On not-self, existence, and ontological strategies

Yes, I think the annihilationist view is also based on the assumption of something existing. It exists for a while and is then annihilated, ie it ceases to exist. Meanwhile the eternalist view assumes that something exists indefinitely.

My understanding of the history is something like this:

Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s teachers in the Thai Forest Tradition teach that there is a consciousness for (a what-its-like-to-be) an arahant. This got kind-of sloppily worded as “there does exist a permanent consciousness” which then gets questioned and criticized by scholars for being contrary to “viññana anicca” / “sabbe dhamma anatta.” Thanissaro Bhikkhu finds himself “having” to defend his tradition, so he concocts a slightly tortured argument to provide academic coverage for his lineage.

Is this an accurate understanding of the history here?

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Sorry for a late reply. I came here through this topic: https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/the-thorny-issue-of-anatta/ which referenced a post on this topic I made 2 years ago, found here Bodhi vs Ṭhānissaro debate - #89 by Sunyo.

One argument I did not make there, because I found it a bit too cheap and didn’t reply to any specific statement in previous posts. But I’d like to add it here, because it is actually quite illustrative of how complicated discussions can get over things are actually very clear. We are here discussing particular phrases in a certain historical context in very particular suttas. That is perhaps part of the confusion for people. We look at the tree and miss the forest.

So what about the forest? Throughout the suttas anatta, dukkha and anicca are treated almost equally. Compare for example SN 22.9 till SN 22.11, and you’ll find similar phrases, such as:

Consciousness of the past and future is impermanent, let alone the present. (SN22.9)
Consciousness of the past and future is suffering, let alone the present. (SN22.10)
Consciousness of the past and future is not-self, let alone the present. (SN22.11)

Given their similarity, both in translation and the Pali, it makes no sense for one of them to be a strategy and two of them to be ontological truths! In other words, if anatta were a strategy, so would dukkha and anicca. Dukkha would be a strategy for what, exactly? Overcoming dukkha?.. I think you all get the drift.

(Sorry if something similar has been said before here or elsewhere. I skipped through the topics a bit – haven’t been here in a long time, and it’s too much to catch up!)

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Yes I think it’s a strategy indeed a safe strategy and it’s better than the alternative strategy for example the view of true self or the view that nibbana is self

nibbana is self for it’s a state of understanding a state of permanent non suffering but it’s dangerous to think like that because if you think you achieve nibbana but it’s not nibbana then you will regard it as self thus clinging to it and being trapped again in this infinity dream called samsara

I personally understand that Buddha means to transcend self & no-self.
When we think of the world, we think in terms of 5 aggregates, and do away with conventional categories, in likes of i, u, it; here there and external, or philosophically, a pot of soup, a grand flux, a collection of energetic units.

Thus any will, action or exploration with footing in self or no self, should ring alarms to our mindfulness, should be discerned as incomplete - recognizing it as it is, should be put in place, although it might take multiple life time to erode away the footing .

Dear Ven. Sujato

I used to think that the Buddha claimed that there is no self, just as you are suggesting. However, after much contemplation on the various arguments put forth, including yours, I have concluded that Ajahn Thanissaro is correct. Below is my analysis of the topic.

Before getting into whether the self exists or not, it is useful to understand what it is for something to exist. The youtuber vsauce has a great video on the various philosophical developments in the area, his final conclusion not withstanding.

One can’t ask a question about what is (i.e. existence) without context. Taking an example from the video linked above:

Suppose that there is a wooden ship. Let us call this the ‘original ship’. This ship is repaired over time such that, in time, all of the original wood is replaced by new wood. Is it still the original ship? Now suppose that all of the old wood is taken and another ship is built. We now have two ships… so now the question is, which is the original ship?

Both questions are nonsensical without context. However, given adequate context the question makes sense. If ‘original ship’ is defined as the ship that was registered with the port authorities, the answer will be the ship with the new wood. The gradual replacement of old wood with new wood would not cause the port authorities to classify it as a new ship. Similarly, if ‘original ship’ is defined as the ship with the original wood, the answer will be the ship with the original wood. Thus, the answer to is it or is it not? is context dependent.

Suppose we now run into someone who claims that the original ship did not exist to begin with. Then we can ask: does the original ship not exist in the same way that a ship imagined in the mind doesn’t exist?. Clearly not. A passenger could ride the original ship from one physical destination to another. It would be difficult to ride an imaginary ship in the same way. We can see from this that an object’s existence is not only context dependent, as shown prior, but also dependent on whether it is causally linked with anything we care about. A passenger who wants to sail from England to America will say that the original ship exists because it is capable of helping them achieve that aim. In contrast, they would say that the imaginary ship doesn’t exist because it is incapable of helping them achieve that aim.

It is worth adding that the causal relationship does not need to be direct either. Taking a pebble as an example; nobody may have any special purpose or aim for the pebble. However, it is recognised to exist because it has the a potential to interact with its environment in predetermined ways. This interaction, in turn, has the potential to affect our lives in some way. For example, if the pebble got lodged in a shoe while walking, it may damage the shoe or foot.

