On early Buddhism

[Sunyo]

Hello

@Dhabba

In what context would one even claim NOT to believe in a self at all, but still, for some odd reason, hold on to a view of annihilationism?

There can be various. Many secular Buddhists for example think there is no self but still don’t belief in rebirth, holding a materialist view. They may have no theoretical view of a self, but still have a sense of “I” so see death as annihilation according to the suttas. In MN22 annihilation is described as “the destruction of an existent being”. Whether the annihilationist refers to this (imagined) existent being as ‘self’ or ‘I’ doesn’t really matter for what the view pragmatically entails.

But a second way to interpret SN22.81, one which perhaps is more contextually accurate, is that some annihilationists see a self or “I” in something else than the five aggregates. The preceding paragraph says:

"He may not regard form as self … or self as in consciousness, but he [still] holds such a view as this: ‘That which is the self is the world; having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change.’ That eternalist view is a formation

So some eternalists do not regard the five aggregates as a self but still imagine an eternal self in something else. Similarly, some annihilationists see an annihilated “I” or self in something else than the five aggregates:

“He may not regard form as self [etc], but he [still] holds such a view as this: ‘I [who is a “self” outside of the aggregates] might not be, and it might not be for me; I will not be, and it will not be for me.’ That annihilationist view is a formation….”

This ‘I’ outside the aggregates could be their (wrongly perceived) owner for example.

This point is actually addressed in the Yamaka Sutta (SN22.85), which is relevant because it is all about the wrong view of annihilationism. It asks Yamaka if he thinks there is actually an annihilated “Tathagata” (referring to a self) outside of the five aggregates. Yamaka says no and in the end rightly concludes that what happens at the death of an arahant is the just cessation of the five aggregates.

Either way we interpret SN22.81 (and on further thought I prefer the second), it doesn’t support your reading of it. The view called ‘annihilationism’ just isn’t described as the cessation of the self-less, I-less aggregates: it’s described as the cessation of an ‘I’ in “I will not be”. If annihilationism instead meant the cessation of mere aggregates and not of an ‘I’, it should say something like “consciousness will not be” or “it will not be”.

@Dhabba

Yet the Buddha refutes this idea/view of annihilation that buddhists have had in the past and still have to this day in SN 22.81 quite clearly by mentioning the following:

Perhaps you can respond to what I wrote about this:

@Sunyo

That the problem in these statements is exactly the word “I”, is indicated by the Buddha’s right view version of this statement, which says, “IT will not be” instead of “I will not be”. See for example SN22.55.

This very specific change from ‘I’ to ‘it’, from the personal to the impersonal, surely is for a reason. Annihilationism means seeing the cessation of existence as a personal thing; the Buddhist view is seeing it as impersonal. As Bodhi notes: "The Buddha transformed this formula into a theme for contemplation consonant with his own teaching by replacing the first person verbs [i.e. “I”] with their third person counterparts [“it”]. The change of person shifts the stress from the view of self implicit in the annihilationist version “I will be annihilated” to an impersonal perspective that harmonizes with the anatta doctrine.” Why else do you think this change is made?

@Dhabba

That very first sentence in the SN 22.81 quote above is ONLY taught in buddhism, this is clearly about adressing issues that can show up for buddhists on the path and for NO ONE else.

This is just wrong. The sutta is describing “the uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma”. It says this even in the specific quote itself: “When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that formation [that wrong view of annihilationism] is born.” Describing wrong views in order to explain right view is a very standard way of explaining things in the canon. There is nothing unique happening here. Most suttas about annihilationism are addressed to bhikkhus, including AN10.29 you mentioned.

@Dhabba

But to even have the insight to begin with that there is no self nor an “I” one has to attain Nibbāna just like the Buddha did.

No, to have that insight one “just” has to become a stream winner. The attainment of nibbana, even though stream winners understand what it entails, is done by arahants only. But attaining something and understanding something are not the same thing.

@Dhabba

But if Nibbāna equals becoming 100% unconscious; how can the Buddha or an arahant in this ”unconscious state” realize and be so certain about the three characteristics anicca, dukkha & anatta?

