On not-self, existence, and ontological strategies

something like:

“what then friend Gotoma: “the self exists.”?”
“what then friend Gotama: “the self doesn’t exist.”?”

Vacchagotta believed in a self.

The merit in Sujato’s translation (compared to Thanissaro) is Sujato reflected the inherent eternalist & annihilationist views of Vacchagotta.

Indeed, which is why the Buddha said Vacchagotta was totally bewildered. :pray:t2:

Deniying the existence of something is exactly what the buddha refused to do, about the self, pleasure and pain, the world, sufferimg, actions and thier consequences, all of these, rather than being fictititious or real, are calimed to be conditionally arisen.

The undeclared points and conditionality are precicely a comment on “the nature of existance” (and non existence).

Metta.

2 Likes

Precisely! I was waiting for someone to finally say this.

For puthujjanas and even for sekkhas, the self does exist. It exists as the manifest, readily-discernible reality of the experience of having a sense of self. It is real as such. If such an experience did not exist at all, we wouldn’t even have a word for it, and it certainly wouldn’t be a thing Buddhists would argue about for 2,600 years.

The experience of the sense of self is indeed bound up with craving, ignorance, and a whole host of ontological delusions. It is dependently co-arisen, yes, but to say the self completely doesn’t exist would be taking it too far. Even saying that the self doesn’t exist in the way most people assume it exists, as an eternal soul or whatever, is still missing the point that, for a puthujjana, that “craving-ignorance-conceit-assumption” with respect to the ontological status of the soul is precisely what constitutes the self. Not understanding that, the puthujjana remains a puthujjana.

Sakkaya ditthi is not done away with via coming to believe that the self doesn’t exist. It is eliminated through understanding that very sense of self as a real phenomenon, a phenomenon that is dependently co-arisen with craving’s ontological appropriation of the five aggregates. Being co-arisen, it is anicca, it is dukkha, it is anattā.

5 Likes

For the awakened, as stated by the Buddha, the above ‘self’ is merely a ‘delusion’ (SN 22.76), a ‘disease’ (Ud 3.10; MN 140), a ‘mental fabrication’ (SN 22.81) and other similar hallucinatory illusory descriptions (SN 22.95). There is no self anywhere, apart from this. This seems why in SN 35.85 the Buddha said the world is utterly empty of self.

Why not? There are different ways for sakkaya ditthi to disappear, such as experiencing the not-self elemental nature of the breathing processes (kayanupassana), experiencing the not-self elemental nature of rapture (vedanupassana) or experiencing the actually dissolution of the self-thought when samadhi expands & subsumes the ordinary thought processes (cittanupassana). In fact, without samadhi subsuming the ordinary thought processes, it seems unlikely there can be clear enough insight into the processes of dependent origination when they do arise. This seems why the Path requires samma samadhi as its fulfilment.

But the suttas never seem to say the self as a real phenomenon. I don’t recall either the Suttas (eg. MN 115 about the elements) or the Abhidhamma (about ‘paramattha dhamma’) ever labelling the ‘self-delusion’ as a ‘real phenomena’. This seems because the only real dhamma related to ‘self’ seems to be the reality of ‘delusion’ & ‘ignorance’. For example, SN 12.17 clearly says suffering is not ‘self-made’ (‘sayaṅkataṁ’) therefore it seems ‘self’ is not part of the dependent origination in SN 12.17.

It is best to quote the suttas rather than post unsubstantiated beliefs & ideologies, particularly if one considers Nanavira or Buddhadasa to be their Omniscient Guru. For example, SN 22.81 says all that arises is a fabrication. The sutta never seem to include “the self” as one of the twelve dependently originated phenomena. SN 22.81 says:

They regard (samanupassati) form as self. But that regarding (samanupassanā) is just a saṅkhāro. And what’s the source, origin, birthplace and inception of that saṅkhāro? When an uneducated ordinary person is struck by feelings born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That saṅkhāro is born from that.

SN 12.2 says:

taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ;
upādānapaccayā bhavo;
bhavapaccayā jāti;

The word ‘self’ is not found above. It seems all that is occurring is attachment or becoming or birth. It seems the Buddha used these types of words. The definition of “birth” (“jati”) does not include the word “self” (“atta”) therefore it seems “self belief” is merely one of four types of attachment. But this type of “attachment” is merely a “belief” (" vāda") called “attavādupādāna”. It is not a “real self phenomena” as you seemed to articulate. It is only attachment; only wrong view; only ignorance; only delusion; like believing you are Julius Caesar or Joan Of Ark.