Since the question of existence is dependent on context and causal relationships, something cannot be said to exist in an absolute sense. In the same way, it cannot be said to not exist in an absolute sense either.

To take the example of the imaginary ship. Suppose a person tried to ride the imaginary ship and drowned; one could say the person drowned trying to ride the imaginary ship. Clearly the imaginary ship didn’t have the property of providing safe passage over a body of physical water. However, it had the property of motivating someone to to behave in a way such that they would drown. Moreover, we can make a general predictive statement to the effect of anyone who tries to ride an imaginary ship will be unable to do so and may drown. Predictions about things or classes of things cannot be made unless those things exist within a given context. Therefore even the imaginary ship, under the right context, exists.

Since things can’t be said to exist nor not exist in an absolute sense, questions phrased in the following way make cannot be answered in a sensible way:

  • Does X exist?
  • Does X not exist?
  • Does X both exist and not exist?
  • Does X neither exist nor not exist?

If one were asked any of the four questions above, one would then need to ask: under what context?.

This is true regardless of what X is, even if X happens to be the ‘self’. However the ‘self’ is defined, its existence or or lack thereof is determined by the context within which that ‘self’ is posited and its causal relationships to aims.

This is true even of the unconditioned. The unconditioned can only exist in contradistinction to the conditioned.

From this we can see, in the Vacchagotta Sutta, that the Buddha likely didn’t answer Vacchagotta’s questions because they were incomplete.

Therefore I have come to the assessment that Ajahn Thanissaro was correct. The Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense because such a thing would make no sense. Rather, he taught ‘not self’ as a strategy for overcoming suffering.

We can also see this clearly from how existence is defined in the dictionary. The following is from Oxford Languages:

The meaning of ‘exist’: have objective reality or being.
The meaning of ‘objective’: (of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
The meaning of ‘fact’: a thing that is known or proved to be true.
The meaning of ‘true’: accurate or exact / accurately or without variation.

Going down the rabbit hole of definitions, we can see that existence is dependent upon truth and truth is dependent on invariability. To the extent that causal relationships hold, they are invariable. The extent to which causal relationships matter depends on context. So even using this route, things can’t be said to exist nor not exist in isolation. The context under which they are defined also defines their causal relationships or lack thereof. Only after contextualising a thing can one say that it either exists or doesn’t.

Similarly, the ‘self’ can’t be said to exist nor not exist in isolation either. The context within which that ‘self’ is defined is what determines that. Any time someone argues that there is a self or that there is no self, they unconsciously assume a context within which their statement is true. The assumed context comes from what that person knows and, since the person is unawakened, anything they know must be based on the aggregates. Since the Buddha teaches that the clinging aggregates cause suffering, any perception of ‘self’ or ‘non self’ that is framed by the aggregates is likely to cause suffering on account of the clinging involved (i.e. taking it to be ‘my self’, or paradoxically ‘my non self’).

Here, Ajahn Thanissaro’s explanation of the Buddha teaching ‘not self’ as a strategy makes sense. The Buddha would not have taught that there is ‘no self’, because it would lead people to cling to some combination of the aggregates, which would form the context for this ‘no self’. Rather, the Buddha would have taught people to gradually let go of defining any self within the context of the aggregates altogether. Defining a ‘self’ or ‘non self’ within the context of the aggregates leads to suffering on account of clinging to that ‘self’ or ‘non self’.

For example, to the extent that someone regards form as ‘self’, they would suffer on account of form, as that form changed. Likewise with the rest of the aggregates. To define the ‘self’ or ‘non self’ within the context of the aggregates is to invite clinging and suffering; and as mentioned above, it is impossible to define ‘self’ and ‘no self’ without context. So the solution is not to define the ‘self’ and ‘no self’ within such a context. Once this context is abandoned and clinging is eliminated, suffering cease. Once suffering ceases, there is then no need to look for a new context under which the ‘self’ could be defined.

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Welcome. I suggest to study SN 44.10 more carefully; particularly the terminology Vacchagotta used; and why the Buddha declared to Ananda that Vacchagotta’s view was annihilationist. Naturally, you must also know what the term annihilationism actually means (which is something Thanissaro seems to inaccurately believe means consciousness ends at death; which seems not what the Suttas, such as DN 1; Iti 49; SN 12.17, say). First, SN 44.10 must be understood. Importantly, I suggest care is taken to not impute Vacchagotta’s own ideas (as Thanissaro seemed to do) onto the Buddha. In SN 44.10, it was not the Buddha who raised the topic of “natthattā” that has been translated as “no self”. You seem to keep making the erroneous statement: “The Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense”. In SN 44.10, the Buddha actually did not “teach” anything. Instead, in SN 44.10, the Buddha kept silent in relation to the various confused ideas of Vacchagotta. In short, regardless of whatever Bhikkhu Sujato posted in the OP (which I have not read), it seems Bhikkhu Thanissaro was not correct. Merely in the excerpt below, Thanissaro seems to have made two serious errors:

Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self :face_with_spiral_eyes:— were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness] :dizzy_face:. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"

Ananda Sutta: To Ananda translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu

It seems your personal view above of “my non self” is the same exact “natthattā” view of Vacchagotta the Buddha admonished, as follows:

Vacchagotta—who is already confused—would have got even more confused, thinking: ‘It seems that the self that I once had no longer survives/exists.’

