The chariot analogy in SN 5:10

Exactly.
And this why the the first translation given, “here no being is found”
is apt for the passive ‘na upalabbhati’.

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“Who created this sentient being?
“Kenāyaṁ pakato satto,
Where is its maker?
kuvaṁ sattassa kārako;
Where has the being arisen?
Kuvaṁ satto samuppanno,
And where does it cease?”
kuvaṁ satto nirujjhatī”ti.

“Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?
“Kiṁ nu sattoti paccesi,
Māra, is this your theory?
māra diṭṭhigataṁ nu te;
This is just a pile of conditions,
Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṁ,
you won’t find a sentient being here.
nayidha sattupalabbhati.

When the parts are assembled
Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā,
we use the word ‘chariot’.
hoti saddo ratho iti;
So too, when the aggregates are present
Evaṁ khandhesu santesu,
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.
hoti sattoti sammuti.
But it’s only suffering that comes to be,
Dukkhameva hi sambhoti,
lasts a while, then disappears.
dukkhaṁ tiṭṭhati veti ca;
Naught but suffering comes to be,
Nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti,
naught but suffering ceases.”
nāññaṁ dukkhā nirujjhatī”ti.

First I think its fraught to try and derive ones philosophy from poetry.

Second if one has to, at least quote the pali not just the translation.

Third given it’s such a short poem, at least include it all.

As for the argument, it appears to be the fictionalist argument, claiming real aggregates and real suffering but a conventional and fictitious subject.

Its probably a late addition to the early material, the chariot metaphor being made only here and in the milindphana, it makes use of the rarely attested … upalabbh which occurs in one paragraph in the late mahaparinibbansutta, in a context unrelated to fictionalism about persons, it occurs next at MN22 again in what is almost certainly a late and composite sutta giving;

“But self and what belongs to a self are not acknowledged as a genuine fact. This being so, is not the following a totally foolish teaching:
“Attani ca, bhikkhave, attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne, yampi taṁ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṁ:

‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever’?”
‘so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo, sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassāmī’ti— nanāyaṁ, bhikkhave, kevalo paripūro bāladhammo”ti?

A rhetorical flourish that makes “after death I will be reborn again and again until I have destroyed lust hatred and delusion” a totally foolish teaching.

It next turns up in MN59 which has

The Realized One describes pleasure as included in happiness wherever it’s found, and in whatever context.’”
api ca, āvuso, yattha yattha sukhaṁ upalabbhati yahiṁ yahiṁ taṁ taṁ tathāgato sukhasmiṁ paññapetī’”ti.

In the Yamaka it is the Buddha that isn’t real:

SN22.85

“In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life, is it appropriate to declare:
“Ettha ca te, āvuso yamaka, diṭṭheva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne, kallaṁ nu te taṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ:

‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”
‘tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā’”ti?

the same argument is repeated in the next sutta

SN36.19 repeats MN59. As does SN36.20
SN44.2 repeats SN22.86.

AN3.61 has

Those who believe that past deeds are the most important thing have no enthusiasm or effort, no idea that there are things that should and should not be done.
Pubbekataṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, sārato paccāgacchataṁ na hoti chando vā vāyāmo vā idaṁ vā karaṇīyaṁ idaṁ vā akaraṇīyanti.
Since they don’t acknowledge as a genuine fact that there are things that should and should not be done, they’re unmindful and careless, and can’t rightly be called ascetics.
Iti karaṇīyākaraṇīye kho pana saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamāne muṭṭhassatīnaṁ anārakkhānaṁ viharataṁ na hoti paccattaṁ sahadhammiko samaṇavādo.

So people aren’t real but the moral weight of their actions are real.

there’s a couple more occurrences in the Theragatha;

Whoever has no respect
Yassa sabrahmacārīsu,
for their spiritual companions
gāravo nūpalabbhati;

then in the Nidessa it occurs 53 times! 5 times as much as in the 4 principle Nikayas combined!! in the Abhidhamma it occurs 218 times!

Basically the “genuine fact” argument is very rare in the 4 principle NIkayas and very, very common in the Nidessa and Kathuvathu.

aṅgasambhārā occurs nowhere else in the 4 principle Nikayas.
suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ occurs nowhere else in the 4 principle Nikayas.
sattupalabbhati occurs nowhere else in the 4 principle Nikayas.
kenāyaṃ occurs nowhere else in the 4 principle Nikayas.
pakato occurs nowhere else in the 4 principle Nikayas.

