I feel it is not a good choice to translate Nibbana in its etymological meaning. I believe it is better to translated it for what it really means in the discipline of the Buddha, so in its experiential meaning or leave it untranslated.
I can see Thanissaro tries to connect with this experiential meaning of Nibbana in translating that word as Unbinding and that is, i feel, better. The same with sakkaya ditthi and others concepts. One must see where it really refers to in an experiential way, and how it as mental tendency is actually present and functions in our own lifes. That way we get a real understanding of it and also understand why the Buddha calls it a kind of fettering and cause of suffering.
The Buddha uses concepts/words to describe things that are part of our direct experience, and does not use them as philosophical concepts or in a philosophical way. Nibbana is also no philosophical concept and sakkaya ditthi is also not a philosophical view on reality. Translating these concepts that way turns Dhamma into a kind of philosophy in stead of an experiential Path and discipline.
The EBT clearly teach that there is what is not seen arising, ceasing and changing in the meantime. This element or aspect is present in our lifes and must be known too. You know all this.
But you seem to denie/neglect this and teach that there is only arising, ceasing and change. And because you think that Buddha teaches that there are only formations or temporary states build upon them, you also believe parinibbana must be a mere cessation. This is how you think, right?
But i do not see that the EBT teach that there are only formations or only condioned existence.
The unconditioned, unborn, unmade, unestablised reality, not supported by conditions is mentioned in the EBT. Texts even talk about an eternal state in Snp. Textst are clear. But while you read this, you and others start to apply all intellectual power to turn also this into something conditioned, temporary, subject to arising and ceasing. Why? (see further)
This is, i believe, you and others do not see an alternative. You and others believe that something is ORâŠsubject to arising and ceasing, OR⊠it must be something eternal, and Buddha rejected eternalism. So you do not see a way out of this.
I believe, this shows an involvement in reification. What is not seen arising and ceasing is regarded as an existent thing, but it is not like that. Conceiving the unconditioned means the reification of it, and that is like entering a wrong Path. It cannot be grasped by reasoning and conceiving.
It cannot be understood that way. You cannot even conceive it as something eternal. So it does not refer to a kind of eternalistic view or doctrine of atta.
so here we have two terms, arising and ceasing, they both occur in all the debt and all the later material, there seems to be more talk of ceasing than of arising.
Pretty straightforward and nothing controversial here. we will conclude assuming that these terms are uncontroversial.
lets try some more, and see if we can see anything more interesting:
keep in mind we are searching for the string, so ALL words with the string in it, meaning all compounds not including other spellings or synonyms terms.
kamma: keep in mind we are taking about hundreds of different words here)
V 1110
D 195
M 365
S 185 less than D! less than any other collection bar none.
A 555
K 1386
B 1586
so karma words are strikingly less frequent in SN than in any other book including the much later KN (K) and Abhidhamma (B).
Note that this pattern is definitely a different pattern to the samudayanirodha pattern.
Lets try another one:
dukkha:
V 89
D 123
M 455
S 919 more than twice as often as any other N
A 463
K 1209
B 1617
dukkhan:
V 6
D 16
M 56
SN 177 almost four times as often as any other N
A 67
K 151
B 117
dukkhaáč:
V 38
D 20
M 150
S 434 almost 4 times as often as any other N
A 138
K 476
B 285
here we have thrown in a few variants to see is the pattern is a glitch, but SN is again strikingly different to the rest of the early books, resembling K and B much more than D M and A.
a few more:
Äsav:
V 49
D 90
M 163
S 194 fewer than A
A 335
K 1038
B 1090
ÄsavÄ:
V 26
D 72
M 117
S 94 a third as often as the similar in length A, and less than the much shorter M
A 262
K 306
B 287
like kamma, another universal buddhist theme is suppressed in SN.
catutthaáč jhÄnaáč:
V 19
D 27
M 45
S 19 a third as frequently as in the same length A, less than half the much shorter M
A 61
K 43
B 135
SO maybe there is simply something about S that makes it have less of the usual technical terms on average, but;
satipaáčáčhÄnÄ:
V 3
D 10
M 17
S 95 more than 4 times as often as any other N
A 23
K 85
B 39
anicca:
V 2
D 9
M 43
S 247 about 5 times as much as any other N
A 69
K 208
B 400
aniccaáč:
V 1
D 0
M 29
S 191 work it out for yourself
A 18
K 29
B 24
I could go on, but a lot of more are in my other threads.