1 Like

I think this is a very good point. Sakkayaditthi is dispelled when the present sense of self is understood for what it is.
Hence, at the beginning of the Majjhima’s Mahatanhasankya sutta we have the Buddha admonishing Sāti’s pernicious view with,

Nanu mayā, moghapurisa, anekapariyāyena paṭiccasamuppannaṁ viññāṇaṁ vuttaṁ, aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavoti?

Fool, hasn’t it been said by me by many teachings that consciousness is dependently originated, that without a condition there is not the origination of consciousness?

I’m not sure if this was linked here, but I continued the discussion with Sujato in the following two topics. After some initial getting used to, I actually quite like “survive”.

By the way, MN22 clearly denies the existence of a self, if it wasn’t already clear from other suttas. I’m surprised people are even arguing this central idea of the Buddha’s teachings. :face_with_peeking_eye:

5 Likes

It is only attachment; only wrong view; only ignorance; only delusion; like believing you are Julius Caesar or Joan Of Ark.

A delusion is real, as a delusion. Someone who believes they are Joan of Ark is actually having the real experience of mistakenly believing they are Joan of Ark. In fact, that’s precisely their problem: that they are having such an experience. It’s a real experience: the experience of having a delusion.

A saṅkhāro that is is real, as a saṅkhāro

1 Like

I don’t think anyone here is denying anattā.

People ‘exist’ as an empirical reality. If I were to go around claiming my wife didn’t exist there would be a serious problem.

But people are devoid of a lasting substantial self, a metaphysical essence.
This has to be first taught and then directly realized. It’s far from apparent.

1 Like

Well said! Precisely.

Ven. Ñānananda gives a great simile of a magic show. Someone watching a magic show who is ignorant truly experiences magic. They have the experience of the phenomenon of magic, and to tell them that that experience is fake or false is not quite correct.
The person who understands how the magician does his tricks does not experience the magic—there is no phenomenon of magic for them.

More appropriately, we should say that magic, as a phenomenon, does exist. But that phenomenon is dependent on ignorance. It is not a delusion in and of itself necessarily; rather, it is dependent on delusion for it to exist/appear.

Telling someone that they don’t actually experience magic and saying it’s non-existent is not going to make their experience go away, or their delusion that caused the manifestation of magic disappear. Only by seeing the conditions behind it will they cease to experience the magic. Telling them that it is based on delusion, and if they knew how things worked, they wouldn’t have the same experience is truthful, and this is the same in the case of the self. Telling people “there is no self” doesn’t make them sotāpannas. Telling them that their sense of self is a knot of craving trapped within pure impermanent experience and having them observe that gradually will.

Mettā

5 Likes

Yes, as I posted, “delusion” is real. Both the Abhidhamma and Suttas say “delusion” is real. But “self” is not real. The reality of “self” is it is merely delusion. The “self” itself is not a real phenomena. :slightly_smiling_face:

Yes, the sankharo is real as a sankharo. But not the ‘self’ aspect of it. It seems what you wrote about ‘self is a real phenomena’ was inaccurate.

If i read the papanca accurately, I recall Ñānananda’s solipsism fell apart, when he quoted the sutta where Saripuutta says one perception arises & ceases and another perception arises & ceases. I recall Ñānananda tried to argue a case that Nibbana has no perception. Similar to Thanissaro, my impression was Ñānananda believed Nibbana was spacing out void of all conceptuality. :face_with_open_eyes_and_hand_over_mouth:

I was away at a meditation retreat over the weekend, and wow there have been a lot of replies. I guess this is one of those topics that is ever engaging.

@sujato’s translations

My intent wasn’t to diminish the work that @sujato has put into the translations and the site. It has resulted in beneficial outcomes for many people. It was just to point out that just because the Chinese translation says something different to Pali is not a reason to discount the Pali unless more substantial evidence is found.

