Indeed, Nothing teaches you more about yourself, and the Dhamma then spend time in a cremation ground.
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I would go a step further and say that it’s not so much that they “don’t have a lot of room” than they don’t know how. The Four Noble Truths, kamma and the gratification, danger and escape make it possible to find the desire and way to disengage.
What I said above. I think the Buddha would have been less concerned with merely acting eco-conscious than renouncing for the right reasons and intention.
And I think the teaching of a Buddhism without kamma has a lot to do with people not just indulging, but not seeing any problem with indulging.
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I hear that position, respect it, and disagree. What I’m pushing here is that disengagement is not actually materially possible for many. It’s not a matter of knowing the teachings, nor of individual interest in doing so. Many sincere practitioners have both, but also have the kinds of responsibilities that give little wiggle room for simplifying. There’s just not that much to give up without impinging on someone else you’re responsible for.
I want to keep emphasizing that substantial material renunciation traditionally is for monastics, and that the material guidelines for laypeople emphasize frugality and generosity but not renunciation persay. This is why the conversation above turned into reflections on the often unclear guidelines for liberation-oriented laypeople, which is a category of practitioner not emphasized in the early texts. Many of the responses to this thread, like yours, seem to me to diminish the real functional difference between laypeople and monastics in terms of renunciation practice.
A classical South Asian solution to the problem, of course, is Kṛṣṇa’s suggestion in the Bhagavad Gītā: renunciation is psychological, not material (which was in part a political move to diminish the power of the ascetic communities in favor of lay-centered devotional sects). “Renunciation of the fruits of one’s actions” and being satisfied with both success and failure is proposed there as a way to attain the fruits of renunciation and still fulfill one’s social role as a wealthy layperson (and I’m saying it that way because this conversation then and now implies a focus on wealthy people and I think that matters). In the Buddhist texts, an exemplar of this is Vimalakirti, but in the PC most of the celebrated laypeople, like Visākhā and Anāthapiṇḍika, are there as donors, not liberated lay-renunciate practitioners.
I don’t want to project that people should be practicing in a way that’s not really possible for them. That feels like it too easily edges into superiority conceit.
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Well, it seems that @Bernat has written a follow-up of the original article:
On resolving the neo-early Buddhist contradiction - Secular Buddhist Network
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This feels like a relevant sutta 
[an9.41] “Sir, Ānanda, we are laypeople who enjoy sensual pleasures. We like sensual pleasures, we love them and take joy in them. But renunciation seems like an abyss. I have heard that in this teaching and training there are very young mendicants whose minds are eager for renunciation; they’re confident, settled, and decided about it. They see it as peaceful. Renunciation is the dividing line between the multitude and the mendicants in this teaching and training.”
[…]
“That’s so true, Ānanda! That’s so true! Before my awakening—when I was still unawakened but intent on awakening—I too thought, ‘Renunciation is good! Seclusion is good!’ But my mind wasn’t eager for renunciation; it wasn’t confident, settled, and decided about it. I didn’t see it as peaceful…
[…]
Then my mind was eager for renunciation; it was confident, settled, and decided about it. I saw it as peaceful. And so, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, I entered and remained in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected. While I was in that meditation, perceptions and attentions accompanied by sensual pleasures beset me, and that was an affliction for me. Suppose a happy person were to experience pain; that would be an affliction for them. In the same way, when perceptions and attentions accompanied by sensual pleasures beset me, that was an affliction for me.
My takeaway from these excerpts from an9.41 is that something like “renunciation is good [for me]” is not going to be emotionally true for most people. It seems even the Buddha(-to be) struggled with the dissonance between the idea of renunciation and the gut feeling that ‘renunciation is good for me’ before having experienced jhana states (assuming they are profound, transcendental states of non-sensual bliss).
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This article makes some good points, but I’m a little confused by this:
Mahāyāna has Buddha-nature: because things are conditioned, they contain the possibility of transformation—but then they’re not inherently dukkha, they’re just empty. In contrast, as a child of the Vipassanā movement, neo-early Buddhism is quite suspicious of pleasantness of any kind, though this seems to be changing, and has yet to fully replace the lived religion aspects of Theravāda that Buddhist modernism ‘sanitised’.
