The chariot analogy in SN 5:10

Discussion
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Thank you so much for the thorough explanation, venerable! Everything that you said about Pali makes me excited to learn it some day.

Yeah, there’s a very wide range of interpretations around, but I feel this and your previous post clarifies the problem. I’ve seen many people on the forum saying that beings are defined in terms of clinging, and I myself was one of them tbh. I didn’t expect that the Buddha liked word-play that much.

Concerning SN 5:10 (The “chariot analogy” sutta), do you think that the nun was saying that we can’t find a being among the pile of aggregates because it’s a pile or because of other reasons? I mean, was the nun advancing a reductionist argument, or didn’t she state the anatta argument? Abhidhamma and Mahayana says that there’s no self because the aggregates are made of parts, does this sutta do the same? Is the fact that the aggregates are composite relevant for anatta?

Btw, this was one of the reasons why this poem made me confused… all of the Buddha’s arguments for not-self don’t use the fact that the aggregates are made of parts. Anatta throughout the canon is always grounded on the fleeting nature of experience, not on the fact that its composite.

Bhikkhu Sunyo, I’m aware I made you spend quite a long time on this topic, but two things aren’t totally clear to me yet. I’d really appreciate it if you tackled them since your replies are always very clarifying.

  1. How is “a being” a conventional label for “the aggregates” and, at the same time, doesn’t really exist? We use labels to label things in the world. If the label doesn’t mean anything, how could we make meaningful, correct, non-deceitful statements with them? If they mean anything, how could we say that it doesn’t exist? If we conventionally use “being” to refer to the aggregates, then a being does exist and does cease in parinibbana.

    This reminds me of Russell’s theory of descriptions; basically, if we state something about a label, we’re implicitly assuming its existence. “The Tathagata is awakened” or “this being has broken its leg” would implicitly assert “there’s a Tathagata” and “there’s a being.” Maybe an analogy could help me to understand it because I can’t think of moments that we use empty labels (labels about non-existent things) and still make meaningful statements with them. To say “the king of the United States is a short man” is clearly false because there’s no “king of the United States,” and we can’t attribute any trait to him (being non-existent doesn’t count as a trait btw).

  2. Of course, “the chariot sutta” applies the analogy with a chariot, but I still can’t get how this analogy works because “chariots” DO exist. Chariots are made of parts. In fact, they are an assemblage of parts. When all the parts cease, the chariot ceases; the chariot no longer exists. However, the self doesn’t exist. The self isn’t made of parts. In fact, the self is not an assemblage of parts since it doesn’t exist. When all the aggregates cease, the self doesn’t cease; we can’t say that it no longer exists because it hasn’t ever existed. Therefore, how can we make sense of the chariot analogy?

Maybe these two questions arise from the way I’m thinking of labels and names, so I’m gonna try to explain how I see them. We got labels, which are things that refer to actions, traits, and etc. If the label X doesn’t refer to anything that exists, then we can say “X doesn’t exist,” but then we can’t use the label to say, “X is walking around” because non-existent things don’t walk around. Basically, there seems to be a huge difference between saying, “The Buddha doesn’t exist”, like in the case that there’s no self, and saying the same but in the case that there hasn’t ever been a historical Buddha and we all got fooled. The former sentence doesn’t even make sense to me tbh… if “the Buddha” refers to a bunch of aggregates or anything like that, then it does exist; it’s just that it’s the union of the aggregates. However, the Buddha rejects this view in the Yamaka sutta. If it doesn’t refer to anything specifically, then we can’t predicate it; i.e. any proposition with “the Buddha” as its subject will be false. Since we do speak about the Buddha (For instance, “The Buddha was born before Jesus”), what does this label refer to? If the label doesn’t refer to anything, how does sentences that possess it as their subject acquire truth value?

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If there are no substances then there are only momentary characteristics (redness, hotness, hardness etc), but it makes little sense to talk only of characteristics existing without substances to bear them. Existence then wouldn’t apply, but neither would non-existence since we do have experiences. Both existence and non-existence wouldn’t apply, nor would neither existence nor non-existence. Arising and ceasing wouldn’t apply ultimately either. Now that sounds familiar :wink:

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If they are dependently originated they are without substance. Remove substances from the world and all you are left with are momentary characteristics (redness, sweetness etc). How are they real?