SN 44.10
:sunny:

The above idea seems unsubstantiated. What inherently makes the view of ‘non-self’ clinging? :saluting_face:

It seems the wooden ship hit an ice-berg above and sunk. The suttas literally say:

There are these four kinds of grasping.

Cattārimāni, bhikkhave, upādānāni—

Grasping at sensual pleasures, views, precepts and observances, and theories of a self.

kāmupādānaṁ, diṭṭhupādānaṁ, sīlabbatupādānaṁ, attavādupādānaṁ.

SN 12.2

Taking not-self as self is a perversion of perception, mind, and view.

anattani, bhikkhave, attāti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso;

AN 4.49 :grimacing: :hushed: :face_with_open_eyes_and_hand_over_mouth:

They don’t regard consciousness as self, self as having consciousness, consciousness in self, or self in consciousness. They’re not obsessed with the thought: ‘I am consciousness, consciousness is mine!’ So when that consciousness of theirs decays and perishes, it doesn’t give rise to sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress.

SN 22.1

:sunny:

The above seems to be preaching the doctrine of non-conceptuality. Some of Thanissaro’s translations, such as of MN 1, give the impression he thinks Nibbana is non-thinking or spacing out.

In summary, if what I wrote is difficult, I summarize:

  • In SN 44.10, Vacchagotta never asked the Buddha about atta & anatta.
  • In SN 44.10, Vacchagotta asked the Buddha about atthattā & natthattā. :face_with_monocle:

Its difficult for me to comprehend how Venerable Thanissaro seemed to not-perceive these linguistic differences so to confuse “natthattā” for “anattā”.

SN 44.10 clearly says “natthattā” is an annihilationist view. Being so, it implicitly includes the belief in “self”. Per the suttas (DN 1; Iti 49: SN 12.17; etc) all annihilationist views include an implicit believe that a “self” is destroyed or has no consequences.

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I don’t agree with this statement. Not self/no self makes perfect sense with the Buddha’s teachings and if there was a self “in an absolute sense”, a plethora of problems would arise within the suttas.

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Just thought to address this point more directly.

I agree with you that all annihilationist views include an implicit believe that a “self” is destroyed or has no consequences. This is still in line with what Ajahn Thanissaro states. If annihilation is the end of consciousness at death, any consequences tied up with it also ends with death. Further, any belief that the ‘self’ is destroyed is tied to an implicit belief that consciousness is too. Any ancient or contemporary definition of Self (big S) or self (little s) is tied up with speculations about consciousness (e.g. in the Upanishads). The destruction of one is therefore synonymous with the destruction of the other.

The idea is not to hold onto an idea of non-conceptuality. The idea is to avoid thinking in terms of the existence or non existence of things, in favour of thinking in terms beneficial and non-beneficial actions.

Things are only of consequence when they aide or impede actions in some way. Since there are major problem with thinking in terms of things and their existence, it makes more sense to think directly in terms of actions.

In short:

What actions, when performed, lead to my long lasting well being and happiness?
What actions, when abstained from, lead to my long lasting well being and happiness?

These do not require us to think in terms of existence and non-existence.

Also, if we think in terms of actions, then we can use ‘not self’ as a useful tool or technique to encourage the right actions. There need not be a question about whether or not a ‘self’ actually exists.

Finally on “anattā” vs “natthattā”. I am not a pali scholar. But I believe this post by ‘Wayfarer’ sheds light on the issue of definition.
https://www.dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?p=156819

To quote:

I believe that misunderstandings of this notion abound in popular interpretations of Buddhism, in fact, I would argue that they are prevalent even in some well-regarded mainstream schools. Perhaps this is due to the interpretation of anattā. Anattā means ‘nothing is self’, which is not the same as ‘there is no self’, even though it is frequently interpreted to mean that. Anattā is used adjectivally, rather than as an assertion about something that does or doesn’t exist.

Note the following:

[T]he wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings and courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: “Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?”

When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.

“Then is there no self?”

A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.

Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, “Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?”

"Ananda, if I were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those priests and contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those priests and contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness]. (Ananda Sutta, SN 44.10; trs Thanissaro, Access to Insight.)

It is significant that in this passage, the question ‘then is there no self?’ is expressed as follows: “Kiṃ pana, bho gotama, natthattā"ti? Here, natthattā is the noun form of ‘no-self’ and is one of the only occurrences of this form in the Pali texts. Virtually every other instances of the term is given adjectivally, as anattā, and nearly always in relation to ‘those things which are not the self’ - this thing, or that thing, is anattā. In other words, on the one occasion when the Buddha was directly asked ‘whether or not there is atta’, he did not respond either negatively or positively. This is a significant point in understanding the meaning of ‘the Middle Way’. ‘Self’ neither exists (which equates to eternalism) nor does not exist (which equates to nihilism). But it is a very subtle point which takes a great deal of reflection to grasp.