Ummm, no, they are still “dukkha.” Anything that changes is still dukkha, even if it changes into something “pleasant.” Dukkha isn’t just “unpleasantness”….this is a common misconception.
Or am I misunderstanding the author’s point here?
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I join the confused group after reading both articles.
After reading the second article still I don’t have a clear idea of what he name “neo-early Buddhism”.
I read many generalist views about something is happening. Although still I don’t know what.
Maybe my own ignorance but still I cannot find the food, only the dish.
Can the author or somebody quote here some words from these “neo-early Buddhists”, to help to identify what he is talking about?.
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It would really help to have some definitions of the key terms. Maybe everyone else knows what is meant by; Neo Early Buddhism, Life Affirming Orientation, metamodern Buddhist… Without understanding the details of what is meant here it is difficult to get to the substance of the argument.
Quoted from the article "Dharmically, I identify (sort of) as a neo-early Buddhist, as a secular Buddhist, and perhaps as a metamodern Buddhist—but that would require another article. To resolve the contradiction I’ve sketched, I see the following three options:
1. Cease to be life-affirming and stick to a more renunciant message.
2. Let go of the doctrine that anything conditioned and impermanent is dukkha.
3. Consciously and explicitly resignify that doctrine."
I have to confess, I really struggle to understand what is meant here - especially what is seen or defined as a dichotomy of ‘life-affirming v/s renunciant’. I just can’t for the life of me see why they are represented as mutually exclusive…
Perhaps what we are looking at is simply two ways to view the world/life according to the Buddhas categorizations 1) wrong view 2) right view. And given that the path is a gradual transition from one to the other, judging the end of the path (where delusion is penetrated and understanding what leads to happiness and what leads to suffering is accurate) from the perspective of the beginning of the path (delusion still active - seeing the reverse things leading to happiness or suffering), is where the problem lies. So as in the sutta quote by Erik above, the perspective on what is ‘life-affirming’ changes with the transformation of view.
This is where confidence/faith plays such a vital role… trust the process … follow the instructions for the gradual training… until the transformation starts to take hold and View begins to change. To try to make things ‘congruent’ with current experience and View when at the beginning of the Path seems a recipe for failure - that’s the whole point of the Path!. Why follow the Buddhas teachings at all and not just the prevailing psychological health and well being theories of the day? Why try and re-make what the Buddha taught into something else? Why appropriate the name of Buddhism, or even neo early buddhism? Is this wanting ones cake and to eat it too?
Another point that has a huge impact is that the Buddha clearly states that different individuals are at different points in their journey, renunciation and the more advanced levels of the Path are not for everybody - maybe further in the future. However, my impression is that especially in the ‘west’ with the emphasis on achievement and attainment, the is an inability to be happy in following what the Buddha describes for Lay practitioners - of being CONTENT with living an ethical life. Everyone wants to be a stream winner or enlightened - live in the bliss of Nibbana - but without undergoing the transformation and renunciation required. To me this just looks like a struggle between desire for Buddhist attainments coupled with aversion for the process to get them. Give up the desire here and the problem vanishes 
Admittedly I am a practitioner and not much concerned with the philosophical debates… but from this practitioners viewpoint, I can’t see these things really assisting in progress along the Path, it seems more to be an avenue to increase doubts and find or justify ways of why the Buddhas teachings are not appropriate any more and need to be modified 
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thanks Viveka. I understand the engagement in the discussion because are generalist thoughts on renunciation, dukkha, etc…
However, the author writes there is a movement interpreting dukkha or renounce in a different way, and at least I understand he writes about teachers or authors who are doing some variation in these meanings.
The article don’t show references or quotes from those “neo-early-buddhist” to understand what he is talking about.
Is there some texts or authors?
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I don’t know I’m one of the confused as well 
Much metta
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Well, I am sure they don’t want to offend any of their readers, many of whom I would bet are in one of those two camps.
This is where I really like the “x-buddhism” kind of idea. There are essentially limitless possible iterations of “Buddhism.”
I have yet to read the article, so I may be interloping a bit. But, I shall rectify that now.
well, at least not alone
metta
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Here is an article that mentions the article in the OP.
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I didn’t see Tricycle mentioned by name, just references to “the magazine”. 