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It’s very common. Ven. Bodhi did a great job in his footnotes. He pointed out a lot of such instances. I recently did a sutta class on SN22.100 and that one was especially full of word plays! :slightly_smiling_face:

The reason is because Mara—whether it’s the actual being here or a representative of her former delusions—assumes there is a being when asking, “Who created this sentient being? Where is its maker?”

Such assumptions come from delusion, from a sense of self or “I”:

‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This sentient being—where did it come from? And where will it go?’ (MN2)

Whether objects really exist in the world is rather irrelevant for suffering. The problem comes from assuming something to exist internally, namely an “I” or true existent being, which in cases such as this does not refer to the external body or conventional being, but to the deluded assumption that we are some entity of sorts, i.e. it refers to a sense of self.

The aggregates in the simile of the chariot are the parts. Of course they are also insubstantial themselves and made of individual instances. But that doesn’t seem to be the point of the verses, where the aggregates are like five parts of the chariot. The aggregates aren’t a “being” and when you put them together, you also don’t create a true being, by which I mean that which people deludedly think they are. That “Mike” you might think you are.

I don’t know, but you may be overthinking it. Metaphors always are limited and only go so far. They are never a perfect explanation.

The self indeed doesn’t exist, but the verses here use the word ‘being’ instead, which is different. Because there is ‘a being’ in the conventional sense, Vajira admits this as well, just like there conventionally is a chariot. But the problem is we assume that we are that being. ‘The being’ is not exactly the same as ‘the self’, perhaps that is what confuses you. The sense of self comes from thinking you are a being. This “self” is not the being itself, it is not identical to it.

The reason the statements on an enlightened being after death usually use the specific term ‘Tathagata’ I belief has to do with the word having special connotations that ‘Buddha’ or ‘arahant’ didn’t have. For example, the Jains seem to have used the same word (or something very similar) to refer to enlightened beings, and to them that would have meant an eternal soul. Notice also that the statements on the Tathagata are questions asked by wanderers of other sects, which also implies it was the term was prevalent outside of Buddhism.

To summarize, the reason it is used with reference to ‘a being’ and not ‘a table’ or whatever, is that we assume we are a being. We don’t assume we are a table.

Vajira tries to make a metaphor for this internal delusion of ‘a being’ by comparing it to a chariot. But it only goes so far.

No problem, I’m very happy to help whenever possible. Especially for topic such as this where written word and sutta references are the best way to explain, I feel.

I hope I was able to help a bit again.

In the end it’s important to realize that this isn’t a matter of logic. It’s about insight into the nature of reality that comes from meditation. It’s about seeing that the body and mind are empty of a self. Whatever we call ‘a chariot’ is to a large extent irrelevant to this. :upside_down_face: Because we don’t identify with a chariot; we identify with some being.

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Why does that make no sense? If consciousness exists, it is in that sense real regardless of whether “substances bear them”.

Also, the statements on existence and non-existence I suppose you refer to SN12.15, the Kaccanagotta Sutta. But these are only two words there, so we should be careful with how to interpret them.

I think the commentarial Theravada interpretation is correct in taking this to refer to post-mortem eternal existence or annihilation of a self. Imo there are plenty of indications in the suttas that this is the correct interpretation. It doesn’t have to do with whether things really exist or not. It’s about what happens after death. No self continues forever, and no self is annihilated. That’s the point there.

I agree with Mike that:

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Thank you, Bhante, for a great, detailed answer.

I agree that trying to map later philosophical ideas and conundrums onto the Pali suttas doesn’t really work.

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Exactly!
I feel as if I should write this down and just quote it every time this sutta comes up !
(Which is a lot)

Thanks

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Just two suttas later:

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Why does that make no sense? If consciousness exists it is real regardless of whether “substances bear them”.

Also, the statements on existence and non existence I suppose you refer to SN12.15, the Kaccanagotta Sutta. But these are only two words there. I think the commentarial interpretation is correct in taking this to refer to post-mortem eternal existence or annihilation of a self and there are plenty of indications in the suttas that this is so. It doesn’t have to do with whether things really exist or not. It’s about what happens after death. No self continues forever, and no self is annihilated. That’s the point there.