It’s pretty difficult to draw solid conclusions about philosophy when so many of the words are used only in this one poem IMO.

Anyway, I know it’s not a popular opinion here, but the sattupalabbhati argument is rare in the EBT’s, it contradicts the argument given in the undeclared points/conditionality suttas which are much more numerous, and it is an idea that is much more popular later in the history of Buddhism at the time the Nidesa and Kathuvathu where compiled.

the argument in the poem itself takes special umbrage at one conventional term with a frankly strange metaphor (after all someone does create the chariot out of its parts, so Mara has a legitimate question on that picture that is totally unanswered by the analogy, if anything it is made worse) but gives ontological weight to other terms, presumably equally conventional, so as philosophy the poem is just incoherent. Thankfully it is not poetry’s job to be coherent philosophy, and much more thankfully there is a mountain of deep, coherent and penetrative actual philosophy given in the suttas that appears to make a much better argument about persons that avoids the extremes of realism and fictionalism.

Metta.

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Note that SN23.2 is a play on the word satta, a pun, not a formal definition. Satta means both ‘a being’ and ‘stuck’ (or clinging) and the Buddha plays with this. It therefore shouldnt be seen as a central doctrinal statement. The Pali it can also be read in a way that he doesnt answer the question on ‘a being’ at all.

Elsewhere in the suttas there is a more direct definition of “a being is the six senses”. Sorry I dont have the reference atm.

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Yes, I think perhaps the pun is made clearer in Ven. Bodhi’s translation, which renders “satta” as “stuck”, the past participle of the verb sajjati, to be attached to, fixed upon.

(It’s this homonym which has created the confusion in ‘bodhisatta’ vs. the later ‘bodhisattva’.)

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Ven Bodhi also notes for these verses,

“The simile of the chariot is elaborated at Mil 27-28, which quotes the previous verse. Vism 593, 18-19 also quotes these two verses to confirm that “there is no being apart from name-and-form.”

Footnote 361, p. 430.

When we arrived at this end of the Bhikkhunisamyutta at Sutta and the City, we were all in collective awe of Ven. Vajirā !!

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Thank you so much for pointing this out, Bhante! I don’t know any Pali, so this explained a lot to me! May I ask another thing too? How would you interpret AN 4.36? Venerable Thanissaro defends that the Buddha is saying that he isn’t any type of being, not even human, but in Bhikkhu Sujato’s translation it sounds clear that the Buddha is just saying that he won’t get reborn. How do you read this sutta?

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Please, you make these arguments all the time but something being unique in the Pali suttas is no good indicator for inauthenticity. Especiqlly when there is a Chinese parallel such as here

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If this clarified make sure to read Ven Bodhis notes to the sutta. Im on a borrowed tablet device so cant answer in depth. Can you quote Ven Thanissaro’s interpretation? Then I’ll look at it later.

I doubt there’s any significance to the order. In any case, what you’re quoting is the active form of the verb. But the relevant form here is the passive upalabbhati, for which Cone’s order is:

  1. is found
  2. exists
  3. is perceived
  4. is ascertained.

None of which mean “to be able to be pinned down”.

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In English, the phrase, “to pin down” has the sense of trying to fix a moving target, or something hard to define.

But in this verse, the ‘na upalabbhati’ has more of the sense that the designation is incorrect, not applicable.

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This is not a unique position though, is the thing. The Buddha using word-play doesn’t disqualify it from being a definition, he does the same thing in the khajjanīya sutta for instance where he says “rūpa” is “ruppati”; it’s called form because it is deformed/afflicted.

If this were strange, I would agree. But the khandhasaṁyutta is filled over and over again by saying that clinging/desire in the aggregates is what defines one, measures one, reckons one, is equal to identity/sakkāya (existent group), and so forth. Time and again it is associated with the presence of conceit/ the sense of self, and connecting it to notions of existence and non-existence (being and non-being in English, conveniently)—as in SN 12.15 and SN 22.90.