The Buddhism that the author of the Slate Magazine describes isn’t what I would consider Buddhism per se. I have a friend who attends a Tibetan “Sangha” group led by a Geshe. When he talks about what goes on there, what is taught, what they focus on, the advice he gets from the Geshe, it’s like another world from what is discussed here at D&D. For instance, if I mention any of the 37 Wings to Awakening, he has no idea what I’m talking about. I can certainly understand a person shying away from “Buddhism” when what they’re presented with isn’t a fair representation of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. Even solid mindfulness practices run out of steam pretty fast if the 4NT, the Noble Eightfold Path, etc. isn’t known and practiced. It’s sad to see someone reject Buddhism as a whole because they get an incomplete or skewed rendition from popular magazines, meditation centers and such.
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The link in the article I just posted goes directly to the article in the OP. You are correct, though, that the article I posted was strangely silent on the magazine name. Similar to the way that Tricycle edited the article in the OP to not include the groups @Bernat was talking about, LOL. Perhaps the Buddhist world is so small and it feels somehow disloyal to actually talk about the things you are talking about. Funny.
Well, that’s kind of the whole point of the discussion in this thread, eh?
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Yes, it certainly is. Touché!
Hello Bernat. The excerpt below (with SN 38.14 origin) seems Commentary rather than Sutta based:
Buddhism calls negative affect dukkha, a word meaning “pain, suffering, discomfort.” Life is filled with dukkha in three ways: as experiences that are painful or unpleasant (dukkha dukkha, felt dukkha), as the transiency and inevitable ending of pleasant experiences (viparinama dukkha, anticipatory dukkha), and as the structure of what it means to be a living thing (sankhara dukkha, potential dukkha). The first sense of dukkha is self-evident. The second refers to how good things often end badly or, more simply, that they end, which hurts or leaves one empty. And the third and the most abstract reflects how transiency, unreliability, and dependence are baked into the recipe of living things—not something that will sustain complete satisfaction. The best-case scenario for a date, for example, is that two true soulmates find each other and live in absolute bliss until one of them dies, leaving the other one heartbroken.
Again, the following excerpt seems contrary to the suttas, such as AN 3.136:
With this reinterpretation, the doctrine that “whatever is conditioned or impermanent is dukkha” sounds like a fact. But it is not a fact: it is a judgment.
It seems the article has the common inflexibility of Western scholars in relation to Pali words such as ‘dukkha’. The statement “whatever is conditioned or impermanent is dukkha”, according to the suttas, is a fixed fact.
Now, because in the first excerpt quoted above (of referring to three types of dukkha that seem do not exist in the suttas because the suttas seem to summarize all dukkha as ‘upadana’), the article then says:
With the scope set to one lifetime, the amount of what can be done about dukkha dwindles greatly. There is little we can do about much of the felt dukkha that life allots us, a bit more we can do about anticipatory dukkha, and there is nothing whatsoever we can do about potential dukkha. That is because dukkha is only completely eradicated by not being (re)born. We can reduce felt dukkha to its bare minimum: the pain of illness, death, unpleasant sensory stimuli; in dharmic jargon, we can keep it to the first arrow. And through insight, we can decrease the suffering of change, of good things ending; but the extreme of completely eradicating it entails not caring—or a similar stance, one that I doubt neo-early Buddhists would cherish as an ideal.
It seems there is only one Path in the suttas, which is the 1st Arrow Path. What path is there in the suttas to stop being (re)born that is different to the 1st Arrow Path? How does believing in countless lifetimes change the amount of dukkha to be quenched via The Path? 
The article continues with another unsubstantiated statement:
Since certain forms of dukkha are perceived as just part of this one life, the problem of dukkha mutates.
The article then creates a novel type of dukkha that must be overcome where as, in reality, it cannot be overcome nor do the suttas prescribe any path for it to be overcome:
Any such “natural dukkha” is no longer on the list of what one’s practice aims to overcome.
Iti 44 says the Arahant continues to experience painful feelings. SN 22.59, Dhp 278, etc, say enlightenment is gained from experiencing the dukkha (unsatisfactory; non-happiness-giving-nature) of impermanent conditioned things; which generates dispassion. It seems the only ‘dukkha’ that can be overcome, according to the suttas, is the dukkha of ‘upadana’. Even if it is held a future life will be ‘dukkha’, the only Path in the suttas for ending any ‘future lives’ is the Path of ending upadana-causing-craving.