Substances are independently existing realities which bear characteristics such as “red, sweet” and so on. Such theories were common the Buddha’s time. The Jains taught a substance theory as did the Vaiśeṣika, which I’m sure the Buddha would have been aware of in some form. In Buddhadhamma dhammas are dependently originated. They have no permanent independent existence. They are devoid of substance (the atta also being a type of substance). What we are left with are our experiences of characteristics. For example, when we eat an apple we experience hardness, sweetness, redness and so on. To say there is an “apple” which bears these characteristics is to subscribe to substance theory, and to go against what the Buddha taught. It is to posit an independently existing thing, behind sense experience, which bears the characteristics. Such a thing cannot exist however, because our experience is simply of dependently originated characteristics and not permanent realities. This leaves us with “redness, sweetness” and so on. These however are sense data occurring in the mind. Its illogical to talk of “hardness” or “redness” existing “out there” independent of mind. Its also illogical to claim that whilst the bearers of the characteristics do not exist (substances such as matter, atta and so on) the characteristics themselves truly exist. This means that whilst we can say we do have experiences we can’t really say if these experiences or, more accurately, labels or designations that sañña applies to reality truly exist or do not exist, or anything in between. Now conciousness is experienced, but conciousness is dependently originated. There is no conciousness substance then which bears the characteristic of cognising. We can only say there is cognising, but to say a characteristic such as “cognising” really exists without a substance to bear it is as absurd as arguing that “hardness” truly exists despite there being no apple which bears it. Just like the apple then, we cannot say that conciousness exists nor that it does not exist and so on. If we can’t say that substances exist, then we can’t really say that arising, ceasing or persisting exist either. Perhaps even more so for these. According to the Buddha all we can experience and talk about is restricted to sense experience, but we never actually experience a “thing” called “arising” or “ceasing”. These, like the characteristics, are labels that sañña applies to experience. In other words, all dhammas are what we impute onto reality but then, in our confusion, we mistake these self-made designations and concepts as being something truly real. A self, matter, a Buddha, nibbāna. On the Sn 12.15 I agree that it is likely talking about the atta. The atta is a substance in the context of the speculative philosophies of the Buddha’s time. His argument via dependent origination was to show that because things arise dependently, there is no substance called an atta in experience. There is indeed no substances at all. What is true of the atta is also true of “apples” or “matter” or “conciousness”, in the end. When the Buddha awakened, he realised there never was an atta which suffered or was reborn. I think Venerable Nāgārjuna had it right when he argued that, in the end, we can’t even speak of dukkha, or arising, or nibbāna either.

I agree with Mike that:

I’m not arguing for Idealism, where the mind is truly real.

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A way, in a way, not too hard to grasp.
But our minds often endeavor to make it harder.

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I didn’t understand quite well why Mara’s question sounds like he’s assuming there’s a self or a self-like being. Couldn’t the questions be about how this conventional being arises and ceases?

Yes, I know that. It’s just that I don’t know what the point of the metaphor is. Is it just that the word “being” is a convention just like “chariot” is?

Aren’t the aggregates a “being”? Not even conventionally? Aren’t they a “being” conventionally, but not a “being” in the sense of a identity? I mean, isn’t a dog or a human just a pile of aggregates?

So is what I said about beings in the beginning of this post correct?

You certainly did! Thank you again.

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I’ve been thinking about everything that was said, and things seem clearer now, so please disregard my previous post. Since I may have made a mistake, I’m going to state my conclusions, just to make sure, you know.

First of all, I’d like to clarify that my confusion with how sentences with “The tathagata” or “The Buddha” acquire truth value was not a mere whim, I promise. Instead, this was because if what these labels mean doesn’t exist, then any sentence predicating them would be false, but if that were so, then deliberately expressing these statements would be a form of lie. Fortunately, I think I got where my mistake was.

Concerning what “a being” means, I concluded that, just like any word, it doesn’t have a precise meaning. For instance, let’s analyze the following propositions: “the dog was barking” and “the dog saw me arriving.” In the first sentence, “the dog” means that body that has a tail, ears, and so on, while in the second one it means eye-consciousness. It’s just more convenient to use the same word at different moments and contexts because people can still understand what exactly you’re referring to. The same thing happens for the word “Buddha”: people would say, “the Buddha entered the hut”, “the Buddha wants to add a new Vinaya rule”, and “the Buddha is hearing our talk.” In the first case, it would mean the body, while in the second case it would mean the volitional formation, and, in the last one, it would mean the sound-consciousness.

