On the consciousness where nothing appears

[Sunyo]

@sujato

In the suttas [nidassana] is almost always used in the context of “form” meditation, where it refers to, for example, the blue color or blue “appearance” of the “forms” that appear in meditation, i.e. what is today called a nimitta.

Ah, yes. To clarify for others, this happens for example in AN10.29, which also mentions perceiving limited and unlimited (appamāṇa) forms: the same idea as MN128, where the context is developing samādhi. I agree, Bhante, that this is another indication that anidassana is a synonym for formless.

The translation “where nothing appears” seems more adequate than “invisible”, certainly in a Buddhist context. But perhaps, if these lines of verse also refer to Brahmanical ideas, the meaning of the term may be wider than that, mostly poetical and not meant to be that technical and specific.

a couple of significant connections with the Upaniṣads,

Although I did not give it much importance in the essay you referred to, I think these connections are actually what these two suttas (DN11 and MN49) are actually all about. Both have a very distinct Brahmanical context, with the Brahmā gods being made fun of, and DN11 is also part of the Sīlakkhandha Vagga of the Dīgha, which is completely aimed at converting outsiders, primarily Brahmins.

These suttas are refuting the Brahmanical belief in a nāmarūpa-less consciousness and reaffirm the Buddha’s idea of the cessation of all existence and hence consciousness, including “infinite” ones. Some small translation issues aside, this much is completely certain to me. This is of course one of the running threads in the suttas: what others took as permanent and as liberation, the Buddha saw as impermanent and suffering. This also goes for this infinite (or “unbounded”) consciousness.

The terminology used is also very Upaniṣadic. You already pointed out some connections. In a recent thread I discussed this in more detail:

@Sunyo

The verses [of DN11] are actually a response to the Brahmins. Richard Gombrich already observed that “the opening statement of the answer seems prima facie to reify consciousness and the language sounds as if it could come from an Upaniṣad” (How Buddhism Began). He did not provide further sources, but I have no doubt these verses indeed reference Brahmanic ideas. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the Brahmin sage Yājñavalkya describes the highest form of existence as “an unbounded, limitless mass of consciousness” and also calls it “neither fine nor coarse, neither long nor short”, in both cases using the direct Sanskrit equivalents of the terms used in the Kevaddha Sutta. (2.4.12, 3.8.8) He also describes this form of existence as being different from and uninfluenced by the four elements. (3.7.3) Further, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad calls this highest essence “invisible” (nadṛśya). (2.8)

It is a bit more speculative, but the term ‘all-shining’ or ‘luminous all-round’ (sabbato pabhaṁ) might have a link with a statement from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: “Far above here [is brahman] the light that shines from heaven on the backs of everything, on the backs of all (sabba) things, in the very highest of the high worlds—it is clearly this very same light here within a man. […] This self of mine that lies deep within my heart—it is made of mind, […] luminous is its appearance.” (3.13.7) One idea here seems to be that this consciousness makes awareness of things in the world possible. It “illuminates” them, making them in a sense visible. However, the term ‘all-shining’, which to Yājñavalkya would have implied a pure eternal entity, to the Buddha merely referred to the purity of a temporal and individual experience.

The term nāmarūpa is also found in the Upaniṣads, where a type of knowing or consciousness apart from “name and form” was the highest goal. (See e.g. Falk Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa.)

Yājñavalkya’s unbounded consciousness likely differed from the Buddha’s, not only philosophically but also in practice, because the Upaniṣads indicate Yājñavalkya arrived at it through reason rather than meditation. (See e.g. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge §42) But regardless, the Buddha did use the exact same terminology, which indicates he—or whoever composed the Kevaddha Sutta—was very familiar with these Brahmanic ideas and was addressing them directly.

Gombrich also commented on the Kevaddha Sutta (DN11) that “it is a bit risky to take a riddle or its solution as a philosophical tenet or argument”. I wholeheartedly embrace this sentiment, but in this particular case the overall meaning seems clear enough to me. In short, the Buddha acknowledged the existence of an unbounded consciousness but denied its unconditioned nature. To the Buddha all consciousness is dependently arisen, including unbounded consciousness. His essential response to the Brahmanic ideas is therefore two final lines of verse: “when consciousness ceases, then those come to cease”. While the Yājñavalkya’s goal was a type of consciousness free from name and form, his goal was the cessation of consciousness.

Some interpreters have failed to keep these two concepts apart. Oldenberg for example wrote in The Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Early Buddhism that the “Brahmanic thinking […] is also basically valid for the Buddhistic”, both resulting in “the blissful merging with infinity” when name and form are abandoned. This is exactly the kind of thinking the Buddha was trying to avoid when saying consciousness depends on nāmarūpa. The essential message in these verses is that nāmarūpa can only end when consciousness ends as well.