Pīti, sukha, kāya in jhāna: mental, physical, or both?

moderators, please make the first post in this thread a wiki editable by everyone.

discussion from


that are more properly focused on this one can be continued here.

Synopsis

We're primarily interested in whether Pīti, sukha, in the standard four jhanas are mental, physical or both.

But in order to do that, we may have to carefully examine the terms
Kāya, kāyena, imameva kāyam (jhana similes), or any other term in the standard samadhi attainment formulas that can help shed light on whether jhāna is mind only or involves experiencing the anatomical body.

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i’m going by SN 46.2 when i talk about calming physical body to fullfil passadhi-sam-bojjhanga. (b.bodhi trans)

“And what, bhikkhus, is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity? There are, bhikkhus, tranquillity of body, tranquillity of mind: frequently giving careful attention to them is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity.

which suttas are you referring to with kāyabhāvanā?

I’m curious. Isn’t it a petitio principii that you are reading the kāya in kāyapassaddhi to mean a “physical body”? That issue being disputed, one should not beg the question by assuming what is in dispute.

What do you think is the role of kāyapassaddhi as a boj­jhaṅ­ga in SN 46.53? Apparently, it works to calm the mind when the mind is excited. No mention of the physical body here.

In SN 46.6, the notion is presented that ṭhito kāyo, ṭhitaṃ cittaṃ (the body is steady, the mind is steady) comes from sense restraint, such that that person “does not long for it [the external bases], or become excited by it, or generate lust for it, not dismayed by it, not daunted, not dejected, without ill-will”. Notice how the steadiness of body and mind are couched in a purely emotive frame? Isn’t this the same outcome as being bhāvitakāya and bhāvitacitta (developed in body and mind) as a result of kāyabhāvanā and cittabhāvanā from MN 36, couched in this format -

And how, Aggivessana, is one developed in body and developed in mind? Here, Aggivessana, pleasant feeling arises in a well-taught noble disciple. Touched by that pleasant feeling, he does not lust after pleasure or continue to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases. With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises. Touched by that painful feeling, he does not sorrow, grieve, and lament, he does not weep beating his breast and become distraught. When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it does not invade his mind and remain because body is developed. And when that painful feeling has arisen in him, it does not invade his mind and remain because mind is developed. Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling does not invade his mind and remain because body is developed, and arisen painful feeling does not invade his mind and remain because mind is developed, is thus developed in body and developed in mind.

How do we deal with this passage from SN 46.55 -

These seven factors of enlightenment, brahmin, are nonobstructions, nonhindrances, noncorruptions of the mind; when developed and cultivated they lead to the realization of the fruit of true knowledge and liberation.

From these contexts, it appears that both aspects of tranquility as an enlightenment factor are the outcome of sense restraint. What kāya/body could there be in relation to sense restraint, if not the saḷāyatanaṃ? Actually, to be more precise, saḷāyatanaṃ seems to be the term favoured for suttas dealing with Dependant Origination, while suttas dealing with sense restraint would typically resort to the indriya classification.

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kāyena in 3rd jhana standard formula was being disputed, it’s news to me if SN 46.2 is as well.

Ko ca, bhikkhave,
“And what, bhikkhus,
āhāro anuppannassa vā passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­gassa uppādāya,
is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity
uppannassa vā passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­gassa bhāvanāya pāripūriyā?
and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity?
Atthi, bhikkhave,
There are, bhikkhus,
> kāya-passaddhi,
> tranquillity of body,
> citta-passaddhi.
> tranquillity of mind:
Tattha yoniso­ma­nasikā­ra­bahu­līkāro– ayamāhāro anuppannassa vā passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­gassa uppādāya,
frequently giving careful attention to them is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity
uppannassa vā passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­gassa bhāvanāya pāripūriyā.
and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity.

if not the anatomical body, what is kāya-passadhi referring to, and why is it being juxtaposed with citta-passadhi?

