Paccaya; is the cause actually the effect? (proof by contrapositive in DN 15)

[Brahmali]

Well, to be honest, I don’t know much about formal logic, and so you may well be talking with the wrong person. I am just trying to apply common sense, while being all too aware that common sense is not always reliable. Anyway, I am happy to continue this exchange for now, not least because I might learn something.

@Erika_ODonnell

Bhante, I can’t see how a temporary stopping is reconcilable with the idea of a sufficient condition, because the idea behind A being sufficient for B is that the existence of A guarantees that B is there too.

@Erika_ODonnell

Bhante, it’s not clear to me how the introduction of time affects the logical relationship between statements.

I am really out of my depth here, but having perused a couple of articles on Wikipedia I am wondering if there is a difference between sufficiency/necessity as used in logic and the same as used in causality. Here is what Wikipedia has to say about necessary and sufficient causes in its article on Causality:

Necessary causes
If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the prior occurrence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.

Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.

And here is an extract from the Wikipedia article on Necessity and Sufficiency (in formal logic):

Necessity:
The assertion that Q is necessary for P is colloquially equivalent to “P cannot be true unless Q is true” or “if Q is false, then P is false”. By contraposition, this is the same thing as “whenever P is true, so is Q”. The logical relation between them is expressed as “if P, then Q” and denoted “P ⇒ Q” (P implies Q). It may also be expressed as any of “P only if Q”, “Q, if P”, Q whenever P", and “Q when P”. One often finds, in mathematical prose for instance, several necessary conditions that, taken together, constitute a sufficient condition …

Sufficiency:
If P is sufficient for Q, then knowing P to be true is adequate grounds to conclude that Q is true; however, knowing P to be false does not meet a minimal need to conclude that Q is false.

The logical relation is expressed as “if P, then Q” or “P ⇒ Q”. This can also be expressed as “P only if Q” or “P implies Q”. Several sufficient conditions may, taken together, constitute a single necessary condition …

And from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, under Necessary and Sufficient Conditions, we have the following in regard to “directional” (i.e. causal) conditioning:

In general, if explanation is directional, it may not seem surprising that when A explains B, it is not usually the case that B, or its negation, is in turn an explanation of A (or its negation). John’s winning the race explains our celebration, but our failure to celebrate is not (normally) a plausible explanation of his failure to win. Lambert’s presence may explain why the seminar was such a great success, but a boring seminar is not—in any normal set of circumstances—a reason why Lambert is not at it. This result undermines the usual understanding that if A is a sufficient condition of B, it will typically be the case that B is a necessary condition for A, and the falsity of B a sufficient condition for the falsity of A.

What you are describing as a sufficient cause seems to me to be related to logic, not causality. In other words, you seem to be describing a structural principle whereby the existence of one thing guarantees the existence of something else. In causality, however, we are often dealing with ephemeral phenomena that have an effect over time (the Wikipedia article speaks of prior and subsequent occurrences). The best example of this from dependent origination is probably the link between birth and death (let’s leave out old age for simplicity’s sake). Birth is a time limited event, not a continuous process. But once birth has happened, death is guaranteed to ensue. Birth is not present when death happens, yet it is sufficient (and necessary) for death.

@Erika_ODonnell

Bhante, aren’t you here describing saṅkhāra as a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness?

If there are saṅkhāras, then there will be consciousness. This shows the sufficiency of saṅkhāras. (If saṅkhāras were merely necessary, this would not guarantee the continuation of consciousness.) If there are no saṅkhāras, then there is no consciousness. This shows the necessity of saṅkhāras. (If saṅkhāras were merely sufficient, then the end of saṅkhāra would not guarantee the end of consciousness.) At the point of death, saṅkhāra is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the continuation of consciousness. (And by the way, during a particular life time, name-and-form is the sufficient and necessary condition for consciousness.)

@Erika_ODonnell

What about dependent origination accounting for how things don’t end, i.e. how things keep on going, and dependent cessation for how things end?

Well, yes. I think we can agree on this.

@Erika_ODonnell

This is what I think of when I think of creation; how the content of existence comes to be. But this might just be because of the fuzziness of word meanings.