As a convention, “being” could be the aggregates or the six senses—SN 5.10 says so right here itself. But that is just a convention for the designation of the aggregates. Existence itself is really tied up with the sense of self and one identifying with that which is born, produced, etc.

The Buddha “evading” the definition of a being and turning it into a pun on being intent on/clinging to the aggregates is exactly the point too—a being is just a convention, and it really just amounts to these things.

Mettā!

I largely agree, but sometimes the conventional use is totally ignored. For example ive seen people say arahants dont age and die because only “beings” do so. I’m not saying you do, but I thought it’s relevant to the discussion to point out that the sutta on “stuck” isnt a definition that applies across the canon.

In other words, the Buddha still used often the conventional term very often.

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This is Venerable Thanissaro’s notes on this sutta:

Dona phrases his question in the future tense, which has led to a great deal of discussion as to what this entire dialogue means: Is he asking what the Buddha will be in a future life, or is he asking what he is right now? The context of the discussion seems to demand the second alternative — Dona wants to know what kind of being would have such amazing footprints, and the Buddha’s image of the lotus describes his present state — but the grammar of Dona’s questions would seem to demand the first. However, A. K. Warder, in his Introduction to Pali (p. 55), notes that the future tense is often used to express perplexity, surprise, or wonder about something in the present: “What might this be?” “What on earth is this?” This seems to be the sense of Dona’s questions here. His earlier statement — “These are not the footprints of a human being” — is also phrased in the future tense, and the mood of wonder extends throughout his conversation with the Buddha.

It’s also possible that the Buddha’s answers to Dona’s questions — which, like the questions, are put in the future tense — are a form of word-play, in which the Buddha is using the future tense in both its meanings, to refer both to his present and to his future state.

The Buddha’s refusal to identify himself as a human being relates to a point made throughout the Canon, that an awakened person cannot be defined in any way at all. On this point, see MN 72, SN 22.85, SN 22.86, and the article, “A Verb for Nirvana.” Because a mind with clinging is “located” by its clinging, an awakened person takes no place in any world: this is why he/she is unsmeared by the world (loka), like the lotus unsmeared by water.

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Actually, this is not easy to discern because we can’t ever have direct contact with the thing itself. All we have is contact with our perception of the thing itself. To the extent that the perception has an effect on us, there is existence. Memory is just a special class of perception where we are seeing with the mind rather than our other senses. We can say that our perception of the chariot is different from the chariot itself. However, in such a case, we have no way to know what the chariot truly is.

Our notions of objective reality come from the need for multiple people to agree on the characteristics of an object. To the extent that they agree, we can say that the object exists. However, even agreement between people is driven from a subjective standpoint.

This is why the Buddha always took things back to suffering and the end of suffering. Those experiences are the only things that we can have direct contact with and know for ourselves; and because of this, those are the only things that have an objective reality. I.e. the Buddha describes suffering as real.

We are still assigning an objective reality to the Arahant though, which is not possible. All we can say is whether he exists or not in our subjective sense. If he is not reborn and will no longer interact with us, we can, in a limited sense, say that he doesn’t exist. By the same token, if the memory of him still shapes our actions, thoughts, emotions etc. we can say that he still does. In both cases, there is no objective standard for existence or non-existence. Both are perceptions of the mind driven by our context.

The bolded part is the key part here. The are areas of the suttas where you have descriptions of consciousness without surface, Nibbana as sublime etc. The words are there, but then we find ways to decide that these are are not original to the teaching. For example, by deciding certain texts are early or late.

The issue with this is that you can justify all sorts of strange view points by using this kind of analysis. E.g. this Wikipedia article that argues that the Four Noble Truths are not central to the Buddha’s teaching and that Nibbana is a later invention, with the Buddha actually trying to only teach Jhana.

So here again, if the nature of Nibbana can be directly known the implication is that there is something to be known. If we extend this further, we can ask - after death, does is the Arahant no longer able to know the nature of Nibbana? Any answer to this would be speculative. My own view is that such a position is nonsensical. If the Buddha expected such a knowledge to cease, he would have added a caveat to his description of of Nibbana (e.g. Only while alive does the Arahant experiences Nibbana as sublime). However, he did not do this. The statement was unequivocal. Nibbana is sublime.