If we take as correct that “natthattā” is the noun form of ‘no self’, then Ajahn Thanissaro’s translation makes sense, because the topic is still about non-existence. The reason that “natthattā” leads to an annihilationist view is that one of the defining characteristics of a ‘self’ is its constance. If the Buddha said that there is no ‘self’, then Vacchagotta could assume that whatever he is currently will be no more after death because there is no continuation of anything, even consciousness. That is synonymous with annihilation.

Nothing in what you have quoted seems to contradict my statements. A summary or paraphrasing that shows the distinction would be useful.

These are two different things. There is the view that there was never a self to begin with, that can be clung to (i.e. my ‘not self’) and there is the view that a self that previously existed no longer exists (i.e. the view mentioned in the sutta).

(Edited for clarity and correctness)

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I just saw the rest of your post… for some reason it didn’t seem to appear before. Perhaps you edited it in the meantime?

The idea is not unsubstantiated at all. How do you define ‘not self’ without context? You cannot. Context is provided by some combination of the aggregates. Use of ‘not self’ as anything other than a technique will result in clinging to the aggregates to give the idea of ‘not self’ meaning.

As a simple analogy. Maintaining the idea that there is no ‘self’ within the context of the aggregates is like cutting out an outline of a person on a piece of paper. There might be no person in the paper. But you are holding onto the paper to maintain such a view.

If you can provide a definition of ‘not self’ without context, then I will happily recant my statement.

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Hi Adutiya. I said that the Buddha did not teach that there is no self in an absolute sense. However that does not imply that the Buddha taught that there is a self either. Both ‘self’ and ‘non self’ take their meaning from context. Adhering to either position as absolute leads to issues.

CurlyCarl, thank you for the welcome and engaging me on this topic :slight_smile:

Annihilationism

On your comment about annihilationism - I’ve taken some extracts from Iti49 and Sn12.17 (again, Ven. Sujato’s translations). How would you interpret these:

Iti49 (Ven. Sujato’s translation)
And how do some overreach? Some, becoming horrified, repelled, and disgusted with existence, delight in ending existence: ‘When this self is annihilated and destroyed when the body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death: that is peaceful, that is sublime, that is reality.’ That is how some overreach.

This sounds a lot like an annihilationist looking for peace via destruction of consciousness after death.

Then there is Sn12.17 (Ven. Sujato’s translation)
Suppose that one person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement leans toward annihilationism.

The phrasing used is leans toward, indicating that there is a tendency to wish for annihilation. How so? If one were to experience bad results on account of another’s actions and one did not have the ability to avoid such results, one would likely wish for annihilation and in wishing it, develop a belief that such a thing is possible. Better to be annihilated and without consciousness than to experience painful results that are unavoidable.

Therefore, Ajahn Thanissaro’s position makes sense even if one takes Ajahn Sujato’s rendering of the suttas.

Even if we go by the dictionary definition, we get the following explanation for annihilationism:

The theological doctrine that the wicked will cease to exist after this life (Mariam-webster)

This also points to the destruction of consciousness after death (the word wicked, with Christian connotations, not withstanding). If someone ceases to exist, they are unable to experience in any way - i.e. consciousness also ceases to exist.

So I am curious. You have mentioned that annihilationism is not the view that death is an annihilation of consciousness. Given the explanation above, and the dictionary definition presented, on what basis do you perceive your view to be correct?

No self

On your other statement:

You seem to keep making the erroneous statement: “The Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense”. In SN 44.10, the Buddha actually did not “teach” anything. Instead, in SN 44.10, the Buddha kept silent in relation to the various confused ideas of Vacchagotta.

I don’t think my statement was erroneous. The Buddha was silent. Being silent he he did not mention that there is no ‘self’ in an absolute sense. Therefore, he did not impart a teaching to that effect. Ergo: the Buddha did not teach that there was ‘no self’ in an absolute sense.

However, with reference to Ven. Sujato’s article - that seems to be exactly what Ven. Sujato is saying. He is saying that anatta is a teaching that there is no ‘self’ in an absolute sense. I am merely saying that such a teaching was not given by the Buddha.

The remainder of my writing will now explore whether, and to what degree, questions about the existence or non existence of the ‘self’ (i.e. ‘self’ and ‘no self’) can be answered by SN44.10.

Existence and non existence - ‘Self’ and ‘No self’

In my previous analysis, I wanted to start from first principles by asking the question: in everyday language, what does one mean when one says that something exists or doesn’t exist?

I’ve shown through various examples that both existence and non existence are context dependent. Given this, non existence cannot be true in an absolute sense, whether it is the ‘self’ that doesn’t exist or an imaginary ship.

To say that there is ‘no self’ in the absolute sense, you would first have to show that it is possible for something to not exist in a way that is independent of context. I have not yet seen any argument to this effect.

I’ve had a read of both Ven. Thanissaro’s translation of of SN 44.10 and Ven. Sujato’s translation. These have been translated very differently.

Ven. Thanissaro:

As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: “Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?”
When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
“Then is there no self?”
A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Ven. Sujato
“Master Gotama, does the self survive?” But when he said this, the Buddha kept silent.
“Then does the self not survive?” But for a second time the Buddha kept silent.