sorry if i seem dismissive of your attempts to discuss MN 36, but i assure you’ve i’ve read what you said several times, made a genuine attempt to understand what you’re trying to communicate, and don’t see how an anatomical body would somehow break sense restraint and well developed mind and body.

in SN 54.7, we have venerable mahaa-kappina seen with [anatomical] body shaking while seated in meditation practicing ananapana-sati-samadhi

(after 16 APS instructions…) evaṃ bhāvite ca kho, bhikkhave, ānāpānassatisamādhimhi evaṃ bahulīkate neva kāyassa iñjitattaṃ vā hoti phanditattaṃ vā, na cittassa iñjitattaṃ vā hoti phanditattaṃ vā”ti. sattamaṃ.

once again we have body and mind being juxtaposed. can there be any doubt the body is anatomical?

from personal experience, and that of many meditators, you can know how to do jhāna, but if your anatomical body is having problems, like that described in SN 54.7, even if you’re doing the right technique, samadhi-bojjhanga to the degree of jhana is not happening until the problems in the anatomical body are worked out. you can have all the sense-restraint and perfect mental development and kaya bhavika of MN 36y, but there are issues only time and correct practice can solve.

as i stated in a recent previous post, i believe it’s possible for super meditators to go into animitta samadhi or any of the 9 attainments even if they are suffering from deathlike pain and illness. but for most cases, and in particular people just learning jhanas, the anatomical body is something we rely on and need to give proper maintenance.

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May I trouble you to add this (kāyena) to the title? “kāya in jhāna” does appear to refer to the "imameva kāyaṃ " formula running through the 4 jhanas, instead of including the kāyena of the Third Jhana formula.

It does not change the fact that there was still a petitio principii. But, there does seem to be an unresolved disagreement on the meaning of kāyapassadhi, given the views expressed in the other thread regarding the meaning of kāyo passambhati and passaddhakāyo. I trust you will not disagree that kāyapassadhi as an aspect of the tranquility bojjhaṅga (SN 46.2) directly corresponds to the formulaic sequence of kāyo passambhati and passaddhakāyo ?

I believe I had expressed my view earlier in my first post above?

And I genuinely thank you for that.

But if you already frame the issue as one involving a physical body, that already begs the question, does it not?

As for SN 54.7, I have little difficulty accepting that that kāya-citta contrast there clearly requires us to read it as the physical body and the mind. Its context demands it.

BUT, is that a good enough reason to juxtapose that supposition upon other contexts?

If you don’t mind, I’ll change my reasoning style from a long vibhaṅga mode and adopt instead a vedalla style. So, my first question to you would be -

Do you accept that SN 48.36 is an exhaustive classification of feelings and emotions, with nothing left out?

In other words, when sukha is said, it means ease/pleasure and does not mean somanassa (joy/happiness).
When dukkha is said, it means dis-ease/pain and does not mean domanassa (grief).

I added a synopsis and a clarification on how kaya relates to the thread. you’re welcome to change the title and synopsis description whenever that first post gets changed into an editable wiki by anyone. i thought keeping the title brief was desirable.

i’m trying, but not fully understanding exactly what the kāyo passambhati and passaddhakāyo controversy is exactly. maybe when the threads get organized a little better, we can summarize.

some other things i don’t think i’m understanding, perhaps you can clarify:

  1. 3rd jhana’s, sukhanca kaayena patisamvedeti. what i gathered from the wijeskara summary you provided is that the popular translation as “experiences pleasure with the body” is a less common, but not illegitimate grammatical way to translate it. Correct? The more common way to treat kaayena would depend on how a previous use of the kāya as a noun appeared? If so, what happens to all the short suttas where for example, in SN 36.31 where it goes right into 5 cords of sense pleasure, and then jhanas, where we don’t have a previous use of kāya to refer back to?

maybe why we’re having trouble understanding each other, or perhaps you understand me and i’m just having trouble following you, is that you seem to impose an abhidhammic (in the sense of complex taxonomy) type of structure that every term has to adhere to on any discussion. whereas i have a more guerrilla approach going bottom up and defaulting to simple interpretations that are doctrinally coherent, and is proven to work in practice. adding unnecessary restrictions or complexity is only done as needed to resolve ambiguities. The very reason so many of us in the EBT world don’t find abhidhamma coherent is because in their quest to have an overarching complex structure that can map every minute mind moment that describes the entire knowable universe, they run into incoherencies, contradictions, and even if it didn’t, the dhamma pracrtice becomes overburdened like having a spouse who packs 10 huge suitcases for a short weekend trip.