However, if one were to ask, “what really is ‘a being’?”, “what really is ‘Mike’?”, “what really is ‘The Buddha’?”, or “what really is ‘the Tathagata’?” That would be a sign of delusion because these words are mere conventions, and they point at different things in different contexts. To ask what it “really” is would imply that one is looking for something true about these labels in all moments, which means that one is looking for something stable, i.e. a self. In this case, the best answer would be “These are just aggregates; there’s no being among them. ‘a being’ is just a mere convention that we use while talking about the aggregates. What exists is just suffering arising and ceasing.” This is exactly the answer that the nun gives to Mara.

However, I still don’t get why it’s obvious that Mara’s question is based on delusion. From what was discussed, my guess is that asking about the origin and cause of a sentient being is usually a sign that the person believes that there’s a being in a self-like sense. Even though we may use the word “being” to refer to the aggregates, Mara asks the cause for the sentient being in a way that’s quite clear that he isn’t talking about the aggregates; he isn’t asking, for example, what causes namarupa.

I also admit that I took the analogy too far, but that’s because I thought the analogy was broader than it is. My initial interpretation was biased because of previous readings. I’ve read in Mahayana books that the chariot analogy works in a way that can be applied to absolutely anything that contains parts and, therefore, it leads to the conclusion that everything is empty. The argument goes like this:

X has A and B

X is not something outside of A and B

X is not A

X is not B

Therefore, X has no inherent existence, essence, or self. I.e. X is empty

To justify this train of thought canonically, the nun’s argument is usually applied as if Vajirā was explaining that there is no being because beings are made of parts. It’s said further that chariots don’t really exist either because they’re made of parts and that this is the core of the analogy. However, when we analyze the Buddha’s argument against the self, he never said “there’s no self because we are made of parts,” let alone would he apply anatta to objects. The Buddha would say something more similar to, “the aggregates are impermanent, unstable, uncontrollable, and unsatisfactory, so they can’t be our self. There can’t be a self outside of the aggregates either, so there is no self.” Whether or not something is made of parts is irrelevant. After discussing this sutta and reading Sunyo ‘s answers, I think it only got clearer that Vajirā wasn’t explaining why there isn’t a self: the reference to the parts isn’t a justification of not-self, but a short explanation of how we use words.

Am I right?

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Some metaphysical conclusions are tricky, aren’t they? We may come up with all sorts of arguments to prove that, let’s say, cars don’t really exist, but we just need a speedy car coming to our direction to find cars very, very real.

The Buddha didn’t try to explain what characteristics belong to. He wasn’t trying to explain what substances were the bearers of characteristics. He wasn’t looking for the minimum constituents of reality. He wasn’t engaged in theorizing about our experience. He just took experience for granted. Trying to theorize what experience essentially is doesn’t lead to awakening. It’s like the arrow simile.

Ofc, we may, aware that this isn’t the Dhamma, discuss metaphysics and what substance may be, if it exists at all. IMHO, this whole substance debate seems unprofitable. “Substance” is an agglomeration of completely different meanings. It’s like when Mahayana Buddhists advance their interpretation of emptiness: they use many different routes as if they were proving the same thing in different manners, which would guarantee a high degree of certainty. However, they’re just mixing different meanings for the word svabhava and proving that nothing can be all of that at the same time. I can’t provide a full defense of my position now because of lack of time, but maybe this would make a nice thread.

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I just think it’s a bad argument, take:

“In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life, is it appropriate to declare:
“Ettha ca te, āvuso yamaka, diṭṭheva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne, kallaṁ nu te taṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ: ‘

As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”
‘tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā’”ti?

by that logic it would be equally inappropriate to declare “the Buddha has gone to the deep woods for the days abiding” or the Buddha requests your presence" or really anything at all about the Buddha.

