I know…
But original " Dhamma"…must come from Buddha.
Therefore we have to check whether it’s inline with Buddha word.
Otherwise… who know that maybe " Devadatta Bikkhu "… own teaching…!!!
@Sunyo - Yes, probably @josephzizys & I have may have been confused here. To clarify my position - the translation of Pali words into English requires that one understands the various connotations of English words one might use in a translation. Some words are better than others, and this is simply a debate about which words are better. I have generally not made statements without logic or facts to back them up. (e.g. my previous comment about I yathabhuta). If the logic is wrong, then it should be simple to point out the fallacy. It is possible that we may speak past each other at various points if the axioms we hold to have not been clarified or aligned properly; but that just requires dialogue to clear up.
This is where we run into trouble. The component words in any language provide a strong context of their own for the meaning. If this is not taken into account, you are now simply making up definitions that match your preconceived views.
Suppose you ignore how the word is broken up and try and extrapolate a meaning of as it really is from yathabhuta. How would you do so in a manner that is unbiased and is not based on your presuppositions?
Well for example we could break down something like “He’s a ladykiller” and miss the meaning by taking a literal translation. We have to try and see how the word is being used. We need context, not just the literal translation by way of breaking down the words.
Actually, the meaning is derived from the two words ‘lady’ and ‘killer’. While the person doesn’t literally kill ladies, the phrase has connotations of to make a lady swoon or to cause a lady to faint etc. The common denominator here is that a lady falls for someone in a way that someone killed falls on the ground. Another way to think of it is that a lady falls because someone is attractive in the way that someone might fall because someone killed them. There is also a possible connotation of charming a lady only to later leave her distraught, where the lady feels like she wants to die.
The meaning of the smaller words is what causes these to be combined to create larger word. In this case, the larger word derives its meaning from the metaphor painted from the smaller words. This is often how new words are coined / born.
Note that even in this case, the connotations of the smaller words place limits on how the larger word may be interpreted. e.g. it is difficult to interpret ladykiller as someone who helps a lady up the stairs.
You can’t understand the idiom just by defining the words. If you did that, you would say the man killed women. That’s the literal translation. That’s how a future non-English speaking literalist translator, who is unfamiliar with ancient English, would translate it and understand it.
Yes. But what I was saying was that the smaller words place limits on how you interpret the larger word. So going back to the topic:
- yathā - as, like, in relation to, according to, in whatever way, just as
- bhūta - become, existed; grown, become; born, produced; nature as the result of becoming.
I am saying that the limit placed on yathabhuta is that it cannot refer to a static and absolute reality because the word bhuta refers almost exclusively to activity. In fact, based on the PTS Pali English Dictionary all of the words refer to activity. It would be strange for yathabhuta to be an idiom that strays so far from the meaning of its root words.
But let’s suppose that you are right and that in some context yathabhuta, somehow idiomatically means as it really is. Would you be able to provide evidence from the suttas that supports this rendering? I have only seen people make a claim that yathabhuta means as it really is, and then use that to justify their position that anatta means that there is no self in absolute terms. No effort has been made to justify the rendering of yathabhuta as as it really is. It is simply taken as a given, even though the root words indicate otherwise.
Thanks both for your considerate replies to my terse previous post. I think we have different methodologies, let’s say, of reading the suttas. So I’d have to dig deep to address all this properly, which takes us even further off topic, and I’m not sure if it is worth our time. Maybe another day in another topic! 
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Thank you too Ven. Sunyo. Yes, perhaps in another thread; it would be good to explore this. I would be keen to know how your methodology differs, and understand how you came to your definitions for various terms, such as yathabhuta being as it really is.
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I’m not making an argument either way to be honest. I was merely pointing out a flaw in your argument.
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I guess a flaw in what you perceived to be my argument. But I wasn’t claiming a universal method for decoding compound words.
I just provided evidence to show how the root words of yathabhuta don’t support a translation of as it really is and support, much more strongly, a translation of as it has come to be. This also makes sense in the context of the teaching of this that conditionality. In the absence of any other contextual evidence to the contrary, this simple way of defining the word seems to work rather well.
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Look again at the PED’s entry, and particularly at the compounds. Those who translate yathābhūta in the way that you don’t approve are taking the word in its third sense, the sense that we find in the compound bhūtavādī (“speaker on fact”) which is practically interchangeable with saccavādī (“speaker on truth”).
- (nt. adj.) that which is, i. e. natural, genuine, true; nt. truth; neg. abhūta falsehood, lie Sn 397; PvA 34. See cpds. ˚bhāva, ˚vacana, ˚vāda.