In SN 46.2, where’s the ambiguity or problem caused by interpreting kaya as anatomical body that would require looking for a more unusual interpretation of kaya? sense restraint, bodily and mental development can be fulfilled with sati, dhammavicaya, and viriya-sambojjhanga. the deep, complete relaxation of the anatomical body is an additional requirement for jhana to happen in samadhi-bojjhanga. This is from the practical experience of meditators of all traditions.

yes.
the anapanasati sutta SN 54.7 cited earlier, while not explicitly stating kāya and citta passaddhi, it’s obvious that has to happen within the 16 steps of APS. The closest explicit reference would be step 4, “…passambhayam kaaya-sankharam” and step 8 “passambhayam citta-sankharam”. The former falls under kaya-nupassana, and is closely related to kaaya-passaddhi, to establish a link with passaddhi-sambojjhanga in SN 46.2.

i believe EBT passages show pīti, sukha both have mental and physical components.

in the context of jhāna and samadhi, for pīti and pamojja the emphasis seems to be on developing the mental aspects it.

i don’t think i could categorically answer your question. in general, i think that sutta does cover the mental and physical spectrum, but if i see “sukha” or “dukkha” without qualification of being a vedana or indriya, we’d have to examine the context.

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Thanks for updating the scope, Frank.

No need to wait that long. I am asserting that kāyapassaddhi (tranquility of the body) as one aspect of passad­dhi­sam­boj­jhaṅ­ga is what is being referred in the pericope “… kāyo passambhati; passaddhakāyo …” (his body becomes tranquil; tranquil in body). So, my -

Question 2 : Would you agree with the correspondence I have proposed above, or do you disagree?

Question 3 : If you disagree, what is your position on how they differ?

(PS - pls also look at my notes in the next post, where I suggest that the identification of kāyapassaddhi with APS’ passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ conflicts with the sequence in AN 11.1)

No, that is not my position. As Wijeysekara explains, instrumental declensions are largely adverbial, not adnominal. The adnominal sense of the instrumental declension only properly shows up as the instrumental of agency and instrumental of comparison. Translating any phrase of the structure -

patient - kāyena - verb

, one faces a choice. One translates it literally "one (insert verb) with the body (insert noun that is the patient). As I am a big fan of Buddhist Hybrid English, this is my preferred translation, as I like to see the Pali denotation (form) rendered literally. For translators who are keen to render the connotation (meaning) clearly, they would opt for a translation that brings out the adverbial nature of kāyena as personally, or directly.

This is an absolutely important point, which was the crux of the discussion that led to @chansik_park 's poll in the previous thread. In answer to your first question, I would say NOT NECESSARILY SO.

The reasons why the kāya in the Third Jhana pericope’s “sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti” does not refer to all 4 jhana pericopes that refer to "imameva kāyaṃ " are twofold -

  1. kāyena everywhere else is adverbial, while the said kāyaṃ is adnominal; and
  2. the kāyaṃ formula is qualified by an anaphoric pronoun. If the kāyena had been intended to refer to the same kāya, would not the anaphoric pronoun had been supplied to be consistent with its usage throughout all 4 jhana pericopes?

Off to lunch now. I’ll attend to your other issues later.

Again Frank, I’m only interested in what the texts say, not what meditators say. In fact, ease of the physical body is not even a pre-requisite for such attainments. Witness the Buddha’s entry into an attainment, despite pain.

