On sakkāya, identity, and substantial reality

Essays
21

I cannot judge translation issues, but I think that substantial view of reality arises together with the act of starting to conceive. In this process of conceiving things, things become more and more concrete and substantial. At least they appear so at those moments.

Conceiving is a kind of involvement that goes together with an inherently wrong understanding of ourselves, others, situations, reality. I am quit sure about this.
It is like being so involved in a movie or dream that one shows all signs that one experiences it as reality. Conceiving makes things substantially real as it were.

One gets easily lost in conceiving. That moment one experiences the conceived as real, truth, reality, as how things really are. There is also love to experience things as real while they are not real.

Conceiving is a strong tendency of the mind, i can see that. The kind of understanding that arises together with conceiving is, i believe, the opposite of direct knowledge and seeing things as they really are. The Dhamma leads to direct knowledge but not to conceived or intellectual understanding.

Delusion (moha) and experiencing the conceived as real, as how things really are, are very close, i think, if not the same. If one makes the head ones home, one becomes more and more deluded.

I am at a point i feel addicted to conceiving. I see it as a fetter. I am a conceiving addict. I confess.
Even while i realise it is not the Noble Path, and not the Path to understand Dhamma, nor practice it,
i feel conceiving and the will to conceive controlls me. The stream or wind of conceiving is like a flood or storm. A mental stream that takes controll over our understanding but also distorts it.
It is not the stream Buddha talks about but it is a strong flood and there is also love for it.

22

While greed, anger, and ignorance have been extinguished, the inherent dukkha of conditions remain while an arahant is alive. So –
In SN45.165:

"The suffering inherent in painful feeling;…

Seems pretty clear. Even without attachment, clinging, or identification, the pain of a bee sting, a broken leg, arthritis, etc. remain as painful sensations in and of themselves. This is a form of dukkha and why the Buddha taught about the cessation of all that in final nbbāna.

In SN 12.125: " Whatever arises and ceases is only dukkha arising and ceasing." Meaning all conditions.
In SN22.15: " What’s impermanent is suffering." Meaning all conditions.

In final nibbāna the khandhas cease with out rebirth, I think you’ll agree. And that is the final cessation of all dukkha.

23

Maybe because this word was invented by the Buddha himself and so before him, such definition is unheard of. sakkāyadiṭṭhi is needed to be removed at sotāpanna level so before the appearance of the Buddha, there were no sotāpanna; that leads to the situation that the word sakkāya is unheard of.

Even if the translators were at arahant level, they still were not the Buddha so they have to struggle to invent new words in their own language. I am not using “wrong” because it seems to be a bit too strong word, it seems to me that they struggle with it.

Anyway, in my understanding, I am using “graspable-body” for sakkāya. It is inspired from the synonym between “graspable” and “fathomable”. And from MN77, the word “unfathomable” (appameyyo) was mentioned for the Buddha so to make a contrast with a normal person, we get “fathomable”. And to remind the relationship with “clinging/craving”, we get the word “grasp” which leads to the synonym of “fathomable”. That’s why in the end, I pick “graspable-body”.

:pray:

Link to synonym of fathomable mentioned in the dictionary of Merriam-Webster

24

This is interesting and valuable work, Bhante. I think we should keep in mind it is speculative.

I am a little concerned about how much theory is getting packed into a single word that is otherwise unelucidated in the Pāli tradition. Was the Buddha aware of this Jain usage? Hard to say for sure. If I remember correctly – and my memory is often faulty – the Buddha’s objection to Jains in the suttas was largely around issues of ethics and practice rather than their views on substance.

Further, as you know, the word “substance” is a technical term in Western philosophy that comes with a large amount of baggage. It stems from Aristotle and became the centerpiece of a lot of Christian theology. While there are no doubt parallels between those Western philosophical and theological positions and the positions that the Buddha objected to in the Upaniṣadic and Jain thinkers of his day, I’m not sure how much of that we want to pack into a single, otherwise unexplained term.

Anyhow, food for thought. :anjal:

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25

I am quite attached to the visceral impact of “identity view” and the corresponding teaching of its cessation. “Identity view” is so temptingly axiomatic and communicable. And precisely because of that common view of “identity”, the challenge posed by the Buddha hits like a brick wall and directly disrupts the underpinning assumption of reality. As a student of Zen, I always appreciate the resounding “slap” of the moment. In muted contrast, “substantialist view” is a bit … dry.

On the upside, I am now able to use my newly learned word “substantialism” to explain the perils of identity view.

:laughing:

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26

What is besides texts the reason, what is the cause, what is the principle behind it, that you yourself really know and see that any formation is suffering? Is that really what you know and see? This is not to annoy you or to confront you but just to explore why someone would teach that any formation is suffering.
If the Buddha knew this, how did he know this? Did he just define any formation as suffering?
Was he so depressed that he saw any formation as suffering? Why did the Buddha see formations as suffering and why do you?