‘Atthi Kassapa maggo atthi patipadā yathā patipanno sāmam yeva ñassati sāmam dakkhīti, Samano va Gotamo kālavādī bhūtavādī atthavādī dhammavādī vinayavādīti.’
There is, Kassapa, a path, there is a way by following which one will come to know and see for oneself: ‘Indeed, the recluse Gotama speaks at the proper time, speaks on what is, speaks on the purpose, speaks on Dhamma, speaks on Vinaya.’
DN8, tr. Ñānavīra.“Now there is, O Kassapa, a way, there is a method which if a man follow he will of himself, both see and know that: “The Samaṇa Gotama is one who speaks in due season, speaks that which is, that which redounds to advantage, that which is the Norm (the Dhamma), that which is the law of self-restraint (the Vinaya).”
tr. Rhys DavidsThere is, Kassapa, a path, there is a practice, practicing in accordance with which you will know and see for yourself: ‘Only the ascetic Gotama’s words are timely, true, and meaningful, in line with the teaching and training.’
tr. Bh. Sujāto“Kassapa, there is a path, there is a course of training, whereby one who has followed it will know and see for himself: “The ascetic Gotama speaks at the proper time, what is true, to the point — the Dhamma and the discipline.”
tr. Maurice Walshe
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As I said, I have no dog in this hunt. I wonder how a literalist would interpret that? 
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It is generally not polite to intentionally misconstrue someone else’s arguments. I’ve already mentioned my reasoning around how root words place limits on compound words. I’ve even provided contextual evidence to support my point of view. I was not establishing a rule to the effect of every word needs to be taken literally.
Thank you for this. Let’s try and unpack this and see where it takes us, as the reasoning and limits for this translation have not yet been laid out.
If bhūtavādī is taken as speaker on fact, the question is, what kind of fact? The various meanings for bhūta give us a clue:
…The (exegetical) definition by Bdhgh of the word bhūta is interesting. He (at MN-a.i.31) distinguishes the foll. 7 meanings of the term:
- animate Nature as principle or the vital aggregates (the 5 Khandhas), with ref. MN.i.260;
- ghosts (amanussā) Snp verse 222;
- inanimate Nature as principle, or the Elements (the 4 dhātus SN.iii.101 (mahābhūtā);
- all that exists, physical existence in general (vijjamānaṁ) Vin.iv.25 (bhūtaṁ)
- what we should call a simple predicative use, is exemplified by a typical dogmatic example, viz. “kālaghaso bhūto,” where bhūta is given as meaning khīṇāsava (Arahant) Ja.ii.260;
- all beings or specified existence, animal kingdom (sattā) DN.ii.157;
- the vegetable kingdom, plants, vegetation (rukkh’ ādayo Vin.iv.34 (as bhūta-gāma)
Definitions 1, 3 and 4
These reference the following items that are inconstant:
- aggregates
- elements
- all (another commonly used term for the aggregates)
Defintions 2 and 5
Definition 2 references ghosts, who are also inconstant.
Definition 4 is a metaphor for an Arahant, who is described by the metaphor kālaghaso bhūto, (lit. time consuming ghost/being). The word kālaghaso had to be prefixed to give bhūto the connotation of timelessness. So again, bhūta by itself is limited to that which is inconstant.
Definitions 6 and 7
Definition 6 refers to beings who are inconstant and definition 7 refers to plant life that is also inconstant.
So there is a theme here of inconstance, which is also supported by its other definitions of become, grown, born etc as quoted in my previous comment.
Given that the theme here is inconstance and what is inconstant is not absolute, the word fact must be limited to that which is conventionally true. It has no connotations of ultimate reality.
Note that that which is conventionally true is subject to this that conditionality and therefore is better described as that which is here because it has come to be, as opposed to that which is here because it was always here.
This can also be seen from this part of your quote:
…Samano va Gotamo kālavādī bhūtavādī atthavādī dhammavādī vinayavādīti…
… the recluse Gotama speaks at the proper time, speaks on what is, speaks on the purpose, speaks on Dhamma, speaks on Vinaya.’…
If bhūtavādī referenced an invariable truth, there would be no need for the word dhammavādī, where dhamma is recognised to be timeless and true.
As a normal reader, look at SN5:10 I see that Mara is asking the nun:
Who created this sentient being?
Where is its maker?
Where has the being arisen?
And where does it cease?”
