The chariot analogy in SN 5:10

Discussion
74

I just think it’s a bad argument, take:

“In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life, is it appropriate to declare:
“Ettha ca te, āvuso yamaka, diṭṭheva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne, kallaṁ nu te taṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ: ‘

As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”
‘tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā’”ti?

by that logic it would be equally inappropriate to declare “the Buddha has gone to the deep woods for the days abiding” or the Buddha requests your presence" or really anything at all about the Buddha.

(I would also note that the in the above tathāgate cannot mean The Realised One (i.e the Buddha) because thats not who Yamaka is talking about, rather it must mean “one gone thus” and refer to any enlightened person, as that is what is being talked about)

requiring all this eel-wriggling about “convenience” and the Buddha saying one thing but “really” meaning completely different things, and dogs not “really” being dogs but really being sometimes “bodies with tails” and sometimes “eye-consciousness” is just incoherent. It’s not based on the bulk of the EBT’s, it’s based on a rare argument, occurring only at MN22 and SN22.85 or repetitions thereof along with the poem, that makes hundreds upon hundreds of other statements in the canon into mysterious doublespeak if not outright lies, or worse, just nonsense, as what could

while beings fare on according to their deeds.
Satto pana gacchati yena kammaṁ;

possibly mean if the aggregates are substituted there, “the aggregates fare on according to their deeds”?!? what does that mean?

A sentient being enters transmigration.
Satto saṁsāramāpādi,

“the aggregates enter transmigration”??

It’s not easy to find a sentient being who in all this long time has not previously been your mother.
na so, bhikkhave, satto sulabharūpo yo namātābhūtapubbo iminā dīghena addhunā.

“it’s not easy to find five aggregates who have not previously been your mother, wait, your “maternal five aggregates”?”?

Are we talking about the same dog? i.e is it the same dog who barked and saw you? if so then what you are saying is not just “inconvenient”, it is downright misleading! Are we to understand that the Buddhas body is in the hut but their volitional formations and sound consciousness are somewhere else?

Again, this is a statement given here and in the form dukkhameva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati at SN12.15 and SN22.90 (the second sutta is quoting the first) and nowhere else. It makes no sense if taken literally, and is so rare it is just really difficult for me to see the justification for making it the basis of your understanding of doctrine.

Metta.

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75

Given the analysis I am surprised that this is your conclusion. The Buddha chooses not to answer Dona’s question and answers a different one instead. He deliberately doesn’t address what he is. This supports the argument that he left the definition of what he is both now and in the future undefined.

I would be keen to know if there is any sutta where the Buddha says outright that the self never existed. To my knowledge, he never does that. One would think that if the self truly didn’t exist that he would simply say so.

It can’t be claimed that the self in reality does not exist while the aggregates do. All that can be claimed is that the aggregates precede the self - i.e. the self is made of the aggregates. This is no different from quantum phenomena preceding a cup - i.e. the cup is made of quantum phenomena . However, just like quantum phenomena the aggregates are not fundamental or indestructible. Quantum phenomena exists in dependence on other quantum phenomena. Similarly, the aggregates exist in dependence on one another.

Nothing can be said to exist absolutely because all phenomena exists in relation to other phenomena. Identities are simply the product of the boundaries we draw between these phenomena. Even the fact that there are five aggregates is a result of drawing the boundaries a particular way. For example, there is no reason that the fabrication aggregate could not be further broken down in terms of its functions. That the aggregates seem to persist is simply a result of the way the functions have been defined and boundaries have been drawn.

Given that nothing can exist absolutely and everything exists in dependence upon everything else, the self is no more real or unreal than a cup.

76

this is simply not true of the early Pali material.

upalab occurs:

VN: 0
DN: 1 (in DN16, which even Buddhaghosa acknowledges has late additions)
MN: 2
SN: 6
AN: 3
KN: 71 (3 in Thera, 1 in Sn, all 65 other occurrences in the late books)
AB: 218 (ALL 218 in the late Kathavatthu)
VM: 8

So this upalab is absent from the Vinaya, absent from the early Abhidhamma, absent from early DN, and rare in MN SN and AN.

Not common. rare.

very common later though, occurring over 50 times in the Nidessa, and over 200 times in the Kathavatthu.

secondly, where it is used in DN16 has nothing to do with arguments about selves or beings;

“Subhadda, in whatever teaching and training the noble eightfold path is not found, there is no true ascetic found, no second ascetic, no third ascetic, and no fourth ascetic.
“Yasmiṁ kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo na upalabbhati, samaṇopi tattha na upalabbhati. Dutiyopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati. Tatiyopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati. Catutthopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati.

