SuttaCentral
I would say that nobody can know if there is.
Physics hold that the quarks are the final, smallest component of matter. They have however said this about every other smallest particle before. And it seems that there are some problems with proving quarks empirically.
The question of whether there is a smallest component of matter at all is held by Kant (the philosopher) as one of four questions that mankind will never be able to solve.
In Hinduism they believe that Vishnu is considered the âsmallestâ as well (as well as containing many other unlimited factors). 
Drawing a parallel, maybe a Buddha?
I didnât talk about the wetness of H2O, I talked about the wetness of water. You know, like when you have a shower.
My definition of essence doesnât preclude this.
But Hurrah! Well done! You thought that you would search and come up empty, and you said this
but yay! You managed to find wetness in water and liquid mercury too. I was beginning to think that maybe you might be one of those people who canât perceive wetness and also maybe one of those people who canât perceive suffering in people 
@stu @green I leave you both to your views about essence whatever they may be. Feel free to ignore when I speak about it. Just because it seems helpful for me to think this way doesnât mean it will be for you 
I think a lot of the problem comes down to the definition of the term in this case. Iâm a bit of an ignostic, so I like to agree on a definition of terms where I can. But we are probably talking about different things by the sound of it. I still canât work out what you were trying to get at. Maybe if you offered your definition of the word âessenceâ and also maybe a definition of âsearchâ and âfindâ and âemptyâ that might help?
As far as I know the Vedanta traditions (and I happen to know one or two things about them), they define the Brahman as satchitanand, i.e. Truth/Being, Mind and Bliss. If we do reify anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu a bit (whether one should do it is beside the point here) as a separate âthingâ, âsphereâ, etc., we may say that it is Truth since it does not feature ignorance and thus does not contain and distortions of the yathabhuta perspective. What we definitely cannot say is that it is Mind: to explain why the viññanam anidassanam camp is wrong would take up too much space, time, and effort, so I would rather refer you to this paper by Ven. AnÄlayo as well as his recent book on Nibbana that provide text critical arguments that preclude the viññanam anidassanam from the inclusion into the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu. Doctrinal arguments are aplenty too, but again, it would not be very difficult for you to find them on this very forum. As for the Bliss characteristic, one may mention Ven. Sariputta in AN9.34 pointing out that the absence of perception and feeling as the highest happiness (sukha). Using a similar figure of speech, I may say that an absence of headache is a bliss, and I think you would agree that it would be at the very least odd to reify this absence as describe it as something, i.e. the bliss of the absence is not positive. Interestingly, when I come to think of it, this sutta also provides additional evidence for the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu not being chit in that it mentions that the happiness of Nibbana consists in the absence of feeling and perceptions. Rupa can be absent even in the arupadhÄtu, sankharÄ are absent from the asankhatam per definitionem (it does not matter, which sankharÄ we are actually talking about), so in the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu there is no perception, feeling, rupa, and sankharÄ, ergo no namarupa, ergo no consciousness/viññanam if we follow the paticcasammuppada exegesis. Therefore, the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu can be described as Truth, cannot be described as Mind and can only be described as Bliss negatively (as in âabsence of headache is a blissâ). In other words, based on the Buddhist material that is presently available to us, we can safely say that the anupadisesa nibbanam is not identical to the concept of the Brahman in the Vedanta traditions.
It also cannot be described as stable and constant. Why? Well, because these concepts are relative to time, or, better said, change. Time emerges out of change (let us accept it as a very rough description of the situation as discussing it in further detail would be unnecessary). In the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu there is no change, there even is nothing that potentially could change, there is even no nothing, which means there is no time there, which means that the concept of stableness and constancy cannot be applied to it.
Isnât it much more rational to re-consider the idea of mere cessation as the goal?
