Pīti, sukha, kāya in jhāna: mental, physical, or both?

Essays
42

OK Frank.

Let me try to address the simpler issue of the 2 types of “bodies” that you see in SN 51.22. I presume you are saying that there is the mind-made body in Ven Ananda’s first question, and there is the flesh-&-blood body in Ven Ananda’s second question?

Despite the presence of the pronoun looking suspiciously anaphoric, I will agree that the 2nd body being referred to is the flesh-&-blood body.

But, does this support your assertion that the “body” in the jhana pericopes is the body with which one exercises the supernormal powers? I would say no, and in fact, one cannot infer either that the mind-made body is even the subject of what happens during a jhana. Neither body is the body in these pericopes, eg -

He drenches, steeps, saturates, and suffuses his body with this rapture and happiness born of seclusion, so that there is no part of his entire body which is not suffused by this rapture and happiness.

The important thing to note about the mind-made body and the flesh-&-blood body in the abhiñña is how they are framed in the texts. Look very carefully at the formula, for which I will use the manomaya kāya pericope for convenience -

_So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe viga­tū­pak­kilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte manomayaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimmānāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti. So imamhā kāyā aññaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimmināti rūpiṃ manomayaṃ sabbaṅ­gapaccaṅ­giṃ ahīnindriyaṃ

When his mind is thus concentrated, pure and bright, unblemished, free from defects, malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability, he directs and inclines it to creating a mind-made body. From this body he creates another body having material form, mind-made, complete in all its parts, not lacking any faculties. (per BB)

The first sentence consists of a subordinate clause bolded in front (samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe viga­tū­pak­kilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte) , followed by the main clause about the excercise of psychic powers.

Now, what type of syntactic construct is the subordinate clause? It’s your good old locative absolute. And notice that this particular locative absolute is composed of past participles, not present participles. What do the grammars say about the temporal relationshionship between -

  1. a subordinate clause made up of a locative absolute formed with past participles; and
  2. the main clause?

Very simply, if one elects not to translate the passage into readable idiomatic English as BB has chosen, the grammars would say that the events in the main clause take place after the events in the subordinate clause. This gives -

After his mind has been concentrated, made pure and bright, made free of blemish and defects, made malleable, wieldy and steady, and attained to imperturbability, he directs and inclines it to creating a mind-made body.

Am I being a Grammar Nazi here? This plain old grammatical consequence is substantiated by another sutta that does not use the locative absolute formulation. It’s AN 9.35, but I would caution against Ven Thanissaro’s erroneous translation of a key passage. If you have BB’s translation, well and good. If not, I am correcting his translation to show what he missed out in the Pali -

Tassa evaṃ hoti: ‘yannūnāhaṃ sabbaso neva­saññā­nā­sañ­ñāyata­naṃ samatikkamma saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃ upasampajja vihareyyan’ti. So saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃ anabhi­hiṃsa­māno sabbaso neva­saññā­nā­sañ­ñāyata­naṃ samatikkamma saññā­ve­dayi­ta­nirodhaṃ upasampajja viharati.
> Yato kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu taṃ tadeva samāpattiṃ samāpajjatipi vuṭṭhātipi, tassa mudu cittaṃ hoti kammaññaṃ. Mudunā kammaññena cittena appamāṇo samādhi hoti subhāvito. So appamāṇena samādhinā subhāvitena yassa yassa abhiñ­ñā­sacchi­karaṇī­yassa dhammassa cittaṃ abhininnāmeti abhiñ­ñā­sacchi­kiriyāyatatra tatreva sak­khi­bhabba­taṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

The thought occurs to him, ‘What if I, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, were to enter & remain in the cessation of perception & feeling.’ Without jumping at the cessation of perception & feeling, he, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters & remains in the cessation of perception & feeling.
When a monk enters & emerges from this or that very attainment, his mind is pliant & malleable. With his pliant, malleable mind, limitless concentration is well developed. With his concentration well developed & limitless, then whichever of the six higher knowledges he turns his mind to know & realize, he can witness them for himself whenever there is an opening.