Here, Mara implies that the sentient being is created by an external force or entity such as “God” or something else. That is what he expected the nun to answer. Moreover, he asked: “Where is its maker?” This means that the maker is not here with the so-called “being”. Therefore, the maker is external, and the being is created by this external maker.
However, he did not ask for a permanent, unchangeable being or “atta” since he asked for the arising and ceasing of the being:
Where has the being arisen?
And where does it cease?”
We can also see that Mara also thinks this “being” was arisen somewhere else and will cease somewhere else. He does not see that the being is arisen right here and will cease right here when he asked “where?.” To Mara, this “being” is an external entity created by external force and will cease back to the external force.
The whole point here is that this “being” is an external entity created by external force and will cease back to the external force.
Examining this sentence: “Kiṁ nu sattoti paccesi”
- Ven. Bodhi: Why now do you assume ‘a being’?
- Ven. Thanissaro: What? Do you assume a ‘living being,’ Mara?
- Ven. Sujato: Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?
Both Ven. Bodhi and Ven. Thanissaro translated to: “assume a (living) being.” As I understand, this means that "assume the nun to be an entity called “being” that is an external entity created by external force and will cease back to the external force. I do not see this statement implies the non existence of “being” in general. However, in the translation of Ven. Sujato: “Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’.” It seems to me that this implies the non existence of “being” in general. However, this is just my impression as a normal reader. I could misunderstand his implication.
Now we examine this sentence: “nayidha sattupalabbhati.”
- Ven. Bodhi: Here no being is found.
- Ven. Thanissaro: Here no living being can be pinned down.
- Ven. Sujato: You won’t find a sentient being here.
I do not know Pali, so I cannot comment about the correct translation here. However, as I understand, the nun simply said that there is no such “being” is found here. That means there is no being that is an external entity created by external force and will cease back to the external force is found here. However she said that:
So too, when the aggregates are present
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.
This means that the so-called “sentient being” or “being” is simply the aggregates. She does not reject the existence of the being. She only rejects the being that is an external entity created by external force and will cease back to the external force.
However, the five aggregates is known as suffering if we cling to them. Right here, they arise and they cease then they arise depending on their conditions. That is their natures. We cannot say that they are non-existence since we can see their arising. Therefore, if we cling to the “being” then we cling to the aggregates and we will suffer.
We are not apart from that “being,” but by wisdom we know that identifying and clinging to that “being” will bring suffering to us. That being will arise and cease depending on its conditions. That is its nature. Therefore, we should detach from it if we do not want suffering. We simply see it as:
Naught but suffering comes to be,
naught but suffering ceases.
When we do not identify ourselves with it, its arising and ceasing will not cause any trouble for us.
With eye and form as conditions, eye-consciousness arises. This is its nature, it has nothing to do with ignorance. However, with ignorance as conditions, we will identify ourselves with this consciousness and we will follow it, establish ourselves to it, like it and crave for it… With wisdom, we will not identify ourselves with it, we will not follow it, will not establish ourselves to it, so it comes and it will cease when nothing supports its arising process.
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If there is being then nothing would change. That isn’t our experience however. Our experience is dependently originated.
If this were being claimed in an absolute sense, yes. Yet, as discussed, neither nor being and non-being can be taken absolute realities.
For whom is this a question? Not, it seems, for the users of the word in the suttas.
By attributing to the word a greater pregnancy of meaning than it actually has, you make things quite needlessly complicated.
Seen in context, the Pali words…
musāvādī - speaker of what is false.
abhūtavādī - non-speaker of what is fact.
atathavādī - non-speaker of what is the case.
vitathavādī - speaker of what is not the case.
aññathavādī - speaker of what is [actually] otherwise.
are just five ways of asserting that someone’s words are either lies or errors. They differ only in phrasing, not in meaning. While their contraries…
saccavādī - speaker of what is true.
bhūtavādī - speaker of what is fact.
tathavādī - speaker of what is the case.
avitathavādī - non-speaker of what is not the case.
anaññathavādī - non-speaker of what is [actually] otherwise.
are five ways of ascribing veracity to a person, likewise differing in phrasing, not in meaning.
You seem to be imposing upon bhūtavādī a degree of specificity and philosophical sophistication that is contextually unsupported.
For example, in the suttas the most frequent occurrence of bhūtavādī is in an oft-repeated list of the things that you become when you quit gossiping (MN27), while abhūtavacana is a term for the false rumours that will likely spread about you if you go wandering the streets at unseemly hours (DN31).
Just as musāvādī and abhūtavādī neither contain nor imply any stipulation about what sort of lies the person is telling, nor presuppose any particular theory of truth (correspondence, coherence, consensus, performative or whatever), so likewise with the terms for truth-tellers.