Well, the Buddha did refer to the annihilationism as the position closer to the Dhamma than the eternalism. Besides, from the point of view of consciousness, of the mind, entering the anupadisesa nibbana is cessation. Even if we do accept the anupadisesa nibbbanadhÄtu as a âthingâ, it will never enter âourâ experience as it would not feature anything we could experience it with. From the point of view of the aggregates, it remains as much a metaphorical black hole as if it were merely nothing. So, trying to describe it as something as opposed to nothing serves no real purpose from the practical standpoint
I myself do not subscribe to the mere cessation position but rather consider Ven. Ăanadipaâs position in his essay No cassa (can be found in Bhante Joe Atuloâs biography of the Venerable titled To the End of Body & Mind) as well as Ven AnalÄyoâs (minus the somewhat emotional argumentation he uses to oppose the annihilationism interpretation; can be found in his Nibbana book) very sound. Summed up, it says that both the Brahmin/viññana-like and cessation interpretation do not do justice to the anupadisesa nibbanadhÄtu and indeed no interpretation can as it is lying beyond the concepts and language, and we cannot but use them in Samsara. This is why Nibbana as the Third Noble Truth has to be realized to be âunderstoodâ.
Thanks for this summary!
i feel youâre asking the wrong question.
youâre acknowledging that the obviously impermanent parts of us are impermanent. however, youâre asserting the existence of some other part of us that is permanently present and unalterable.
where is that part? does it lie in the body? i canât see how it could.
does it lie in the mind? thatâs a broad domain, so take it aggregate by aggregate - sensation? no, sensations arise and pop away like bubbles; perception? no they shimmer and transition into something else; intentional fabrications? no they change and lead to another, another, another; conscious awareness? no - looks like one continuous flow of awareness, but how can that be when one moment itâs eye-consciousness, next itâs ear or body etc.
so that sense of self isnât in the mental aggregates or form.
where could it be? where could that enduring aspect of self lie? can we access it? if we canât access it, is it truly us or ours? is it any intrinsic part of us if we canât access it?
There is no need to talk about an enduring aspect of self. Like we also do not have to talk about thoughts, feelings, body, perceptions as a not enduring part of ourself. Dhamma is not about this.
We have to talk about seeing rupa as rupa, vedana as vedana, sanna as sanna, sankhara as sankhara, vinnana as vinnana, Nibbana as Nibbana.
But some do not believe that Nibbana refers to something stable, constant, not-desintegrating, while the suttaâs are very clear it does. So, if people are without knowledge and vision of what is stable and constant and not-desintegrating, or do not even acknowledge that Buddha taught this, they tend to the extreme of mere cessationalism. In fact they see no other escape but the vanish, go up in smoke, as it were. They delight in that prospect of not feeling, sensing, perceiving anything anymore.
But must we go to that extreme?
you are asking the right questionsâŠnow we have to attain the yet unattained, realize the yet unrealized, discover the yet not discovered
Anyway, another look for an aspect would show you that there is no aspect. Empty.
Do not know what such means.
All phenomena are Empty, and they are already holding the marks of tranquil extinction. The aspect of no-change can be understood as what the Buddha perceived to be Enlightenment, thatâs why itâs so sought after. But even Enlightenment has a tenant of Sunyata, where there is no substantial reality. So youâre looking for what you make of it. But you have to understand itâs a mirage to get there. Accepting that and becoming Enlightened is the greatest meaning.
I also used to have such great ideas. But now i look back upon this period as being intoxicated. All such things as the emptiness of all phenomena, all holding the marks of tranquil extinction, all such ideas, can really intoxicate oneself. One can feel so wise to sahre such things.
But, probably, if one feels some small pain, suddenly the pain has not at all the mark of tranquil extinction. Or if one has to deal with loss, suddenly all knowledge of empty phenomena is gone, etc.
My experience isâŠshowing such deep and great wisdomâŠprobably is a sign that someone is not even connected to real practice.
Practice makes perfect.
i think thatâs a good point. nibbana is not annihilation.
the buddha states that it is permanent and it is blissful and entirely satisfactory. however, it has no essence - itâs anatta.
our conditioned minds have difficulty conceiving of a state that has no intrinsic essence, and further converting that to be satisfactory. and yet, heâs stating it is the destination.
i saw your exchange on that link bhante. i tend to agree with you.
the buddhaâs distinct use of sankhara (conditioned phenomena) as distinct from dhamma (all phenomena) in distinguishing the application of anicca and dukkha from anatta suggests to me the permanent unconditioned state that is entirely satisfactory. thereâs no self or conditionality in that state. itâs imperturbable.