Here, you cannot get any more explicit. This confirms the grammatical reading of the abhiñña pericopes, ie the abhiñña are exercised after arising from the jhanas.

Now that being the case, since we cannot even equate the mind-made body with the “body” mentioned in the 4 jhana similes, what possibility do we have to even equate the flesh-&-blood body with that “body” in the jhana similes?

Let me try to offer my thoughts on your other issue about kāya in SN 46.2. But first -

Question 6 - Do you agree that SN 46.2’s 2 passadhi’s is connected to sense restraint? If not, what do you say is its role or roles?

PS - above, I had for the sake of argument agreed that the “body” which pops into the Brahma world is the flesh-&-blood body. This is in fact BB’s opinion. I am actually not persuaded that this is correct.

Elsewhere, if we pop into the abhiñña pericopes, we find that these forms of supernormal powers are part of the 2nd abhiñña pericope. It’s undeniable how SN 51.22’s second “body” is the same as the body in the 2nd abhiñña pericope.

So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe viga­tū­pak­kilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte iddhividhāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti. So anekavihitaṃ iddhividhaṃ paccanubhoti– ekopi hutvā bahudhā hoti, bahudhāpi hutvā eko hoti; āvibhāvaṃ tirobhāvaṃ tirokuṭṭaṃ tiropākāraṃ tiropabbataṃ asajjamāno gacchati seyyathāpi ākāse; pathaviyāpi ummuj­jani­mujjaṃ karoti seyyathāpi udake; udakepi abhijjamāne gacchati seyyathāpi pathaviyā; ākāsepi pallaṅkena kamati seyyathāpi pakkhī sakuṇo; imepi candimasūriye evaṃmahiddhike evaṃma­hānu­bhāve pāṇinā parāmasati parimajjati; yāva brahmalokāpi kāyena vasaṃ vatteti. (2nd abhiñña pericope)

Yasmiṃ, ānanda, samaye tathāgato kāyampi citte samodahati, cittampi kāye samodahati, sukhasaññañca lahusaññañca kāye okkamitvā viharati; tasmiṃ, ānanda, samaye tathāgatassa kāyo appakasireneva pathaviyā vehāsaṃ abbhuggacchati, so anekavihitaṃ iddhividhaṃ paccanubhoti— ekopi hutvā bahudhā hoti, bahudhāpi hutvā eko hoti; āvibhāvaṃ tirobhāvaṃ tirokuṭṭaṃ tiropākāraṃ tiropabbataṃ asajjamāno gacchati seyyathāpi ākāse; pathaviyāpi ummuj­jani­mujjaṃ karoti seyyathāpi udake; udakepi abhijjamāne gacchati seyyathāpi pathaviyā; ākāsepi pallaṅkena kamati seyyathāpi pakkhī sakuṇo; imepi candimasūriye evaṃmahiddhike evaṃma­hānu­bhāve pāṇinā parāmasati parimajjati; yāva brahmalokāpi kāyena vasaṃ vatteti. (SN 51.22)

This is where I think BB is wrong to equate the 2nd “body” in SN 51.22 with the “natural physical body” (fn 275 on that sutta). If we look carefully at the abhiñña pericopes, the first abhiñña is framed like this -

So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe viga­tū­pak­kilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte manomayaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimmānāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti. So imamhā kāyā aññaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimmināti rūpiṃ manomayaṃ sabbaṅ­gapaccaṅ­giṃ ahīnindriyaṃ.

When his mind is thus concentrated, pure and bright, unblemished, free from defects, malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability, he directs and inclines it to creating a mind-made body. From this body he creates another body having material form, mind-made, complete in all its parts, not lacking any faculties.

The first abhiñña pericope actually has 2 “bodies” discussed therein. The first is the mind-made “body”, from which the other “body” is drawn out, like a reed from its sheath, sword from scabbard or snake from slough.