I think I have posted enough to apply the following excerpt from the article to the article itself:
Nevertheless, this outlook is something new that draws from early Buddhist texts while replacing the whole frame—it is not early Buddhism.
The article seems to continue to ignore the various teachings given to laypeople in the suttas, such as AN 10.91:
A life-affirming dharma has no reason to maintain that everything conditioned and impermanent is dukkha; for the latter doctrine makes full sense only when we aspire to leave cyclic existence.
The article concludes:
The recent trend in dharma circles that we may call “neo-early Buddhism” differs in fundamental respects from the early Buddhist texts it claims as basis, and it should be more open about that. Chiefly, it is life- or world-affirming, which early Buddhism is not. I have argued that the doctrine that “everything conditioned and impermanent is dukkha,” one element of the rationale for wanting to leave the world, is a renunciant doctrine. Since in affirming life neo- early Buddhism affirms the impermanent and conditioned rather than attempting to get away from it, it is senseless for it to maintain that everything conditioned and impermanent is dukkha. I have suggested that this inconsistency stems from two things: from not instinctively regarding life as cyclical and from an emotional difficulty in disagreeing with the Buddha. The latter facilitates relating to those teachings that create cognitive dissonance in a way that is dishonest and unhelpful, planting the seeds of future confusion, stuckness, or even crises of faith, and that does not help to harmonize our values, our goals, and our means to reach them. I hope I am exaggerating.
Fortunately, imo, the article is exaggerating because:
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There are university scholars earning probably $$$,$$$ per year peddling their verbose essays & books about Buddhism. Are these university scholars renunciates with students who are renunciates?
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In the spirit of the above, there are Pali translators translating suttas for public consumption that seem were never intended (by the Buddha) to be studied by the general public. It seems the Buddha made a very clear distinction between the Path for a renunciate (SN 56.11) and the path to heaven (DN 31) for the average Buddhist layperson.
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The doctrine of ‘life-cycle’ seems to have little relevance to the quenching of dukkha because dukkha can only be quenched in the here & now. Even if there is a belief in “my” future life cycle, this idea of “my future life cycle” cannot end the dukkha of regarding life as “me” & “mine” and thus cannot end life cycles.
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Fortunately, the following are exaggerations: “emotional difficulty”, “cognitive dissonance”, “dishonest”, etc. Instead, I imagine any genuine difficulties a layperson may have with the core message of the EBTs naturally arises from the career $cholar$ who are peddling the EBT$ onto the general public.
Hi Sean, thanks for your interesting perspective. As a teacher of the Dhamma, it is useful for me to get some insight into how these matters are playing out in the US. As so often, however, it is what I disagree with that prompts me to respond. Here is what I find problematic in your otherwise fascinating contribution:
To start with, we know that this does not sit well with the Buddha’s own advice as we find it in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN16):
“Now, Ānanda, some of you might think: ‘The teacher’s dispensation has passed. Now we have no Teacher.’ But you should not see it like this. The teaching and training that I have taught and pointed out for you shall be your Teacher after my passing."
“So, mendicants, having carefully memorized those things I have taught you from my direct knowledge, you should cultivate, develop, and make much of them so that this spiritual practice may last for a long time. That would be for the welfare and happiness of the people, out of compassion for the world, for the benefit, welfare, and happiness of gods and humans. And what are those things I have taught from my direct knowledge? They are: the four kinds of mindfulness meditation, the four right efforts, the four bases of psychic power, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven awakening factors, and the noble eightfold path."
In fact, the word of the Buddha is always the standards by which any teaching should be measured:
“Take a mendicant who says: ‘Reverend, I have heard and learned this in the presence of the Buddha: this is the teaching, this is the training, this is the Teacher’s instruction.’ You should neither approve nor dismiss that mendicant’s statement. Instead, having carefully memorized those words and phrases, you should make sure they fit in the discourse and are exhibited in the training. If they do not fit in the discourse and are not exhibited in the training, you should draw the conclusion: ‘Clearly this is not the word of the Buddha. It has been incorrectly memorized by that mendicant.’ And so you should reject it. If they do fit in the discourse and are exhibited in the training, you should draw the conclusion: ‘Clearly this is the word of the Buddha. It has been correctly memorized by that mendicant.’ You should remember it."