But the “content of existence” is first and foremost experience itself. In other words, the most basic thing we can say about existence is that there is experience. Everything else is derived from that. And dependent origination shows us how experience keeps on going.

@Erika_ODonnell

Coincidentally, have you ever considered translating DO as “why the heck do we keep getting reborn? ” it could be a good title for a book!

We have a rule at Bodhinyana Monastery that the one who has the idea must do the work!

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Brahmali

What you are describing as a sufficient cause seems to me to be related to logic, not causality. In other words, you seem to be describing a structural principle whereby the existence of one thing guarantees the existence of something else. In causality, however, we are often dealing with ephemeral phenomena that have an effect over time (the Wikipedia article speaks of prior and subsequent occurrences). The best example of this from dependent origination is probably the link between birth and death (let’s leave out old age for simplicity’s sake). Birth is a time limited event, not a continuous process. But once birth has happened, death is guaranteed to ensue. Birth is not present when death happens, yet it is sufficient (and necessary) for death.

The relationship between logic and causality seems to go pretty deep into philosophy, so we probably shouldn’t venture into that

I found this post on Quora about “logical and causal necessity”, here’s a quote:

For example, we know that clouds (plus other conditions) cause rain. So the causal direction is clouds → rain. However, the correct logical inference is rain → clouds (if it is raining, then it is cloudy).

I think it boils down to the fuzziness of the language of causation. It seems to me that in DN 15, the Buddha may be actually teaching an understanding of causality that is the same as in modern science.

Looking at the text, it’s “‘Jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti” and then the Buddha explains how to understand it, by providing the proper logical inference that can be drawn from the causal relationships.

Or perhaps just pointing out the relevant logical inference (how something ending leads to something else ending) without going into what can be inferred.

So we could make a distinction between the causal direction and the logical inferences one can (should?) make based on causal direction. What do you think?

[quote=“Brahmali, post:14, topic:5726”]
If there are saṅkhāras, then there will be consciousness. This shows the sufficiency of saṅkhāras. (If saṅkhāras were merely necessary, this would not guarantee the continuation of consciousness.) If there are no saṅkhāras, then there is no consciousness. This shows the necessity of saṅkhāras. (If saṅkhāras were merely sufficient, then the end of saṅkhāra would not guarantee the end of consciousness.) At the point of death, saṅkhāra is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the continuation of consciousness. (And by the way, during a particular life time, name-and-form is the sufficient and necessary condition for consciousness.)[/quote]
If we put aside sufficient and necessary for a bit, we could say that saṅkhāras cause consciousness, and that the salient logical inference to draw from that is that the end of saṅkhāras guarantees the end of consciousness.

This way, we don’t have to go too much into the relationship between language, logic, causality and reality, etc. which I think is probably more in line with the Buddha’s teaching style when I think about it.

@Brahmali

But the “content of existence” is first and foremost experience itself. In other words, the most basic thing we can say about existence is that there is experience. Everything else is derived from that. And dependent origination shows us how experience keeps on going.

I guess I mean this in the sense that “having a TV” doesn’t explain how the TV shows (the content) are created or how the TV works, but it does explain how I keep watching TV. In particular, if I throw out my TV, I won’t experience its content anymore.

Does that mean content is still being creating even if I don’t have a TV? I think I don’t have to take any position on that, because it’s not strictly relevant to my problem; it doesn’t affect whether or not I can throw out my TV.

The TV could stand for consciousness and nama-rupa for example.

[freedom]

I do not want to interrupt this good discussion; however, I would like to add some thoughts into this topic and hope that we may find something useful…

My English is bad, so I cannot be precise with my wordings. However, you can just take the ideas.

“With feeling as condition, craving comes to be”

To me, this statement means with enough level/amount/intensity…to that feeling, the corresponding craving comes to be.

Just as if there is enough water to overflow a cup, and we keep pouring water into that cup, then overflow will come to be with no exception. However, if there is not enough water, or we do not continue pouring water into that cup until it overflows, then overflow will not come to be.

