The Saṅgāvara Sutta (MN 100) is one of the trickier texts in the canon. The bulk of it repeats the account of the Buddha’s pracyice before awakening, but the narrative framework, while fairly short, is full of challenges both in the language and interpretation.
Indeed, such are the textual difficulties that K.R. Norman wrote a whole essay (The Buddha’s View of devas, also in Collected Papers II) arguing that it suffers from major textual corruption, for which he proposed a reconstructed version. But Anālayo showed that the reconstructions are not supported by the Chinese parallels. Much ink has been spilled on these matters; Piya Tan discusses details. There have been previous discussions on this forum, to which I hope to contribute.
Ven Bodhi says:
The sequence of ideas in this passage is difficult to follow and it is likely that the text is corrupt. K.R. Norman has proposed a reconstruction of this portion of the dialogue, but it is hard to follow him in details.
I’ll spare you another go through all this mass of argumentation. I believe these illustrious former interpreters have missed the mark, and here I’ll explain my take.
who is Saṅgāvara
In MN 100 Saṅgāvara is presented as a mānava, a brahmanical student, of sixteen years of age, living at Caṇḍalakappa (otherwise unknown). He is one of those precocious teens who has learned the whole scripture and thinks he knows better than everyone else. He snaps at the brahmin lady Dhanañjānī when she expresses homage to the BUddha. The relationship between the two is not spelled out in the text, but I think she is the wife of his brahmin teacher.
Now, a “brahmin” Saṅgārava asks about the near shore and far shore (AN 10.117, AN 10.169), and about how hymns are remembered (SN 46.55, AN 5.193). It would appear to be the same Saṅgārava of Sāvatthī who practiced purification in water (AN 7.21) and who asked about sacrifice (AN 3.60).
Apart from the “far shore” discourses, in all of these he was said to go for refuge at the end, as does the Saṅgārava of the current discourse. This is historically unlikely, but not unusual in the suttas. In any case it indicates we should be cautious about drawing historical inferences here.
Whether that Saṅgārava, who lived at Sāvatthī and is always identified as “brahmin”, is the same person as the teenage “student” (māṇava) living at Caṇḍalakappa is unclear.
the difficult passage
Here’s my current translation. Saṅgārava, at the end of the long passage on the Buddha’s awakening, abruptly changes topic.
When he had spoken, Saṅgārava said to the Buddha, “The striving of Mister Gotama was indeed assiduous and that of a true person, since he is a perfected one, a fully awakened Buddha. But Mister Gotama, do gods survive?”
“I’ve understood about gods in terms of causes.”
“But Mister Gotama, when asked ‘Do gods survive?’ why did you say that you have understood about gods in terms of causes? That being so, is it not hollow and false?”
“When asked ‘Do gods survive’, whether you reply ‘Gods survive’ or ‘I’ve understood in terms of causes’ a sensible person would come to the categorical conclusion in this matter that gods survive.”
“But why didn’t you say that in the first place?”
“It is agreed by the eminent in the world that gods survive.”
Now, clearly the passage is a bit choppy and confusing. The key point, to me, is that the confusion is part of the text itself. Those who were speaking are well aware that there has been a confusion or difficulty. This suggests that what has been taken as corruption is simply the text representing naturalistic dialogue.
language details
There are few linguistic difficulties to sort out.
“indeed assiduous”
This represents the hapax aṭṭhitavataṁ. This, I believe, should be resolved with aṭṭhita as ā+ṭhita, “assiduous”; see Ja 242:2.1 in the same sense, and compare Sanskrit āsthita. Most dictionaries and translators read as if it were a+ṭhita, which I think is a mistake.
For the suffix, I follow the variant vata rather than vataṁ, as exclamations with repeated vata are idiomatic.
“gods survive”
The phrase atthi devā is established at MN 90:13.2, where it is explained as whether gods “survive”, i.e. whether they are reborn. The implicit contrast is with gods who exist eternally. There are a number of similar passages. I’ve written about this detail a number of times, most recently here, and here is the relevant portion:
Compare the following passage from MN 90 (see also MN 100). It uses the exact same phrasing, but instead of asking “does the self exist?” (atthi attā) it asks “do gods exist” (atthi devā). King Pasenadi asks the Buddha:
“But sir, do gods survive (/exist)?”
“But what exactly are you asking?”
“Whether those gods come back to this state of existence or not.”
“Those gods who are subject to affliction come back to this state of existence, but those free of affliction do not come back.”I’ve translated atthi in such passages as “survive” rather than “exist”, and here you can see why. Pasenadi is not asking about whether gods exist in an abstract sense, but about whether they are reborn. But the phrasing is unclear, so even the Buddha requires clarification. This shows that the verb atthi, while often having the simple sense of “exist” can also carry a philosophically pregnant sense of “continue to exist”, “exist forever”, or more simply, “survive”.