In whatever teaching and training the noble eightfold path is found, there is a true ascetic found, a second ascetic, a third ascetic, and a fourth ascetic.
Yasmiñca kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo upalabbhati, samaṇopi tattha upalabbhati, dutiyopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati, tatiyopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati, catutthopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati.

In this teaching and training the noble eightfold path is found. Only here is there a true ascetic, here a second ascetic, here a third ascetic, and here a fourth ascetic. Other sects are empty of ascetics.
Imasmiṁ kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo upalabbhati, idheva, subhadda, samaṇo, idha dutiyo samaṇo, idha tatiyo samaṇo, idha catuttho samaṇo, suññā parappavādā samaṇebhi aññehi.

the occurrences at AN3.61 also have nothing to do with beings:

Those who believe that past deeds are the most important thing have no enthusiasm or effort, no idea that there are things that should and should not be done.
Pubbekataṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, sārato paccāgacchataṁ na hoti chando vā vāyāmo vā idaṁ vā karaṇīyaṁ idaṁ vā akaraṇīyanti.

Since they don’t acknowledge as a genuine fact that there are things that should and should not be done, they’re unmindful and careless, and can’t rightly be called ascetics.
Iti karaṇīyākaraṇīye kho pana saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamāne muṭṭhassatīnaṁ anārakkhānaṁ viharataṁ na hoti paccattaṁ sahadhammiko samaṇavādo.

MN59, SN36.19 and SN36.20 also do not use the root for this purpose:

The Realized One describes pleasure as included in happiness wherever it’s found, and in whatever context.’”
api ca, āvuso, yattha yattha sukhaṁ upalabbhati yahiṁ yahiṁ taṁ taṁ tathāgato sukhasmiṁ paññapetī’”ti.

So MN22, SN5.10, SN22.85, SN22.86 and SN44.2 are the only examples of this root being used to assert the non-existence of something in the early canon apart from the AN passage, and the AN passage does not support the interpretation, as it clearly implies that present actions are real, just not properly acknowledged by the past-focused practitioners, “not acknowledged as salient” seems more of the sense here.

So in summary, of the 12 occurrences in the 4 principle Nikayas of the root upalab fully half the occurances do not support the gloss of non-existence, as in fact there are true ascetics to be found and present actions are not being denied to exist, just denied to be salient for salvation, happiness is happiness wherever it is found, not wherever it is real or existing.

In fact, the only occurrences that support the argument are the very ones under discussion.

I believe that’s called begging the question.

(as a postscript, the Sn and Thera occurrences are:

They have no sons or cattle,
Na tassa puttā pasavo,
nor possess fields or lands.
Khettaṁ vatthuñca vijjati;
No picking up or putting down
Attā vāpi nirattā vā,
is to be found in them.
Na tasmiṁ upalabbhati.

and

Whoever has no respect
“Yassa sabrahmacārīsu,
for their spiritual companions
gāravo nūpalabbhati;
falls away from the true teaching,
Parihāyati saddhammā,
like a fish in a little puddle.
maccho appodake yathā.

neither of which support the “not a real thing” gloss)

Metta.

77

It is common, but upalabbhati isn’t the only verb with which the idea is expressed. There are several verbs pertaining to cognition which in their passive form convey the same idea.

For starters try the passive forms of vindati, pajānāti and dassati, i.e., vijjati, paññayati and dissati.

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78

all right then, it is rare to see upalabbhati used to express this idea.

not getting a lot on DPR for disatti either, except things in curly brackets that don’t show up on suttacentral…

Among the brahmins we can see gradual progress
imesampi hi, bho gotama, brāhmaṇānaṁ dissati anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā yadidaṁ—
in learning the chants.

is the first occurrence outside the brackets, at MN107 …

paññayati I can’t find at all.

vijjati however occurs hundreds upon hundreds of times, so I will have my work cut out for me looking into it!

perhaps some examples of the other two would help?

(ooh, vijjati is one of those interesting words that fo some reason occurs less often in SN than it does in DN… I wonder why that might be?)

79

Don’t forget the macron: paññāyati.

I actually posted an example only two years ago.

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Okay, when na dissati occurs in curly brackets it’s just the editor telling you that the word “is not found” in such and such edition of the text. Actually the use of dissati in the sense that we want is more of a commentarial thing.

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Thanks @Dhammanando, this is all really interesting stuff, as is the link to the other thread I will now have to read!

82

Since he asks about “who” and “a maker” which is very similar to a number of suttas in SN12 where people ask for example “who feels” or “is [suffering] made by oneself or another?” The answer there is always in line with anatta too.

Also, these exchanges with Mara in SN5 (and elsewhere) I think should not be seen as conversations that actually happened, but as texts composed to make a certain point. By Vajira’s answer you can deduce what was implied in the question.

