The verse uses the passive verb form upalabbhati, based on the active upalabhati.
Probably, the passive infix -iya has been assimilated to the double b.
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Just to clarify my position here. Suffering can be directly experienced and known, thus it is real. The aggregates are real only to the extent that involvement with them produces suffering. Similarly to any compound object composed of the aggregates.
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Why imply im frustrated or lack scrutiny? There’s no need for that. My answers are brief because as i said Im on a tablet im unfamiliar with.
Mike already said my answer was very helpful so Ill leave it at what i said. I think you’re missing the point, but have no time to explain now.
I’m sorry if I was unclear—I wasn’t trying to say you were doing these things. I don’t mean to offend or attack in any way. Like you said with the ‘being’ situation, it’s just a common thing people tend to think. I was speaking generally, not about you specifically.
The internet is hard to get the tone across sometimes, especially with complicated issues like these.
With mettā!
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I feel this talk would end up turning into a realism-idealism discussion. Honestly, I think idealism just has no basis on the early suttas. Discussing it now would deviate too much from the topic, so I’ll just leave at that.
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I didn’t have a good grasp on passive and active, so had to look it up. Below is an explanation:
When we talk about active and passive verbs, we usually talk about voice. In the active voice, the subject performs the action of the verb, while in passive voice, the subject receives the action. Look at the difference in the following two sentences:
The cat scratched Joanna.
Joanna was scratched by the cat.Passive voice always includes forms of the verb to be (is, was, is being, etc.). Generally speaking, you should try to use the active voice wherever possible:
The difference between the two is that the passive verb is used with is, was, is being etc.
E.g.
Active sense: He finds no being.
Passive sense: No being is found
Active sense: He obtains no being
Passive sense: No being is obtained
Active sense: He pins down no being
Passive sense: No being is pinned down
Therefore whether upalabbhati is used in the active or passive sense makes little difference to Ajahn Thanissaro’s translation.
Could you elaborate this, please? How does it contradict more common arguments?
If these were later additions, it would explain a lot to me because I’m not aware of any sutta where the Buddha advances anatta on the grounds that the aggregates are made of parts or anything similar, only in later developments (ultimate reality containing only dhammas or Mahayana emptiness). However, I can’t see how this argument would contradict others, which would make a good argument against its authenticity.
I think it’s important to distinguish this argument from the later Abhidhamma two-truths argument that uses the same simile where the aggregates are “real” but the individual is not, due to the fact that it’s made of parts. But an individual thing is precisely a thing made of parts distinct from other things. This doesn’t imply a self, but the later Abhidhamma confused the individual with the attā and tried to remove them both, which I don’t think the Buddha did. He was perfectly comfortable with there being an individual assemblage of aggregates as a “being” in that sense. He was rejecting that this have any substantiality in terms of essence or substance, though. Also, the aggregates are just conceptual frameworks, they aren’t literally concrete existent dhammas of ultimate reality. Even the idea of ‘consciousness’ as an abstract thing apart from other things makes no sense beyond mere concept, but it’s useful for understanding and crossing the shore, IMO. The aggregates are experiential ways to categorize existence, but they’re still conceptual ways we break up our experience.
As @Sunyo said, people tend to overlook the down-to-earth terminology the Buddha used (probably influenced by the Abhidhamma ideas of Ultimate Truth, maybe). There’s nothing wrong with the aggregates=a being conventionally so long as we know the limitations of language and don’t push too far.
Mettā
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The question about what is real and what is not seems to be at the heart of most discussions though. It’s just that different people have different ideas about this. When you said in a previous comment that perception of anatta is actually a true perception, you were putting forward your views on what you consider real. My comments subsequent to that were a view on why such a consideration may not work.
I see the conversation of real vs non-real as an attempt to get to a set of axioms upon which we can agree, so that we can draw conclusions from there. Many discussions go sideways simply because participants start them holding different axioms.
This was an interesting topic to talk about; so thank you for kicking it off. I think any discussion about identity, being, self etc. will tend to go back to how we define what is real vs what is not.
My rule of thumb is that something is real to the extent that it either causes, aides or impedes action or impacts our experience of suffering.
