Not-self and no-self and possibly non-self. Totally different

Hi Bhante @Brahmali and Bhante @sujato

I agree with Bhante Brahmali. The privative sense comes through in some doctrinal statements. Taking eg “sabbe dhammā anattā”, I gave this analysis over at DW (with edits) -

This post will explore the meaning of sabbe dhammā anattā, particularly the issue of whether its anattā is the same in meaning as the anattā found in eg -

Rūpaṃ anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā, saṅkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṃ anattā
Form is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself : eg SN 22.14

First order of business, the atta in the latter anattā is from the stem attan (self, the Self). Here are its declensions –

Singular Plural
Nominative attā attāno
Vocative attā attāno
Accusative attānaṃ attāno
Instrumental attanā attehi
Dative attano attānaṃ
Ablative attanā attehi
Genitive attano attānaṃ
Locative attani attanesu (hypothetical form)

Warder, p.184

Quite clearly, the anattā in rūpaṃ anattā is a nominative singular, and the phrase rūpaṃ anattā would therefore be a predicative proposition meaning “form is not the Self”. It would not be a nexus between a substantive and an adjective, given that there is no numerical agreement between the substantive formations and adjective in “saṅkhārā anattā”.

What about sabbe dhammā anattā?

It should be noted that this phrase is part of the tag-team –

Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā; sabbe dhammā anattā
All formations are impermanent; all phenomena are nonself
(per BB SN 22.90)

Both clauses are to be read as ending with adjectives predicating their respective substantive nouns, which probably explains why BB has rendered it as such. Other translators render it as -

all phenomena are not-self (Ven T)
all things are not-self (Mrs Rhys Davids & Woodward; Buddharakkhita)

It is this use of “not-self” for this phrase which creates the confusion in English, suggesting that the anattā in sabbe dhammā anattā and saṅkhārā anattā are exactly the same in meaning.

Taking my earlier point about “sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā; sabbe dhammā anattā”, the anattā here must be an adjective. But, adjectives must agree in case and number with their substantive noun.

And here, we see the point overlooked – since dhammā is the nominative plural of dhamma, its adjective anattā also needs to be in the nominative plural. But yet, as the declension table above shows, the adjective would need to be anattāno, instead of anattā.

What has happened? A sneaky little linguistic phenomenon has taken place, as described in Geiger’s “A Pali Grammar”, §92 –

Transfer to the a-declension often takes place as a consequence of the dropping of the final nasal.

In other words, an alternative form of attan would be atta, and this is inflected in the standard way for other –a ending nouns. For a-stems, the ā ending shows up only as the ablative singular, or the nominative plural. This clearly shows that anattā in sabbe dhammā anattā is a nominative plural. As an adjective in nominative plural, it is not another substantive noun standing in apposition to dhammā. It actually means “without Self”, instead of “not-Self”.

Where else can we find evidence that anattā in sabbe dhammā anattā means “without Self”? Take Dhp 279 -
Sabbe dhammā anattā”ti,
yadā paññāya passati;
Atha nibbindati dukkhe
esa maggo visuddhiyā.

Compare this to its Sanskrit parallel -

sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ (= nominative plural)
prajñayā paśyate yadā
atha nirvidyate duḥkhād
eṣa mārgo viśuddhaye

https://suttacentral.net/skt/uv12

The Sanskrit does not have the nominative singular to read “not-Self”.

This also appears to be how the Chinese translated sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ. We see this in the parallel to SN 22.90 –

一切法無我
All dharmas are without self

SuttaCentral

It does not say 一切法非我 (all dharmas are not-self), which is untraceable on SC’s database.

It appears that depending on context, anattā needs to be translated either as “not-Self” (most of the time) and occassionally as “without Self”.

I think Harvey may have suggested that the 1st option read as “not the Self”. Might Bhantes discern any distinction between “not-Self” versus “not the Self”?

