translation. It’s a confusion between not-self and not belonging to a self.
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