(I would also note that the in the above tathāgate cannot mean The Realised One (i.e the Buddha) because thats not who Yamaka is talking about, rather it must mean “one gone thus” and refer to any enlightened person, as that is what is being talked about)

requiring all this eel-wriggling about “convenience” and the Buddha saying one thing but “really” meaning completely different things, and dogs not “really” being dogs but really being sometimes “bodies with tails” and sometimes “eye-consciousness” is just incoherent. It’s not based on the bulk of the EBT’s, it’s based on a rare argument, occurring only at MN22 and SN22.85 or repetitions thereof along with the poem, that makes hundreds upon hundreds of other statements in the canon into mysterious doublespeak if not outright lies, or worse, just nonsense, as what could

while beings fare on according to their deeds.
Satto pana gacchati yena kammaṁ;

possibly mean if the aggregates are substituted there, “the aggregates fare on according to their deeds”?!? what does that mean?

A sentient being enters transmigration.
Satto saṁsāramāpādi,

“the aggregates enter transmigration”??

It’s not easy to find a sentient being who in all this long time has not previously been your mother.
na so, bhikkhave, satto sulabharūpo yo namātābhūtapubbo iminā dīghena addhunā.

“it’s not easy to find five aggregates who have not previously been your mother, wait, your “maternal five aggregates”?”?

Are we talking about the same dog? i.e is it the same dog who barked and saw you? if so then what you are saying is not just “inconvenient”, it is downright misleading! Are we to understand that the Buddhas body is in the hut but their volitional formations and sound consciousness are somewhere else?

Again, this is a statement given here and in the form dukkhameva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati at SN12.15 and SN22.90 (the second sutta is quoting the first) and nowhere else. It makes no sense if taken literally, and is so rare it is just really difficult for me to see the justification for making it the basis of your understanding of doctrine.

Metta.

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Given the analysis I am surprised that this is your conclusion. The Buddha chooses not to answer Dona’s question and answers a different one instead. He deliberately doesn’t address what he is. This supports the argument that he left the definition of what he is both now and in the future undefined.

I would be keen to know if there is any sutta where the Buddha says outright that the self never existed. To my knowledge, he never does that. One would think that if the self truly didn’t exist that he would simply say so.

It can’t be claimed that the self in reality does not exist while the aggregates do. All that can be claimed is that the aggregates precede the self - i.e. the self is made of the aggregates. This is no different from quantum phenomena preceding a cup - i.e. the cup is made of quantum phenomena . However, just like quantum phenomena the aggregates are not fundamental or indestructible. Quantum phenomena exists in dependence on other quantum phenomena. Similarly, the aggregates exist in dependence on one another.

Nothing can be said to exist absolutely because all phenomena exists in relation to other phenomena. Identities are simply the product of the boundaries we draw between these phenomena. Even the fact that there are five aggregates is a result of drawing the boundaries a particular way. For example, there is no reason that the fabrication aggregate could not be further broken down in terms of its functions. That the aggregates seem to persist is simply a result of the way the functions have been defined and boundaries have been drawn.

Given that nothing can exist absolutely and everything exists in dependence upon everything else, the self is no more real or unreal than a cup.

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this is simply not true of the early Pali material.

upalab occurs:

VN: 0
DN: 1 (in DN16, which even Buddhaghosa acknowledges has late additions)
MN: 2
SN: 6
AN: 3
KN: 71 (3 in Thera, 1 in Sn, all 65 other occurrences in the late books)
AB: 218 (ALL 218 in the late Kathavatthu)
VM: 8

So this upalab is absent from the Vinaya, absent from the early Abhidhamma, absent from early DN, and rare in MN SN and AN.

Not common. rare.

very common later though, occurring over 50 times in the Nidessa, and over 200 times in the Kathavatthu.

secondly, where it is used in DN16 has nothing to do with arguments about selves or beings;

“Subhadda, in whatever teaching and training the noble eightfold path is not found, there is no true ascetic found, no second ascetic, no third ascetic, and no fourth ascetic.
“Yasmiṁ kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo na upalabbhati, samaṇopi tattha na upalabbhati. Dutiyopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati. Tatiyopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati. Catutthopi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati.