The point is that it works both ways, the difference of S is both in expansion and omission.
Yes âbecome coolâ, but is this the same as âŠeverything ceases?
Yes, the end of becoming is realised here and now, i believe. The mind that is without becoming, meaning without grasping, is, here and now, free of bhava. It is detached from khandhaâs and therefor cannot be identified as a form, feeling, will, perception or perceptual awareness. Because it cannot even be described in terms of form/body, this mind cannot even be called man or woman nor human.
There is also a sutta that describes this. The Tathagata cannot be pinpointed as being this or that. Not only after death but even in this life cannot be pinpointed as being this or that. This might look very complicated but i believe it only means: there is the realm of the unconceived, the realm beyond Maraâs reach.
The realm beyond conceiving is impossible to describe but it can be known to be there. It can also be known that conceiving starts and ends and the mind can get lost in conceivings and it cannot. This can be seen or known. When mind gets lost in conceivings Buddha teaches that it becomes deluded in understanding. It does not see things anymore as they are but how they are conceived to be. And there is huge difference between them .
Seeing this realm of the unconceived is what we fail to do. OrâŠit feels like nothing special, and we just ignore it. It is always present in our lifes but we are so involved in conceivings and conceived understanding, that we just ignore it and do not see and understand the depth of it. The Tathagata is deep, unfathomble, deep like the ocean.
Our lifes have always both aspect of the non-conceived and the conceived. The proces of unintentionally getting lost in conceivings is what the Buddha describes as grasping. The forces which cause this are called anusaya , asava, tanha. It is not that an atta rules this proces. Getting lost in conceivings and experiencing that as real at the moment, is unvoluntairy and, for the fettered mind, in no way a choice.
An awakened one has uprooted this unintentionally getting lost in conceivings and the deluded understanding that arises together with it.
In other words, it knows and understand what is conventionally true. It knows that the mind lost in conceivings experiences those conceivings as true and real. Like getting lost in a film.
So, in the awakened one there is always an awareness of the great, huge, enormous difference between an understanding rooted in conceiving and not.
Everything is an illusion or dream refers to the fact that all we experience is constructed, and not some absolute reality or in some absolute sense real. It is not true that an apple is red or has this or that form. Maybe for us as humans, in the way our body and mind functions, it has such features, but this a complete constructed and subjective reality. There is nothing ultimately real about the way we experience things. Great master know this and are also able to do wonders.
If another being would see an apple as green or as another shape, it is useless to discuss which perception is right. It is like debating about which dream is true. It is not about mysticism.
The inner perception of being a human being is also a fully 100% subjective and constructed experience and kind of understanding. Totally conceived. That is what Buddha teaches. One cannot see the Buddha as just a human being.
I do not have the most prominent Dutch translations (which are by De Breet and Janssen) here. However, the only way I remember nibbÄna and related verbs to have been translated is along the lines of âuitdovingâ, which basically means âgoing outâ (as a noun).
Sorry, but the fact that translators disagree doesnât mean they are all correct. Translators too make mistakes. As to translating nibbÄna as âunbindingâ, you will not find that in any dictionary nor in serious academic works. The consensus in the English scholarly world is that it just means âgoing out/extinguishmentâ. Ven. Thanissaro is really the outlier here. If you read Mind Like Fire Unbound, youâll see it is largely based on Vedic texts, which is problematic for various reasons.
The Visudhimaggaâs âetymologyâ which Ven T. follows, is not actually an attempt at serious linguistics. Itâs a didactic tool instead, as are most âetymologiesâ in the Visudhimagga. It reminds the reader that nibbÄna is the escape from (nir) craving, which is a thing that weaves (vÄna) together life to life. This was never meant to be a true derivation of the word nibbÄna nor was it meant to give itâs real meaning. Itâs just a play of words with a practical message. The Vism is full of these.