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The basic argument goes something like this:
is “spleck” real? that is not he buddhist view!
is “spleck” a fiction while “bleck” is real? that is not he buddhist view!
are both “spleck” and “bleck” (separately) real? that is not he buddhist view!
are neither “spleck” nor “bleck” real? that is not he buddhist view!
well what is the buddhist view?
avoiding the two extremes of “real” and “fictional” a buddhist takes the middle way between extremes;
“splecks” appear.
“splecks” appear when “blecks” are present.
“splecks” disappear
"splecks disappear when “blecks” are absent.
There are variations, including “are splecks and blecks identical? or are they different?”
difference and identity are similarly critiqued.
“Feeling, perception, and consciousness—
“Yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṁ—
these things are mixed, not separate.
ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā, no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely dissect them so as to describe the difference between them.
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetuṁ.
For you perceive what you feel, and you cognize what you perceive.
Yaṁ hāvuso, vedeti taṁ sañjānāti, yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vijānāti.
That’s why these things are mixed, not separate.
Tasmā ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely dissect them so as to describe the difference between them.”
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetun”ti.
MN43
so the individual aggregates are dependently arisen, tangled up, not real, not fictional, both, neither, just as an individual is.
I am at work today so I will try and update my answer throughout the day…
but a few places where beings are mentioned and not taken as fictions:
Then a certain sentient being—due to the running out of their life-span or merit—passes away from that host of radiant deities and is reborn in that empty mansion of Brahmā.
Atha kho aññataro satto āyukkhayā vā puññakkhayā vā ābhassarakāyā cavitvā suññaṁ brahmavimānaṁ upapajjati.
There they are mind-made, feeding on rapture, self-luminous, moving through the sky, steadily glorious, and they remain like that for a very long time.
So tattha hoti manomayo pītibhakkho sayampabho antalikkhacaro subhaṭṭhāyī, ciraṁ dīghamaddhānaṁ tiṭṭhati.
DN1
Then a certain sentient being—due to the running out of their life-span or merit—passes away from that host of radiant deities and is reborn in that empty mansion of Brahmā.
Atha kho aññataro satto āyukkhayā vā puññakkhayā vā ābhassarakāyā cavitvā suññaṁ brahmavimānaṁ upapajjati.
There they are mind-made, feeding on rapture, self-luminous, moving through the sky, steadily glorious, and they remain like that for a very long time.
So tattha hoti manomayo pītibhakkho sayampabho antalikkhacaro subhaṭṭhāyī, ciraṁ dīghamaddhānaṁ tiṭṭhati.
DN24
Now, one of those beings was reckless.
Atha kho, vāseṭṭha, aññataro satto lolajātiko:
Thinking, ‘Oh my, what might this be?’ they tasted the solid nectar with their finger.
‘ambho, kimevidaṁ bhavissatī’ti rasapathaviṁ aṅguliyā sāyi.
They enjoyed it, and craving was born in them.
Tassa rasapathaviṁ aṅguliyā sāyato acchādesi, taṇhā cassa okkami.
And other beings, following that being’s example, tasted solid nectar with their fingers.
Aññepi kho, vāseṭṭha, sattā tassa sattassa diṭṭhānugatiṁ āpajjamānā rasapathaviṁ aṅguliyā sāyiṁsu.
They too enjoyed it, and craving was born in them.
Tesaṁ rasapathaviṁ aṅguliyā sāyataṁ acchādesi, taṇhā ca tesaṁ okkami.
DN27
‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This sentient being—where did it come from? And where will it go?’
‘ahaṁ nu khosmi? No nu khosmi? Kiṁ nu khosmi? Kathaṁ nu khosmi? Ayaṁ nu kho satto kuto āgato? So kuhiṁ gāmī bhavissatī’ti?
When they attend improperly in this way, one of the following six views arises in them and is taken as a genuine fact.
Tassa evaṁ ayoniso manasikaroto channaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ aññatarā diṭṭhi uppajjati.
The view: ‘My self exists in an absolute sense.’
‘Atthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘My self does not exist in an absolute sense.’