We can see that the same passage has been translated very differently. Not having access to the original Pali, I am unable to attempt a word for word translation (emphasis on attempt… as this would be new to me).

However, to be pragmatic, I will go with Ven. Sujato’s translation for now; since it is likely to be the most acceptable translation on this particular platform.

Let’s start with what it means to survive. Suppose we asked the following question: did the cup survive falling on the floor?. The typical answer would be yes it did if the cup escaped relatively unharmed, or no it did not if the cup was relatively damaged. The typical answer would NOT be the question doesn’t apply because there was no cup to begin with.

To further analyse - on what basis might we judge that the cup was relatively harmed or unharmed? If we valued functionality, it might be on the basis of whether or not the cup is still able to hold water. If we valued aesthetics, it might be on the basis of whether or not the cup has been chipped or scratched in a major way.

As can be seen, the very definition, and therefore existence, of a cup depends on what we value about it. If, after falling on the floor, the cup does not deviate from what we value about it, we say that it survived and still exists. In contrast, if, after falling on the floor, the cup deviates from what we value about it, we say that it did not survive and no longer exists.

To go further, anything valued about the cup can be classified in one of the following ways:

  • Form: The cup has such a form. Its form allows it to hold water. Its form is curved in such and such a way.
  • Perception: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such perceptions. It gives rise to a perceptions of convenience and beauty.
  • Feeling: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such feelings. It gives rise to a pleasant feelings.
  • Mental formation: Coming in contact with the cup gives rise to such and such mental formations. It reminds of thirst and gives rise to an intention to drink.
  • Consciousness: Contact with the cup is made possible via such and such kinds of consciousness. Eye consciousness allows the perception of its visual form. Ear consciousness allows the perception of its auditory form as the cup echoes as it is pressed against the ear. Etc.

As can be seen, any value judgement made about the cup is based in the aggregates.

We can, in a relative or subjective sense, say that the cup never existed in the first place if we do not define it with a value judgement. For example, one may only perceive a mass of atoms and molecules rather than a cup because one does not choose to define or value the cup as any combination of the aggregates.

Yet, there is no room to say that the cup never existed in an absolute sense, because existence is tied up with context - the cup that doesn’t exist for one person may exist for someone else because that other person still defines it with a value judgement; and therefore any deviation from that value judgement has consequences for them.

Now let’s move to the question of the ‘self’.

Vacchagotta asks:

Does the ‘self’ survive after death?
Does the ‘self’ not survive after death?

Many people may jump to the conclusion that Vacchagotta’s questions don’t apply because the ‘self’ did not exist to begin with and therefore can neither survive nor not survive. But that is like jumping to the conclusion that the cup did not exist to begin with and therefore can neither survive nor not survive. There is little practical value in this approach.

How would one use the cup and make distinctions about the cup with a perception that the cup never existed? Similarly, how would one use the ‘self’ (e.g. to set an intention) and make distinctions about the ‘self’ (e.g. walking into a burning building is a bad idea) with a perception that the ‘self’ never existed?

Again, this is not to say that either the cup or ‘self’ exists absolutely. As mentioned before, existence and non existence only have meaning when consequences are considered. Something exists within a given context only if it is able to affect meaningful consequences in line with the value judgements that define it. It does not exist within a given context if it is not able to affect meaningful consequences in line with those same value judgements.

The ‘self’, just like the cup cannot exist nor not exist in an absolute sense, without context.

The ‘self’ one thinks about is defined and contextualised by value judgements based in the aggregates which are inconstant. However, unlike the cup, it is also defined and contextualised by elements that are beyond the aggregates. For example, kamma. The ‘self’, as typically perceived, participates in creating kamma and experiencing its fruit.

Therefore, Vacchagotta’s questions present a dilemma:

On the one hand, to answer to the affirmative, the self survives, fails to acknowledge that anything based in the aggregates is inconstant and and definitely will not survive. The failure to acknowledge inconstance would put one in the camp of the eternalists.

On the other hand, to answer to the negative, the self does not survive, fails to acknowledge that some aspects commonly used to define the ‘self’ do survive death, such as the creation of kamma the experiencing of its fruit, and the awareness that constitutes such experience. The failure to acknowledge the survival of aspects such as kamma and awareness would put one in the camp of annihilationists.

The final hurdle is that, if such a distinction were presented to Vacchagotta, he might mistakenly decide that if an element of his ‘self’ survives death this element is his true ‘self’. For example, he may decide that kamma is his true ‘self’, or that pure awareness is his true ‘self’. These present their own problems in the form of creating clinging and misapprehensions about the nature of kamma and awareness.

Misapprehensions arise because the value judgements made, when considering questions about the existence of kamma and awareness, will invariable be done within the context of the aggregates. Also, speculation about what they might be outside the context of the aggregates is meaningless because the aggregates are all that one knows. Finally, adopting the perception ‘I am kamma’ or ‘I am awareness’ definitely results in suffering.

Given these hurdles, any answer the Buddha gave would not have given rise to knowledge that all things are not self (from Ven. Sujato’s AN44.10).