No text in the PÄli canon suggests nibbana to mean âunbindingâ, and various texts use nibbÄna as an explicit synonym for cessation. As Ven ĂÄnananda said in his NibbÄna sermons:
[âŠ] on the meaning of the word NibbÄna. Here too one can see some unusual semantic developments in the commentarial period. It is very common these days to explain the etymology of the word NibbÄna with the help of a phrase like: VÄnasaáčkhÄtÄya taáčhÄya nikkhantattÄ. And that is to say that NibbÄna is so called because it is an exit from craving which is a form of weaving. [âŠ] It is said that craving is a kind of weaving [vÄna] in the sense that it connects up one form of existence with another and the prefix ni is said to signify the exit from that weaving. But nowhere in the suttas do we get this sort of etymology and interpretation. On the other hand it is obvious that the suttas use the word NibbÄna in the sense of âextinguishingâ or âextinctionâ. In fact this is the sense that brings out the true essence of the Dhamma. [âŠ] The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is true for the fire is true for existence as well. [âŠ] He pointed out that existence is a fire kept up by the fuel of grasping, so much so that, when grasping ceases, existence ceases as well.
Yes. But it is a metaphorical synonym for cessation, hence âextinguishmentâ (like SUjato) and âquenchingâ (like Bodhi) are good translations.
That the problem in these statements is exactly the word âIâ, is indicated by the Buddhaâs right view version of this statement, which says, âIT will not beâ instead of âI will not beâ. See for example SN22.55.
The point of the sutta you quoted is that the view of a self exists on a more intellectual level, letâs say, than the sense of âIâ. You can claim not to believe in a self but still have this sense of âIâ, hence have the view of annihilationism. The view that avoids annihilationism is that there is no self nor an âIâ yet still cessation.
The Dutch translators you mention do not translate Nibbana , i have understood of someone who send me some Dutch Texts. I think that is a good choice.
Unbinding is not that bad, i feel. Anusaya cause binding. A way to talk about Nibbana of the arahant is that all anusaya are uprooted. This means, the end of all unvoluntairy binding or fettering. Unbinding as translation gives at least some practical meaning to it. The Pali texts certainly suggest a situation of Unbinding for Nibbana. Unfettering. That is all the time suggested in almost every sutta about Nibbana. So Nibbana also refers to an enormous freedom of mind. The mind is not under controll anymore of the anusayaâs.
Cessation as synonym needs explanation i believe. Because what is ceased? It is clear the Nibbana of the arahant is no mere cessation. And i also do not believe that this is true for parinibbana.
EBT also do not teach that the cessation of future bhava is a mere cessation. That is interpretation based upon the idea that Nibbana is also an made, builded, constructed, produced state that will cease too. Is it?
The image of fire as the influence of defilement upon the mind is recognisable for me. Like an impact, impingement. And extinguishment of our own fire has meaning for me. Then all becomes cool.
When the Buddha was talking to villagers and village leaders, and he taught them just virtue (that is to say giving and rebirth) its really reincarnation we are talking about. To those who could understand, he taught the 4NT and dependent origination. The first isnât wrong per se, its just not the whole story. Regarding fire in MN 72 what is being said is that because the fire arises from conditions, it will cease when those conditions cease. Because it arises and ceases the fire cannot be said to truly exist (atthitÄ) or not exist (natthitÄ). All we can say is that conditions arise and cease, and nothing more. To say then it really exists, just like the conditions really exist, and that you really exist is to go against what dependent origination is pointing towards.
Thanks for takimg.the time to respond tho!
Youâre welcome.
Iâd also like to address your claim that Buddhas and Arahants do not experience dukkha, if we may?
I think this is only true when we misuse âreallyâ to mean âindependently of conditionsâ which I do not.
In terms of suffering, the buddha was freed from suffering by uprooting greed hatred and delusion and thereafter was not âreckonableâ in terms of pleasure and pain.
That is how the Buddhaâs contemporaries understood it. I would argue that is how we today understand it, when we want to call something truly real. It has to have some form of independence like when we say the tree is there when no one is looking.
In terms of suffering, the buddha was freed from suffering by uprooting greed hatred and delusion and thereafter was not âreckonableâ in terms of pleasure and pain.
Yet he still experienced pain, and pain is included in the 1st Noble Truth. Buddhas and Arahants are free from future dependent origination, but they arenât free from past ignorance and kamma.
I still hope you can understand why NibbÄna canât be the type of cessation as meaning an unconscious state and why I and others question this view?