I also take your point that each translator will have their own bias. Still, I don’t see why one would translate many words into a single word unless one had no other choice. Mapping multiple variables into a single variable always results in an irreversible loss of information. Should the original Pali be lost, future generations may start to debate whether the Buddha meant ‘metta’ in one use of the word ‘love’ or ‘pema’ in another use. Keeping the same delineation between metta, pema etc. while adding a note, or using a different compound word that might be a better fit as a translation, would still do the job without confusing the terms.

natthattā

An interesting thought came to me while I was thinking about this. In Sinhalese, which has common roots with Pali:

  • attha means true; and
  • naththa means untrue or false

This also has some similarity with the rendering ‘exist’ and ‘not exist’ for ‘atthi’ and ‘natthi’.

I wasn’t trying to assert that the Buddha is only in temporary Nibbana. I’m not sure what that would even mean.

I tried to use Ven Sujato’s translations because the majority of people here would likely use them as the primary source. Had I used Ajahn Thanissaro’s translations, we would have been arguing about whether or not his translations were correct. This would have resulted in an impasse that could not be resolved.

What I take from ‘entirely given up’ is that there is no clinging.

One of the dhamma talks I was listening to pointed out a phrase that many people would say after gaining stream-entry. Using the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta as an example, at the end Kondañña says:

Ajahn Thanissaro

Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation

Ven Sujato

Everything that has a beginning has an end

Bhikkhu Bodhi

Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation

This phrase is littered throughout the suttas such that it is a commonly known phrase. What is interesting about it is that it doesn’t say all is subject to cessation or everything has an end. Rather, whatever is subject to origination is subject to cessation or everything that has a beginning has an end.

This points to the fact that there are one more more elements that are NOT subject to origination and therefore are NOT subject to cessation. If there were not one or more of these elements, the Buddha and other arahants could simply have said all is subject to cessation, which they did not.

We can’t speculate on what the characteristics of any unconditioned elements may be because we would be caught up in trying to understand unconditional within the context of the aggregates which are conditional. However, whether it is labelled as ‘consciousness without surface’ or something else, the suttas clearly point to a category of phenomena that is outside the realm of the conditioned.

From this perspective, the various conflicting views we have may be because the words used to describe aspects of an awakened being all have roots in what is conditioned. This subsequently results in either a complete rejection of the words, tending toward nihilism or a mistaken understanding of the words tending towards eternalism. It is difficult to simply understand the words as a placeholder for something we have not yet experienced for ourselves.

3 Likes

Here’s a place where Bhante @Sujato discusses this point:

1 Like

If you are not sure what that would even mean then you probably should put in some effort to consider again.

  • Nibbana is a permanent attainment for Arahants. It does not change; it does not fluctuate.
  • Viññanam anidassanam is a state without conceptual discrimination, such as long v short, etc. Obviously viññanam anidassanam cannot be a permanent state; otherwise a Buddha could not even utter words, let alone describe phenomena.

Conclusion: viññanam anidassanam is not Nibbana; just as natthatta is not anatta. :slightly_smiling_face: :upside_down_face:

While the above seems questionable, the matter also seems irrelevant.

When the Buddha gives advice to laypeople about how to make & save money or how a husband should behave towards his wife; this does not mean this advice applies to the Buddha, because a Buddha does not use money & because a Buddha is not married.

Similarly, when the Buddha is talking to a confused wanderer such as Vacchagotta or when the Buddha is talking to Brahma Worshippers, this does not mean his advice applies to the Buddha.

It seems quite obvious Venerable Thanissaro was befuddled about the contextual situations in SN 44.10 & MN 49 / DN 11. For the last time, SN 44.10 is without doubt about atthatta vs natthatta and MN 49 seems about the spheres Brahma Gods cannot access because Brahma gods are attached to solipsist creation & rapture. All the best. :slightly_smiling_face:

1 Like

Stream-enterers utter this phrase.

The Pali is "“yaṁ kiñci samudayadhammaṁ sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadhamman”ti. “Yam” means “whatever thing” and “sabbaṁ” means “all”.

Please. There is no evidence for the above. It was already refuted. ‘Consciousness without surface’ is a non-conceptual consciousness thus cannot be permanent thus cannot be unconditioned. MN 140 literally says the sphere of infinite consciousness is “conditioned”. MN 140 says:

If I were to apply this equanimity, so pure and bright, to the dimension of infinite consciousness … But that is conditioned… MN 140

Conflicting views? Or is it heretical views of Maha Boowa, Thanissaro, Sumedho, etc, who seem to insist there is a permanent unconditioned consciousness?