Just as, bhikkhus, when rain pours down in thick droplets on a mountain top, the water flows down along the slope and fills the cleft, gullies, and creeks; these being full fill up the pools; these being full fill up the lakes; these being full fill up the streams; these being full fill up the rivers; and these being full fill up the great ocean; so too, with ignorance as proximate cause, volitional formations come to be; with volitional formations as proximate cause, consciousness … with liberation as proximate cause, the knowledge of destruction. (SN 12.23)

All dependently arisen phenomena are impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation (SN 12.20). By nature, after they arise, they must cease by themselves. Therefore, when a feeling arose, that feeling must cease by itself. We do not need to do anything to make that happen.

However, when a feeling arose, by ignorance we pay inappropriate attention to it and continue generating more and more feeling of that kind (This is the effect of the loop-back between name-and-form and consciousness). When there is enough feeling of that kind, it now can be used as a condition for craving comes to be, and craving must come.

For an arahant, when a feeling arose, he does not pay inappropriate attention to it. He does not generate any more feeling of that kind (the loop-back is cut). That feeling will cease by itself; therefore, there is not enough level/intensity of that kind of feeling so it cannot be used as condition for the corresponding craving comes to be. In other words, the feeling that can be used as condition for craving does not exist for the arahant.

Each dependently arisen phenomenon may have different sufficient level/intensity to be used as a condition for the next dependently arisen phenomenon. When birth arose, it right away fulfilled as a condition for dukkha comes to be.

That’s how I understand DO.

[Mat]

@freedom

For an arahant, when a feeling arose, he does not pay inappropriate attention to it. He does not generate any more feeling of that kind (the loop-back is cut). That feeling will cease by itself;

Not paying attention to unwholesome phenomena won’t get rid of them necessarily. See the vitakkasantana sutta for a few other methods used by the Buddha and his disciples.

Defilements cease but they arise again and again as other propagating factors like ignorance (avijja) are still present.

The Four Right efforts must be used to remove defilements.

With metta

[freedom]

@Mat

Not paying attention to unwholesome phenomena won’t get rid of them necessarily. See the vitakkasantana sutta for a few other methods used by the Buddha and his disciples.

Defilements cease but they arise again and again as other propagating factors like ignorance (avijja) are still present.

The Four Right efforts must be used to remove defilements.

Agree. that’s what a practitioner should do. However, I am here referring to an arahant who has cut off ignorance and has made an end of suffering. Moreover, I said that he does not pay inappropriate attention. In the same sutta that you mention (vitakkasantana sutta MN 20), the arahant can “think whatever thought he wishes to think and he will not think any thought that he does not wish to think”. This is how he can cut off the loop-back.

[Brahmali]

@Erika_ODonnell

Looking at the text, it’s “‘Jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti” and then the Buddha explains how to understand it, by providing the proper logical inference that can be drawn from the causal relationships.

Ok, let’s have look at how conditionality is explained in DN 15 (Ven. Bodhi’s translation):

‘Jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ. Jāti ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṃ sabbathā sabbaṃ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṃ— devānaṃ vā devattāya, gandhabbānaṃ vā gandhabbattāya, yakkhānaṃ vā yakkhattāya, bhūtānaṃ vā bhūtattāya, manussānaṃ vā manussattāya, catuppadānaṃ vā catuppadattāya, pakkhīnaṃ vā pakkhittāya, sarīsapānaṃ vā sarīsapattāya, tesaṃ tesañca hi, ānanda, sattānaṃ tadattāya jāti nābhavissa. Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmaraṇaṃ paññāyethā”ti?
“No hetaṃ, bhante”.
“Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo jarāmaraṇassa, yadidaṃ jāti.

“It was said: ‘With birth as condition there is aging and death.’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If there were absolutely and utterly no birth of any kind anywhere—that is, of gods into the state of gods, of celestials into the state of celestials, of spirits, demons, human beings, quadrupeds, winged creatures, and reptiles, each into their own state—if there were no birth of beings of any sort into any state, then, in the complete absence of birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for aging and death, namely, birth.