I will now bring up several arguments as to why this view is wrong.
In what context would one even claim NOT to believe in a self at all, but still, for some odd reason, hold on to a view of annihilationism?
In the context of trying to attain NibbÄna under the guidance of the Buddha one would hold on to that view!
But to even have the insight to begin with that there is no self nor an âIâ one has to attain NibbÄna just like the Buddha did. Same goes for the insights regarding unsatisfactoriness and impermanence, only fully understood thanks to NibbÄna - no other possible way.
But if NibbÄna equals becoming 100% unconscious; how can the Buddha or an arahant in this âunconscious stateâ realize and be so certain about the three characteristics anicca, dukkha & anatta?
Even going so far as to applying these three characteristics, that are near impossible to see otherwise and that only a Buddha discovers, to the formless arupa planes of existence that keep going on for countless of billions of years�
We have to REALLY understand in what context things are being said in the suttas. The Buddha even praises the same type of âannihilationismâ formula in AN 10.29.
This is applicable to various ascetic practices by others that are very painful to the body but due to the deep concentration attained leads one to the formless realm of nothingness. These meditators donât care about a future âexistenceâ of any sort in rupa loka and kama-loka and couldnât care less about âceasing to existâ as they have come to know existence (kama-loka & rupa-loka): since the formless realm of nothingness is seen as the highest type of âcessationâ in their dhamma.
So you see in AN 10.29 the Buddha praises this view held by outsiders as the best among non-buddhists but in SN 22.81 he refutes this view among buddhist monastics using the same formula: âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â But that annihilationist view is just a conditioned phenomenon.â
SN 22.81 has VERY MUCH to do with attaining NibbÄna since the whole reason for the sutta is: âHow do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?â
The ordained are taught how to attain NibbÄna and the Buddha tells them the best methods for doing this in the sutta and the obstacles that can show up. Otherwise why would ordained under the guidance of the Buddha himself during this time even get the idea that one is annihilated in NibbÄna in the first place? Well if the khandhas cease to exist and there is nothing more then the khandhas some students clearly make that logical assumption.
Yet the Buddha refutes this idea/view of annihilation that buddhists have had in the past and still have to this day in SN 22.81 quite clearly by mentioning the following:
That very first sentence in the SN 22.81 quote above is ONLY taught in buddhism, this is clearly about adressing issues that can show up for buddhists on the path and for NO ONE else. Same with refuting eternalism in the next sentences - only found in the Buddhaâs teaching and up to this point the buddhists in question do follow the instructions. BUT lastly the third sentence is refuting the annihilationist NibbÄna view that some buddhists mistakenly have while on the path - this is where you and others sharing the same view are currently at, in the practice of the path.
This is crystal clear for anyone reading the sutta.
I wanted to bring up the tetralemma: Since âThe Tathagata does not exist after deathâ is rejected by The Buddha himself - but saw that you claim that this rejection by the Buddha is due to an âover-literal translationââŠ
I must say, with no offense intended: this line of reasoning really leaves me speechlessâŠ
Anyhow, if NibbÄna is really a 100 % complete unconscious non-existence as you and others claim why is then NibbÄna classified as atakkÄvacara?
NibbÄna is atakkÄvacara, âbeyond logical reasoningâ. It is difficult to comprehend with logic or reason, since it is not a concrete âthing.â It cannot be explained with logic or reason to someone who has not attained it by themselves.
I do understand your logical reasoning regarding the selfless khandhas ceasing and then concluding: âhow could there possibly be anything left?â
BUT by the very same logic I can claim that hundreds of millions enter NibbÄna on a daily basis via dreamless sleep - no real difference between the highest spiritual state NibbÄna and having 100% unconscious dreamless sleep. Or is there? How so?
But if NibbÄna truly is atakkÄvacara, âbeyond logical reasoningâ. And it is truly difficult to comprehend with logic or reason and it cannot be explained with logic or reason to someone who has not attained it by themselves; it is IMPOSSIBLE it is even remotely anything like unconscious dreamless sleep in any shape or form:
Since we all, and billions of others humans, have already experienced what it is like being unconscious!