To your first question on SN 46.2, I would draw attention to the fact that the kāya is a vehicle for the five hindrances and the ­_boj­jhaṅ­gas_, which are the tenors of a metaphor. Each set is sustained by nutriment. That it is a metaphor comes through from the use of seyyathāpi (just as). How probable is it that, everywhere else in that metaphor, the vehicle body is not merged with the other ­_boj­jhaṅ­gas_, but then merges with the tenor “body tranquility”?

That seems to contradict the sequence of contemplations in APS. As I pointed out earlier, in the APS, pīti comes at No.5, after the tranquilisation of the kāyasaṅkhāra. In the AN 11.1 sequence, pīti comes before the tranquilisation set as the cause of tranquility. If you are saying the APS’ kāyasaṅkhāra is the same as SN 46.2’s kāya that is tranqulised, this is not borne out by the sequences of the trainings laid out in both sets.

I don’t see how can you draw an equivalence between APS’ passambhayaṃ cittasaṅkhāraṃ with SN 46.2’s cittapassaddhi. Despite both terms sharing the term citta, cittasaṅkhāraṃ refers to feelings and perception (MN 44). That does not quite look like SN 46.2’s emotional apparatus in citta. In fact, that emotional apparatus only pops up in APS in the third tetrad.

This is easy enough. Let’s look at the context furnished by SN 36.6. It is pschologically difficult to tease sukha apart from somanassa, so I will examine the distinction between dukkha and domanassa.

Bhikkhus, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling (dukkhā vedanā), he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. He feels two feelings—a bodily (kāyika) one and a mental (cetasika) one.

Question 4 - Is “painful feeling” above a kāyika feeling and therefore falls into SN 48.36’s dukkhindriyaṃ?

Question 5 - Is “he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught” above a cetasika feeling and thus falls within SN 48.36’s domanas­sindriyaṃ?

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:+1: :relieved: SN 47.42

I suppose that if you want to understand the subtleties in feelings, you have to look at them from a macro & micro perspective.
A drawing being better than a thousand words; look at the following sketches: Macro & Micro (the latter by Dmytro). In the latter, replace consciousness (viññāṇa) by “sense-consciousness” - Also, I would drop the avijja and saṅkhāra part, if this is related to the micro level . The micro level is better explained by SN 22.47, as far as avijja & saṇkhāra/cetāna are concerned).

In what I have in (my very “ad hominem” EBT) store ,
Pīti is referenced in the four Nikayas in relation to mano.

Pītimanassa, in the four nikayas, of which the more reliable (viz. with parallels in SA) are:
an6.10, an11.11, an11.12,
mn118,
sn35.97, sn42.13, sn46.3, sn47.10, sn54.13, sn55.40.

Pītimano, in snp4.1 & sn7.18

While sukha is referenced in relation to the citta in the later Nikayas.
cittasukhaṃ dn33 ~~
cetosukhampi mn149 ~
cittekaggatāsukhaṃ mn122 ~

May I add that, once you have considered what kāya, citta I (macro) and citta II (micro) are all about; then you should also consider what sāmisā (carnal), and nirāmisā (spiritual) are all about, in relation to pīti & sukha. SN 36.31

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Many thanks for the grammar explanation! It will take me some time to process everything you’ve written in those 2 messages, but it’s becoming more clear to me what your position is.

It may take me a day or 2 to respond.

It’s OK Frank. Take your time. This is not a speed contest to see if you will beat the 7 years it took me to arrive at this.

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Much obliged, yogakkhemi!

There is actually a sutta which present another macro versus micro presentation of the Second Noble Truth, namely DN 15. It’s my go-to sutta for the macro/cosmological and micro/psychological turnings of nāmarūpaṃ. Perhaps we could chat about the different ways we understand this macro/micro presentation. In fact, I’m largely in agreement with yours and Dymtro’s models as per your sketches.

What do you think is the kāya in passaddhakāya that appears to be the consequence of pītimanassa in your helpful catalogue of pīti?

Greetings Sylvester.

To a difficult question, an approximate answer.

