Then how do you justify this reflection/description on/of not-self which appears several times such as in MN109 or the Anattalakkhaṇasutta:
Part of it extracted: rūpaṁ anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā, saṅkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṁ anattā
It follows the same grammatical format “plural-subject anattā”
This is talking about Brahmanical soul? Or does it sound more like “You are not my self, this forum is not my self”
What do you think, mendicants?
Taṁ kiṁ maññatha, bhikkhave,
Is form permanent or impermanent?”
rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?
“Impermanent, sir.”
“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vā taṁ sukhaṁ vā”ti?
“Suffering, sir.”
“Dukkhaṁ, bhante”.
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, is it fit to be regarded thus:
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, kallaṁ nu taṁ samanupassituṁ:
‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
‘etaṁ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti?
“No, sir.”
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.
(iterates for the other 4 aggregates)
Even though it has in the same order as “anicca, dukkha, anatta”, let’s suppose the structure in AN 3.136 is still yet unrelated to these other suttas. Then, it wouldn’t change that the suttas claim that those things are not-self in the sense of a general selfish view.
Let’s suppose that these suttas about aggregates being notself are either “post-Buddha” or are also supposed to be about Brahmanical dharma and soul: how could the wisdom leading to enlightenment be specifically about Brahmanical soul when many beings in saṁsara don’t know what that is? The belief in Brahmanical soul causes all war, terror, and fear in the world? Does avijja means something else?
For example here’s the end of that sutta:
“So you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
You should truly see any kind of feeling … perception … choices … consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near, all consciousness—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’
Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Being disillusioned, desire fades away. When desire fades away they’re freed. When they’re freed, they know they’re freed.
They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’”
And if beings inherently believe in Brahmanical soul, then isn’t that no different from the regular default selfishness which is described here?
And even if it is a parody of Brahmanism, why can’t it have this meaning or even double meaning rather than same exclusive Vedic meaning of each word.
You may be dissatisfied with the “is” in “all things are not-self”, because you can just see that on both sides of the equation that these aren’t the same, but the idea of something being something can include processes in-between. Not only are things not self, they aren’t mine and aren’t owned by me, which is more personally relatable. You can expand this to 36 or 108 views AN 4.199.
Finally, one can also just see whether these things are true or false for themselves in meditation. This matters much more than learning texts. Self view happens everywhere, hiding in plain sight in so many perceptions and reactions. This correlates and leads to desire and clinging and suffering as it says.
The first sutta quote also asks for each aggregate if they are anicca, then dukkha. These suttas include saṅkhārā as one of such aggregates that are anicca and dukkha, which means that volition is just one category of the full “sabbe saṅkhārā anicca” which would therefore have the more general meaning of saṅkhāra, which is how some words work, sometimes words exist on varying levels of vagueness which depends on context (the context here being the other 4 aggregates). Like in English, consciousness can mean a lot of vague things such as soul.
I don’t actually agree with you or John Kelly on why it’s dhammā as I hinted once because why not ask why the other two are saṅkhāra in the first place? I don’t see the third statement as some kind of exception. But I think it’s ultimately about namarupa where the impermanent idea of something becomes a selfish object of attachment, but that could apply any (impermanent name-and-form of) permanent thing like facts, falsities, math, logic, or teachings, and I don’t think nibbāna out of all of those was specifically why it’s ‘dhammā’ (but it’s technically true that nibbāna is not-self).
But I don’t care to avoid hearing other people’s opinions, it’s kind of unavoidable, and I delight in taking them with discernment. I’m around people filled with selfishness daily outside of Buddhist circles anyway, and I wouldn’t place teachers as the role of necessarily knowing everything either. Although it could be uncomfortable if someone presents their view as dogma, it looked like his intention was just to explain a translation.