Hi all, 
I don’t think there are. 
The brackets in “the cessation (the activity of) consciousness” in this translation already indicate that one has to be very liberal in one’s interpretation to read the discourse in this way. Because it doesn’t say “the activity of” consciousness ceases, it just says consciousness itself ceases. And that includes the infinite consciousness mentioned just before, which as others said is indeed a state of meditation that’s mentioned throughout the discourses to be impermanent and conditioned. (I prefer to call it ‘unbounded/boundless consciousness’, and also argued for this in the brief essay linked by Jasudho above, which notified me of this topic.)
The rendering ‘formless’ for 無形 I find interesting, because in the essay I concluded the Pāli equivalent anidassana to be a poetic metaphor for formless. The quite literal Chinese translations 無形 (formless/invisible) also agrees that renderings such as ‘without surface’ aren’t warranted.
Hi Ven! This I agree forms part of understanding what the discourse is about, but the story doesn’t have to be literal, and I’m not convinced the formless meditations is the only thing the monk is inquiring about. It seems he also thinks these attainments are themselves nibbāna, in part because he asks for where the four elements cease without remnant, i.e., cease forever.
Discussions about this discourse always start with the verses, but I think it is helpful to consider the wider context as well. Noteworthy is the place of this discourse in the Dīgha Nikāya. It’s part of the Sīlakkhandha Vagga, each discourse of which addresses views of outsiders. The function of this discourse therefore isn’t to give some of the canon’s highest teachings on nibbāna. Its primary function is to refute the doctrines of others. That knowledge helps us interpret the sutta. 
An important idea of the discourse, one that it sort of revolves around, is:
And what is the miracle of instruction? Here, Kevaddha, a monk gives instruction as follows: "Consider in this way, don’t consider in that, direct your mind this way, not that way, give up that, gain this and persevere in it.”
So who are considering things the wrong way in this case? Whose view is to be given up? As in most cases, it’s the Brahmins. This is indicated indirectly by the story wherein Brahmā doesn’t know the answer to the question and refers to the Buddha, and more directly by the specific terms used in the verses.
However, since no Brahmin is explicitly addressed, and since the commentary is—as always—completely unaware of Upaniṣadic ideas and terminology, it misinterpreted the verse’s “invisible, unbounded consciousness” (viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ). It took this to refer to the ability to know (viññātabba) nibbāna, even though the word ananta should make it clear that this refers to the second formless state, the state of unbounded (or “infinite”) consciousness.
Note, though, that the commentary understood viññāṇa here to have the meaning of understanding rather than awareness. It did not think this was about a type of unconditioned consciousness, a consciousness outside of the aggregates or alike. Such ideas only came later, quite possibly indirectly influenced by the commentary’s initial misunderstanding and reference to nibbāna.
But as I said, it seems the verses are actually a response to the Brahmins. Richard Gombrich already observed that “the opening statement of the answer seems prima facie to reify consciousness and the language sounds as if it could come from an Upaniṣad” (How Buddhism Began). He did not provide further sources, but I have no doubt these verses indeed reference Brahmanic ideas. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the Brahmin sage Yājñavalkya describes the highest form of existence as “an unbounded, limitless mass of consciousness” and also calls it “neither fine nor coarse, neither long nor short”, in both cases using the direct Sanskrit equivalents of the terms used in the Kevaddha Sutta. (2.4.12, 3.8.8) He also describes this form of existence as being different from and uninfluenced by the four elements. (3.7.3) Further, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad calls this highest essence “invisible” (nadṛśya). (2.8)
It is a bit more speculative, but the term ‘all-shining’ or ‘luminous all-round’ (sabbato pabhaṁ) might have a link with a statement from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: “Far above here [is brahman] the light that shines from heaven on the backs of everything, on the backs of all (sabba) things, in the very highest of the high worlds—it is clearly this very same light here within a man. […] This self of mine that lies deep within my heart—it is made of mind, […] luminous is its appearance.” (3.13.7) One idea here seems to be that this consciousness makes awareness of things in the world possible. It “illuminates” them, making them in a sense visible. However, the term ‘all-shining’, which to Yājñavalkya would have implied a pure eternal entity, to the Buddha merely referred to the purity of a temporal and individual experience.
The term nāmarūpa is also found in the Upaniṣads, where a type of knowing or consciousness apart from “name and form” was the highest goal. (See e.g. Falk Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa.)
Yājñavalkya’s unbounded consciousness likely differed from the Buddha’s, not only philosophically but also in practice, because the Upaniṣads indicate Yājñavalkya arrived at it through reason rather than meditation. (See e.g. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge §42) But regardless, the Buddha did use the exact same terminology, which indicates he—or whoever composed the Kevaddha Sutta—was very familiar with these Brahmanic ideas and was addressing them directly.
Gombrich also commented on the Kevaddha Sutta (DN11) that “it is a bit risky to take a riddle or its solution as a philosophical tenet or argument”. I wholeheartedly embrace this sentiment, but in this particular case the overall meaning seems clear enough to me. In short, the Buddha acknowledged the existence of an unbounded consciousness but denied its unconditioned nature. To the Buddha all consciousness is dependently arisen, including unbounded consciousness. His essential response to the Brahmanic ideas is therefore two final lines of verse: “when consciousness ceases, then those come to cease”. While the Yājñavalkya’s goal was a type of consciousness free from name and form, his goal was the cessation of consciousness.
Some interpreters have failed to keep these two concepts apart. Oldenberg for example wrote in The Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Early Buddhism that the “Brahmanic thinking […] is also basically valid for the Buddhistic”, both resulting in “the blissful merging with infinity” when name and form are abandoned. 
This is exactly the kind of thinking the Buddha was trying to avoid when saying consciousness depends on nāmarūpa. The essential message in these verses is that nāmarūpa can only end when consciousness ends as well. So it’s somewhat ironic (and perhaps also a bit sad) that these statements are now often interpreted in the exact opposite way. 
Oldenberg isn’t alone in this. Some very well-known Buddhist monks have made similar statements, although less publicly.
That something is inauthentic in some versions of MN49 is not in question, because the Pāli versions differ. None of them actually correctly attributes the quote to the Buddha. The Burmese tries to do so, but does it in a broken way, lacking an end quote marker ti. Since the other versions aren’t broken in such a way and attribute the words to Brahmā, and since the Chinese parallel attributes a similar statement to him, this is more likely to be the more authentic reading. That of course also aligns with an unbounded/infinite consciousness being a Brahmanic idea of liberation.
That aside, if we have to take a playful statement on ‘the all’ from one sutta to interpret a unique and broken quotation in another sutta, to interpret a cryptic riddle-like verse in yet another, and then this we take as one the strongest indications that the Buddha’s goal was a type of consciousness… to me this isn’t really very solid reasoning.