‘natthi me attā’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with the self.’
‘attanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive what is not-self with the self.’
‘attanāva anattānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
The view: ‘I perceive the self with what is not-self.’
‘anattanāva attānaṁ sañjānāmī’ti vā assa saccato thetato diṭṭhi uppajjati;
Or they have such a view:
atha vā panassa evaṁ diṭṭhi hoti:
‘This self of mine is he who speaks and feels and experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms. This self is permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable, and will last forever and ever.’
‘yo me ayaṁ attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti so kho pana me ayaṁ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassatī’ti.
This is called a misconception, the thicket of views, the desert of views, the trick of views, the evasiveness of views, the fetter of views.
Idaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, diṭṭhigataṁ diṭṭhigahanaṁ diṭṭhikantāraṁ diṭṭhivisūkaṁ diṭṭhivipphanditaṁ diṭṭhisaṁyojanaṁ.
MN2
a being not liable to delusion has arisen in the world for the welfare and happiness of the people, out of compassion for the world, for the benefit, welfare, and happiness of gods and humans, it’s of me that this should be said.
‘asammohadhammo satto loke uppanno bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānan’ti, mameva taṁ sammā vadamāno vadeyya:
‘asammohadhammo satto loke uppanno bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānan’ti.
MN4
Heirs take your riches,
Dāyādakā tassa dhanaṁ haranti,
while beings fare on according to their deeds.
Satto pana gacchati yena kammaṁ;
Riches don’t follow you when you die;
Na mīyamānaṁ dhanamanveti kiñci,
nor do children, wife, wealth, nor kingdom.
Puttā ca dārā ca dhanañca raṭṭhaṁ.
MN82
“What gives birth to a person?
“Kiṁsu janeti purisaṁ,
What do they have that runs about?
kiṁsu tassa vidhāvati;
What enters transmigration?
Kiṁsu saṁsāramāpādi,
What’s their greatest fear?”
kiṁsu tassa mahabbhayan”ti.
“Craving gives birth to a person.
“Taṇhā janeti purisaṁ,
Their mind is what runs about.
cittamassa vidhāvati;
A sentient being enters transmigration.
Satto saṁsāramāpādi,
Suffering is their greatest fear.”
dukkhamassa mahabbhayan”ti.
SN1.55
“Mendicants, transmigration has no known beginning. …
“Anamataggoyaṁ, bhikkhave, saṁsāro …pe…
It’s not easy to find a sentient being who in all this long time has not previously been your mother.
na so, bhikkhave, satto sulabharūpo yo namātābhūtapubbo iminā dīghena addhunā.
SN15.14
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SN23.2 gives a more consistent analogy, actually quite glorious!
It has been discussed at length in this very thread.
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That’s certainly a common mode of argument throughout the suttas, but the fact that an argument doesn’t follow this train of thought doesn’t mean that it’s unauthentic. Even the arguments present in the anattalakkhana sutta and the anicca sutta aren’t like that. When you said “especially when they make arguments that contradict more common arguments,” I thought you were talking about a contradiction in the sense of denying what had been asserted somewhere else (or asserting what had been denied). Not that it just didn’t follow one of the common structure of Buddhist arguments.
I don’t remember any sutta that the four options of the tetralemma are negated concerning the aggregates. In fact, It’s explicitly stated that they exist in SN 22.94:
And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form [feelings, perception, fabrications, and consciousness] that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
The Buddha never applied this argument to suffering or to the aggregates. Probably because you don’t need to assume any wrong underlying statement to believe that the aggregates exist.
IMO, the tetralemma is used throughout the texts to refute underlying claims. Dependent origination is given as an alternative because it explains why the underlying claim is wrong and what is true instead. It’s not as if dependent origination was going to supplant everything.
We probably have a huge time difference. I’m gonna sleep soon, so it may take kinda long for my next reply too.
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Yes I am just seeing this now! thanks!!
In that sutta the Buddha calls form, feelings etc lokadhammo. This can mean “worldly phenomenon” or it can mean “worldly custom”, in other words it can be read to mean the aggregates are just worldly conventions. Since the aggregates likely predated the Buddha, as a means of classifying the Ātman, such a reading is possible.