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Hi Piotr

Besides the forms of Annihilationism listed in DN 1, there is another model to complicate the picture. That’s to be found in SN 12.17 -

Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences the result,’ then one asserts with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism. But, Kassapa, if one thinks, ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences the result is another,’ then one asserts with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism.

I’m not sure if this particular model fits in with the DN 1 model. The latter supposes that the Self is (as you put it) perishable, while the SN 12.17 allows for a new Self to arise after the destruction of the former Self.

It’s hard to tell if Kassapa and Vacchagotta shared anything in common, other than both being wanderers. But, I can’t help but wonder if their understanding of Annihilationism are similar enough that the Buddha was thinking of this particular model of Annihilationism, when He spoke with both. Namely, in this form of Annihilationism (paraṅkataṃ dukkhaṃ), there is no kammic continuity, even if there is one perishable Self on each side of life.

This might explain the idea of Annihilationism in SN 44.10, ie not that there is no Self per se, but no kammic continuity.

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Thanks Sylvester. So your argument is that the noun anattā should be translated as “not-self,” whereas the adjective anattā should be “without self.” And based on grammatical analysis you conclude anattā is an adjective in sabbe dhammā anattā, while you seem to imply - if I understand you correctly - that it is a noun in rūpaṃ anattā, etc.

I wonder if it really is necessary to distinguish in translation between the adjective and the noun. It seems to me that there is no real difference in meaning between “form is not-self” or “form is devoid of self.” And if there is no distinction in meaning, then surely we can use the same rendering for both. For this reason I would be quite happy to use “form is devoid of self” throughout. Or have I missed something?

As for Harvey’s suggestion, “not the Self,” this seems to imply that there is a self somewhere. If this is not the self, then one should presumably look for it somewhere else. This may all tie in with Harvey’s eternalist tendencies. It is clear from his writings that he posits a self, and this may have influenced his translation.

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Firstly, I’d like to say I’m delighted that my question has generated so much dhamma discussion. Secondly, I’d like to just mention that I listen to you give talks on you tube and I am always moved by them. No joke. You have helped me through some tough times.

I see a difference. The latter could mean that form has no essential identity. Whilst the former could mean ‘I cannot be identified with form’ . So it is ‘I am not form’ vs ‘form has no essence, no essential identity’. It is a very subtle but very significant difference. No doubt many confused arguments begin by not seeing that difference.

Exactly! A point well made. My problem is that every translation seems to leave open that possibility. The 5 aggregates are not-self, so the self could be something else. Don’t misunderstand me, I am not arguing that there is a self. I’m agreeing with your qoute above and then adding that every translation is like that. Perhaps the original Pali is also like that? It is as if the Buddha is saying the self cannot be found in all known and experienced phenomena, but stops short of actually flat out denying the existence of the self.
With respect and much metta. :anjal: :sweat:

Goos point Bhante. I was about to post something along this line.
The problem is if you use the word self, it implies there is a self somewhere.
It does not matter it is “not-self, no-self, or without self”

I just wanted to add to the discussion: it sounds impossible to get away from a translation of there being a Self somewhere else, whichever term we use, and there is something that a Self should have certain qualities like sukha, permanence and control. I guess that’s where kalyanamittas come in. Discussing is indispensable.

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Just a side note.
There is a common word used in Sinhalese language called “Anatha” .
Street kids without (neglected) by parents called “Anatha child”

You are certainly right that it means this, but I would say it is also a universal statement that all form is “not-self.” In practice you begin with yourself. As calm and insight deepens, you directly experience how certain aspects of your five khandhas disappear, and you consequently see them as non-self. Over time you broaden this to include all five khandhas. Eventually this results in stream-entry. You start with the personal and move to the universal.

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Factors of stream entry:

  1. association with spiritual friends
  2. absorbing the true dhamma
  3. yonisomanasikara (‘contemplation + discussion?’)
  1. practice that culminates into seeing five aggregates - Samatha and Vipassana (…and the Path is born…)

With metta

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Thanks Bhante for replying. Yes, that is how I see the distinction. It does not seem possible that in the latter’s formulation of “saṅkhārā anattā”, the word anattā is functioning as an adjective. For an adjective, won’t we need “saṅkhārā anattāno”? Unless Bhante is toying with the reading that the anattā predication of the Five Aggregates is a mixture of the attan and atta stems?

