SN 22.81 and the distinctly buddhist teachings found in it

[Dhabba]

But contextually ”They” in this sutta still adhere to the strictly buddhist teaching of not regarding form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self.

That is why I asked in my first post in this thread if there was any other contemporary sect during the Buddha’s time that also teaches, just like the Buddha, to not regard form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self?

@Sunyo

Now, this unlearned person could be a Buddhist or not. Whatever religion they follow is not important. The point is that they views are all equally wrong views, and both Buddhists and non-Buddhists can have wrong views. There’s no distinctly Buddhist-only views here.

And which outsider sect adheres to this teaching on the aggregates as not-self but also at the same time embraces eternalism?

And which outsider sect adheres to the aggregates as not-self and dismiss eternalism but instead embraces annihilationism?

And which sect…? You get the point.

Here in AN 10.29 the Buddha praises outsiders using exactly the same phrase and formula as in SN 22.81:

”This is the best of the convictions of outsiders, that is: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ When someone has such a view, you can expect that they will be repulsed by continued existence, and they will not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence. Some sentient beings have such a view. But even the sentient beings who have views like this decay and perish.”

Like I wrote in the other thread:

@Dhabba

This is applicable to various ascetic practices by others that are very painful to the body but due to the deep concentration attained leads one to the formless realm of nothingness. These meditators don’t care about a future ”existence” of any sort in rupa loka and kama-loka and couldn’t care less about ”ceasing to exist” as they have come to know existence (kama-loka & rupa-loka): since the formless realm of nothingness is seen as the highest type of ”cessation” in their dhamma.

Yet in SN 22.81 everyone is encouraged to completely give up every notion of ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’

In AN 10.29 the reason for the Buddha’s praise is:

When someone has such a view, you can expect that they will be repulsed by continued existence, and they will not be repulsed by the cessation of continued existence.

But this reason for praise seems not to be applicable anymore in SN 22.81 and is instead considered a wrong view that has to be given up in the pursuit of ending the defilements in this present life.

Any clue as to why?

@Sunyo

I would appreciate it if you don’t try to tell me what my view is, because it’s not this. You seem to misunderstand something here. I don’t think there is a real “I” or self at all, so it can’t cease either.

So this not-real ”I” or self can’t even cease by attaning Nibbāna?

In the sutta in question they already do not regard the five aggregates as self and see the already non-existent “I” or self finally coming to a permanent end in something else than the five aggregates - Nibbāna.

What is the difference?

@Sunyo

You’re addressing the view of the annihilationists instead. And you seem to assume there are just the five aggregates and nibbāna, nothing else. Fair enough. But that is not the assumption of the eternalists and annihilationists make in this sutta.

Well to some degree they are on the buddhist path because they both DO have the view that the 5 aggregates are not-self, even according to the Buddha himself in the sutta. Their assumptions are more about what Nibbāna (ending the defilements in this present life) will result in. One group believe it will result in eternalism, the other in annihilation.

@Sunyo

Not necessarily being Buddhists, they probably don’t even believe in nibbāna in the first place. But more importantly, some of them think there is still a self or “I” outside of the aggregates—that’s the point I perceive is being made here. That self or “I” could for example be the incorrectly perceived owner or experiencer of the aggregates. Eternalists think this continues forever after death; annihilationists think it is destroyed at death. But since such a thing doesn’t exist in the first place, both views are wrong.

@Sunyo

The point is that they views are all equally wrong views, and both Buddhists and non-Buddhists can have wrong views. There’s no distinctly Buddhist-only views here.

Well their wrong views are only the result of not regarding form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness as self. This view is not wrong in itself but it can still lead to other wrong views, namely regarding Nibbāna.

That is my whole point.

How, from where and why did Yamaka get his wrong views?

Due to anything specifically in the Buddha’s teaching or was it maybe due to something taught by outsiders in their dhamma?

Is there is any other teaching out there also saying that form or feeling or perception or choices or consciousness is not-self? I’d love to study it.

But it has to be a teaching prior to or contemporary to the Buddha, I wouldn’t want to waste my time on the copycats who showed up later on, AFTER the Buddha…