So, yes, here birth is given as a necessary condition for death: without birth, there is no death. And I agree with you, it does not follow from this that birth is a sufficient condition for death. I am not sure, however, if DN 15 is meant as an exhaustive treatment of causality in dependent origination. I would suggest the point of DN 15, rather, is to focus on the ending of suffering, as seems to be implied by the opening statement of the sutta.

To fully understand the conditionality that applies in DO we need to take a broader look at the suttas. I believe the best place to start is with the abstract principle of conditionality, which invariably is followed by the standard set of twelve links. It reads as follows in Ven. Bodhi’s translation:

Iti imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati. Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati. (e.g. at SN 12.21)

When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.

Here we have, I think, an almost perfect match with sufficient and necessary conditionality. “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises” shows sufficiency, whereas “with the cessation of this, that ceases; with the cessation of this, that ceases” shows necessity. If we are to take anything as the paradigm of conditionality that applies for DO, I would say this is it. It seems to me that DN 15 does not give the full story, but instead focuses on a particular aspect.

So I guess this means that the Buddha goes beyond causality as understood in modern science?

@Erika_ODonnell

If we put aside sufficient and necessary for a bit, we could say that saṅkhāras cause consciousness, and that the salient logical inference to draw from that is that the end of saṅkhāras guarantees the end of consciousness.

The abstract principle I have mentioned above is equally applicable here; in other words, both necessity and sufficiency applies.

[quote=“freedom, post:16, topic:5726”]
For an arahant, when a feeling arose, he does not pay inappropriate attention to it. He does not generate any more feeling of that kind (the loop-back is cut). That feeling will cease by itself; therefore, there is not enough level/intensity of that kind of feeling so it cannot be used as condition for the corresponding craving comes to be.[/quote]

It is not the intensity of the feeling that matters, but only how you relate to it. If you understand it in the right way, you will never crave for it regardless of its intensity. It is the insight of the arahant that matters.

[Erika_ODonnell]

@Brahmali

So, yes, here birth is given as a necessary condition for death: without birth, there is no death. And I agree with you, it does not follow from this that birth is a sufficient condition for death. I am not sure, however, if DN 15 is meant as an exhaustive treatment of causality in dependent origination. I would suggest the point of DN 15, rather, is to focus on the ending of suffering, as seems to be implied by the opening statement of the sutta.

It just came to mind that dependent cessation guarantees the necessity of each link of DO in any case. I.e. if dependent cessation is assumed to be true, the necessity of each link in DO is just a logically equivalent statement.

So DO is at least a chain of necessity relations. But of course, there could also be links where there is sufficiency in addition to necessity.

Bhante, is there any link in DO where you see lack of sufficiency causing problems in the suttas?

@Brahmali

Here we have, I think, an almost perfect match with sufficient and necessary conditionality. “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises” shows sufficiency, whereas “with the cessation of this, that ceases; with the cessation of this, that ceases” shows necessity. If we are to take anything as the paradigm of conditionality that applies for DO, I would say this is it. It seems to me that DN 15 does not give the full story, but instead focuses on a particular aspect.

So I guess this means that the Buddha goes beyond causality as understood in modern science?

It seems to me that one could interpret this abstract definition to show causal direction and logical necessity. For example, delusion is there before the volition, and the volition comes before consciousness etc.

It also depends on what one takes sufficient to mean in terms of causation. The way I understand sufficient is a 100% guarantee for a co-existing phenomena. E.g. feeling 100% guarantees there is craving. This creates an obvious conflict with the arahant for example.

You could say that sufficient means a guarantee but with exceptions. But then isn’t it better to say “in general feeling means craving, with some exceptions”, and then leave sufficient to retain a strict meaning?

And looking at DN 15:

[No birth means no aging and death]

“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for aging and death, namely, birth.

It seems to me that what is being said is almost that necessity is what it means for something to be a cause, source, origin and condition.

[freedom]

@Brahmali

It is not the intensity of the feeling that matters, but only how you relate to it. If you understand it in the right way, you will never crave for it regardless of its intensity. It is the insight of the arahant that matters.

Thanks for your input, Bhante.