No offense in return either, but it seems you don’t understand the view you’re trying to refute. As a result you’re simplifying it and aren’t addressing it effectively.

The term ‘nibbāna’ is used in two ways in the suttas, which are distinctly different but you’re mixing up: (1) the ending of greed, hatred, and delusion, and (2) the ending of existence; that is, the five aggregates including consciousness (also called parinibbāna). (see Iti44) Arahants have attained the former but not the latter. So they realize the three characteristics while there is still consciousness. But they (and all noble ones, in fact) also understand that parinibbāna is possible, by knowing through insight how the cessation of craving will lead to the discontinuance of the aggregates after death. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN16) for example, the Buddha says that his parinibbāna will be soon, using the future tense. The final cessation of consciousness clearly hadn’t happened yet, but the Buddha still knew that it would.

@Dhabba

I was wanted to bring up the tetralemma: Since ”The Tathagata does not exist after death” is rejected by The Buddha himself - but saw that you claim that this rejection by the Buddha is due to an ”over-literal translation”…
I must say, with no offense intended: this line of reasoning really leaves me speechless…

I had to Google what you were referring to, and I think it’s this thread, right? The question at hand there is very different from what we’re discussing here, coming from a place that agrees with the view of cessation, at least for the sake of argument.

The change in translation I suggested isn’t major and doesn’t seem to matter for our discussion. (“The Tathagata no longer exist after death” instead of “does not exist after death”.) FYI, Ven. Sujato actually adopted my suggestion for the alternative translation, so I don’t know why it leaves you speechless. Even more so because my interpretation of it is the standard one, shared by the Pāli commentaries and Nagarjuna for starters, namely that the view “the Tathagata no longer exists after death” implies the annihilation of an existent being called ‘the Tathagata’. The specific translation isn’t relevant to this interpretation, my suggestion just clarifies it a little.

@Dhabba

BUT by the very same logic I can claim that hundreds of millions enter Nibbāna on a daily basis via dreamless sleep - no real difference between the highest spiritual state Nibbāna and having 100% unconscious dreamless sleep.

But this isn’t the same logic I’m using at all. You’re oversimplifying the view again.

I wouldn’t say that nibbana (referring to parinibbāna) is merely the cessation of consciousness. First of all, it is the permanent cessation of consciousness, which sleep isn’t. Secondly, when you’re asleep you can still hear your alarm clock so you’re not fully unconscious. Thirdly and most importantly, understanding parinibbāna is undrestanding the cessation of consciousness due to a specific reason, namely the cessation of rebirth as a result of letting go of craving and the sense of self through insight into suffering and non-self. That is completely different from going to sleep. There are other reasons why this comparison doesn’t hold, but that’s a start.

Since you bring up the topic of sleep, if you think sleep entails the cessation of awareness, where does this “unconditoned state” of awareness you mentioned go while asleep? Is it dependent on being awake, or do arahants still experience it while asleep?

@Dhabba

I will also lastly bring up that if the Buddha said Nibbāna is bliss and Nibbāna equals unconscious non-existence

That’s assuming that bliss (the word here is sukha) is always a feeling/experience. But if parinibbāna is a blissful feeling as you seem to think, then it is not the cessation of vedanā.

I can explain my interpretation by analogy. If you have a pain in your tummy and it ends, that is “blissful” in the sense that it is the end of suffering. AN9.34 asks the very same question you’re asking and explains it with the same analogy:

Venerable Sariputta [said]: “Venerables, extinguishment (nibbāna) is pleasant (sukha)!”

Then Venerable Udayi asked him: “But, Venerable Sariputta, what can be pleasant when nothing is experienced?”

“Then exactly that, venerable, is pleasant: that nothing is experienced.

It is of note that Udayi apparently understood what nibbāna was, yet still asked this question. This indicates using the word sukha to describe nibbāna can be a little strange even to those who understand it.

MN59 has a similar question and then says:

‘Friends, the Blessed One describes sukha not only with reference to pleasant feeling; rather, friends, the Tathāgata describes as sukha any kind of sukha wherever and in whatever way it is found.’”