Note the phrasing here. Even in Ven. Sujato’s rendering of the sentence, the knowledge is NOT that there is no self. Rather, the knowledge is that all things are not self. Any thing can only be spoken of within the context of the aggregates, which are inconstant. Since a primary characteristic of the ‘self’ (particularly one taken as a true ‘self’) is constance, no thing is ‘self’.

It is right there in the sentence. Questions about existence and not existence (or in Ven. Sujato’s translation, survival and not survival) are to be put aside. Rather, the knowledge that there is no self to be found within the aggregates is to be developed. This is because identifying with a constant ‘self’ that is defined in terms of inconstant aggregates can only lead to suffering.

Finally, as mentioned before, identifying with a constant ‘self’ that is not based in the inconstant aggregates is impossible because nothing outside the aggregates is known. Any attempt to do so will cause one to once again identify with a constant ‘self’ that is based in the inconstantaggregates and therefore experience suffering.

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I am not sure this reading can be sustained. First of all it appears that SN44.10 is a very short precis of the much more detailed and substantive MN72. Second the siding with eternalists or with annihilationists is given a much more philosophically nuanced gloss in SN12.17 that doesn’t seem to have the same opportunity to declare the subject under question a fiction.

There we have:

“Well, Master Gotama, is suffering made by oneself?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?

“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.

“Then is suffering made by another?”
‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, paraṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?

“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.

“Well, is suffering made by both oneself and another?”
‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca dukkhan’ti?

“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.

“Then does suffering arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ dukkhan’ti?

“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.

“Well, is there no such thing as suffering?”
‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, natthi dukkhan’ti?

“It’s not that there’s no such thing as suffering.
‘Na kho, kassapa, natthi dukkhaṁ.

Suffering is real.”
Atthi kho, kassapa, dukkhan’ti.

This obviously does not directly bear on the ontological status of an ‘atta’, but it does make it difficult to maintain that where we see the Buddha denying the 4 alternatives (as at MN72) he is doing so because of a fictionalism with regard to the subject under scrutiny, as here the subject is suffering, and it is explicitly asserted as “real”

later in the same sutta, the Buddha says of his reasoning:

“Suppose that the person who does the deed experiences the result. Then for one who has existed since the beginning, suffering is made by oneself. This statement leans toward eternalism.
“‘So karoti so paṭisaṁvedayatī’ti kho, kassapa, ādito sato ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti iti vadaṁ sassataṁ etaṁ pareti.

Suppose that one person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement leans toward annihilationism.
‘Añño karoti añño paṭisaṁvedayatī’ti kho, kassapa, vedanābhitunnassa sato ‘paraṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti iti vadaṁ ucchedaṁ etaṁ pareti.

Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:
Ete te, kassapa, ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṁ deseti:

‘Ignorance is a condition for choices.
‘avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā;

Here again, it is difficult to see how we can make sense of this on the fictionalist account, for then we should, at worst, have the third option, “Then does suffering arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?” and at best we should have a clear statement like “there is no such thing as a self” (since we have the clear denial of such a statement with regard to suffering it seems that the linguistic resource was available to the Buddha).

Furthur we have the “leaning toward” explanation that seems to indicate that the problem with the annihilation position isn’t simply with the idea of a real but temporary self, but with the incoherence of one such temporary self being the cause of the affliction of another, later and therefore different temporary self. Again, this is a different reason than “persons are fictions” which, again, it is clearly open to the Buddha to say if that is what he thinks.

I would also note that this is the reasoning given first in SN44.10 and that the second set of reasons given (the sabbe dhamma anatta reason and the “confusion” reason) is not reproduced here.

I am not sure this is true, I have listed every appearance of Vacchagotta in the canon here

And it appears to me that there are really only 2 substantive exchanges, and there seems a good chance that really there is just one incident being described, anyway, in the much more substantial MN72 we get the fire simile relating again to a slightly different question to the atta question, about the status of the enlightened one after death:

“But Master Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where are they reborn?”

“Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī”ti?

“‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

“Well then, are they not reborn?”

“Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī”ti?

“‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

“Well then, are they both reborn and not reborn?”

“Tena hi, bho gotama, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī”ti?

“‘They’re both reborn and not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

“Well then, are they neither reborn nor not reborn?”

“Tena hi, bho gotama, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī”ti?

“‘They’re neither reborn nor not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”

“Neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

“Master Gotama, when asked all these questions, you say: ‘It doesn’t apply.’

“‘Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi. ‘Tena hi, bho gotama, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatī’ti iti puṭṭho samāno ‘neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upetī’ti vadesi.

I fail to understand this point, Master Gotama; I’ve fallen into confusion.

Etthāhaṁ, bho gotama, aññāṇamāpādiṁ, ettha sammohamāpādiṁ.

And I’ve now lost even the degree of clarity I had from previous discussions with Master Gotama.”

Yāpi me esā bhoto gotamassa purimena kathāsallāpena ahu pasādamattā sāpi me etarahi antarahitā”ti.