When the bright, cheerful and happy feeling of mud, is produced by the recollection of the Dhamma - the profound, pervasive, cooling, substantial and satisfying feeling of pīti, that remains forever printed in the flesh, transcends mud; while being still attached to the flesh. Why that? - because mano, being the great kapellmeister of the senses - yet a mental process - has lifted the carnal feeling of mud, to a more subtle, yet still gross (heavy) feeling.
How should we see kāya in the process? Physical or mental?
There is no clear cut boundary here. Physical for sure; but with an open door to citta. A citta that, on a “micro” standpoint, inherits mano (SN 47.42). And anything that has to do with the great kapellmeister, is somewhat, if not thoroughly mental.
In SN 36.31, sāmisā (carnal) is concerned with only five senses. However I would include mano in kāya (in addition to its paraphernalia, such as hair, nails, etc.).

Serenity is born on the verge of the transcendence between the somewhat physical/mental feeling of pīti; and the more mental, (yet still physical,) subtle, clear, light, almost unbound, essential and pleasant feeling of sukha.

I suppose that we can speak of purely mental feelings, only when we have left the world of forms. When we have deconstructed up to the “macro” citta. With the death of the kapellmeister.

Mudita.

Note: I have no kāyasakkhī (“body witness”) in my “ad hominem” EBT store.

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what is that exactly? you’ve mentioned “ad hominem EBT store” a couple of times, and i have no idea what it means, my best guess is it’s some kind of simile like your kapelmeister representing mano?

Greetings Frankk,

The kapellmeister is the conductor; the coordinating center of the senses, and particularly the senses that have developed their faculties (see SN 22.47).
This concept of a “conductor” is given in MN 43, as follows:

[quote]Friend, these five faculties — each with a separate range, a separate domain, not experiencing one another’s range & domain: the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, & the body-faculty — have the intellect as their [common] arbitrator. The intellect is what experiences their ranges & domains. (transl: Thanissaro)

“Friend,these five faculties each have a separate field, a separate domain, and do not experience eachother’s field and domain, that is, the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, and the body faculty. Now these five faculties, each having a separate field, a separate domain, not experiencing each other’s field and domain ,have mind as their resort, and mind experiences their fields and domains.” (transl: Bodhi)

Añcimānī āvuso indriyāni nānāvisayāni nānāgocarāni, na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhonti. Seyyathīdaṃ: cakkhundriyaṃ sotindriyaṃ ghānindriyaṃ jivhindriyaṃ kāyindriyaṃ. Imesaṃ kho āvuso pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ nānāvisayānaṃ nānāgocarānaṃ na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhontānaṃ mano ca nesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhotīti.[/quote].

As far as my “ad hominem EBT store” is concerned, I will give you an instance of what I consider a truthful early account of the Buddha:
Anything in the four Nikayas, with a parallel in SA. That is a sample. My take though.
That is why I look at these “kāyasakkhī” references in AN - that have no parallel in SA - with a pinch of dubiousness. Particularly when it begets such serious contradictions.

Mudita.

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Thanks again!

Hee, hee. MN 28 and its parallel do allow the Form Aggregate to come about with contact born of the mind base and dhammas.

I believe you’re correct that the AN’s kāyasakkhī does not have any Agama parallel listed on SuttaCentral. However, that listing (liberated both ways, liberated by wisdom, body witness etc etc) is in fact found quite regularly in the Chinese. You can search for it using the phrase 身證者 (body witness) and it is attested in MA 194.

See also the formal definition of the kāyasakkhī in MA 195, which mirrors the AN 9.43 definition (in an abridged manner vide the shorthand “Eight Liberations”). I should mention that it uses a verbal form 身證, instead of the adnominal 身證者 (the person who 身證).

Does it appear in the SA? Try SA 936. Although it does not use the substantive noun 身證者 in relation to the Eight Liberations, it does use the adverb and verb 身作證.