On the contrary what would really be âbeyond logical reasoningâ atakkÄvacara is that one can still somehow be âAWAREâ of a unconditional state despite the nature of selfless khandhasâŠ
I will also lastly bring up that if the Buddha said NibbÄna is bliss and NibbÄna equals unconscious non-existence - That means one can only experience the bliss of NibbÄna while in SamsaraâŠRight?
Yes. Nibanna cannot be an unconscious state any more than it can be a conscious state. It refers to the extinguishment of attraction repulsion and confusion.
When the fire is out we do not say that the fire is in a âstateâ in the sense that it is actually hidden somewhere in the timeless and non-phenomenal âstate of extinguishmentâ consciously or unconsciously.
We also do not think that the buddha amd sariputta where unconscious like rocks after they awakened, they answered questions, so they could hear and think and talk, so nibanna does not refer to unconsciousness.
A particular interpretation of nibbana is the result of a particular interpretation of the cause of dukkha, and a particular interpretation of the cause of dukkha is the result of a particular interpretation of dukkha. Itâs all the result of a particular interpretation of dukkha. Dukkha is the sickness and Nibbana is a state of being free from sickness: there is no point in discussing what it means to be free from sickness if there is no consensus on what the sickness is.
There can be various. Many secular Buddhists for example think there is no self but still donât belief in rebirth, holding a materialist view. They may have no theoretical view of a self, but still have a sense of âIâ so see death as annihilation according to the suttas. In MN22 annihilation is described as âthe destruction of an existent beingâ. Whether the annihilationist refers to this (imagined) existent being as âselfâ or âIâ doesnât really matter for what the view pragmatically entails.
But a second way to interpret SN22.81, one which perhaps is more contextually accurate, is that some annihilationists see a self or âIâ in something else than the five aggregates. The preceding paragraph says:
So some eternalists do not regard the five aggregates as a self but still imagine an eternal self in something else. Similarly, some annihilationists see an annihilated âIâ or self in something else than the five aggregates:
âHe may not regard form as self [etc], but he [still] holds such a view as this: âI [who is a âselfâ outside of the aggregates] might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, and it will not be for me.â That annihilationist view is a formationâŠ.â
This âIâ outside the aggregates could be their (wrongly perceived) owner for example.
This point is actually addressed in the Yamaka Sutta (SN22.85), which is relevant because it is all about the wrong view of annihilationism. It asks Yamaka if he thinks there is actually an annihilated âTathagataâ (referring to a self) outside of the five aggregates. Yamaka says no and in the end rightly concludes that what happens at the death of an arahant is the just cessation of the five aggregates.
Either way we interpret SN22.81 (and on further thought I prefer the second), it doesnât support your reading of it. The view called âannihilationismâ just isnât described as the cessation of the self-less, I-less aggregates: itâs described as the cessation of an âIâ in âI will not beâ. If annihilationism instead meant the cessation of mere aggregates and not of an âIâ, it should say something like âconsciousness will not beâ or âit will not beâ.
Perhaps you can respond to what I wrote about this:
This very specific change from âIâ to âitâ, from the personal to the impersonal, surely is for a reason. Annihilationism means seeing the cessation of existence as a personal thing; the Buddhist view is seeing it as impersonal. As Bodhi notes: "The Buddha transformed this formula into a theme for contemplation consonant with his own teaching by replacing the first person verbs [i.e. âIâ] with their third person counterparts [âitâ]. The change of person shifts the stress from the view of self implicit in the annihilationist version âI will be annihilatedâ to an impersonal perspective that harmonizes with the anatta doctrine.â Why else do you think this change is made?
This is just wrong. The sutta is describing âthe uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhammaâ. It says this even in the specific quote itself: âWhen the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that formation [that wrong view of annihilationism] is born.â Describing wrong views in order to explain right view is a very standard way of explaining things in the canon. There is nothing unique happening here. Most suttas about annihilationism are addressed to bhikkhus, including AN10.29 you mentioned.
No, to have that insight one âjustâ has to become a stream winner. The attainment of nibbana, even though stream winners understand what it entails, is done by arahants only. But attaining something and understanding something are not the same thing.
No offense in return either, but it seems you donât understand the view youâre trying to refute. As a result youâre simplifying it and arenât addressing it effectively.