The intensity that I referred is the total weight/amount of all feelings of that kind (or just one) at that moment. This intensity is increasing if those same kind feelings are continuously fed to the system. When the intensity reaches certain level, next step (craving) will come with no exception.

Just as if one is getting angry about an issue. At first, the intensity of this anger is not enough for one to crave for violent or inappropriate action. However, if one keeps engaging with that issue, the intensity of that anger will increase up to the point that one will crave for violent or inappropriate action.

When one saw a beautiful flower, pleasant feeling arose. However, this does not mean that one must crave for that flower at the first sight.

When one saw a beautiful flower, pleasant feeling arose and one keeps thinking about that flower (or the pleasant feeling that one experienced) or/and intentionally seeing that flower again and again, then up to some point craving will come.

When a person with no wisdom saw a beautiful flower, pleasant feeling arose but he has no time to think about that flower or that pleasant feeling then craving may not come.

Intensity of the feeling and how we relate to it may have direct relationship. Depend on how we relate to the feeling, it will increase or decrease. However, there are some levels of intensity that even we have wisdom or how hard we have tried to properly relate to it, it is hard or impossible for us to ignore or decrease it (as in case of venerable Channa used the knife in SN 35.87)

“Friend Sāriputta, I am not bearing up, I am not getting better. Strong painful feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding, is to be discerned. Just as if a strong man were to split my head open with a sharp sword, so too violent winds cut through my head. I am not bearing up…. Just as if a strong man were to tighten a tough leather strap around my head as a headband, so too there are violent pains in my head. I am not bearing up…. Just as if a skilled butcher or his apprentice were to carve up an ox’s belly with a sharp butcher’s knife, so too violent winds are carving up my belly. I am not bearing up…. Just as if two strong men were to seize a weaker man by both arms and roast him over a pit of hot coals, so too there is a violent burning in my body. I am not bearing up, I am not getting better. Strong painful feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding, is to be discerned. I will use the knife, friend Sāriputta, I have no desire to live.” SN 35.87

If the intensity of the painful feelings does not matter, then Ven. Channa does not need to use the knife since he is the one who has right understanding and insight. However, in this case, the intensity has reached its level, so craving to end that life has come no matter what Ven. Sariputa and Ven. Mahacunda have tried to persuade him.

That’s how I understand.

[Sylvester]

Hi @Erika_ODonnell and Bhante @Brahmali

I wonder if it might be useful to distinguish the different types of propositions made about Causality through epistemology. We have -

1. logical propositions that are deduced ie analytic a priori propositions
2. scientific propositions that are induced from empirical evidence, ie synthetic a posteriori propositions
3. metaphysical propositions, ie synthetic a priori propositions.

Given how a variety of synthetic a priori propositions are dismissed as unsafe in DN 1, I work on the assumption that these have no place in Buddhist causality (apologies to the Nanavirists!)

Going by the logic seen in DN 15 to define the 2nd Noble Truth (dependant origination) through the 3rd Noble Truth (the cessation series), the proposition “Feeling is a necessary condition for craving” is a formally and validly deduced proposition, ie it is an analytic a priori proposition.

What, on the other hand, about the statement “Feeling is a sufficient condition for craving”? Can it be deduced from any of other 3 Noble Truths?

For a start, I would like to comment on resorting to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of the locative absolute used in This-That Conditionality. It is not altogether apparent why this locative absolute needs to be translated as “When this exists”, when Wijesekara offers that it can be be translated as “On condition that this exists”. Secondly, the hoti in the main clause can take on any number of temporal shades, including the past tense.

What then are the bases used to justify a reading of sufficiency to Dependant Origination? If we argue from the observation that birth must lead to death, that’s already using the method of Induction from observable phenomena. It’s a completely different type of inference from Deduction, where the truth of the conclusion is embedded in the meaning of the premiss.

I think it is possible to interpret Dependant Origination inductively to yield the “sufficient cause” model if we accept that such judgments being based on observation are not guaranteed necessary truth, ie as a synthetic a posteriori proposition, “Feeling is a sufficient cause of craving” does not have to be true all of the time.