Yes, that’s how I see understand it too.

OK, yes that’s not really how I see it either. I don’t think it applies to everything.

When asked why “the world” is empty in SN35.85 the Buddha answers that it is just the six senses that are empty of a self. So the concept of emptiness and the chariot analogy are really telling us something about the self, not so much about things in the world out there. That’s not really what matters.

It’s about how we use words, but it is about anatta too. Thinking “I am a being” is a sense of self. There is a being conventionally but it is the sense of “I” that is the problem here. In that ultimate sense there is no being that we are.

In SN35.66 ‘a being’ is just defined conventionally as the six sense spheres, by the way. (The sutta I mentioned earlier but couldn’t find then.)

“Your reverence, we say ‘a being’, but when is there a being or that which is defined as a being?”

“Samiddhi, when the sense of sight, sights, sight-consciousness, and things cognizable by sight-consciousness exist, then there is a being or that which is defined as a being. When the sense of hearing … When the sense of smell … When the sense of taste … When the sense of touch … When the mind, mental phenomena, mind-consciousness, and things cognizable by mind-consciousness exist, then there is a being or that which is defined as a being.”

This is a more conventional definition, unlike the play on words in SN23.2 which puns on the word satta as ‘stuck’. In this conventional sense of the being’ being six senses’, there does really exist ‘a being’. But this is not how Mara uses the word in SN5.10, where he assumes a self.

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83

Hi,

With respect, to me this is the kind of argument: “If the suttas don’t say literally what i want them to say, the Buddha didn’t imply it.”.But we could just as well say the same of the opposite view: the Buddha never said that he never said there was a self. So he must have had a reason for that! :crazy_face: In other words, he never said any of the things you said either. Clearly, this way of reasoning, by means of what is not said, is not very convincing or reliable… You have to go by what IS actually said, not by what is unsaid. Anyway, there are many quotes from which it is implied that there is no self. I once listed them somewhere here, if I recall, but don’t remember where. Anyway, MN22 is quite clear for example:

Mendicants, were a self to exist, would there be the thought, ‘Belonging to my self’?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Were what belongs to a self to exist, would there be the thought, ‘My self’?”

“Yes, sir.”

“But self and what belongs to a self are not acknowledged as a genuine fact.

The last sentence also uses anupalabbhamāne which as discussed means it doesn’t actually exist. I would translate it something like “a self or what belongs to a self is not found to actually exist”. In other words, a self does not exist. That it doesn’t literally say ‘there is no self’ like some demand the suttas to say, doesn’t take away from the fact that it means the exact same thing.

Was going to say the same. It’s very common, in fact. Gombrich first pointed out this use of “to find” to me. I can’t remember in which work, but he compared it to the French “se trouve”, which functions more or less the same.

I like to quote AN5.167 as an example: " If I know, ‘That is not present in me,’ then I say, ‘It is not present, it is not found in me.’” (the verb is saṁvijjati) So what can’t be found does not actually exist, in this context. Of course not in all contexts, that’s just not how words work. But it is the same in SN5.10 and MN22 and such, where the idea is anatta.

84

still have a lot of DPR’ing to do with what you have given me, but just on na paññāyati it is actually looking like the no discernible beginning of samsara and no discernible picking up without hands are actually the only two occurrences of the idea. DN and MN have no occurrences of na paññāyati at all, DN only has even paññāyati by itself at DN16 and DN27, SN just repeats the samsara argument from SN15.1 on and again in a couple of other places and then gives the “no hands” example, just once, at SN35.236. AN3.100 adds;

‘No matter how this person performs a deed, they experience it the same way.’ This being so, the spiritual life could not be lived, and there’d be no chance of making a complete end of suffering.
‘yathā yathāyaṁ puriso kammaṁ karoti tathā tathā taṁ paṭisaṁvediyatī’ti, evaṁ santaṁ, bhikkhave, brahmacariyavāso na hoti, okāso na paññāyati sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya.

plus a couple more at AN10.61 that are riffs on the samsara one substituting ignorance and craving for samsara.