Edit - it appears that SA 936’s 身作證 would correspond to the Pali kāyena sacchikaroti. Why would that translate into the substantive noun “body witness” (kāyasakkhī)? According to Hiroyasu Mizuno’s dictionary of Pali (パーリ語辞典 水野弘元著), sakkhi would in Skt be sākṣin (= eye-witness, a usage that survives in Malay today), while sacchi would be Skt’s sākṣāt (= directly, from Dhammajoti’s glossary on Sarvastivadin terminology). Perhaps the MIA and Sanskrit experts here might be able to opine on how closely related these words are in their themes.

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I hope I am not interrupt this wonderful discussion.
I am not sure whether I am allowed to discuss Abhidhamma in this forum either.
However these terms are very clear in Abhidhamma.

-Joy (piiti), which creates an interest in the object, giving the mind buoyancy. Hence it is mental

  • Sukha can be mental or physical.

Relevant to the Abhidhamma, two other classifications of vedanaa must be mentioned.
Five Kinds:1.bodily agreeable feeling — kaayikaa sukhaa vedanaa (sukha)
2.bodily disagreeable feeling — kaayikaa dukkhaa vedanaa (dukkha)
3.mentally agreeable feeling — cetasikaa sukhaa vedanaa (somanassa)
4.mentally disagreeable feeling — cetasikaa dukkhaa vedanaa (domanassa)
5.indifferent or neutral feeling — adukkha-m-asukhaa vedanaa (upekkhaa)
Six Kinds:Feelings born of eye-contact, ear-contact, nose-contact, tongue-contact, body-contact and mind-contact.

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/mendis/wheel322.html

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Hi Sarath

The list of 5 above is in fact from the suttas, ie SN 48.36. What would be of interest to us is whether the term kāyika has the same referent as a physical body, or something else.

If I am not miss understanding what you are trying to establish here, according to Abhidhamma Kaaya is Rupa and Kaya Vinnana is mental. For example a dead body can’t experience feelings.

  • A citta that turns towards the object through the sense door that has been stimulated
    (pañcadvāra-vajjana).
    -The appropriate sense consciousness; in the case of the eye, for example, eye
    consciousness (cakkhu viññāṇa).

Greetings Sylvester,

Hee, hee. !?!
I think you misunderstood my point. We are not refering to the micro level here; namely the sense-consciousness process, with its lots of form + sense (in our case mind base) = contact - but instead to the macro level, as in here (AN 9.43):
How could you touch these dimensions with your body?
Sure there is always a modicum (avasiṭṭha) of “body” present, as long as you live.
Let me give you a silly illustration of the latter - when you are jogging, you are “thinking” with your head and your feet, so to speak. But when you are purely thinking , you are not thinking with your feet anymore. Yet your feet are there. There is always this modicum of feet “in you”. Yet you don’t use that to think.
In this metaphor, citta is your head, and mano is your feet.
This is exactly what Bhuddistic Emptiness (Suññata) is all about - emptiness and the modicum - The active process on one side, and the emptiness and its modicum on the other.

In our case, we are confronted to the contradiction of having a kāyasakkhī sutta stating a rather full body involvement in the higher dimensions of the higher jhanas. Which would include mano, the kapellmeister.
However, in these dimensions, mano is gone (just an inactive modicum).
Enters back citta I.
We are back to using citta. But a citta I (a macro citta) - not the citta II (the micro citta, that involves the mental mano). A citta I, as in MN 44/SN 41.6 (see above posts - the “cosmological” citta, as you stated previously, when you agreed on the possibility of two different qualities of citta).
Yet a citta I that has been “actualized” through the sphere of senses. A higher citta I that “knows” now the Noble Truths. An appeased citta I with a token amount of saṅkhāra.
Because citta I, at inception, (coming from ignorance), was roaring with a huge saṅkhāra (viz. the desire to know).
But now, this citta knows the Noble Truths, and it is appeased. This citta I does not need mano anymore, to orchestrate phenomenas from the senses. For it knows.