Yes, and I know what’s coming next - does this mean that statements such as “Birth will lead to death” are only contingent? Not necessary, as there is something else in the Stream Entry pericopes that regulate this relationship which can furnish an analytic a priori basis for this statement to be unfalsifiable. Guess which one?

[Brahmali]

@Erika_ODonnell

It just came to mind that dependent cessation guarantees the necessity of each link of DO in any case. I.e. if dependent cessation is assumed to be true, the necessity of each link in DO is just a logically equivalent statement.

Exactly. Yet it all depends on what we assume. If we assume dependent arising to be true (in addition to or instead of dependent cessation), then this guarantees the sufficiency of each link in DO.

[quote=“Erik_ODonnell, post:20, topic:5726”]
Bhante, is there any link in DO where you see lack of sufficiency causing problems in the suttas?[/quote]

Pretty much everywhere. If birth were not a sufficient condition for death, then you could have birth without death. The same would hold for all the other links: you could have craving without attachment, contact without feeling, delusion without volitional activities, etc. All in all you could have delusion without suffering. None of this makes any sense, and as I see it, it contradicts the general principle of conditionality that “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises”.

@Erika_ODonnell

You could say that sufficient means a guarantee but with exceptions. But then isn’t it better to say “in general feeling means craving, with some exceptions”, and then leave sufficient to retain a strict meaning?

Well, for the arising mode of DO, we do in fact have sufficiency for all the links, including that between feeling and craving. The arising mode starts out with delusion, and whenever there is delusion, craving follows from feeling. For the arahant, we have already departed from the arising mode of DO. Yes, the arahant still feels, but the whole process is already moving towards cessation. DO, in its arising mode, does not apply to the arahant.

@Sylvester

Going by the logic seen in DN 15 to define the 2nd Noble Truth (dependant origination) through the 3rd Noble Truth (the cessation series), the proposition “Feeling is a necessary condition for craving” is a formally and validly deduced proposition, ie it is an analytic a priori proposition.

But the Buddha did not exclusively rely on formal logic to arrive at his insight into DO. The Buddha’s main insight into DO, as I see it, is that craving perpetuates experience, which is really the content of the second noble truth. It may not be possible to arrive at this through formal logic, but then the Buddha’s insight would not have been as revolutionary if it was limited to this.

@Sylvester

For a start, I would like to comment on resorting to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of the locative absolute used in This-That Conditionality. It is not altogether apparent why this locative absolute needs to be translated as “When this exists”, when Wijesekara offers that it can be be translated as “On condition that this exists”. Secondly, the hoti in the main clause can take on any number of temporal shades, including the past tense.

It’s not clear to me why this would make any difference.

@Sylvester

What then are the bases used to justify a reading of sufficiency to Dependant Origination? If we argue from the observation that birth must lead to death, that’s already using the method of Induction from observable phenomena. It’s a completely different type of inference from Deduction, where the truth of the conclusion is embedded in the meaning of the premiss.

It may not be possible to show on purely logical grounds that birth is a sufficient condition for death. But do we really need such a logical proof? To me this just shows the limits of logic, not that birth being a sufficient condition for death is false.

@Sylvester

Not necessary, as there is something else in the Stream Entry pericopes that regulate this relationship which can furnish an analytic a priori basis for this statement to be unfalsifiable. Guess which one?

Oh, the suspense!

[Sylvester]

Dear Bhante

@Brahmali

Oh, the suspense!

Hee, hee, hee.

@Brahmali

DO, in its arising mode, does not apply to the arahant.

I’m a bit concerned by this, as I thought the whole point about This-That Conditionality is to propose that the “elements” in that arising sequence are each paṭic­ca­samup­panna things : SN 12.20. Perhaps we could say that there being no craving in an arahant, craving as a dependently arisen thing is not relevant to an arahant. Yet, for those elements that survive in an arahant, eg feeling, that feeling remains a dependantly arisen thing for the arahant.

@Brahmali

But the Buddha did not exclusively rely on formal logic to arrive at his insight into DO.