“No wonder you don’t understand, Vaccha, no wonder you’re confused.

“Alañhi te, vaccha, aññāṇāya, alaṁ sammohāya.

For this principle is deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, comprehensible to the astute.

Gambhīro hāyaṁ, vaccha, dhammo duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo.

It’s hard for you to understand, since you have a different view, creed, preference, practice, and tradition.

So tayā dujjāno aññadiṭṭhikena aññakhantikena aññarucikena aññatrayogena aññatrācariyakena.

Well then, Vaccha, I’ll ask you about this in return, and you can answer as you like.

Tena hi, vaccha, taññevettha paṭipucchissāmi; yathā te khameyya tathā naṁ byākareyyāsi.

What do you think, Vaccha?

Taṁ kiṁ maññasi, vaccha,

Suppose a fire was burning in front of you. Would you know:

sace te purato aggi jaleyya, jāneyyāsi tvaṁ:

‘This fire is burning in front of me’?”

‘ayaṁ me purato aggi jalatī’”ti?

“Yes, I would, Master Gotama.”

“Sace me, bho gotama, purato aggi jaleyya, jāneyyāhaṁ: ‘ayaṁ me purato aggi jalatī’”ti.

“But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you:

“Sace pana taṁ, vaccha, evaṁ puccheyya: ‘

This fire burning in front of you: what does it depend on to burn?’ How would you answer?”

‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi kiṁ paṭicca jalatī’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, vaccha, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?

“Sace maṁ, bho gotama, evaṁ puccheyya:

“I would answer like this:

‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi kiṁ paṭicca jalatī’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho ahaṁ, bho gotama, evaṁ byākareyyaṁ:

‘This fire burning in front of me burns in dependence on grass and logs as fuel.’”

‘yo me ayaṁ purato aggi jalati ayaṁ aggi tiṇakaṭṭhupādānaṁ paṭicca jalatī’”ti.

“Suppose that fire burning in front of you was extinguished. Would you know:

“Sace te, vaccha, purato so aggi nibbāyeyya, jāneyyāsi tvaṁ:

‘This fire in front of me is extinguished’?”

‘ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto’”ti?

“Yes, I would, Master Gotama.”

“Sace me, bho gotama, purato so aggi nibbāyeyya, jāneyyāhaṁ: ‘ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto’”ti.

“But Vaccha, suppose they were to ask you:

“Sace pana taṁ, vaccha, evaṁ puccheyya:

‘This fire in front of you that is extinguished: in what direction did it go—

‘yo te ayaṁ purato aggi nibbuto so aggi ito katamaṁ disaṁ gato—

east, south, west, or north?’ How would you answer?”

puratthimaṁ vā dakkhiṇaṁ vā pacchimaṁ vā uttaraṁ vā’ti, evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, vaccha, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?

“It doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. The fire depended on grass and logs as fuel. When that runs out, and no more fuel is added, the fire is reckoned to have become extinguished due to lack of fuel.”

“Na upeti, bho gotama, yañhi so, bho gotama, aggi tiṇakaṭṭhupādānaṁ paṭicca ajali tassa ca pariyādānā aññassa ca anupahārā anāhāro nibbutotveva saṅkhyaṁ gacchatī”ti. Variant: ajali → jalati (sya-all, km, mr)

“In the same way, Vaccha, any form by which a Realized One might be described has been cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated, and unable to arise in the future.

“Evameva kho, vaccha, yena rūpena tathāgataṁ paññāpayamāno paññāpeyya taṁ rūpaṁ tathāgatassa pahīnaṁ ucchinnamūlaṁ tālāvatthukataṁ anabhāvaṅkataṁ āyatiṁ anuppādadhammaṁ.

A Realized One is freed from reckoning in terms of form. They’re deep, immeasurable, and hard to fathom,

Rūpasaṅkhayavimutto kho, vaccha, tathāgato gambhīro appameyyo duppariyogāḷho— like the ocean. seyyathāpi mahāsamuddo.

‘They’re reborn’, ‘they’re not reborn’, ‘they’re both reborn and not reborn’, ‘they’re neither reborn nor not reborn’—none of these apply.

Upapajjatīti na upeti, na upapajjatīti na upeti, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti na upeti, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti na upeti.

Again, here the fictionalist account seems to struggle, the fire in the analogy, like the suffering in SN12.17 is real, not fictional fire, and the inappropriateness of applying cardinal directions to its status after extinguishment is a categorical error, not an error of applying a term to a fictional entity.

Of course it may be that in the case of the status of suffering and the status of the enlightened after death there is a one philosophy being invoked , while in the atta case there is a different position.

It would certainly be more intellectually satisfying in my opinion if it turned out that all cases where examples of a consistent philosophical argument that worked the same way in each case.