It seems to me that these statements need to be taken seriously. And indeed most of the Buddhist tradition, especially Theravada, has done so for 2,500 years. The word of the Buddha is preeminent, and everything else is really just commentary.
But can we know that these words were spoken by the Buddha? To me the more interesting question is whether we have any reason to think they were not. I don’t think so. Yet even if we admit to some degree of doubt, we can be sure that this was the attitude of the early Buddhist community. And where would such an attitude have originated if not with the Buddha himself? In other words, even if he did not speak those very words, it seems reasonable to think he would said something like them. The sentiment that the word of the Buddha is preeminent would have come from the Buddha himself.
Indeed, we don’t need to hear this from the Buddha to arrive at a similar conclusion. All of Buddhist history only makes sense in so far as it refers back to the Buddha’s teachings. Anything that has been said in the name of Buddhism has value only because of the Buddha’s utterances. Later teachings build on what was said before, mostly by commenting on earlier teachings. The word of the Buddha is what holds all of Buddhism together and is the lens through which everything must ultimately be understood. All of Buddhist history assumes that the Buddha had a profound insight into the nature of reality. If he didn’t, the rest of Buddhism falls flat.
The Buddha is the only person for whom we are obliged to make such an assumption. Buddhist history is full of all sorts of characters, some with a high reputation for their insight. Some of these existed in the very earliest period, such as Sāriputta and Khemā. Yet even these monastics, who were more or less certified as fully awakened by the Buddha himself, were never on par with the Buddha. To the extent that their teachings were recorded at all - and for the most part they were not - they were always subsidiary to the Buddha’s discourses. Sāriputta’s teachings, for instance, are generally detailed expositions of teachings previously given by the Buddha.
With later Buddhist teachers we have far greater reasons to be even more careful. Although they sometimes have a big reputation, the reality is that we normally know very little about them. The little we do know are stories and legends that are impossible to verify. It would be unwise to place too much faith in the sayings of such teachers, such as elevating them to the same position as the sayings of the Buddha, as is sometimes done. Our lack of knowledge should make us very careful. In practice this means always giving preference to the word of the Buddha.
Much of Buddhist literature does not even have known authors. The Pali Abhidhamma, for instance, which was probably compiled in the centuries after the Buddha passed away, is not attributed to any specific person (apart from legends that cannot be taken literally). In spite of this, the Abhidhamma is often considered the pinnacle of the Theravada tradition, supposedly expressing the Dhamma from the perspective of ultimate reality. It is astonishing and little bit frightening that the tradition accepts the word of anonymous authors over the word of the Buddha. Yet this is exactly what is happening. And the Abhidhamma is just the beginning. Most of Theravada and Mahayana literature is not attributed to specific authors. It is a measure of our own lack of proper reflection that we give such literature such a preeminent position within Buddhism, sometimes eclipsing the word of the Buddha himself.
In the end, the only literature that we are compelled to regard as expressing true insight into the nature of reality is the word of the Buddha. With all other Buddhist literature, there is always going to be a degree of uncertainty, which needs to be reflected in its relative position vis a vis the Buddha’s own discourses. It follows from this that early Buddhism - provided we define it as the word of the Buddha - is indeed more authentic. To me the real delusion is that Buddhist literature cannot be stratified in this manner. Indeed, a lack of such stratification is almost certainly going to lead us astray. The Dhamma as envisioned by the Buddha is too often at odds with the teachings of later generations.
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I think that has some truth to it. As a married householder with kids, my goal is to one day be a renunciate, but that’s probably not that common.
Another thing to consider is that America has some of the features of a low-level heaven making it less conducive to practice the dhamma. Copious intoxicants (alcohol, drugs, television, internet, etc) and relative comfort for most people (air conditioning, nice beds, easy transportation).
Its because they see it as being the word of the Buddha, directly. On Buddhavacana, does that mean only the words the Buddha spoke directly or also that which accords with the meaning or spirit of what he taught? Personally I think it’s the latter. If something leads to less greed, hatred and delusion then its Buddhavacana. For example if someone sees things in terms of the arising and falling of the 4 elements or the rising and falling of rūpa-kalāpas what does it matter, as long as either leads to less greed, hate and delusion? Someone might say that rūpa-kalāpas don’t exist, but neither does the “earth element” really. Its an outdated way of looking at matter, but it can still be useful.