The DN occurrence of paññāyati is not exactly encouraging as to earliness either:

And when the Buddha’s corpse was cremated no ash or soot was found from outer or inner skin, flesh, sinews, or synovial fluid.
Jhāyamānassa kho pana bhagavato sarīrassa yaṁ ahosi chavīti vā cammanti vā maṁsanti vā nhārūti vā lasikāti vā, tassa neva chārikā paññāyittha, na masi;
Only the relics remained.
sarīrāneva avasissiṁsu.
It’s like when ghee or oil blaze and burn, and neither ashes nor soot are found.
Seyyathāpi nāma sappissa vā telassa vā jhāyamānassa neva chārikā paññāyati, na masi;
In the same way, when the Buddha’s corpse was cremated no ash or soot was found from outer or inner skin, flesh, sinews, or synovial fluid.
evameva bhagavato sarīrassa jhāyamānassa yaṁ ahosi chavīti vā cammanti vā maṁsanti vā nhārūti vā lasikāti vā, tassa neva chārikā paññāyittha, na masi;
Only the relics remained.
sarīrāneva avasissiṁsu.
DN16

DN27 adds

When the bursting pods had vanished, ripe untilled rice appeared to those beings. It had no powder or husk, pure and fragrant, with only the rice-grain.
Atha kho tesaṁ, vāseṭṭha, sattānaṁ padālatāya antarahitāya akaṭṭhapāko sāli pāturahosi akaṇo athuso suddho sugandho taṇḍulapphalo.
What they took for supper in the evening, by the morning had grown back and ripened.
Yaṁ taṁ sāyaṁ sāyamāsāya āharanti, pāto taṁ hoti pakkaṁ paṭivirūḷhaṁ.
And what they took for breakfast in the morning had grown back and ripened by the evening,
Yaṁ taṁ pāto pātarāsāya āharanti, sāyaṁ taṁ hoti pakkaṁ paṭivirūḷhaṁ;
so the cutting didn’t show.
nāpadānaṁ paññāyati.
Then those beings eating the ripe untilled rice, with that as their food and nourishment, remained for a very long time.
Atha kho te, vāseṭṭha, sattā akaṭṭhapākaṁ sāliṁ paribhuñjantā tambhakkhā tadāhārā ciraṁ dīghamaddhānaṁ aṭṭhaṁsu.

and

From that day on stealing was found, and blaming and lying and the taking up of rods.
Tadagge kho, vāseṭṭha, adinnādānaṁ paññāyati, garahā paññāyati, musāvādo paññāyati, daṇḍādānaṁ paññāyati.

all the occurrences of paññāyati in the abhidhamma are from the kathavatthu.

Metta.

85

His denial of an atta is a denial of substance. People like the Jains etc were arguing that it was a substance. Dependent origination is about how there is no permanent core, no substance, in experience. The Buddha would have been aware of the substance vs quality distinction, since the other ascetics were making use of it. Remove substance from experience, which dependent origination does, and what does that leave you with? Momentary flashes of characteristics that can’t be said to exist or not exist. The Phena sutta too is denying the substance of things.

Why else do you think the path culminates in Emptiness, Signless and Wishless/Nothingness samadhis? These are meditations which take an aspect of experience , that the awakened person understands, as their object. The absence of self or other, the absence of form, earth, feeling, consciousness etc and the absence of anything worth holding onto. All through an insight into dependent origination, which shows the emptiness of any permanent core. Any bearer of characteristics. The emptiness of substance in experience.

When you see dependent origination you see nibbana, the highest truth. You see no arising, no ceasing, no persisting, no change, no sun, no moon, no earth element, no me, no you, no infinite space, no boundless consciousness, no coming, no going nor remaining.

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86

How could you possibly know, when you haven’t yet searched for the third person plural, paññāyanti; the future singular and plural, paññāyissati and paññāyissanti; the present participle in at least two cases, nominative and locative, paññāyamāno, paññāyamāne? I believe you’ll find all of these in the suttas, along with a few others that don’t come immediately to mind.

Frankly, until you’ve learned the basics of Pali grammar this number-counting is a waste of time, for you have no idea what to look for and therefore no circumspection as to what you might be missing.

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I find it troubling that study and knowledge of a language can be substituted with a few clicks of a button.
The results have been repeatedly shown to be misleading and potentially damaging.

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Absolutely. There were good reasons for the Buddha to not go out of his way to say that there is a self, probably the most major reason being that it opens the door to a plethora of beliefs about the self existing and then ceasing to exist, or being eternal etc that are detrimental to the path. His primary focus was suffering and an affirmation of the self would not support the endeavour of decreasing suffering.

In other words, he never said any of the things you said either.

I’m not saying that the Buddha said there is a self. All I am saying is that the Buddha didn’t say there is no self in absolute terms. I.e.

He always said the aggregates are not fit to be regarded as self. This is a practical teaching. The aggregates are inconstant and are therefore painful and are thus are not fit to be thought of as self.

He did not say there is no self. Such a statement is as nonsensical as saying there is no cup or there is no world. Sure, if you zoom in close you can break up an identity. But that is the point - nothing exists nor doesn’t exist absolutely. It is all dependent on context.

Anyway, MN22 is quite clear for example:

Mendicants, were a self to exist, would there be the thought, ‘Belonging to my self’?”

“Yes, sir.”

“Were what belongs to a self to exist, would there be the thought, ‘My self’?”