That is absolutely true. The point I was making above is that DN 15 is a formal logical treatment of the interchangeability of the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths through the Logic procedure of contraposition. I would not go so far as to suggest that the 2nd Noble Truth was derived logically absent the 3rd Noble Truth. The really tricky issue would be, for me, was how (if at all) the Buddha discovered the 2nd Noble Truth. I believe SN 12.10 and SN 12.65 may open a window in the awakening process of the Bodhisatta. This leads me to the point regarding the difference I perceive in BB’s and Wijesekara’s treatment of the locative absolute in idappaccayatā.

In the above 2 suttas, the locative absolute is in an interrogative form, eg -

kimhi nu kho sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti, kiṃpaccayā jarāmaraṇan’ti?

When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? By what is aging-and death conditioned?
(per BB)

It’s telling that the question does not ask, “What comes to be when birth exists?”. It does suggest again that the Bodhisatta’s enquiry is also a search for necessary conditions.

Coming back now to the suspenseful part -

@Brahmali

It may not be possible to show on purely logical grounds that birth is a sufficient condition for death.

I believe it is possible. I just hope it was not bad kamma on my part to keep a good monk waiting.

I’ll start with an observation about the definition of “birth” and “aging-and-death” -

And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death? The aging of the various beings in the various orders of beings, their growing old, brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, decline of vitality, degeneration of the faculties: this is called aging.
The passing away of the various beings from the various orders of beings, their perishing, breakup, disappearance, mortality, death, completion of time, the breakup of the aggregates, the laying down of the carcass: this is called death. Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death.

“And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent into the womb, production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth.

SN 12.2

I believe this is the only place in Dependant Arising where one common denominator straddles both elements, namely the “being” (satta). I would take this “being” as being regulated by the most fundamental awakening datum of Stream Entry -

yaṃ kiñci samuda­ya­dhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman’ti

What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

What I am arguing is not that Dependant Origination can be hammered out logically from raw data available to all and sundry. I would only go so far as to argue that Dependant Origination as a structure of necessary conditions is logically derivable from the Cessation series.

However, the raw datum of Stream Entry as above, does not seem to be logically derived, and must represent something unique. It might be related to the contents of the realisation of the 1st Noble Truth of Suffering.

[freedom]

This is how I understand the statement: “When this exists, that comes to be. With the arising of this, that arises.”

From SN 12.20

Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this, the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness, specific conditionality: this is called dependent origination.

Take feeling as an example:

When this exists, that comes to be
To me this statement means: when feeling exists, craving will come to be. Not clinging, birth or anything else… Must be craving. This statement emphasizes the actuality, the specific conditionality of DO.

With the arising of this, that arises
When feeling arises up to a level that can be used as condition, craving must arise with no exception. This statement emphasizes the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness of DO.

I do not think simple necessary and sufficient in logic can properly explain DO.

We can say contact is necessary for craving. Without contact, there is no feeling. Without feeling, there is no craving. Therefore, contact is necessary for craving by logic. However, this is not what DO is about. DO is a specific conditionality. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be (Not craving or anything else).

We can say birth is sufficient for death, but we cannot say for sure feeling is sufficient for craving. This will create inconsistency.

If we think feeling is sufficient for craving then craving is sufficient for clinging, clinging is sufficient for existence… then when we see a beautiful, attractive girl, pleasant feeling arise then we must have that girl in the future with no exception!

When we said sufficient, we imply that dependently origination phenomenon, right after it comes to be, is ready to trigger the next dependently origination phenomenon. Seeing this way, we ignore the “weight (or tolerant level)” of the cause. To me, the weight of the cause is also a factor in DO (Each person may have different tolerant level/weight that can be used as condition for the same cause).

Therefore, I see DO as a specific conditional law. It is a specific condition, and it is a law. If it meets its conditions, it must happen. If it does not meet its conditions, it will not happen.

If we try to explain DO by necessary we may say specific necessary. However, to me, necessary is already implied in specific (As I understand with my limited English!!!). If we try to use sufficient, we may say DO is sufficient when it meets its conditions (right type and right weight/level/intensity…). However, it sounds a little awkward to me.