For another example at DN29 we get:

Pleasure and pain are eternal,
‘Sassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …

or not eternal,
asassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …

or both eternal and not eternal,
sassatañca asassatañca sukhadukkhaṁ …

or neither eternal nor not eternal.
nevasassataṁ nāsassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …

Now again, this seems to be the same structure as before, and there seems to be no implication that pleasure and pain are fictitious, rather that any way of thinking about them in terms that make them substantive or fictitious makes them in some sense inescapable…

Anyhoo, all this is to say that while think the idea that not-self is a “strategy” is silly, I also think that the idea that persons are fictions is sort of silly and I think that there is plenty in the EBT’s that could be used to defend a the notion that Buddha was a metaphysical quietest with relation to views of BOTH the form “a self exists” and the form “no self exists”. (and both and neither)

This is a first draft of this response and I reserve the right to substantively revise it should my understanding change :stuck_out_tongue:
Metta.

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Hi josephzizys. I enjoyed reading your first draft. I have a question about your summary paragraph:

Anyhoo, all this is to say that while think the idea that not-self is a “strategy” is silly, I also think that the idea that persons are fictions is sort of silly and I think that there is plenty in the EBT’s that could be used to defend a the notion that Buddha was a metaphysical quietest with relation to views of BOTH the form “a self exists” and the form “no self exists”. (and both and neither)

Why do you think the idea of using not-self as a strategy is silly?

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I would say that this entire discussion between you two is wrong view brought by inappropriate attention

MN 2

To one who does not pay wise attention in these ways, one of six (wrong) views arises: (1) ‘There is for me a self’—the view arises to him as though it were true, as though it were real. (2) Or, ‘There is not for me a self.’—the view arises to him as though it were true, as though it were real.

Simply thinking about or discussing no-self does not make one reduce asavas and is still inappropriate attention.

Monks, from unwise attention cankers arise that had not arisen, and also cankers that have arisen increase. But, monks, from wise attention cankers that had not arisen do not arise, and also cankers that have arisen decline.

No-self must be seen, not speculated on, seeing no-self results in the fruit of stream entry which means attaining jhana and seeing the 3 poisons at play.

Remember, the 5 hindrances obstruct vision and prevent you from seeing things as they are, they prevent you from seeing no-self fully.

A virtuous monk, Kotthita my friend, should attend in an appropriate way to the five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self. Which five? Form as a clinging-aggregate, feeling… perception… fabrications… consciousness as a clinging-aggregate. A virtuous monk should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self. For it is possible that a virtuous monk, attending in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant… not-self, would realize the fruit of stream-entry."

  • SN 22.122

The sutta continues with the exact same text but for greater fruits such as the fruit of once return, non-return and Arahantship. This signifies the recursiveness of the training.

Proper attention = prevents arising of craving and also reduces present craving, proper attention is done by placing attention on the drawbacks.

The drawbacks are

inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self.

So the chain of events is like this

Present 5 hindrances/craving → proper attention by contemplating drawbacks → reduces hindrance → first jhana → see drawbacks (no-self) of aggregates in first jhana → further recursion

You can see the recursion in tapussa sutta

Then the thought occurred to me: ‘If, having seen the drawback of sensual pleasures, I were to pursue that theme; and if, having understood the reward of renunciation, I were to familiarize myself with it, there’s the possibility that my heart would leap up at renunciation, grow confident, steadfast, & firm, seeing it as peace.’

"So at a later time, having seen the drawback of sensual pleasures, I pursued that theme; having understood the reward of renunciation, I familiarized myself with it. My heart leaped up at renunciation, grew confident, steadfast, & firm, seeing it as peace. Then, quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful qualities, I entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation.

So in summary, speculating on no-self is still wrong view born of inappropriate attention. No-self can only be seen by properly attending to the drawbacks, which then weakens the hindrances and allows one to see more drawbacks and no-self clearly. This is a recursive loop that with each deeper execution leads to clearer seeing.

Hi Thito. The reason I posted initially was to show that taking ‘no self’ as an absolute is not a tenable position. This is not speculation, it is a function of the way that language works.

I like your quote from MN2:

To one who does not pay wise attention in these ways, one of six (wrong) views arises: (1) ‘There is for me a self’—the view arises to him as though it were true, as though it were real. (2) Or, ‘There is not for me a self.’—the view arises to him as though it were true, as though it were real.`

The point of my argument was that questions about existence and non-existence of the self need to be put aside in favour of acting in beneficial ways.

On stream entry.

What leads to stream entry is the cutting away of sakkāya-diththi, commonly translated as self-view or identity-view or more literally body-view. To translate the cutting away of sakkāya-diththi as realising ‘non-self’ is misleading.

Realising non-self has the connotation that there was never any self to begin with, which leads us back to square one.

I appreciate that you may have a different interpretation. Perhaps you do not speak of non-self in the absolute sense. If so, I broadly agree with your statements. Stream entry is to be achieved through practice and not speculation.

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Of course hence all ariyans except Arahants still have the delusion of conceit (I am) which is a lingering habituation of self, which requires recursion of seeing no-self clearly to remove. Hence the sutta (pottpada sutta I think) on when one sees the no-self of intention and thus it is better to not intend, one attains Arahantship. This means self habituation (i.e. conceit) of the aggregates (i.e. clinging) is removed gradually.

For the sotapanna identity view is replaced by dependent origination view, which is important for attaining stream entry path - see my post from 2 years ago Identity View vs Dependent Originaton