“Yes, sir.”

“But self and what belongs to a self are not acknowledged as a genuine fact.

Hmm… this may be a bit circular because the translation was made by Bhante Sujato who presupposed the nonexistence of self. Below is Ajahn Thanissaro’s translation:

“Monks, where there is a self, would there be (the thought,) ‘belonging to my self’?”

“Yes, lord.”

“Or, monks, where there is what belongs to self, would there be (the thought,) ‘my self’?”

“Yes, lord.”

“Monks, where a self or what belongs to self are not pinned down as a truth or reality, then the view-position—‘This cosmos is the self. After death this I will be constant, permanent, eternal, not subject to change. I will stay just like that for an eternity’—Isn’t it utterly & completely a fool’s teaching?”

“What else could it be, lord? It’s utterly & completely a fool’s teaching.”

What is common to both translations is that no claim is made that there is a self. However where the translations differ is that Bhante Sujato’s rendering claims that there is no self. In contrast, Ajahn Thanissaro’s rendering claims that a self cannot be pinned down.

The difference is that in Bhante sujato’s rendering treats the self as an objective thing and negates it.

Ajahn Thanissaro’s rendering, in contrast, does not treat the self as an objective thing but undermines the very basis for a view based on objectivity. Things don’t exist or not exist in an objective sense because there is no objective reality to begin with. This has recently been empirically shown in the area of physics for which a Nobel prize was awarded. It actually proved Einstein’s notions of reality wrong.

Given that the entire universe doesn’t have an objective reality but rather has an emergent one, it makes no sense to say that things exist or don’t in an absolute sense. This includes the self. Things don’t exist in an absolute sense because things are not objectively real. However things don’t non exist in an absolute sense either because they are emergent. The lack of objective reality coupled with the emergent properties of the things is what makes them unable to be pinned down.

In a universe with emergent properties, things come into being if certain conditions are met or don’t come into being if they are not met. So even if one were to say X is not present in me or X is not found in me it does not mean that X does not exist in an absolute sense. Rather, it means that the conditions for X to exist are not present.

The fact that the universe works in an emergent way is probably one of strongest pieces of evidence supporting Ajahn Thanissaro’s view of the Buddha’s teaching of anatta as a strategy rather than an ontology.

Ven. Nyanamoli shows this to be the case in a more hands-on way:

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In addition, I find it troubling that explanations based on logic are almost entirely disregarded in favour of views do not align with currently established fact.

I provided a very simple analogy between a regular object (e.g. a cup) and the self, to show how notions of absolute reality (both in terms of existence and non-existence) break down but there hasn’t been no agreement or attempt to show how the logic is false. All there is, is a repeated insistence to the effect of don’t be ridiculous - in an absolute sense, of course there is no self.

90

Thanks for the extra info @Dhammanando ! I have gone through the examples you gave in the 4 principle Nikayas:

paññāyamānesu

days and nights were distinguished, Nakkhattesu tārakarūpesu pātubhūtesu rattindivā paññāyiṁsu. and so were months and fortnights, Rattindivesu paññāyamānesu māsaḍḍhamāsā paññāyiṁsu. and years and seasons. Māsaḍḍhamāsesu paññāyamānesu utusaṁvaccharā paññāyiṁsu. To this extent the world had evolved once more. Ettāvatā kho, vāseṭṭha, ayaṁ loko puna vivaṭṭo hoti.
DN27

paññāyamāne

only occurs in VM

paññāyamāno

does not occur

paññāyissanti

occurs once in MN at MN76 giving;

Namely, that there’s no glorifying one’s own teaching and putting down the teaching of others. The Dhamma is taught in its own field, and so many emancipators are recognized. Na ca nāma sadhammokkaṁsanā bhavissati, na paradhammavambhanā, āyatane ca dhammadesanā tāva bahukā ca niyyātāro paññāyissanti.
MN72

paññāyissati

Back at the royal compound, the prince brooded, miserable and sad: Tatra sudaṁ, bhikkhave, vipassī kumāro antepuraṁ gato dukkhī dummano pajjhāyati: ‘Damn this thing called rebirth, since old age will come to anyone who’s born.’ ‘dhiratthu kira, bho, jāti nāma, yatra hi nāma jātassa jarā paññāyissatī’ti.

and

Oh, when will an escape be found from this suffering, from old age and death?’ kudāssu nāma imassa dukkhassa nissaraṇaṁ paññāyissati jarāmaraṇassā’ti?
DN14

‘Oh, how wicked things have appeared among beings, in that stealing is found, and blaming and lying and the taking up of rods! ‘pāpakā vata bho dhammā sattesu pātubhūtā, yatra hi nāma adinnādānaṁ paññāyissati, garahā paññāyissati, musāvādo paññāyissati, daṇḍādānaṁ paññāyissati.
DN27