27

Hi,

Are you asking how we know if a bee sting or broken leg is painful?
Does that kind of pain, dukkha, need to be defined?
Can any changeable condition offer lasting relief from all dukkha?

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28

This is a terrible and obviously false interpretation of the text that would render nibbanns into a sense experience and make it incoherent.

No they didnt and thats not what your qoute says.

No they dont.

No it isnt.

This is a pali specific sectarian phrase and it is missinterpreting it to apply to nibanna.

This is not obvious amd if it where true the buddhist path would be impossible.

Basically I think this is another example of how interpreting what the texts mean in terms of a later, sectarian body of texts is dangerous and fraught, while a great deal of clarity and illumination of sectarian texts is possible by studying the early texts.

As to the OP, its a genuine rationale for a translation choice and I say the more of that the merrier!

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29

I’m struggling with the specificity of the term substantialism, it seems a highly precise term for what you describe, but I’ve had to spend rather a long time splitting substantial out from essential within the realm of philosophy.

Something (not) having an essence; ie one of the khandhas (not) being the essential aspect of one’s self, in a plain, non-philisophical terms seems clear. Then I start to doubt that I am even clear about the difference between the EBT and Theravadin views on the khandhas. Yikes!

Sorry if this deviates too far from the OP

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30

They do that because they are the result of intention. Rapture, for example. It does make sense to do that, IMO.

31

A substance is an independent thing which has characteristics, which grounds reality. An apple for example has the characteristics of “red”, “sweet” etc which are carried by the “apple”, which is the substance. Essence is what makes a substance what it is, apart from other substances. Substances and essences abstractions. They are claimed to be known via reason, and so are a part of Rationalism. Already we can see a conflict between substance theory and the Buddha’s own epistemology.

32

These are the Jain’s substances. We also see substance theory in Vaiśeṣika, for example in the work of Kaṇāda. From what we know of the Ājīvikas they too had a substance theory via their atomic theory and their concept of a soul which was a material substance, hence why they thought it was subject to fate. Based on what we know, the Buddha’s contemporaries were steeped in this kind of thinking and this is what he was replying to via dependent origination. Substances can’t be found, because all we can know is dependent rather than independent, and so by definition cannot be substantially real. This is true of the soul as it is for any other substance, such as matter etc.

Jain substances
Jain substances2048×1086 483 KB

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33

Thanks, that’s helpful. However it’s quite a complex concept for a translation choice.

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34

There are those sutta’s that describe the progressive stilling of formations. They, and practise also, reveals that stilling is unmade, unbecome, in the sense that it is not seen arising and ceasing. Like silence is just the natural result of the absence of noise, in the same way the stilling is just the natural result of the absence of formations. In that sense it is unmade, unbecome, not produced, unconditioned.

I feel Buddha saw this stilling, this emptiness, as a happiness that is more refined then the happiness of a mind with pleasant formations such as the formations of joy, delight, enthousiam, etc. The stilling of formations cannot be itself a formation ofcourse otherwise it becomes meaningless to talk about the stilling of formations.

The stilling of all formations is also sensed, or rather tasted. Ofcourse.
And from this perspective it can be said that any formation in the mind is more or less a violation of that totally unburdened empty stillness. Probably because the mind still inclines towards that formation and there is still a subtle landing on it.

So that might be a good reason to teach that any formation is dukkha, a kind of violation of the ultimate peace and burdenfree stilling of all formation.

Stilness, cessation, emptiness, the stilling of all formations, non-movement, the uninclined does refer to something which can be known as ultimate happiness. The stilling of all formations, the empty stilness is never seen arising, ceasing, and changing in the meantime. I believe this is how EBT talk about the unconditioned or condition free. It is unmade because it does not rely on conditions or formations. It is emptiness, an empty stillness. It reveals itself when formations cease.

This makes sense, for me:-) But just calling all formations suffering makes no sense at all. There must be a reason and cause for doing that. I have made an attempt to describe this reason.

Indeed, stilness, emptiness is not a changeable condition. It is also not a bhava, it does not show growth and decay and change. This is always present as some kind of background in our lives. I would say it is not the same as unawareness, bhavanga. I also believe it cannot be manipulated in any way and is beyond good and bad.

i believe it is not that easy to really talk about suffering. The 16th Karmapa was very ill, like some monks in the sutta’s. There were great pain. But if mind stays totally unaffected, such as his, even when spitting blood, can it be said that this person suffers? Maybe in a dogmatical way it can be said, but in an experiential way it cannot really, i feel.