If the dhammas are momentary (SN 22.37, SN 22.38, SN 22.97 and SN 35.93) and are without substance (SN 22.95) then how can they be real? If there are no substances which bear the characteristics in the world, then all there is are momentary characteristics arising and ceasing. How can there be characteristics though with no substance to bear them? What we are left with are just labels that we apply to experience, thus rendering all dhammas as being mere conventions only. On such an understanding, dhammas do exist but we can’t really say if they truly exist or not or anything in between. We can only say there is a conventional existence.
“Then the Blessed One took up a little bit of soil in his fingernail and said to that bhikkhu: “Bhikkhu, there is not even this much form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much form that was permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned. But because there is not even this much form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering is discerned.” - SN 22.97
“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).
“Therefore, monks, with regard to all empty compounded things you should know, rejoice in, and be mindful of (awake to) this:
“All empty compounded things are empty of any permanent, eternal, lasting, unchanging nature; they are empty of self and of belonging to self” - SA 273
not true:
“Well, Master Gotama, is suffering made by oneself?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, ‘sayaṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?
“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.
“Then is suffering made by another?”
‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, paraṅkataṁ dukkhan’ti?
“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.
“Well, is suffering made by both oneself and another?”
‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca dukkhan’ti?
“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.
“Then does suffering arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
‘Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ dukkhan’ti?
“Not so, Kassapa,” said the Buddha.
‘Mā hevaṁ, kassapā’ti bhagavā avoca.
“Well, is there no such thing as suffering?”
‘Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, natthi dukkhan’ti?
“It’s not that there’s no such thing as suffering.
‘Na kho, kassapa, natthi dukkhaṁ.
Suffering is real.”
Atthi kho, kassapa, dukkhan’ti.
“Then Master Gotama doesn’t know nor see suffering.”
‘Tena hi bhavaṁ gotamo dukkhaṁ na jānāti, na passatī’ti.
“It’s not that I don’t know or see suffering.
‘Na khvāhaṁ, kassapa, dukkhaṁ na jānāmi, na passāmi.
I do know suffering,
Jānāmi khvāhaṁ, kassapa, dukkhaṁ;
I do see suffering.”
passāmi khvāhaṁ, kassapa, dukkhan’”ti.
SN12.17
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Hi Mike, hope you’re well.
First of all, I was unaware of this “great deal of discussion”. To be honest, I never deeply looked at this sutta before. So these are just my initial thoughts.
As I read it, there is indeed a possible ambiguity in the question of the brahmin Dona (although he does not intend any ambiguity himself, he unintentionally created it). But there is no ambiguity in the answer of the Buddha. Venerable Thanissaro said “that the future tense is often used to express perplexity” but why would the Buddha answer with perplexity? He seems pretty sure of what he is saying, and of course that is exactly the point: the brahmin is perplexed but the Buddha is not.
Both the brahmin’s questions and the Buddha’s answers in the initial exchange are in the future tense. Venerables Bodhi and Sujato have “resolved” this by first rendering the Pali future tense as an English optative (“might you be”) in the question but as an English future tense (“I will be”) in the answer. This is an extract of Ven. Sujato’s:
“Sir, might you be a god?” “Devo no bhavaṁ bhavissatī”ti?
“I will not be a god, brahmin.” “Na kho ahaṁ, brāhmaṇa, devo bhavissāmī”ti.
[…]
“Might you be a human?” “Manusso no bhavaṁ bhavissatī”ti?
“I will not be a human.” “Na kho ahaṁ, brāhmaṇa, manusso bhavissāmī”ti.
I’d probably have translated it the same. It is not ideal, because in the English now the Buddha uses a different verb form, which is not the case in Pali. But it does quite well portray the ambiguity in the question, since “might you be” can be read as perplexity or a question about the future.
It’s a similar situation to SN23.2 where Radha asks how there is “a being” (satta), expecting the buddha to answer directly. Instead the Buddha chooses to interpret it as “how is one stuck (satta)” and answers that question instead. (This is why I said earlier the Pali can easily be read as the Buddha avoiding the question on “a being” all together". Which is why it should not be given too much weight and not be seen as a general definition for the word “being”.)