So for all its great age, the earth element will be revealed as impermanent, liable to end, vanish, and perish. Tassā hi nāma, āvuso, bāhirāya pathavīdhātuyā tāva mahallikāya aniccatā paññāyissati, khayadhammatā paññāyissati, vayadhammatā paññāyissati, vipariṇāmadhammatā paññāyissati.
MN28

‘Reverend Ānanda, what are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting were evident? ‘katamesaṁ, āvuso ānanda, dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyittha, vayo paññāyittha, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyittha? What are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting will be evident? Katamesaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyissati, vayo paññāyissati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyissati? What are the things for which arising, vanishing, and change while persisting are evident?’ Katamesaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyatī’ti? How would you answer?” Evaṁ puṭṭho tvaṁ, ānanda, kinti byākareyyāsī”ti?
SN22.38

paññāyanti

Four men with a bier carry away the corpse. Āsandipañcamā purisā mataṁ ādāya gacchanti. Their footprints show the way to the cemetery. Yāvāḷāhanā padāni paññāyanti.
DN2

From that day on the Sakyans were recognized, and he was their founder. Tadagge kho pana, ambaṭṭha, sakyā paññāyanti; so ca nesaṁ pubbapuriso.
DN3

The moon and sun were not found, nor were stars and constellations, day and night, months and fortnights, years and seasons, or male and female. Beings were simply known as ‘beings’. Na candimasūriyā paññāyanti, na nakkhattāni tārakarūpāni paññāyanti, na rattindivā paññāyanti, na māsaḍḍhamāsā paññāyanti, na utusaṁvaccharā paññāyanti, na itthipumā paññāyanti, sattā sattātveva saṅkhyaṁ gacchanti.
DN27

“Since this is so, do we find sentient beings who initiate activity?” “Ārabbhadhātuyā sati ārabbhavanto sattā paññāyantī”ti?

“Yes, sir.” “Evaṁ, bho”.

“Since there is an element of initiative, and sentient beings who initiate activity are found, sentient beings act of their own volition or that of another. “Yaṁ kho, brāhmaṇa, ārabbhadhātuyā sati ārabbhavanto sattā paññāyanti, ayaṁ sattānaṁ attakāro ayaṁ parakāro.
AN6.38 (but of course it is five aggregates that have the element of initiative, it was just inconvenient to say so)

It’s not because of deeds born of greed, hate, and delusion that gods, humans, or those in any other good places are found. Na, bhikkhave, lobhajena kammena dosajena kammena mohajena kammena devā paññāyanti, manussā paññāyanti, yā vā panaññāpi kāci sugatiyo. Rather, it’s because of deeds born of greed, hate, and delusion that hell, the animal realm, the ghost realm, or any other bad places are found. Atha kho, bhikkhave, lobhajena kammena dosajena kammena mohajena kammena nirayo paññāyati tiracchānayoni paññāyati pettivisayo paññāyati, yā vā panaññāpi kāci duggatiyo.
AN6.39

It’s because of those who do these ten kinds of skillful deeds that gods, humans, or any other good places are found.” Imesaṁ pana, cunda, dasannaṁ kusalānaṁ kammapathānaṁ samannāgamanahetu devā paññāyanti, manussā paññāyanti, yā vā panaññāpi kāci sugatiyo”ti.
AN10.176

So in conclusion amongst the examples you give there are no new occurrences of arguments of the sort; “a metaphysical thing of type t cannot be found (amongst phenomena)”

@stephen I get that my Pali grammer is poor, heck my English grammer is poor, and I am really appreciative of your and @Dhammanando 's and others educating me on this here on the forum, and I am trying to study independently, and I am very much looking forward to @sujato 's course next year, but to describe what I am doing as “a few clicks of a button” is hardly fair. I am painstakingly searching through every occurrence of a given string of letters in a corpus of millions of such strings, checking against a reliable translation in each case, collecting every significant example of the given string in quotation in situ, and assessing the frequency and prevalence of the idea against my gold standard, the first jhana formula. It may not be comprehensive, for the reasons that have been pointed out, but it is a lot more blood sweat and tears than “a few clicks” I can assure you, and perhaps if more scholars worried less about grammar and more about the actual content the grammar is used to express people would have a better appraisal of the strengths of their arguments as represented by their commonality in the canon than they currently do.

Once again, it still appears to me that upalabbhati and paññāyati are in fact rarely used to make metaphysical arguments in the early Buddhist texts, and the samsara without discernible beginning, no picking up with no hands, no being is discerned, and Yamaka examples are basically all of them. The use of the argument is however much more prevalent in the Kathavatthu and Netti, and, I assume, the commentarial tradition.