In whatever teaching and training the noble eightfold path is found, there is a true ascetic found, a second ascetic, a third ascetic, and a fourth ascetic.
Yasmiñca kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo upalabbhati, samaṇopi tattha upalabbhati, dutiyopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati, tatiyopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati, catutthopi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati.

In this teaching and training the noble eightfold path is found. Only here is there a true ascetic, here a second ascetic, here a third ascetic, and here a fourth ascetic. Other sects are empty of ascetics.
Imasmiṁ kho, subhadda, dhammavinaye ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo upalabbhati, idheva, subhadda, samaṇo, idha dutiyo samaṇo, idha tatiyo samaṇo, idha catuttho samaṇo, suññā parappavādā samaṇebhi aññehi.

the occurrences at AN3.61 also have nothing to do with beings:

Those who believe that past deeds are the most important thing have no enthusiasm or effort, no idea that there are things that should and should not be done.
Pubbekataṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, sārato paccāgacchataṁ na hoti chando vā vāyāmo vā idaṁ vā karaṇīyaṁ idaṁ vā akaraṇīyanti.

Since they don’t acknowledge as a genuine fact that there are things that should and should not be done, they’re unmindful and careless, and can’t rightly be called ascetics.
Iti karaṇīyākaraṇīye kho pana saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamāne muṭṭhassatīnaṁ anārakkhānaṁ viharataṁ na hoti paccattaṁ sahadhammiko samaṇavādo.

MN59, SN36.19 and SN36.20 also do not use the root for this purpose:

The Realized One describes pleasure as included in happiness wherever it’s found, and in whatever context.’”
api ca, āvuso, yattha yattha sukhaṁ upalabbhati yahiṁ yahiṁ taṁ taṁ tathāgato sukhasmiṁ paññapetī’”ti.

So MN22, SN5.10, SN22.85, SN22.86 and SN44.2 are the only examples of this root being used to assert the non-existence of something in the early canon apart from the AN passage, and the AN passage does not support the interpretation, as it clearly implies that present actions are real, just not properly acknowledged by the past-focused practitioners, “not acknowledged as salient” seems more of the sense here.

So in summary, of the 12 occurrences in the 4 principle Nikayas of the root upalab fully half the occurances do not support the gloss of non-existence, as in fact there are true ascetics to be found and present actions are not being denied to exist, just denied to be salient for salvation, happiness is happiness wherever it is found, not wherever it is real or existing.

In fact, the only occurrences that support the argument are the very ones under discussion.

I believe that’s called begging the question.

(as a postscript, the Sn and Thera occurrences are:

They have no sons or cattle,
Na tassa puttā pasavo,
nor possess fields or lands.
Khettaṁ vatthuñca vijjati;
No picking up or putting down
Attā vāpi nirattā vā,
is to be found in them.
Na tasmiṁ upalabbhati.

and

Whoever has no respect
“Yassa sabrahmacārīsu,
for their spiritual companions
gāravo nūpalabbhati;
falls away from the true teaching,
Parihāyati saddhammā,
like a fish in a little puddle.
maccho appodake yathā.

neither of which support the “not a real thing” gloss)

Metta.

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It is common, but upalabbhati isn’t the only verb with which the idea is expressed. There are several verbs pertaining to cognition which in their passive form convey the same idea.

For starters try the passive forms of vindati, pajānāti and dassati, i.e., vijjati, paññayati and dissati.

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all right then, it is rare to see upalabbhati used to express this idea.

not getting a lot on DPR for disatti either, except things in curly brackets that don’t show up on suttacentral…

Among the brahmins we can see gradual progress
imesampi hi, bho gotama, brāhmaṇānaṁ dissati anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā yadidaṁ—
in learning the chants.

is the first occurrence outside the brackets, at MN107 …

paññayati I can’t find at all.

vijjati however occurs hundreds upon hundreds of times, so I will have my work cut out for me looking into it!

perhaps some examples of the other two would help?

(ooh, vijjati is one of those interesting words that fo some reason occurs less often in SN than it does in DN… I wonder why that might be?)

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Don’t forget the macron: paññāyati.

I actually posted an example only two years ago.

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Okay, when na dissati occurs in curly brackets it’s just the editor telling you that the word “is not found” in such and such edition of the text. Actually the use of dissati in the sense that we want is more of a commentarial thing.

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