SuttaCentral
I think you’re taking my “apparently” the wrong way. I meant it in the third sense given below, not the second:
(archaic) Plainly; clearly; manifestly; evidently.
Synonyms: obviously, plainly, clearly, evidently, visibly.Seemingly; in appearance.
Synonyms: ostensibly, seemingly.According to what the speaker has read or heard.
Synonyms: allegedly, reportedly
It’s a rather treacherous sort of adverb and it would probably be sensible if we stopped using it altogether.
I took Raftafarian’s query to be about the post-khandhaparibbāna arahant, not the arahant in the interim between kilesaparinibbāna and khandhaparinibbāna.
Regarding the latter, as I’ve scarcely at all looked into modern discussions of the “philosophical zombie” conception, I can’t say for sure how apt the term would be for the post-kilesaparinibbāna arahant. My suspicion, however, is that it wouldn’t be apt at all, for in the zombie conception, as I understand it, there’s an absence of teleology. In the arahant, by contrast:
The arahat’s experience, as stated above, is teleological, as is the puthujjana’s; but with the arahat things no longer have the particular significance of being ‘mine’. This special significance, dependent upon avijjā, is not of the same kind as a thing’s simple intentional or teleological significances, but is, as it were, a parasite upon them.
(Ñānavīra, Note on Anicca)
You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat’s experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
The puthujjana’s experience, however, is still more complex, since there is also avijjā, and there is thus appropriation as well as teleology.
But this, too, functions automatically, without any self or agent to direct it. On account of the appropriation, however, it appears to be directed by a self, agent, or master. Avijjā functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjā is an automatically functioning blindness, blind to its own automatic functioning. Removal of the blindness removes the appropriation but not the teleology.
(Ñānavīra, Letter to Sister Vajirā, 10 January 1962)
Ah okay 
That was my question, as I’ve once or twice heard the living Arahant described as such, and your original post was “apparently” 
unclear which stage you meant 
DN1 doesn’t just bring up the annihilationist view point. There’s also “non-percipient being without a body”.
It’s safe to say that whatever we (and by that, I mean “most of us”) think Paranibbana is, we could very well be mistaken.
Annihilation and non-percipient being are both wrong views.
To answer your question, I don’t know. 
The Arahant is said to be free from further births and deaths, and the suttas don’t speak of Arahants going to “heaven” when they die.
So it sounds like a complete extinction, similar to a materialist view.
A different angle…
The consciousness aggregate can only know and be known when it contacts the other aggregates. For example, we only detect the presence of eye consciousness if there is visual stimuli.
A simple experiment.
Look straight ahead and note what you see. Assuming there is light, you will see a variety of colours. Then close your eyes. You will only see black. Either way, eye consciousness is at work because you sense the presence or absence of light.
Now try to look through the back of your head. Notice that there is no colour there, not even black. Eye consciousness does not arise because the appropriate visual organ does not exist at the back of your head.
This can be extrapolated to all the other kinds of consciousness that sense other aggregates.
If the aggregates fail to arise after death, any consciousness tied up with the aggregates also fails to be arise.
However, that is not to say that there is nothing at all. Just that any consciousness associated with the aggregates doesn’t arise.
The Buddha has sometimes called the deathless a dimension or reality, so Nibbana is not nothingness.
To call something a dimension or reality, one must have been able to experience it. But this is where language breaks down. The experience has nothing to do with the aggregates, so any description of it will be imperfect at best.
I am inclined to go with a consciousness that is not of the aggregates. However, more than a few of my fellow commenters don’t like the idea, as they believe it espouses an eternal ‘self’. However, there is actually no need to superimpose a sense of self onto such a consciousness.
You can read through the debate here if you’re interested. This is my first post on the matter and the debate starts from there…
I give you a ton of credit for acknowledging this.
While I am inclined to think something like this, I think that it would be regarded as heretical by most Buddhist as your experience indicates. I think that by “self” the Buddha originally meant a visceral personal self. In other worlds, self as the feeling of “being an organism in a hostile environment.” That is why in so many suttas the Buddha talks about seeing the end of the world as so important. Without opposition to the world the sense of this visceral self disappears. That said, I think the collision with Brahmanism derailed Buddhist thought by making “self” something abstract which I do not believe was the intent in a whole bunch of suttas.