I still have vijjati to look into, and of course any declensions of the other terms you or others would like to throw at me, but so far I am not turning up piles of metaphysical discernability arguments beyond the ones under discussion, perhaps in addition to word declensions people with superior grammar could provide actual examples of such arguments (as @Dhammanando very helpfully did with the no discernible beginning argument) ?

!smacks forehead!

paññāyethā !!

I knew I had a “discernability” argument from the suttas that was mocking me from just beyond the tip of my tongue!

DN15!!!

That is, there were no rebirth of sentient beings into their various realms—of gods, fairies, spirits, creatures, humans, quadrupeds, birds, or reptiles, each into their own realm. When there’s no rebirth at all, with the cessation of rebirth, would old age and death still be found?”
devānaṁ vā devattāya, gandhabbānaṁ vā gandhabbattāya, yakkhānaṁ vā yakkhattāya, bhūtānaṁ vā bhūtattāya, manussānaṁ vā manussattāya, catuppadānaṁ vā catuppadattāya, pakkhīnaṁ vā pakkhittāya, sarīsapānaṁ vā sarīsapattāya, tesaṁ tesañca hi, ānanda, sattānaṁ tadattāya jāti nābhavissa. Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmaraṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?

maybe this changes everything?

Hopefully I can find an end to this entire mass of suffering.’
appeva nāma imassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa antakiriyā paññāyethā’ti.
MN29 (lol, I know the feeling)

no wait, it doesn’t change everything…

“And when there are no choices at all, with the cessation of choices, would consciousness still be found?” “Sabbaso vā pana saṅkhāresu asati, saṅkhāranirodhā api nu kho viññāṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?
SN12.51 is a kind of recapitulation of DN15 in a more formulaic mode.

“If the cause and reason that gives rise to eye consciousness were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over, would eye consciousness still be found?” “Yo cāvuso, hetu, yo ca paccayo cakkhuviññāṇassa uppādāya, so ca hetu, so ca paccayo sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ aparisesaṁ nirujjheyya. Api nu kho cakkhuviññāṇaṁ paññāyethā”ti?

“No, reverend.” “No hetaṁ, āvuso”.
SN35.234

“If, Ānanda, there were no deeds to result in the sensual realm, would continued existence in the sensual realm still come about?” “Kāmadhātuvepakkañca, ānanda, kammaṁ nābhavissa, api nu kho kāmabhavo paññāyethā”ti?
AN3.77

But I guess it does connect us up to another discernability argument, maybe the first one? that of discernability applied to conditional cessation, and also I suppose, in the same sutta, the regarding a self argument;

‘But reverend, where there is nothing felt at all, would the thought “I am” occur there?’” ‘yattha panāvuso, sabbaso vedayitaṁ natthi api nu kho, tattha “ayamahamasmī”ti siyā’”ti?

“No, sir.” “No hetaṁ, bhante”.

so my journey continues, but maybe we are approaching a point where we can start to make some claims about the number of and relation between discernability arguments in the EBTS?

lets see if we can get any more search terms or examples going! this is fun!!

Transmigration has no known beginning. Anamataggoyaṁ, bhikkhave, saṁsāro; No first point is found of blows by spears, swords, arrows, and axes. pubbā koṭi nappaññāyati sattippahārānaṁ asippahārānaṁ usuppahārānaṁ pharasuppahārānaṁ.
SN56.35 (nappaññāyati 's only occurrence in the canon)

It’s not possible for a woman, Na taṁ dvaṅgulapaññāya, with her two-fingered wisdom.” sakkā pappotumitthiyā”ti.
at SN5.2 and again at Soma’s verse in the Theri (olnce again, the only occurance of dvaṅgulapaññāya in the canon)

“Silly man, you will be known by your own harmful misconception. “paññāyissasi kho tvaṁ, moghapurisa, etena sakena pāpakena diṭṭhigatena. I’ll question the mendicants about this.” Idhāhaṁ bhikkhū paṭipucchissāmī”ti. paññāyissasi MN22 and MN38 and nowhere else

The element of light, the element of beauty, the element of the dimension of infinite space, the element of the dimension of infinite consciousness, the element of the dimension of nothingness, the element of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, and the element of the cessation of perception and feeling. Ābhādhātu, subhadhātu, ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu, viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu, ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu, saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu— These are the seven elements.” imā kho, bhikkhave, satta dhātuyo”ti.

When he said this, one of the mendicants asked the Buddha, Evaṁ vutte, aññataro bhikkhu bhagavantaṁ etadavoca: “Sir, due to what does each of these elements appear?” “yā cāyaṁ, bhante, ābhādhātu yā ca subhadhātu yā ca ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu yā ca viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu yā ca ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu yā ca nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu yā ca saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu—imā nu kho, bhante, dhātuyo kiṁ paṭicca paññāyantī”ti?