No. The heresy seems to be from not considering the contextual situation of suttas; from believing Vacchagotta asked about anatta & from believing the Buddha was teaching a secret Nibbana to puthujjana Brahma Gods.

Yes, the above arguably applied/s to Maha Boowa, Thanissaro & Sumedho. :upside_down_face: :face_with_spiral_eyes:

You meant to say: "something I have not yet experienced for my-self"? Best wishes :pray:t2:

1 Like

Yes, you’re right. I’ve corrected my earlier post.

Yes, but samudayadhammaṁ means coming into existence. So, to put the translation together:

“Yam” - Whatever thing
“Samudaya” - Coming into existence
“Sabbam” - All

i.e. Whatever is subject to arising…

Yes, but that is not viññāṇa anidassana, as that term only appears a limited number of times - e.g. in MN49.

The rest, above, doesn’t really give me much to work with. So I shall simply accept your best wishes.

Thanks for this mike.

I had a read of the original essay. Here is my take on it:

@Sunyo presents the argument that the following six line verse is actually two separate answers to two separate questions:

If the two verses are separated by a full-stop, as argued, this is a reasonable interpretation to take.

However also argued is:

With the following reasoning…

The reasoning can be summarised in the following way:

  1. The order of the words within the poem have been changed to fit the metre
  2. If it is ‘corrected’, then the the viññāṇaṁ in viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ can be equated to consciousness of the second Jhana, rather than anything to do with Nibbana
  3. One more challenge must be overcome because MN49 mentions that viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is not part of the allness of the all (a common way to refer to the aggregates).
  4. This can be resolved by either deciding that:
  • 'allness of the all does not refer to the aggregates, but rather to the elements and all heavenly realms prior to the second Jhana OR
  • By deciding that the Burmese version of the Sutta is wrong. This would mean that the sentence below was NOT spoken by the Buddha but actually by Baka the Brahma. If that is the case, then because the Buddha didn’t speak the words, Baka could only have been referring to consciousness as part of the aggregates (e.g. consciousness in the second Jhana).

Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up—that’s what is not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Overlord, and the all.

On the Pali poetry aspect. Perhaps it is true that words in a poem can be rearranged. However viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ appears in the same order, without rearrangement, in MN49. Given this, the proposed change in word order seems somewhat arbitrary.

Then, as far as I know, allness of the all has only ever been spoken about with regard to the aggregates. Taking ‘all’ as simply the elements and lower heavenly realms seems to ignore the context provided by other Suttas. Also, just before the above the sentence in question, the Buddha speaks the following:

Having directly known water … fire … air … creatures … gods … the Creator … Brahmā … the gods of streaming radiance … the gods replete with glory … the gods of abundant fruit … the Overlord … Having directly known all as all, and having directly known that which does not fall within the scope of experience based on all, I did not identify with all, I did not identify regarding all, I did not identify as all, I did not identify ‘all is mine’, I did not enjoy all. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.’

Here, the Buddha has set the precedent that all means the aggregates rather than just the elements of fire, water etc. and the lower heavenly realms. The Buddha’s words must encompass all the aggregates. To limit all to just the elements and the lower heavenly realms would mean that the Buddha has not given up the second Jhana and above. Given the context within the other Suttas, and the context within this one, treating all as something other than the aggregates makes no sense. It also makes no sense to use the word all to mean the aggregates, and then immediately use it again afterward as simply meaning the elements and lower heavenly realms.

Finally, let’s suppose that the Burmese version of the Sutta is indeed wrong and that the sentence above can be attributed to Baka the Brahma. If this is so, Baka is now insulting himself. He wants to show the Buddha that he is more knowledgeable, but then at the same time he’s arguing that Viññāṇaṁ anidassanaṁ is:

not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā, the gods of streaming radiance, the gods replete with glory, the gods of abundant fruit, the Overlord, and the all.

So in essence he would be admitting that this kind of consciousness is out of his reach. That the proud Brahama would admit to such a thing is difficult to believe.