Even in philosophical contexts (e.g., the Kathāvatthu debates) there’s no indication that these words carry anything but the non-clinical everyday sort of meaning that they have for non-philosophers:
Nanu bhagavā saccavādī kālavādī bhūtavādī tathavādī avitathavādī anaññathavādīti?
Theravādin: Was not the Blessed One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of fact, a speaker of what is the case, a non-speaker of what is not the case and a non-speaker of what is [actually] otherwise?Āmantā.
Puggalavādin: Yes.Vuttaṃ bhagavatā—“ sabbe dhammā anattā”ti. Attheva suttantoti?
Theravādin: Now it was said by the Blessed One: “All dhammas are without a self.” Is the suttanta thus?Āmantā.
Puggalavādin: YesTena hi na vattabbaṃ—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā” ti.
Theravādin: Hence, surely, it must not be said: a puggala obtains in the ultimate sense.
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By attributing to the word a greater pregnancy of meaning than it actually has, you make things quite needlessly complicated.
Not really. I’ve merely constrained the definition of bhūtavādī to conventional fact on the basis of all the meanings that bhūta can have. It only complicates things because it undermines your view that there is no self in an absolute sense.
I would say that you are imposing a broader meaning on bhūtavādī simply to support the philosophical position you have. You’ve asserted that saccavādī, bhūtavādī etc. are the same in meaning but haven’t provided any contextual evidence to support this (see below).
Which pretty much supports my point. You don’t need to speak absolute truth to not gossip. You only need to speak what is conventionally factual in a timely and useful way.
Just as musāvādī and abhūtavādī neither contain nor imply any stipulation about what sort of lies the person is telling, nor presuppose any particular theory of truth (correspondence, coherence, consensus, performative or whatever), so likewise with the terms for truth-tellers.
On musāvādī…
The vinaya provides a very clear interpretation of what a lie is. It is not just any falsehood, but a falsehood spoken with intention. In other words, what is spoken is only regarded as a lie if the speaker knew it to be so. As such, one might say something completely false (e.g. arahants are born again after they die), and not be found to be lying if one believes that statement. Therefore the scope of musāvādī as a falsehood is implicitly limited to a condition of the fabrication aggregate, to which intention belongs. As such, it precludes falsehoods that are ‘absolute’ (more on this below).
Sure, but there is no connotation here that the fact has anything to do with absolute reality or timeless truths. For instance, from MN27:
They give up lying. They speak the truth and stick to the truth. They’re honest and trustworthy, and don’t trick the world with their words…
…They give up talking nonsense. Their words are timely, true, and meaningful, in line with the teaching and training. They say things at the right time which are valuable, reasonable, succinct, and beneficial.
Suppose you were to believe that the Buddha’s Dhamma was false but decided to tell people that it was true. On account of your intention to tell a falsehood you would be lying even though the content of your speech, being the Buddha’s Dhamma, is timeless and true (imagine another sect that did not believe the Buddha but happened to have the same definition of a lie… to them your statement at face value is false, and you also had the intention to tell a falsehood, so you would be taken to have lied). In such a case, could you be known as a bhūtavādī? Since, based on the sutta, the precondition is that you not intentionally tell a falsehood, you could not. So again, bhūtavādī is not to do with absolute truths but relative or conventional truths.
Even in philosophical contexts (e.g., the Kathāvatthu debates) there’s no indication that these words carry anything but the non-clinical everyday sort of meaning that they have for non-philosophers:
Nanu bhagavā saccavādī kālavādī bhūtavādī tathavādī avitathavādī anaññathavādīti?
Theravādin: Was not the Blessed One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of fact, a speaker of what is the case, a non-speaker of what is not the case and a non-speaker of what is [actually] otherwise?Āmantā.
Puggalavādin: Yes.
A number of different words have been used here - e.g. saccavādī, bhūtavādī etc. This may well indicate that the speaker wanted to cover every conceivable sense of the word true. This would make more sense than the speaker using multiple redundant words in the same sentence.
In speeches and debates, one can often use different words to paint a picture from multiple angles. For example, if one were to say the following: he is a scoundrel, a thief, a warmonger and sinner of the worst sort, one is trying to paint a character profile by describing negative attributes from various angles. It would be a mistake to think that scoundrel, thief, warmonger and sinner are interchangeable. Some words may encompass others (e.g. a thief might by default be a sinner) however they cannot be equated one to one (e.g. a sinner may not, by default, always be a thief).