On the last line of SN 44.10

I am working on my thread as we speak, but will say a few quick things in response, again on my mobile, so forgive me,

So as per the above, yes, i think thats roughly it, the problem that the buddha says most people have is attatchment to and craving for manifest phenomena like form and feeling and consciousness that cannot ever be satisfying or identical to the subject that is experiencing them.

The Samyutta seems to take up a secondary problem, or perhpas better, the subsequent Theravada and much of contemporary academic study of Buddhism have used the Samyutta to take up a different problem, that is the philosophical criticism of the metaphysical claim that an unmanifest but real substance called atman underlies all manifest phenomena and is ultimatly identical to the subjectivity that experienses diverse manifest phenomena.

This is an important position for Buddhists in the context of Vedanta to take, but it is, as i have said, not clear to me that such a position is actually particularly prominent in the EBTs, DN1 and DN2 for example list several philosophical positions in some detail, and none of them look like Vedanta without a fair bit of squinting.

But leaving aside permanent or absolute atmans, there is still the significant problem of “the manifestation of individual subjectivity”. This is the problem I suggest is wrestled with in the undeclared points.

It goes something like this;

If “I” am just an illusion, a non-real thing that only appears to exist, then no salvation is possible for me, no one is freed when the illusion is dispelled, there wasn’t anyone to be freed to begin with.

On the other hand if “I” am a real existing thing then I am subject to predicates, entangled with language and the world, subject, in short, to suffering.

I am still puzzling out the both amd niether.

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Hey :wave:

Could you tell me where you see this in the Saṁyutta? I may be forgetting certain things, but I really don’t see this position being expressed in the SN at all. I actually see much more anxiety about this in the DN as a whole: They talk about all the possible types of attā people might believe in at DN 1. They go into it at DN 15 (and also respond to Brahmanical notions of consciousness and nāmarūpa with their mutual correspondence). They show the primacy of the Buddha over Brahmā, a kind of personified bráhman, etc. There is a lot more concern for outside ideas of an attā and philosophical speculation in general.

In the SN, apart from an occasional exception, I really only see discussion of the former thing: nothing manifest in experience should be grasped on to. We see a more simple formula of aniccadukkhaanattā, and lack of control → anattā, etc. We see discussion of some of the undeclared points and the Tathāgata not being able to be defined by any of these phenomena (or anything outside of these phenomena). If your idea is that the former (concern with absolute and permanent ātmans of more sophisticated type) is later, then again this points to the DN being much more reflective of that concern than the SN itself as I see it.

I have not read your whole post on the undeclared points, so I’m not up to date on where you stand in relation to all this. I think this will be a valuable post :slight_smile: That said, it seems that the concern with individual subjectivity is actually addressed elsewhere in the recurring passages where we see “useless speculation” and getting caught in a “thicket of views”. This is the formula found at e.g. MN 2 (and many other places) where people wonder What ‘I’ am, who they are, where they come from, where they will go, etc. The answer to this is the four noble truths and to set all of this aside until one sees clearly the delusion in it. The whole question of ‘I’ in regards to individuality seems irrelevant to me, personally. There is obviously individual manifestation: an individual body, stream of consciousness, feelings, etc. We can call this internal vs. external as the early texts do. But these are still just phenomena: internal or external it’s all the same, and this is precisely the view expressed about this that leads to dis-appropriation / lack of ownership / stream-entry / relinquishment of sakkāyadiṭṭhi.

The undeclared points probably have some bearing on this, but it seems to be minor. Maybe you feel otherwise and can show that. I think it comes up when discussing the factuality of the Tathāgata and his existence or non-existence, but it seems secondary there in that it is building off of the same ideas expressed elsewhere. There too the problem is not individuality but identity with individuality in the form of an I-theory or notion of a true ‘being’ apart from the manifest.

Mettā

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