So here in AN4.36 the Buddha also avoids a direct answer. The brahmin is perplexed, asking “might you be (bhavissati) a god?” expecting an affirmative answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in the present tense. But the Buddha chooses to interpret the question differently as “will you be a god?”. And he answers that question instead, ignoring the real intent of the question. He instead speaks of his no longer being reborn, as a god or anything else, including a human. He doesn’t answer what he is right now.
This purposeful reinterpreting of questions is not unique to these suttas either. It’s something the Buddha does more often, and of course something people have always done.
Now, the reason it is quite clear the brahmin Dona’s questions are of perplexity is the background story in the sutta, where he sees the Buddha’s footprint. So far I agree with Ven. Thanissaro.
But the Buddha’s answer is not ambiguous.
The reason the Buddha’s answer is in the future tense, talking about rebirth, is most clear in the verse, which says:
“I have destroyed those taints by which
I might have been reborn as a deva
The verb for “might have been reborn” (upapatti, here as a past participle) is always used to refer to rebirth as we ordinarily understand the word. There are also other words in the verse that indicate the same idea but I think this is the clearest.
So in brief, I think Ven. Thanissaro’s dual interpretation is not well-founded. The Buddha is a human and would have considered himself one too supposedly. His negative answer is only about him not being reborn as a human.
I hope that helps. And I hope it is not too off-topic for the discussion.
To bring it back to the topic a bit, I also agree with earlier assertions of @Dhammanando and others that the venerable’s translation “pinned down” is incorrect. The point of ‘a being’ is that it is not found, i.e. does in reality not exist. (In Pali it is common to say of something that does not exist that it is not found, as Cone’s glosses of the verb upalabbhati indicate.)
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Something momentary can be real in the sense that it exists. At least, that is one way to use the word ‘real’ and I think a very common one. Feelings, consciousness, and so on do actually exist. In that sense they are real. Otherwise, is there no consciousness when you read this?
The difference with what is being discussed in this topic, is that ‘a self’ or ‘a being’ (in the sense of some essence inside of us, or as Mike called it, a being “in a self-like sense”) is just an illusion created by the unenlightened mind. It truly isn’t real in any sense of the word.
But the five aggregates are different. They are not illusions. They also exist when one is enlightened.
As joseph just quoted SN12.17:
But a main point of that sutta is that there is no self that created the suffering.
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Here’s Buddhaghosa on Nibbāna:
Nattheva nibbānaṃ, sasavisāṇaṃ viya anupalabbhanīyatoti ce?
Na, upāyena upalabbhanīyato.Is Nibbāna non-existent because it is unapprehendable, like the hare’s horn?
That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the right means.
(Visuddhimagga, XVI 67)
Apparently for Ajahn Thanissaro, the horn of a hare, sky-flowers and the son of barren woman are not non-existents. It’s just that nobody can pin down what they are.
But seriously, if there’s one ancient Indian verb whose semantic range there’s no doubt about, it’s upalabbhati, along with its Sanskrit cognate. We know so much about it because in its Sanskrit negative nominal form anupalabdhi - “unfindableness”, “non-instantiation”, it was a perennial topic of debate among the epistemologists and logicians of all schools, Buddhist, Jaina and Brahminical.
Dhirendra Sharma, Epistemological Negative Dialectics of Indian Logic: ‘abhāva’ vs ‘anupalabdhi’
Anupalabdhi and Abhava.pdf (562.1 KB)
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The sutta that you quoted applies the argument to how suffering arises. What I meant is that there’s no moment that the Buddha does something like:
"There’s suffering doesn’t apply
There isn’t suffering doesn’t apply
Both doesn’t apply
Neither doesn’t apply
Avoiding the two extremes a Buddhist takes the middle way…"
What I was trying to say is that the aggregates aren’t unreal as you said in your previous post. They’re quite real and not fictional; the fact that they arise dependent on other things doesn’t change that. Again, I don’t see why the nun’s chariot analogy would be wrong.
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