Further, prior to the above passage which is attributed by @Sunyo to Baka, the Buddha says the following:

But there is another realm that you don’t know or see. But I know it and see it. There is the realm named after the gods of streaming radiance. You passed away from there and were reborn here. You’ve dwelt here so long that you’ve forgotten about that, so you don’t know it or see it. But I know it and see it. So Brahmā, I am not your equal in knowledge, still less your inferior. Rather, I know more than you.

Here, the Buddha mentions for the first time that there is a realm above the realm of Baka, namely, that of the gods of streaming radiance. Given this, it doesn’t make sense that Baka would claim to have knowledge of a kind of consciousness that was not only beyond his current reach but also beyond the reach of the gods supposedly above his realm; especially having heard of them for the first time. So on these grounds the attribution of the passage containing viññāṇa anidassana to Baka makes no sense.

To summarise, I find a few issues with @Sunyo’s analysis of viññāṇa anidassana as several assumptions have been made that seem to deviate from the principle of Occam’s razor.

Hey, thanks for reading and responding to that. :upside_down_face:

In MN49 it the line also still follows the metrical rules of verse. Bodhi has even typeset it as verse in his translation iirc. It’s a bit awkward to have a single line like this, but perhaps it is not unique.

It leaves other questions, that’s for sure. But is it really that strange that the Brahma would say he discovered something beyond his realm? And that he was also mistaken about his attainment at the same time? In the end, it seems like he was unable to attain it anyway. Either way, the sutta (to me) is obviously a story that makes a philosophical point. It didn’t literally happen, so such inconsistencies may be because of that.

Anyway, most importantly, the Burmese version is not only unique: it is also broken. Because it too does not fully attribute the quote to the Buddha. It seems one quote marker (iti) is added later, yet one was forgotten. So other issues aside, the quote must be attributed to Baka. See also:

Regardless of who spoke the line in MN49—and this was actually my conclusion—it is not a good idea to put to much weight on it. Especially if one’s interpretation turns it into something rather unique, like a consciousness of nibbana which isn’t mentioned anywhere else.

2 Likes

Nice to meet you :slight_smile:

Thank you for clarifying this point. It isn’t immediately obvious that MN49 also follows a metrical pattern.

This seems strange to me because, in addition to Baka insulting himself, he would have had to outright lie in order to claim this, because he is claiming knowledge of the gods of radiance which the Buddha pointed out he doesn’t know about. There was one other Sutta I remember reading (I can’t remember which unfortunately), where a Brahma was asked a question he didn’t know the answer to by a monk, and he had to take the monk aside and ask the monk not to embarrass him. I believe there is a precedent that Brahmas can’t or don’t lie. So, while Baka claiming an attainment mistakenly may make sense, Baka lying doesn’t.

On the brokenness of the Burmese version. I understand that not all transmitted teachings are regular, perhaps particularly in an initially orally transmitted teaching. So perhaps this explains why it seems broken. But that is just a guess on my part.

Thank you for the new link also.

I’m not sure it is unique though. The presentation of the phrase viññāṇa anidassana is definitely unique and found only in a couple of places. But there is evidence of phenomena that lie outside of the aggregates.

I mentioned above, in a previous comment, that stream-enterers utter the following phrase:

Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to ceasing

It seems a little superfluous to say whatever is subject to arising unless there are one or more elements that are not subject to arising. In the absence of such elements, stream-enterers might have said instead:

All is subject to cessation

Since they did not say this, it seems a reasonable conclusion that one or more elements fall into the category of unarisen and consequently are not subject to cessation.

For example, the law of kamma cannot be subject to arising or ceasing because the entire teaching of the Buddha is based on the laws of kamma operating in a particular manner. We expect it to be constant such that killing people always eventually leads to unpleasant results, unless Nibbana is achieved. If the law of kamma is thought of as the governing principle for a set of activities, although the activities are subject to arising and ceasing, the governing principle itself is not.

I think what complicates the viññāṇa anidassana debate is the use of viññāṇa, which many are tempted to equate with the aggregate of consciousness. However, it could also be understood as a metaphor that uses the reader’s familiarity with the aggregate of consciousness to point to something else.

If the law of kamma can be understood as a governing principle that is unarisen, then there is no reason that viññāṇa anidassana could not be understood in the same way. Perhaps as the principle governing the activities of consciousness or fabrication. If viññāṇa anidassana is understood in this way, then no sense of self needs to be superimposed upon it that violates the teaching of anatta.