Hi Bhante,
Can you explain how this relates to stream-entry in the texts? And also what ajjhattabahiddhā in satipaṭṭhāna is? Thanks.
Well, stream-entry is seeing sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, “all conditioned phenomena are impermanent,” sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, “all conditioned phenomena are suffering,” and sabbe dhammā anattā, “all things are void of self.” What you are seeing is a universal condition, not just what relates to you personally. To gain such universal insight you start with yourself, then contemplate others, and finally make the inferential breakthrough that this refers to everyone. Ajjhattabahiddhā, “internal and external,” seems to imply such a universalisation.
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Thanks. Can you point to where the early texts define stream entry like that?
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I suspect Bhante has had to adjourn to lunch, so let me take a stab.
I think the 3 realizations above form part of the First Noble Truth. Stream Entry gives the first personal vision into the 4 Noble Truths - SN 55.5. I can’t recall a sutta which defines Stream Entry in terms of the 3 realizations but one can infer as such from perhaps SN 25.1 - 10 wrt impermanence.
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@Sylvester has made the important point that the stream-enterer has direct knowledge of the four noble truths, which includes seeing the the five khandhas as suffering. Seeing them as suffering implies seeing them as impermanent and void of self.
Here is another useful quote from the suttas:
AN 1.268:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is such a possibility.
AN 1.269:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is such a possibility.
AN 1.270:
It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider anything as a self; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider something as a self; there is such a possibility.
A person accomplished in view is any noble person, including the stream-enterer.
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AN1.270 translation:
270. Bhikkhus, it is impossible that a person come to right view should think that any thoughts are his possession. It is possible that an ordinary person should think that thoughts are his possession.
Why Anatta translated as possessions?
It’s just a bad translation. It’s a confusion between not-self and not belonging to a self.
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To add to what Bhanthe and Sylvester has said these suttas (Okkanta samyutta e.g. SN 25.1) show how this insight develops from just knowing to knowing and seeing (reasoned acceptance to actually seeing the arising and passing away of the aggregates).
With metta
Ven. B > “it is not the case that you have a self until you attain final extinguishment, but rather the view that there is a self. This is a crucial distinction”
Shaun > Ven. B, am I correct in understanding that what you mean is; realising there is already no self and you can attain the final extinguishment as opposed to; having a self up until you attain the final extinguishment by which there is finally no self?
Ven B > “void of self” (in a previous paragraph)
Shaun > I also wanted to point out that your description of no self to mean ‘void of self’ is very profound in that it gives one an ability to grasp the more inner meaning of this idea of no self in three simple words.
Yes, that’s it. Nothing ends except suffering. Buddhism really is the best possible deal!
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Reading these selfhood conversations here that popped up recently reminds me of an apocryphal urban legend of sorts about a monk instructing a novice on the subject of anattā, tellers of the story usually place it in a Zen context.
The novice monks says to the master something along the lines of “There is no self.”
-and the master slaps him in the face!
“Who hurts?”
Another version I heard someone tell had the master and the novice then sit in an uncomfortable silence. After a while, the novice tentatively asked the master why he was slapped. The responce being:
“I didn’t slap anybody.”
It went something like that at least. Its funnier when better storytellers tell it, but it also highlights the interesting disparity between being able to intellectually ascent to the notion (theory) that there is no self in any thing, but quite something else to actually know (experience), hence I suppose, why the 4 Noble Truths are noble truths, not the four noble notions, because until they are really known they are really only the 4 noble notions, only through knowing do they become truths.
The novice monk in the selfhood-parable, who proclaims a pristine doctrine of selflessness (in theory) and is then betrayed by his pain (experience) is a bit of a Buddhist everyman, if my reading of the story has any merit.
I had a point when I began, my apologies.
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Thanks Ven. !!!
This kind of thing has a long history, at least since the Vimalakirti Sutra, which has what should probably be considered the first ever “knock knock” joke. Sariputra arrives at Vimalakirti’s house and knocks. Vimalakirti says, “No-one’s home!” Hilarity ensues.
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Hi @Sylvester,
Can you explain how do you understand annihilationist model from DN1? I’m actually perplexed by how it’s presented and rather hesitant to decide on what those views actually mean… The first annihilationist view is rather obvious, but it seems that 2nd-7th views postulate multiple selves. Would those count as “the other” from SN 12.17?
On the side note I’m also inclined to think that “The self does not exist” statement from SN44.10 might be a cryptic reference to the annihilationist phrase from DN1 which says that “[the self] is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death”.
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Hi @Piotr
Like you, I find the DN 1 presentation quite challenging, but I am currently of the view that viewpoints #2 to #7 may coincide with the SN 12.17 model of annihilationism.
Let’s dig a little into model #2 -
Tamañño evamāha: ‘atthi kho, bho, eso attā, yaṃ tvaṃ vadesi, neso natthīti vadāmi; no ca kho, bho, ayaṃ attā ettāvatā sammā samucchinno hoti. Atthi kho, bho, añño attā dibbo rūpī kāmāvacaro kabaḷīkārāhārabhakkho. Taṃ tvaṃ na jānāsi na passasi. Tamahaṃ jānāmi passāmi. So kho, bho, attā yato kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṃ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṃ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti. Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññapenti.
To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self—divine, having material form, pertaining to the sense sphere, feeding on edible nutriment. That you neither know nor see, but I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way others proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.
You’ll doubtless have noticed that very specific pronouns are used for the attans, ie eso (that), ayaṃ (this) and so (that). I didn’t really give this much thought, but now that I’ve noticed it, I wonder if the scheme in #2 to #7 might not actually be capable of accomodating the SN 12.17 variety of annihilationism? So, yes, I would share your suspicion that DN’s listing of annihilationist views do actually include the “other” self from SN 12.17.
In fact, if you look at the Pali, for the part which I bolded above, the text actually uses that specific pronoun so. Here, I would propose that so/“that” is functioning anaphorically, which explains why BB translates it as “this” to point back to the previous mention of that Self.
All along, I had always thought that the annihilationists were talking about the destruction of the Self in the abstract, but with this closer examination of DN 1 and SN 12.17, it appears that the annihilationists may not have such a model and that they were speaking of the specific destruction of each Self within a series of Selves. While it does not come through clearly in BB’s translation, what he rendered as -
at this point the self is completely annihilated
is actually -
ettāvatā … ayaṃ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti
Notice the specific pronoun ayaṃ? If the Pali had intended a general proposition, why use such a specific pronoun?
Of course, if we take a specific example of an annihilationist, ie Ajita Kesakambala in DN 2, it does strike me that his model does not entertain the re-arising of a new Self.
Back to the drawing board!
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