Because there is a contradiction in AN 9.43 (without parallel) - because this sutta includes mano in citta I - I say “goodbye AN without SA parallels”. Because I have found along the years, that there are no contradiction in the Teaching, when you stick to the Nikayas with parallels in SA.
And I am betraying no school here. Just making things less schismatic, and less confounding.


[quote=“Sylvester, post:17, topic:4096”]
it appears that SA 936’s 身作證 would correspond to the Pali kāyena sacchikaroti. Why would that translate into the substantive noun “body witness” (kāyasakkhī)?
[/quote]So what you mean here, is to translate the Pali in Chinese, and retranslate the Chinese in the Pali? - in two different contextual suttas??.
Where do we stop the confusion here?

You have to remain in the above context.
身作證 in SA 936 does not have the same context than in AN 9.43 - might it be verbal or adnominal.
SA 936 is about liberation of mind, for instance; which in its practicality is the “bodily” awakening to the truth that there is no “I” - this is a micro level concretism. A bodily concretism.
The Chinese translator, in this case is right to include body (身-shēn) in the equation.
cetovimutti is a bodily processes; using mano.

You have to be more precise with your references. More contextual.
And may I ask you to be be kind enough to use the fabulous utility provided by suttacentral, that allows to underline even a specific sentence in a all text. That would be swell.

We should not rely too much on the Chinese as a proof of what the Pali or Sanskrit might have wanted to convey. Does Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of pañña by “wisdom”, make it a definitive proof that pañña means wisdom? That would be responsively silly.
And it is certainly not because Guṇabhadra translated it as 智 zhì or 智慧 zhìhuì (wisdom,) that it makes a definite proof of it.
Moreover, 智 zhì having the connotation of “knowing;” Thanissaro is much more closer with his “discernment”, when it comes to translating pañña. Much more accurate and fine. Particularly within the context of the early Nikayas, and especially in the sutra-aṅga part.

Sorry to say, but you are adding confusion; not clearness to the discussion.
Translation, (as well as written transmission of oral knowledge,) will always remain interpretative.


We should not rely too much on the grammar either; to the point of being some “alt-write”. As Sujato rightly once said: [quote=“sujato, post:52, topic:3714”](there is a) problem with relying overly on grammar. Grammar is a blunt instrument. … The sense is determined rather by syntax and context.[/quote]

So, let’s stick with the context; and wonder why there are these contextual contradictions on which we could spend eons arguing.

Mudita.

Late edit of some significance:

Two celestial planes of existence of the rupa-loka, that correspond to the the second and third jhana, are respectively called appamanabha and appamanasubha. This is where you end up, if you die having attained one of these Jhanas. You become an appamanabha or an appamanasubha.
Strangely enough, there is already an “insignificant” (appa) amount of mano in both. How much less, should one have, when one reaches the arupa-loka?

Nada, I suppose. Or barely a tiny tiny modicum, just for life sake.
My take. For I am not really sure that appamana means “an insignificant amount of mano”. But if it does, it would be just one more proof of what’s been said above.
No active mano - no active body.

Also (as a somewhat summary):
Kāya uses the six senses; including mano that is mental.
Sāmisā (carnal) is concerned with only five senses; excluding mano.
Mano being a low-level (micro) mental instrument, so to speak - part of citta II.

Also, properly speaking, body should not involve cetasika; at least when it comes to feelings (cetasika vedanā). As per SN 36.6 and its strict parallel on the subject (SA 470).
The “micro” feeling born of contact (the clinging-feeling that is vedanā nidāna - and not the “macro” feeling that is in saṇkhāra nidāna,) involves mental mano, and indeed the all mental citta II (cetasika), which includes mano.
In the configuration of an instructed noble disciple, citta I is transcending citta II (the cetasika phenomena). The mental, higher nature of citta I, is dropping out the mano part of citta I, as well as the cetasika part of citta I.
The instructed noble disciple feels a body feeling; and not a debased citta I feeling.

All this to say that body should involve (mental) mano, but not the (mental) citta part (cetasika) of citta I.
Makes sense?

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