We find a similar question posed to Yama, god of death, by the student Naciketa in Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.20. Naciketa wonders what happens to a man after he dies, as “some say he survives, while others say he does not survive” (astīty eke nāyam astīti caike). Yama initially refuses to answer such a difficult question. Pressed, he reveals that those who insist there is only this world simply fall under his sway (2.6), but one who knows the subtle true Self realizes the ultimate goal.
This lets us make better sense of the conversation with Vacchagotta. He is asking whether a self survives after death (eternalism) or whether it does not survive after death (Annihilationism). Both cases are of the “do you beat your wife often?” variety, as they assume a self. It also shows that the problematic aspect of Vacchagotta’s question is not the notion of a “self” but the ambiguous verb atthi.
What is really striking here is the Buddha’s response in the three atthi passages under consideration:
- SN 44.10: the Buddha stays silent, refusing to answer.
- MN 90: the Buddha immediately asks for clarification of the question.
- MN 100: the Buddha gives an oblique answer that confuses the questioner.
Clearly, atthi is a tricky verb. The exact implications were a niggling source of confusion in those days just as today. Given that it is, after all, just a verb “to be”, this only makes sense if it has multiple meanings, in particular, a specialized sense in such philosophical contexts.
Thus it seems that Saṅgārava is asking a question that can mean either, “Are gods real, do they exist?”, or “Do gods exist in an eternal state?” The Buddha’s response attempts to satisfy both these senses.
“about gods”
Multiple commentators have proceeded as if adhidevā meant “higher gods”. But this meaning appears to be entirely absent from the Pali. Both here and at AN 8.64:10.1 the sense is, rather, “about the gods”, drawing on a well-known distinction between things that are “about the gods”, those “about beings” (adhibhūta), and those “about the body/self” (adhyātmam, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.7.14–15).
That this sense applies here is established at MN 90:17.8.
“in terms of causes”
Ṭhānaso sometimes means “immediately”, but here it means “in terms of cause” or “by way of cause”. It typically appears in the context of kamma and rebirth, followed by a verb of knowing (eg. MN 12:11.2, ṭhānaso hetuso vipākaṁ yathābhūtaṁ pajānāti, “understands results [of kamma] in terms of grounds and causes”).
The Buddha’s point is that the survival of gods is not a metaphysical absolute but depends on their kamma. They exist in a relative and conditioned sense, not in an absolute and eternal sense.
“by the eminent”
Uccena is rendered “widely by Ven Bodhi, which I earlier followed. But the sense of ucca is “high, lofty”, and here it is, I believe, a noun referring to those who are “eminent”. This, I think, is meant to include Saṅgārava’s teachers, in contrast with the less reputable annihilationists.
I think the point the Buddha is making here is that they share common ground, since respectable teachers agree that gods exist. So in his answer, the Buddha was taking this for granted, and assuming that Saṅgārava wanted to know about the manner in which gods exist.
the overall coherence
With this linguistic details sorted out, it seems to me that the passage makes clear sense.
Saṅgārava asks about the “existence” of the gods, and the Buddha replies in a way that implicitly assumes their existence, but mainly focuses on asserting that the manner of their existence was conditioned, dependent on kamma.
Saṅgārava misses the point and accuses the Buddha of lying. This passage would normally include a reference to the Buddha’s “speech” being false and hollow, and this is indeed supplied by some translators. But it is absent from the text, perhaps due to corruption, or, as I think, to represent Saṅgārava’s confused and reactive speech patterns.
The underlying assumption of those who argue the passage is corrupt is, I think, that the suttas should be coherent. Now, obviously we can expect that the Buddha’s speech is presented as coherent. But natural conversation is very often not. Normally the suttas, it is true, present a stylized and smoothed out form of dialogue. But there are numerous occasions where they are more jagged, more clumsy, more naturalistic, and I think this is a good example.
Thus the incoherence stems partly from the trickiness of the subject matter and terminology, and partly from Saṅgārava’s personality.
Right from the start, Saṅgārava exhibits a sharp reaction to Dhanañjānī’s behavior, evidencing a prickly and somewhat fundamentalist mindset. Such attitudes make it hard to have a decent conversation. He doesn’t follow the Buddha’s logic, and feeling confused and trapped, lashes out rather than asking for clarification.
Notably, the Saṅgārava of AN 3.60 is evasive and a little rude, reminiscent of the prickly and somewhat chaotic personality on display in the current sutta. But as noted above, the connection between Saṅgāravas of different suttas is unclear.
Given that Saṅgārava’s conversion here seems abrupt and unconvincing, I suspect that the ending was tacked on, and he was not converted until later.
conclusion
I think the bulk of the problems of the text can be explained by a correct understanding of the terms involved, as well as naturalistic dialogue depciting the prickly and chaotic character of Saṅgārava. This doesn’t rule out the possibility of textual corruption, of course. But as far as I can see, the overall meaning of the passage is clear enough.
Thank you 
which Wolfgang Geiger shared using his palikanon.com-files. Simply the remark on the repetition-block in MN85 is missing.