I tend to believe now that some buddhist feel that our bhava is fixed, is human, and there is no way to escape this. Others feel and teach this is possible because the empty stilled nature of mind has no bhava. This bhava free mind is mirror-like, it only reflects and it does not show any signs of suffering.
To consider bhava as something fixed from the moment of birth is, i think, wrong.

Is emptiness, the stilling of all formations, the unconditioned, a substantial reality?
Pffff…now i must see what that wording means

35

Thank you for the essay. For me it is convincing and I decided to follow your change of the translation.

There is now also a German translation available.

I feel the change from “identity view” (Glaube an eine Persönlichkeit) to “substantialist view” (substanzialistische Ansicht) is such a substantial one that it deserves an explanation also for the German reader. :smiley:

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36

Characteristics as red and sweet are not really carried by the apple, ofcourse. Such characteristics do not exist independend of an observer. It is a mind-made subjective reality. Maybe another being does not experience an apple as red or sweet. Is it wrong? Ofcourse not. That would be like discussing which dream is true.

37

Not “this person” suffers, for the arahant has let go of all attachment, aversion, and ignorance – so the “mind” is free of of all that, of all proliferations and the usual reactivity.
But pain is painful – so this is freedom from the dukkha of the defilements but not yet freedom from the dukkha inherent in conditional khandhas.
The sutta citations I offered in earlier posts appear to be direct and clear.

Also in SN36.6:

“In the same way, when a learned noble disciple experiences painful physical feelings they don’t sorrow or wail or lament, beating their breast and falling into confusion. They experience one feeling: physical, not mental.
When they’re touched by painful feeling, they don’t resist it. There’s no underlying tendency for repulsion towards painful feeling underlying that.”
So, yes, the arahant is detached, disentangled, and unfettered (visaññutta) by painful sensations. But the sheer experience of pain remains – and that points to still having to experience the dukkha of conditions, even as the mind remains calm and eqaunimous.

I mean, isn’t the Unconditioned a synonym for nibbāna? And even practitioners who express the view that final nibbāna is an ineffable sort of being-ness or timeless citta don’t say that any conditions remain, let alone those who express that final nibbāna is the complete cessation of even that.
If conditions are not intrinsically dukkha, why couldn’t they exist in final nibbāna? What would be the problem?
But they don’t.

What’s directly felt/experienced via the khandhas is still a form of dukkha – like the “great pain” you mentioned and like the Buddha’s back pain that lead him to ask Sariputta to offer a Dhamma talk so the Awakened One could rest, (sorry, can’t recall the sutta right now).

What we may call mental suffering, stress, reactivity, etc. are not present in the Arahant. But while alive, there is still a body, nerves, painful sensations, and these are forms of dukkha as well. I think this is the crux of our different expressions on this topic.

We can recall the three forms of dukkha taught by the Buddha in a prior post – not all of which point to “suffering” in its more intense sense. On subtler levels, conditions themselves are suffering in their aspect of impermanence, (vipariņāma-dukkha).

We can ask ourselves, which is more free of any dukkha – to experience painful sensations or not to experience them at all?
To not experience them at all, all conditions must be absent.

Anyway, that’s how I understand this.

38

It seems what’s at the core of sakkhaya ditthi is taking the 5 aggregates as I, me, and mine.
Taking them ‘personally’.
In the end this ‘person’ is not to be found.
Perhaps this is the same as saying what is believed to make up a ‘person’ is ultimately insubstantial.

I believe Ajahn Sumedho has said, “Don’t take your life personally.”

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39

Thanks. :pray:
Agree!

Somehow the topic diverged a bit into the dukkha of conditions, but I’m kinda done with posting about that now. :slightly_smiling_face:

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40

I think that in discussing what sakkaya ditthi is, i think we can also look at the effects of sakkaya ditthi. To get a better understanding of what is meant.

This is described in SN22.1, for example. With sakkaya ditthi one is not only ailing in body but also ailing in mind. It clearly relates to the tendency to see body and mental aspect as me and mine. And when changes occur one is worried. I believe this is immediately recognisable in our daily lives. Who does not worry when certain bodily changes happen related to sicknesses etc. It is amazing, i feel, that sakkaya ditthi can be uprooted. I cannot really see yet, fo myself!, how this is even possible.

Substantialist view or “substantialist view of reality” sound a bit to philosophical, i feel. In this context. In this sutta it clearly refers to a direct recognisable and straigtforward psychological tendency.

Also SN22.155 gives insight i feel. It describes how sakkaya ditthi’s arise due to grasping the khandha’s.
I think also in this case substantialist view seems a bit fabricated/fancied. It does not seem really in place.

I know this does not cover all but i think we must be careful to see sakkaya ditthi as some philosophical view but as a psychological tendency, just as the other anusaya are also.

I think identity view is not that bad