I think Buddhists became dead set on denying Atman with a capital ‘A’ and veered off into the “forbidden zone” of things the Buddha would not comment on. Obviously, I am implying that the much of the canon is a later creation by later Buddhists competing with Brahmans and not from the Buddha. I think he would have said “How could you possibly know what happens after death and why are you wasting your time thinking about it when you could be meditating.”
final extinguishment(parinibbānasa)… There is element left over… That element is not 5 aggregates. But extinguished-element or unconditioned-element or deathless-element.
This is different from " ucchedavādā " (their view is, there left not thing)
And not " sassatavādā " (their view is, left some of 5 aggregates, especially citta - vinnana - mano)
In AN 10.81, a Tathagata is said to dwell with “unrestricted awareness” free of 10 things, one of which is the consciousness aggregate.
Take this with a grain of salt, but my understanding is that in Buddhist philosophy consciousness relies on objects of consciousness – it arises dependent on something else. In other words, the consciousness aggregate is conditioned. However, it seems (according to the referenced sutta) that there is an awareness operating separately from the consciousness aggregate.
It seems to me that it is this awareness that can cease being caught up with conditioned reality, and thus be freed (i.e. Nibbana).
The suttas seem to say in many places an Arahant does not experienced “death” therefore it seems possibly there is no such thing as Nibbana after “death”.
The most eminent Professor Jay Garfield discusses “Zombies and Other Exotica in Consciousness Studies” in his book Engaging Buddhism: Why Buddhism Matters to Contemporary Philosophy (2015).
Assuming that the jaygarfield on wordpress supplying jaygarfield/files is really Prof. Garfield, he has a draft of his book (not for any sort of republication, so you have to look at it for yourself) on his wordpress site at:
It looks good to me.
This brings up something I found a while ago which I find very interesting.
Wikipedia states that although Atman is taken as ‘soul’ or ‘self’, the literal translation of Atman is breath.
Breath is what provides sustenance, and more than a few branches of Hinduism portray the Atman as being the ultimate sustenance by virtue of it being the source of all things.
If we take the literal translation of Atman as breath or, to make it clearer, sustenance the transformation in the following passage is remarkable.
SN22.59. Rather than this:
“Bhikkhus, how do you conceive it: is form permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, venerable Sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent painful or pleasant?” — “Painful, venerable Sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my self’”? — “No, venerable sir.”`
"Is feeling permanent or impermanent?..
"Is perception permanent or impermanent?..
"Are determinations permanent or impermanent?..
“Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent pleasant or painful?” — “Painful, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my self’”? — “No, venerable sir.”
"So, bhikkhus any kind of form whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, must with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: ‘This is not mine, this is not I, this is not myself.’
You get this:
“Bhikkhus, how do you conceive it: is form permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, venerable Sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent painful or pleasant?” — “Painful, venerable Sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my sustenance’”? — “No, venerable sir.”
"Is feeling permanent or impermanent?..
"Is perception permanent or impermanent?..
"Are determinations permanent or impermanent?..
“Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent pleasant or painful?” — “Painful, venerable sir.” — “Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my sustenance’”? — “No, venerable sir.”
"So, bhikkhus any kind of form whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, whether gross or subtle, whether in oneself or external, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, must with right understanding how it is, be regarded thus: ‘This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my sustenance.’
Rather than an abstract don’t take it as a ‘self’, the instruction is much more explicit. Don’t look for pleasure in the aggregates.
In layman’s terms, if it’s going to give you a stomach ache (i.e. if it is painful), don’t eat it (i.e. don’t take it as sustenance).
In the same way as what is not physically eaten is not absorbed into a body, an aggregate that is not relied upon for sustenance is not absorbed into a ‘self’.
This seems to also work with the many suttas which talk about stopping nutriment.
Now I don’t know if the words atta and anatta should be re-translated as sustenance or non sustenance. But the origins of atta (or Atman) give us some nice clues about how to put the Buddha’s teachings into practice and avoids philosophical arguments over the ‘self’.
Thank you for sharing! That is a really cool way to think of anatta.
I think sustenance is also interesting in light of the fire analogy. We “feed” a fire, no?
Wow, that is quite nice and fits rather well 
But that is not how Buddhists thought of Atman. Atman was eternal, unchanging, and conscious. This was used in arguments to demonstrate anatta. Buddhism went from a means to liberate beings to an obsession with debunking Brahmanism. I suspect the Buddhism went from liberation as the end of suffering in this life to the extinguishing of consciousness at death of a arahant because it was committed to anatta(not Atman).