Intuitively, I am most tempted to draw the equivalence. But, since I’ve not set myself to the task yet of writing out a formal proof for such equivalence, I satisfy myself with stating that -

“form is not-Self” is logically inferrable from “form is without Self”.

As for Harvey, I find his stand difficult to understand. He is clearly familiar with the Buddha’s declaration that there is no Self (MN 22, discussed at p.28), but yet he assumes that there is a conventional self that survives post-mortem (p.38). He premises this on the understanding that the Annihilationists reject the idea of rebirth, and thus denied self in that sense. Perhaps that is the weakness in his argument, in not taking into account the variety of Annihilationism in SN 12.17 where the Self of one life is destroyed, to be succeeded by a new Self in the next life.

The difference between annihilation view (there is no self) and anatta doctrine is mentioned in SA 105:

Seniya, you should know that there are three kinds of teacher. What are the three?

“There is a teacher who has the view that [only] in the present world there truly is a self, and he speaks according to his understanding, yet he is not able to know matters of the afterlife. This is called the first [kind of] teacher that appears in the world.

“Again, Seniya, there is a teacher who has the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and he also has the view that in the afterlife there [truly] is a self, and he speaks according to his understanding.

“Again, Seniya, there is a teacher who does not have the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and he also does not have the view that in the afterlife there truly is a self.

“Seniya, the first teacher who has the view that in the present world there truly is a self and who speaks according to his understanding, he is reckoned as having the view of annihilation.

“The second teacher who has the view that in the present world and in the future world there truly is a self, and who speaks according to his understanding, he has the view of eternalism.

“The third teacher who does not have the view that in the present world there truly is a self, and who also does not have the view that in the afterlife there [truly] is a self ― this is the Tathāgata, the arahant, the fully awakened one, who in the present has abandoned craving, become separated from desire, has made them cease, and has attained Nirvāṇa.”

Interestingly, there is no parallel of this sutta in Sutta Pitaka of Pali canon, but this sutta is quote in Kathavatthu of Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka (Kv 1.1):

“There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, but not a self in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a self either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world.”.

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[quote=“Sylvester, post:22, topic:4902”]
It does not say 一切法非我 (all dharmas are not-self), which is untraceable on SC’s database.
[/quote]If I am not mistaken, “not self” and “no self” are two valid readings of 無我, are they not? They are listed as such in my handy dandy dictionaries I am beholden to, in the extries for 無.

非 has an added layer of meaning, “contrary to/opposite”, but 無 can also mean “no” or “non” or “not” as much as it can mean what it seems to usually mean: “without”, “lacking”?

Indeed they are. For example, in SA 58 the question 若色無我 corresponds to the Pali proposition “iti kira rūpaṃ anattā”, where it is clear this means not-Self.

While a comparison to the Indic text may resolve the nature of the “無我” or “非我” in a particular Chinese text, occassionally, the Chinese text itself resolves the issue when it contains both “無我” and “非我”. In this situation, it is quite likely that each phrase denotes different concepts, namely without-Self and not-Self respectively. Eg MA 62, where 無我, 無我所 (anattā anattaniya) lies adjacent to 空我, 空我所 (suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena) thereby suggestive of waxing syllables synonyms at work, whereas 非我 pops up in the context of the Aggregates. It seems reasonable to surmise that 無我, 無我所 should be read in a privative sense, since (i) 非我 is used to indicate the more common sense of not-Self, and (ii) the proposition fits neatly into the waxing syllables framework with the privative “empty”.