“Mendicant, the element of light appears due to the element of darkness. “Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ābhādhātu—ayaṁ dhātu andhakāraṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of beauty appears due to the element of ugliness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, subhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu asubhaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of infinite space appears due to the element of form. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākāsānañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu rūpaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of infinite consciousness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite space. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, viññāṇañcāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of nothingness appears due to the element of the dimension of infinite consciousness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, ākiñcaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception appears due to the element of the dimension of nothingness. Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, nevasaññānāsaññāyatanadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ paṭicca paññāyati. The element of the cessation of perception and feeling appears due to the element of cessation.” Yāyaṁ, bhikkhu, saññāvedayitanirodhadhātu—ayaṁ dhātu nirodhaṁ paṭicca paññāyatī”ti.
SN14.11

“It’s incredible, it’s amazing! That there should be such a magnificent Teacher, and such a magnificent exposition of the teaching! And that such achievements of high distinction should be made known!” “acchariyaṁ vata bho, abbhutaṁ vata bho, evarūpopi nāma uḷāro satthā bhavissati, evarūpaṁ uḷāraṁ dhammakkhānaṁ, evarūpā uḷārā visesādhigamā paññāyissantī”ti.
DN18

91

But people did rightly spoke about the Buddha, even the Buddha himself. I think the problem isn’t using the word “Buddha” per se (nor any other word); the problem was that Yamaka believed that there was a self that would be annihilated at death. In some contexts, the underlying assumption becomes obvious, like in the SN 22.85 or in MN 38.

I’m not trying to advance anything new btw: That’s just the way we usually use words, namely according to the present context. I’m just saying that we can say that beings do exist, without meaning that there’s something stable in them.

That there’s rebirth (appearance of new aggregates) and new feelings (new vedana) according to previous kamma (previous sankhara).

I wasn’t saying that the word “being” can always be substituted by “aggregates.” Most of the times, yeah. But it depends on the context. In this case, it doesn’t mean that there’s something stable existing through rebirth. It’s like in the following sutta SN 12:12:

“Lord, who craves?”

“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One said. “I don’t say ‘craves.’ If I were to say ‘craves,’ then ‘Who craves?’ would be a valid question. But I don’t say that. When I don’t say that, the valid question is ‘From what as a requisite condition comes craving?’ And the valid answer is, ‘From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.’

Obviously, if someone asks anybody, in a daily context, “who craved for the candy?”, it would be inappropriate to just say, “not applicable.” We can just name the person. For rebirth, I think it works the same way. In the sutta that you mentioned, we can’t say that the aggregates enter transmigration indeed, but we can’t say anything that enters transmigration either: there is no soul or consciousness moving from one life to the next.

That words need to be interpreted according to the context is implicit but can be seen in a number of suttas. We can’t take words to mean only a specific thing, or else we get plenty of contradictions. For instance, the Buddha said that the Dhamma is true independent of the arising of Buddhas; he also said that anything that arises ceases… does it mean that Buddhas cease in the same way that aggregates do? By being annihilated and destroyed? I don’t think so.

Conventionally, yes, they’re the same. Is there something stable in there? Nah, I don’t think so. In so far as those aggregates are there, we can still say “the dog Rex saw me,” and some seconds later I may say, “Rex bit me”; the point is that by using the same word you’ll have no doubt that it was this and not that thing that bit me.

Hmm… maybe in that exact form that you quoted, but there are the multiple places where the Buddha says that all aggregates are not-self and that the aggregates are suffering. Glue these things in order to conclude this is all just suffering.

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Got it!

I totally agree. Unfortunately, if anyone googles “emptiness Buddhism,” they’re gonna read only texts saying the exact opposite.

This sounds reasonable; much more reasonable than the clinging definition because it sounded like an arahat couldn’t be called “a being.” Moreover, this definition based on the six-senses addresses our intuition that we only use the word “being” in cases that there’s experience, i.e. we wouldn’t call a rock “a being”.

This whole matter seems solved to me now. In addition to your replies here, I read some of your past posts about anatta, the existence of the tathagata after death, nibbana, and dependent origination, which were equally helpful. You advanced strong and clear arguments. Thanks a lot for all the explanations, venerable!

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93

The Buddha certainly denied the self that the Jains defended, but does that mean that the Buddha denied every form of substance? He denied that there was something stable among the aggregates… does that mean that there isn’t anything uncaused? Maybe it’s possible to conclude that there’s actually no substance from the Buddha’s teachings, but that certainly would be broader than the Buddha’s initial intention.