We still get into trouble with the idea of a trueperception though. There is a clear distinction between perception and knowing. An everyday object can only be perceived (i.e. filtered through our own aggregates) and not directly known. All that can be directly known is suffering and its end.

Given that we are filtering everything, our perception cannot be true. Put another way, the aggregate of perception is inconstant, therefore our perceptions are neither lasting nor pin down the actual nature of what is trying to be perceived. We are just drawing a caricature in our minds that has some implication for the way we act.

Actually the comparison with the Anguttara Dona sutta (AN 4.36) is interesting, @Sunyo because there the Buddha declares,

“Nupalippāmi lokena“

Using the passive verb upalippati.
I am not defiled/hung on to by the world.

A very beautiful verse.

(The active verb ‘limpati’ has the sense of “smear” or “defile”. The Buddha claims he is without taints (asavas))

So long as someone doesn’t wonder whether prior to awakening a being existed who after awakening stopped existing, this would work. I think your statement here gets quite close neither can any arahant in the sense of ‘they are X.’

On what basis do you take this to be the case?

Ah but it is still a convention. Is it not somewhat strange to insist that “the arahant dies” because a sheer conventional linguistic usage says so? That’s the point of convention: it’s convenient.

To insist that the arahant dies remains and must be sheer convention, because what can die are the aggregates, i.e. the born. If the arahant is not the aggregates because all upādāna, asmīmāna, etc. has ceased (atammayatā), then ‘the arahant’ does not die; in fact, the ‘arahant’ is not a thing at all. This is just one possible use of the term “arahant” though, the other being that the arahant does die.

So any such argument or insistence sounds like a fundamental miscommunication in language. Literally, the arahant cannot die, because to assert this to be literal is to assert that the arahant is the aggregates (and therefore to fall into the wrong views described in SN 12.15, SN 22.90, and the same view of Māra in SN 5.10). To assert that the aggregates—which we call for mere conventions sake ‘the arahant,’ nothing more than a string of phonetic sounds assigned relative meaning for the sake of communication—die, is in fact perfectly in line with the teaching, and with reality. But this is not literal anymore then, is it. It is sheer convention, as far as ‘the arahant’ goes.

Point being, I don’t see why there’s any need to be frustrated over someone saying the arahant doesn’t die. In fact, this is just as valid as saying the arahant does die. Both statements posit a sheerly conventional subject of “the arahant,” and both accurately apply it to convey some kind of meaningful message to their audience, which is the entire point of convention and communication.

If the arahant is not the aggregates—which are all that can die—then sure, the arahant doesn’t die. No Buddhist should deny this fact. If the arahant is a designation for the aggregates, then we can say the arahant dies. Both work depending on context. There’s no need to assert and insist on one as absolute or more “real” than the other, which is just asserting that one convention is more “real” and “existent” than another equally valid convention.

I would call this a “metaphorical ātman.” To insist the arahant really does die, and yet to say the arahant isn’t the aggregates, is to insist on an ātman, while recognizing that such an ātman is a metaphor. But a metaphor isn’t literal anymore, so the whole rhetoric collapses. There’s no point in insisting a metaphor is simultaneously a real and literal representation, and yet also a sheer convention; it shows a lack of scrutiny and examination of the terms being used. To argue over it would be even more absurd, as really, both people are saying the same thing but talking past the words they use. One person says “the arahant dies” and they mean “the aggregates die”; the other person says “the arahant doesn’t die” and they mean “the aggregates can no longer properly be used to reckon or define one, so the arahant doesn’t die.” Both are in line with the suttas; the problem is language, not doctrine.

Mettā

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From this dictionary:

  • To describe or define something
  • To understand something
  • To force someone to make a decision about something

But in this verse, the ‘na upalabbhati’ has more of the sense that the designation is incorrect, not applicable.

And that is why it cannot be pinned down or understood. The way of thinking about it is wrong.

On the other hand, if we use the word found, we might start to think along the lines of existence and non-existence.

I just disagree @Sunyo I think that rarely attested terms are most likely mostly late. especially when they make arguments that contradict more common arguments, and especially when they occur in poetry.

As for chinese parallels, just to be clear, I am not claiming that the late terms are post-sectarian, I think that it is clearly the case that there was doctrinal development in the pre-secatrian period and this is what I am referring to when I say “late”.