I am working on my thread as we speak, but will say a few quick things in response, again on my mobile, so forgive me,
So as per the above, yes, i think thats roughly it, the problem that the buddha says most people have is attatchment to and craving for manifest phenomena like form and feeling and consciousness that cannot ever be satisfying or identical to the subject that is experiencing them.
The Samyutta seems to take up a secondary problem, or perhpas better, the subsequent Theravada and much of contemporary academic study of Buddhism have used the Samyutta to take up a different problem, that is the philosophical criticism of the metaphysical claim that an unmanifest but real substance called atman underlies all manifest phenomena and is ultimatly identical to the subjectivity that experienses diverse manifest phenomena.
This is an important position for Buddhists in the context of Vedanta to take, but it is, as i have said, not clear to me that such a position is actually particularly prominent in the EBTs, DN1 and DN2 for example list several philosophical positions in some detail, and none of them look like Vedanta without a fair bit of squinting.
But leaving aside permanent or absolute atmans, there is still the significant problem of “the manifestation of individual subjectivity”. This is the problem I suggest is wrestled with in the undeclared points.
It goes something like this;
If “I” am just an illusion, a non-real thing that only appears to exist, then no salvation is possible for me, no one is freed when the illusion is dispelled, there wasn’t anyone to be freed to begin with.
On the other hand if “I” am a real existing thing then I am subject to predicates, entangled with language and the world, subject, in short, to suffering.
I am still puzzling out the both amd niether.