Note: When I said right type, right weight/level/intensity… I mean right condition for the DO to operate. Just as when we have a seed, we will need right condition (like moisture, temperature, nutriments, environment…) for the seed to develop. Not just the weight/tolerant level of the seed (or the cause). Weight/tolerant level is just one of them. Right condition is more complicated than that.

Edit: Added note to clarify and correct what I meant by the weight/level…

[Brahmali]

@Sylvester

I’m a bit concerned by this, as I thought the whole point about This-That Conditionality is to propose that the “elements” in that arising sequence are each paṭic­ca­samup­panna things : SN 12.20. … Yet, for those elements that survive in an arahant, eg feeling, that feeling remains a dependantly arisen thing for the arahant.

It seems to me – and I think this is also the message of SN 12.20 – that “dependent origination” (paṭicca samuppāda) is a name for the whole sequence, whereas “dependently arisen phenomena” (paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā) concerns each individual factor. Dependent origination really concerns how suffering arises from delusion, and to show this the whole sequence is required. This means that for the arahant DO no longer applies, yet the phenomena that the arahant experiences, such as feeling, are still dependently arisen.

@Sylvester

It’s telling that the question does not ask, “What comes to be when birth exists?”. It does suggest again that the Bodhisatta’s enquiry is also a search for necessary conditions.

Well, it does make sense to search for necessary conditions, because if you are able to eliminate them you will be able to also eliminate the effect. But the search for a necessary condition only makes full sense if that condition is also sufficient. For if a condition is necessary but not sufficient, then there may be other ways of stopping the effect apart from eliminating that necessary condition. In others words, it suggests there may be other ways of eliminating suffering apart from giving up delusion. I cannot see how this is acceptable.

@Sylvester

What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

This seems reasonable enough. But it does not really help us with the question of sufficiency between the other factors of DO.

[freedom]

@Brahmali

In others words, it suggests there may be other ways of eliminating suffering apart from giving up delusion. I cannot see how this is acceptable.

By wisdom, we do not create condition for craving to arise. By wisdom, we give up ignorance(delusion). By wisdom, we still/end volitional formations that in turn cut off the condition for craving to arise. That’s how I see.

[Sylvester]

Thanks Bhante. Much to mull over. Better yet, work on Stream Entry!

[Mat]

@Brahmali

Sylvester: What is born, is doomed to death. It is by this line of reasoning that I believe that birth is a sufficient condition for aging-and death.

This is dependant **co-**arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

“Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The intention & aspiration of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a refined property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future. This is how there is becoming.” AN3.77

If for example, feelings vedana is present without ignorance, there would be no craving. That’s how I see it.

with metta

[Piotr]

@Mat

This is dependant co-arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

This is important point, I think. It’s stressed in SN 22.81, where the Buddha explains how upādāna arises:

[He/she] regards form as self. That regarding, bhikkhus, is a formation. That formation—what is its source, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that formation is born. (Bodhi)

---

[He/she] assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. (Ṭhānissaro)

[Brahmali]

@freedom

By wisdom, we do not create condition for craving to arise. By wisdom, we give up ignorance(delusion). By wisdom, we still/end volitional formations that in turn cut off the condition for craving to arise. That’s how I see.

I agree with this.

@Mat

This is dependant co-arising, not just dependant arising. Ignorance must be present for birth to arise.

Personally I do not like the term co-arising. So far as I can see there are many factors in this sequence that do not arise together, such as birth and death for starters.

[Mat]

@Brahmali

I can see there are many factors in this sequence that do not arise together, such as birth and death for starters.

You are right that birth and death do not arise at the same point in time. Yet, death cannot arise without birth-that which is born is destined to die. They are arise ‘co-dependently’ in that sense, I think.

Those two links are necessary and sufficient I think. That which is born must die. We could also think in terms of aggregates etc -that which arises, must pass away. Impermanence is inherent in the DO.

with metta

[Brahmali]

@Mat

They are arise ‘co-dependently’ in that sense, I think.

But then it should really be “co-dependent arising”. And I am not sure if this is ideal either, since it might be read as mutual dependency. There is, of course, some degree of mutual dependency in DO, but the thrust of the dependency is in the ordinary forward order. With some links there seems to be no mutual dependency at all.