This certainly agrees remarkably with many of the short and simple sutras in SN/SA, which I think are more obvious in SA because it begins with the short sutras and builds up to the more elaborate ones as a general policy in many of its samyuktas. They basically say that liberation is ceasing to be addicted to the sensory experience of the world. There are even a couple sutras that talk of consciousness growing on the substrates of the other four aggregates using a plant metaphor.
The thing to remember, too, is that animist beliefs tend to imbue the physical world with spirit rather than focus on a separate world like the heavens or a spirit realm. Breath as the soul makes sense in many ways. Things stop breathing when they die, breath is moist and warm, also things living things need to survive and leave them when they die. But these kinds of practical, real-world observations turned into ideas as human thought became more abstract, and then those ideas became things divorced from day-to-day life. Spirits turned into something separate from the body or like a second non-physical body, etc.
That is not quite accurate. Atman wasn’t used by Buddhists in a special way. The word existed and was used in a certain way prior to the Buddha. The Buddha merely pointed out that such an idea was untenable.
Later on, Hinduism borrowed ideas from Buddhism to create their version of an everlasting Source (Wikipedia):
Adhyaropa Apavada - imposition and negation
See also: Neti Neti
Since Gaudapada,[252] who adopted the Buddhist four-cornered negation which negates any positive predicates of ‘the Absolute’,[253][254][note 50] a central method in Advaita Vedanta to express the inexpressable is the method called Adhyaropa Apavada.[252] In this method, which was highly estimated by Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a property is imposed (adhyaropa) on Atman to convince one of its existence, whereafter the imposition is removed (apavada) to reveal the true nature of Atman as nondual and undefinable.
Advaita Vedanta (non-dualism) sees the “spirit/soul/self” within each living entity as being fully identical with Brahman.[59] The Advaita school believes that there is one soul that connects and exists in all living beings, regardless of their shapes or forms, and there is no distinction, no superior, no inferior, no separate devotee soul (Atman), no separate god soul (Brahman).[59] The oneness unifies all beings, there is divine in every being, and that all existence is a single reality, state the Advaita Vedanta Hindus. In contrast, devotional sub-schools of Vedanta such as Dvaita (dualism) differentiate between the individual Atma in living beings, and the supreme Atma (Paramatma) as being separate.[60][61]
The borrowing of ideas from Buddhism complicated things to the point that now, Buddhists reject certain teachings because they exist in Hinduism (not realising that they were original to Buddhism to begin with). I’ll be exploring this theme sometime later when I have more headspace.
Yes, Atman predated the Buddha and it has other meanings and connotations. But, those other meanings and connotations did not shape Buddhism to the extent that the eternal, unchanging, and conscious Atman did. That said, what benefit would changing how I think of self have?
I don’t have a view of self in the abstract. I view the self as the feeling of being an organism in a hostile environment. That is not abstract. That is as visceral as it gets and I think it is far more keeping with how the suttas that taught the cessation of the world viewed it. The problem is not how I view self, but that the notion of self as being in the world was de-emphasized to the point of being virtually forgotten in Buddhism to fixate on an abstract Atman that has no resemblance to what the vast majority of human beings think of as self and so miss how down to earth and sensible the Buddha really was. Instead we just have a bunch of people who don’t know what anatta really means in a way that is relevant to how they really think of self and whether or not nibbana is experienced in some way. The former is odd since we see a lot of westerners who never heard of the notion of this abstract Atman until they learned about Buddhism accepting it uncritically as if that is how they conceived it all along. Sorry, I am ranting. The main point is the bolded question above.
In the traditonal interpretation this is correct, but if we take the interpretation of ego rebirth rather than physical rebirth, it means that the Arahant doesn’t become something in the first place (born) let alone dies at a later time, and what is not born cannot die. Say for example when an alcoholic wakes up in the morning with a fresh mind they may just have normal desires as a human being, but throughout the day as the 3 poisons stir up and worsen, and the misery of existence and suffering starts to boil up, thoughts and perceptions of alcohol arise as an escape from suffering and the alcoholic becomes (born) a hungry ghost.
Whereas when the Arahant wakes up in the morning, even the basic desires of a human do not arise, nothing stirs up or worsens, and he does not even go from heaven to hell like many jhana attainers who do not have Supermundane right view, who go from sublime bliss to quarreling with others.
So in terms of the 3 poisons and ego rebirth, the Arahant has no fuel to become anything, a self and conceit is never born, thus he never experiences misery and suffering, and never dies. Thus the deathless has been reached.