The term ânibbÄnaâ is used in two ways in the suttas, which are distinctly different but youâre mixing up: (1) the ending of greed, hatred, and delusion, and (2) the ending of existence; that is, the five aggregates including consciousness (also called parinibbÄna). (see Iti44) Arahants have attained the former but not the latter. So they realize the three characteristics while there is still consciousness. But they (and all noble ones, in fact) also understand that parinibbÄna is possible, by knowing through insight how the cessation of craving will lead to the discontinuance of the aggregates after death. In the MahÄparinibbÄna Sutta (DN16) for example, the Buddha says that his parinibbÄna will be soon, using the future tense. The final cessation of consciousness clearly hadnât happened yet, but the Buddha still knew that it would.
I had to Google what you were referring to, and I think itâs this thread, right? The question at hand there is very different from what weâre discussing here, coming from a place that agrees with the view of cessation, at least for the sake of argument.
The change in translation I suggested isnât major and doesnât seem to matter for our discussion. (âThe Tathagata no longer exist after deathâ instead of âdoes not exist after deathâ.) FYI, Ven. Sujato actually adopted my suggestion for the alternative translation, so I donât know why it leaves you speechless. Even more so because my interpretation of it is the standard one, shared by the PÄli commentaries and Nagarjuna for starters, namely that the view âthe Tathagata no longer exists after deathâ implies the annihilation of an existent being called âthe Tathagataâ. The specific translation isnât relevant to this interpretation, my suggestion just clarifies it a little.
But this isnât the same logic Iâm using at all. Youâre oversimplifying the view again.
I wouldnât say that nibbana (referring to parinibbÄna) is merely the cessation of consciousness. First of all, it is the permanent cessation of consciousness, which sleep isnât. Secondly, when youâre asleep you can still hear your alarm clock so youâre not fully unconscious. Thirdly and most importantly, understanding parinibbÄna is undrestanding the cessation of consciousness due to a specific reason, namely the cessation of rebirth as a result of letting go of craving and the sense of self through insight into suffering and non-self. That is completely different from going to sleep. There are other reasons why this comparison doesnât hold, but thatâs a start.
Since you bring up the topic of sleep, if you think sleep entails the cessation of awareness, where does this âunconditoned stateâ of awareness you mentioned go while asleep? Is it dependent on being awake, or do arahants still experience it while asleep?
Thatâs assuming that bliss (the word here is sukha) is always a feeling/experience. But if parinibbÄna is a blissful feeling as you seem to think, then it is not the cessation of vedanÄ.
I can explain my interpretation by analogy. If you have a pain in your tummy and it ends, that is âblissfulâ in the sense that it is the end of suffering. AN9.34 asks the very same question youâre asking and explains it with the same analogy:
It is of note that Udayi apparently understood what nibbÄna was, yet still asked this question. This indicates using the word sukha to describe nibbÄna can be a little strange even to those who understand it.
Yes exactly! , Isnât there some buddhists that could be called eternalists, just like the Buddha mentioned, who imagine NibbÄna to be this âsomething elseâ?
And then the Buddha goes on to describe the next type of buddhist who rejects both the five aggregates and eternalism but who has the mistaken idea of annihilationism⊠Specifically the one you are advocating.
âPerhaps they donât regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.â So this sentence is not a unique thing to buddhism then, to not regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self? Is it buddhism or not?
Since other sects/religions also have access to everything from the luminous form realms up to the very last formless one, an âuninstructed worldlingâ
must be someone not instructed in what the Buddha specifically has to teach with his very unique insights.
But my whole point is, how could the Buddha himself during his time attain NibbÄna and from this attainment have his very unique insights regarding anicca, dukkha, anatta?
And not only that, he applied these three characteristics otherwise impossible to see to all planes of existence, even realms that last for billions of yearsâŠHow can even knowledge arise regarding the three characteristics from a state that you claim is the âpermanent cessation of consciousnessâ?
An unlearned ordinary person who has not seen the noble ones, and is neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the noble ones. Theyâve not seen true persons, and are neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the true persons and because of this they:
Regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.
Regard that the self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.â
Have such a view: âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â
A buddhist practioner can still:
Not regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.
Not regard that the self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.â
But can, despite the first two points, still have such a view: âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â
And even if they get rid of this wrong view:
âThey have doubts and uncertainties. Theyâre undecided about the true teaching. That doubt and uncertainty, the indecision about the true teaching, is just a conditioned phenomenon.â
In your view you adhere to points 1 and 2 but you still claim that âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â is a fact when stating that NibbÄna is the âpermanent cessation of conscioussnessâ.