As we know from DN 9, the mind-made body is just a synonym for the mind-made acquisition of self. The first abhiñña pericope is therefore not even talking about a “body” in the English sense of a corporeal body, but simply conventional selfhood.

Notice also, that the 2nd “body” in the first abhiñña pericope is actually given without the “feeding on food” qualifier, which eliminates the flesh-&-blood body. This, I believe, would be the way to reconcile the 2 “bodies” in SN 51.22. The first is the mind-made “body”, the second is the “body” drawn out of the mind-made “body”.

43

Hi Frank

I’ve given consideration to your request very carefully. What drove me to elect for a Q&A method in this thread was the obvious failure of my earlier vibhaṅga method. I think it would be more fruitful if we continue with the Q&A, as what I think the kāya means in -

  1. kāyo passambhati (his body becomes tranquil : pre-jhana pericope)
  2. kāyapassaddhi, cittapassaddhi (as the components of passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­ga)

will become obvious. They are pointing to one common denominator, namely the development of the body and the development of the mind in MN 36 -

Kathañca, aggivessana, bhāvitakāyo ca hoti bhāvitacitto ca? Idha, aggivessana, sutavato ariyasāvakassa uppajjati sukhā vedanā. So sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na sukhasārāgī ca hoti, na sukha­sārā­gitañca āpajjati. Tassa sā sukhā vedanā nirujjhati. Sukhāya vedanāya nirodhā uppajjati dukkhā vedanā. So dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattāḷiṃ kandati na sammohaṃ āpajjati. Tassa kho esā, aggivessana, uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhati bhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhati bhāvitattā cittassa. Yassa kassaci, aggivessana, evaṃ ubhatopakkhaṃ uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhati bhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhati bhāvitattā cittassa. Evaṃ kho, aggivessana, bhāvitakāyo ca hoti bhāvitacitto cā”ti.

And how, Aggivessana, is one developed in body and developed in mind? Here, Aggivessana, pleasant feeling arises in a well-taught noble disciple. Touched by that pleasant feeling, he does not lust after pleasure or continue to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases. With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises. Touched by that painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, and lament, he does not weep beating his breast and become distraught. When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it does not invade his mind and remain because body is developed. And when that painful feeling has arisen in him, it does not invade his mind and remain because mind is developed. Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling does not invade his mind and remain because body is developed, and arisen painful feeling does not invade his mind and remain because mind is developed, is thus developed in body and developed in mind.

Please consider also the passage which precedes this, where the Buddha unequivocally rejects the theory that kāyabhāvana has anything to do with the physical body -

But there are some recluses and brahmins who abide pursuing development of mind, but not development of body. They are touched by mental painful feeling. In the past, when one was touched by mental painful feeling, one’s thighs would become rigid, one’s heart would burst, hot blood would gush from one’s mouth, and one would go mad, go out of one’s mind. So then the body was subservient to the mind, the mind wielded mastery over it. Why is that? Because the body was not developed. (Saccaka’s theory)

Can you see where I’m coming from regarding this business of the kāya in the jhana pericopes? In MN 36, being “developed in body” (bhāvitakāya) is explained in a purely emotional framework of not responding with lust towards pleasurable feeling. Isn’t this good old sense restraint? What kāya is it that needs to be trained and tranquilised so as to curtail the latent tendency to lust following a pleasant feeling?

44

Before pulling in other suttas and adding more moving parts into the discussion, I want to point out my original post, based on SN 51.22 translated in full pali and english a few msgs’s up on this thread, that after the buddha says he can travel with a mind made body to the brahma world, the rest of the sutta is talking about him traveling to the brahma world, and levitating with the flesh and blood body made of four elements that he was born with. And it explicitly talks about the 6ab STED #1 (first of the 6 abhinna for supernormal powers standard EBT definition, incuded in the same post above with SN 51.22).