We’re not so lucky with this trope 一切法無我, in that I have not found a Chinese text that uses both propositions in the same sutra. That leaves the Indic testament, for which I gave a Sanskrit citation. If the Skt says sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ (“all things are without-Self”, rather than “all things are not-Self”), is there any reason to read its Chinese translation to mean anything other than “all things are without-Self”?

[quote=“Sylvester, post:34, topic:4902”]
whereas 非我 pops up in the context of the Aggregates
[/quote]I’ve never actually encountered 非我 in the collections hosted at SuttaCentral, I’ll have to take a look for the term, very interesting though, that this distinction exists even in Chinese translation. [quote=“Sylvester, post:34, topic:4902”]
We’re not so lucky with this trope 一切法無我, in that I have not found a Chinese text that uses both propositions in the same sutra. That leaves the Indic testament, for which I gave a Sanskrit citation. If the Skt says sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ (“all things are without-Self”, rather than “all things are not-Self”), is there any reason to read its Chinese translation to mean anything other than “all things are without-Self”?
[/quote]“Lack/lacking” and “without” are the two most common readings of 無 in Buddhist Chinese, I think, but I am hardly an expert.

Compare here from SA 176:[quote]何等法無常?
Which ranks [of] dharmāḥ [are] lack[ing/without] constancy?[/quote]無常, “lack constancy”, “without constancy”, is definitely expressing anicca here, IMO, and “lacking/without,” as a reading, differentiates 無 from 不 on terms of what sorts of words they can negate, perhaps, in that 無(我/常) has the potentiality of meaning “without X” whereas other forms of negation (非 & 不, for example) cannot fill this function.

To think of 無 as having multiple readings is a bit of an Englishism, or perhaps an Academicism if such a thing were to exist, 無 still persists as a feature of modern Chinese in a way very similar to older historical usages, it has multiple “readings” but it also, in a sense, means all of these things at once without some other kind of qualifier (空?). Other forms of negation lack the ability to mean “without/lacking” (不 must negate negate verbs and adjectives, i.e. it means “not” often, and 非 most often means “contrary to/opposite”, which is a bit tricky because it sort-of implies that there is a self that one can be “contrary to”). All in all 無 is the best usage in Chinese, and matches what is being said about the Indic texts.

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Could you explain this, please?
Is Nibbana means moving from personal to universal?

When you contemplate the five khandhas as void of self, you start with your personal experience. This is what is meant in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta when it says that you contemplate ajjhattaṃ, “with reference to yourself.” As this contemplation deepens, in conjunction with a deepening of samādhi, you also contemplate the khandhas of other people. This is the bahiddhā aspect of satipaṭṭhāna. Eventually you have the insight that all khandhas, whether your own or those of others, are void of self. This is when the insight becomes universal, and it is at this point you become a stream-enterer. This universalisation is what is meant by ajjhat­ta­bahid­dhā in satipaṭṭhāna, as I see it.

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I agreed to that point. As far as I know this the equivalent of equanimity in fourth Jhana. Seen the not-self nature of this mental state is the Sotapanna.

What a wonderful explanation, Bhante! Viewed this way, it now becomes clear how the 4 Sublime Abidings become integrated with the bojjhangas.

Bhante, I have a niggling uncertainty. Will Ariyas develop satipatthana differently from non-Ariyas? The former have Right View personally, while the latter do not.

:anjal:

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I would say yes. Once you know the Dhamma personally it becomes relatively simple to abandon the hindrances. One of the explanations of how to develop the bojjhaṅgas starts off with the recollection of the Dhamma (SN 46.3), being the satisambojjhaṅga, the awakening factor of mindfulness. If you have seen the Dhamma for yourself, as the noble ones have, it is easy to see how this will lead to joy and then samādhi. For most people the recollection of the Dhamma is not so straightforward, because they only have an approximate idea of what it refers to, at best. So the ariyas can often just skip satipaṭṭhāna and go straight to the joy connected with the Dhamma. Everyone else, however, needs to be more systematic in their treatment of the hindrances, and this is where satipaṭṭhāna comes in.

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Thank you very much, Bhante!