And even if you make the case that the khandhas were already selfless from the get go and there never was an âIâ or self to begin with you only go back to point 1 by doing so, namely that you DO NOT regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.
Iâm not making up some special interpretation here as you can clearly see.
Yes exactly, even buddhist teachers do this!
Which proves that this teaching in the sutta is exclusively for buddhists using exclusive buddhist concepts like:
*Not to regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.
*Not to regard that the self and the cosmos are one and the same. After passing away I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.â
*Not to have such a view like: âI might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.â
All that is taught in the sutta is in the context of:
âHow do you know and see in order to end the defilements in the present life?â
Not so.
The Stream-Enterer by definition has seen into the conditionality of the "Iâ but has not yet attained nibbÄna.
I know of no one who is proposing this.
Meanwhile, youâre making strong assertions about nibbÄna while at the same time appropriately saying itâs âbeyond logical reasoningâ , notions, and views.
Actually, in AN9.34 Sariputta says, " The fact that nothing is felt is precisely whatâs blissful about it. âEtadeva khvettha, Ävuso, sukhaáč yadettha natthi vedayitaáč."
If nothing is felt and there is no perception, there is no consciousness since these cannot be separated, (SN22.55, MN43).
And, at the end of this sutta he specifically cites this:
"Furthermore, take a mendicant who, going totally beyond the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling. And, having seen with wisdom, their defilements come to an end. Puna caparaáč, Ävuso, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññÄnÄsaññÄyatanaáč samatikkamma saññÄvedayitanirodhaáč upasampajja viharati, paññÄya cassa disvÄ ÄsavÄ parikkhÄ«áčÄ honti.
That too is a way to understand how extinguishment is bliss.â
IminÄpi kho etaáč, Ävuso, pariyÄyena veditabbaáč yathÄ sukhaáč nibbÄnanâti.
The whole sutta points to a progressive letting go of perceptions until there is no perception (hence, no feelings or consciousness). And this is called the highest bliss.
This cessation of perceptions and consciousness is temporary, but points to the cessation of all defilements while an arahant is alive (meaning the khandhas are still present and active) and to when these aggregates cease without rebirth in final nibbÄna.
Bliss is English generally means âintense joyâ or âcomplete happinessâ in a felt/emotional sense.
So the ceasing of all the khandhas/senses appears to be the opposite of this.
But the teachings are not so much about feelings as they are about the final cessation of all dukkha. In this sense, extinguishment is indeed bliss.
Yes, by experiencing the previous existences one has had one can come to the conclusion that the bodies that have perished and will perish is ânot the selfâ.
But without the guidance of the Buddhaâs teaching everyone will come to the same conclusion as SÄti did in MN 38 if we only go by thatâŠ
What I mean is this: ONLY a Buddha, just like the previous Buddhas and the current Buddha, teach that not only is one not form but in fact also not feeling or perception or choices or consciousness. How did the Buddhas in the past and present even realize this in the first place? Thanks to NibbÄna.
How did they know that the formless realms, that go on for billions of years, will finally come to an end? NibbÄna.
The formless realms are ONLY dukkha in the sense that sooner or later they come to an END according to the Buddha, and only the BuddhaâŠ
The FEELINGS while in such a realm are the most extremely blissful feelings one could ever experience in all the planes of existence. The Buddha teaches to even give up these amazing blissful feelingsâŠNot an easy task by any stretch BUT doing it takes away the final greed for these amazing feelings and you finally feel NOTHING, hence greed has been uprooted completely and the superior insights into all things conditioned has been reached. 100% cool⊠like this: not like this:
The only assertions I can make about NibbÄna is what the Buddha himself has refuted. Nothing more, nothing less.
If we just stick to SN 22.81 for now and nothing else, how exactly am I understanding this sutta in the wrong way?
Sorry, but youâre just reiterating your point while not replying to my points nor to any specific questions I asked, so Iâll respectfully bow out of this conversation.
, Isnât there some buddhists that could be called eternalists, just like the Buddha mentioned, who imagine NibbÄna to be this âsomething elseâ? 
not like this: 