In other words the 6ab STED #1 if not exclusively talking about an anatomical body traveling to the brahma world, levitating, walking on water, flying through the air like a winged bird, etc, must at least include it (anatomical body) as one of the options.

Now the reason I went through the trouble to look through SN 51.22 carefully word by word in pali, is because it talks about kaya, citta, sukha, things we’re very interested in for the jhanas.

It’s really hard to try to link back to my original post on SN 51.22 while compsosing a msg. to add to the same thread. I don’t want to repeat myself, so I’ll just reiterate the main point:

In STED 6ab #1 (supernormal powers), kaaya only appears once in it explicitly, at the end:

“yava brahma loka pi kayena vasam vetteti”,
“as far as the brahma worlds also (he) with-his-body exercises mastery [of supernormal powers]”

the anatomical body is implicit through unstated pronouns for “avi bhava, tiro bhava, …, pallankena kamati, seyyathapi pakkhi sakuno” walking on water, flying through air in seated posture, walking through mountains like it’s spaace, diving into the earth like its water, etc…

So without looking at a grammar look, it looks like the kayena at the end of the formula, must include an anatomical body made of four elements, whatever else or whatever the precise grammatical case you want to use.

And since it looks it might be the same grammatical case as the 3rd jhana formula’s kayena, grammar isn’t going to save the day for the no-anatomical body camp.

I also pointed out the the process of levitation involves putting mind in body and body in mind, attending to the perception of light-weightedness and bliss (sukha). So you have a straightforward mind-body dichotomy in use here (kaaya/citta), and sukha clearly referring to anatomical body.

Now someone might want to say, well, he had to exit jhana before exercising this supernormal power. Ok, let’s say he did. But is it not samadhi?

If you refer to the very beginning of Ajahn Mun’s biography, it talks about a monk levitating (free pdf available, you can google it). Now the first time it happened to him, he was in the kuti, got startled to see he was up in the air and fell down. He had to practice how to balance his samadhi to maintain levitation and be aware of his surroundings and presumably think as well. Is this not an act of very strong samadhi?

So my point was, if someone has the samadhi to do levitate, which involves perceptions of light-weightedness and bliss (sukha) in the anatomical body, is it so hard to believe 3rd jhana also can have perceptions of sukha /pleasure in the anatomical body?

1 Like
45

Hi again Frank.

I’m sorry you felt that you had to repeat yourself. For argument’s sake, I did indicate that I was prepared to treat SN 56.11’s second “body” as the flesh-&-blood body.

Moving on -

I took pains to point out that in the suttas, when it is intended to refer to the normal physical body, a different description is used. These could be -

This body of mine is endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother & father, nourished with rice & porridge, subject to inconstancy, rubbing, pressing, dissolution, & dispersion.
or
A gross self, possessed of form, made up of the four great elements, feeding on physical food.
or
Possessed of form, made up of the four great elements, feeding on physical food: this is the gross acquisition of a self.

But in SN 51.22, the second body is described quite differently -

­_cātuma­hā­bhū­tika kāya_
body composed of the four great elements

Where’s the bit about porridge or food to qualify this as the normal physical body? I will grant that this is not a particularly strong point, except in contexts involving the 3 different types of “selfhood”.

I think this is not correct, since it also appears earlier in the mind-made body section as well -

Abhijānāmi khvāhaṃ, ānanda, iddhiyā manomayena kāyena brahmalokaṃ upasaṅkamitā.

I recall, Ananda, having gone to the brahma world by spiritual power with a mind-made body.

Since your original premise that the kāya appears only once is wrong, how will you now argue that kāyena relates only to the second body and not the first body which is mind-made?

Even if the sutta did not contain any mention of the mind-made body, demanding that kāyena must refer to the physical body requires a particular Pali idiom, ie anaphora. That sentence would have had to have been cast as -

yāva brahmalokāpi tena kāyena vasaṃ vatteti

Without the anaphoric pronoun ta, there is simply no way for this kāya to be read as if it were a substantive noun, instead of an adverb.

From the looks of it, you may just confirmed the no-anatomical body camp’s thesis, unless you work around the 1st kāya problem, as well as the absent anaphora problem.

Yes, it is still samādhi. But, since he’s already re-entered and re-contacted kāmasaññā, the sukha in this experience does not necessarily equate the sukha of the 3 jhanas; there will be a mixture of sukha born of the 5 senses, and the sukha born of mind-contact. Bearing in mind that in the Nikayas and Agamas, samādhi is a very large menagerie of states that include non-jhanic conditions, is it safe to even assume that the levitator is doing all that within a jhana? You still cannot get around the problem I outlined in my post above, ie the locative absolute with past participles problem, and the AN 9.35 problem. Both of these clearly indicate that psychic powers are not exercised while one is within a jhana.

Well, the anatomical body contacts tactility. Sight, sounds, smells, tastes and tactility are defined as the kāmā. Doesn’t the First Jhana pericope state -

vivicceva kāmehi
having been quite separated from the kāmā

If this is not to your satisfaction, let’s discuss AN 9.36.

Frank, I’m not at all keen to discuss the Thai ajahns. But if you wish to cite them and their teachings here, surely you must be prepared that where we notice that the suttas contradict them, it needs to be pointed out. I’m loathe to do this in a resource that is dedicated to textual study, but I personally feel that SC is not the correct platform for affirmation.

46

We already discussed this in another thread, and we reached a point where we have to agree to disagree. Quick summary:

You said Thanissaro’s kamehi translation as “sensuality” is based on only one sutta and that is proto-abhidhamma. I said fine, let’s use your translation. You translated something like:

"quite secluded from sensual objects "

And I said, one can be secluded from sensual objects without completely having 5 sensory perceptions cut off. The other point is that what pops out to me is “sensual”. One could be cut off from 5 senses as in Vism. and Ajahn Brahm’s jhana, but it still doesn’t satisfy the main criteria of seclusion of sensual-pleasure in relation to those sensual objects. You always see 5 cords of sense pleasure and 5 hindrances in passages immedidately preceding first jhana pericope. Also, everything in buddhism has to answer to 2nd noble truth. Cause of dukkha, kāma-tanha, bhava-tanha, vibhava-tanha.

So you can try to milk the eva particle in first jhana formula for all its worth, but it still has to answer to 2nd noble truth and 5 cords of sensual pleasure.

47

I am seeing this as the first post in this thread. And it is in the essays section. But I can see no essay. Has it been moved? I am assuming the essay was originally the first post in this thread…? Thanks!

48

Have you got a link to that poll? Sounds interesting.

49

Where are you getting the translation from? I would be interested in the context, but I don’t see any translatoin here on Suttacentral for this text.

50

Oh dear! If worldwide Buddhism has only produced one respectable person, it would not appear to be functioning very well! Or, perhaps there is an unusual criterion for respectability at work?

51

I just checked the first post (which I authored), there was no essay ever written as far as I can tell, I had intended it to become a wiki article.

There should be another thread somewhere that has a long collection of EBT references (pali and agama) to kāya in jhana and 16 APS (anapana) contexts.

At some point I’ll share my notes on this, with detailed pali/english audits. But it’s good for you and others to do your research independently and see if you come to similar to different conclusions.

Here is a new one I found recently:

1 Like
52

Ah I see. I guess I got muddled because of the wiki reference, and because this is in the essays section!

Great!

Yeah I’m doing research on this. My sense is that it really is referencing the body, and I think we might be able to say specifically in relation to the psycho-psysiological phenomena we call ‘affect’ in psychology.

53

How the body is viewed in the West: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/5701/7/07_chapter%201.pdf

I feel there is less of a dichotomy when viewed with insight, between body and mind. Ie it’s not a travesty to have body in a spiritual place. I’m just throwing something out there.

With metta