As shown in my previous post, some suttas have had to be changed to agree with the notion that all consciousness ceases.
In the case of AN4.173, Ven. Sunyo adds the words no longer to make it fit with that philosophical position, even though it breaks the symmetry of the four questions.
In the case of MN49, he and others say that Baka is the speaker of the phrase referring to consciousness entirely given up, even though that makes no sense in context.
If you bend the suttas in this way, then perhaps you could get to the point where all consciousness ceases at nibbana. But when taken at face value, they paint a different picture.
But, given that neither of us is unlikely to change our positions, we can leave it here. Thank you for the conversation.
At the very least thought requires perception (i.e. the ability to make distinctions). If you think elephant, you automatically make a distinction between elephant and not elephant. This is regardless of whether the thought is a word, visualisation or whatever.
Can you provide an example of thought that is not within the realm of the aggregates?
Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?”
“On the western wall, sir.”
“If there was no western wall, where would it land?”
“On the ground, sir.”
“If there was no ground, where would it land?”
“In water, sir.”
“If there was no water, where would it land?”
“It wouldn’t land, sir.”
“In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …
Here, the Buddha compares consciousness to a ray of light. The ray of light does not cease. Rather, it does not land on any object, and is thus imperceptible.
Yes, I am aware of this sutta. But, as a non-native speaker of English, I was not sure whether the following means
(i) there is no consciousness whatsoever or (ii) there is another type of consciousness and it does not land on or grow. Given the context, though, I lean toward (ii). It is because, if what the Buddha meant was (i), there was no need to mention ground or water.
I understand this in the context of the Buddha’s simile that consciousness is the seed, kamma is the field and craving is the moisture. When craving has been destroyed and an arahant dies, there is no re-establishing of consciousness and it simply ceases because there’s no object for it to take, in the same way that light is only visible when it shines on an object.
But the simile does not read this way. Consciousness is compared to light, and in the simile the light does not cease. Rather, it does not land on anything.
Only if you read the simile without the rest of the sutta as context . The sutta is entirely about dependent origination (really dependent cessation. The simile is describing what happens when the conditions consciousness is dependent upon do not arise. Again and again, the suttas tell us that when sankharas ceases, vinnana ceases. So even if this simile doesn’t use the term “nirodha/cessation,” we have to keep in mind the million suttas which do, eg
When choices cease, consciousness ceases.
saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho;
Does not become established and does not grow is repeated throughout the sutta. That is the context within which the similie makes sense.
Sure. But then you must also keep in mind the definition provided for consciousness as that which is limited to the six sense bases.
The goal shouldn’t be to pigeonhole this sutta with the light simile into something it is not. Rather, it should be find an interpretation of the suttas that fits with the variety of wording provided.
The end of suffering is not born, not made, etc. The end of suffering also exists, but it is not a state of consciousness. Indeed this quote never says it is, nor does any other instance in the canon. Also I agree with Jasudho. See Norman’s Mistaken Ideas about Nibbāna. This is one of the prime Pāli philologists saying it means “which has no birth/death/etc” and that “unborn, etc” is likely to be misunderstood.
Well, as I said, “there is nothing” can sound like a place where there is nothing, or like the Nothing being a thing. (Kind of how “Emptiness” is sometimes understood as a thing.)
But in your defense, to me Ud8.2 may not speak about final nibbāna. It coulud be about nibbāna at enlightenment. In that case it says “there is nothing” of the defilements left.
(By the way, can you copy paste the text instead of inserting pictures?)
I mean all statements assume something outside of the six senses including their objects. It is exactly assuming a kind of seventh consciousness or eternal mind that would be included in “is there still anything else?”
And “does something else no longer exist?” implies there existed something outside of these six sense spheres—like a self or soul or someone who possesses the six sense spheres—which also comes to cease when the six senses cease. (Like the “self possessing form, etc.” that is often mentioned with reference to the five aggregates.) This is why it is annihilationism.
I had some links in the post that help explain. It’s not adding something, it’s clarifying what the Pāli can imply. Many others have translated na similarly as “no longer” when there is an implication of a difference between moments of time, a before and after. That is what we have here, because it implies what happens after death.
I think you’re getting too stuck in translation rather than looking at what the Pāli itself implies. Regardless, the sentences are made parallel in English if we say: “is there still anything else?” “is there no longer anything else?”
Anyway, your position that there is a consciousness outside of the six senses is more problematic in light of this sutta. Because however we take it, it is said to be a bad question to ask if anything exists (or still exists) after the senses cease.
You refer to the “non-objectification” or however we translate this. But notice that this is said about ALL FOUR statements. In other words, to say nothing exists (or something else no longer exists) is also called objectification. So it can not refer to a kind of non-objectifiable consciousness. Because if you take the negative statement to mean “there is nothing”, what consciousness is being objectified then?
I would argue that the best way to make sense of this objectification (I prefer elaboratoin/proliferation) to apply to all four statements, is that they all (wrongly) imply something outside of the six senses.
That is what you say, but the Buddha never said that. The same definition of including “any kind whatsoever” is also applied to the other aggregates. Do you imply that there is also a kind of nibbānic form, feeling, perception, and saṅkhāra? I think it more logically simply means exactly what it says: that all consciousness is included in the aggregate. Just like all form and such are. That is clearly the intent of the statement “any kind whatsoever”: to include all form, and such, and also all consciousness. If any kind of consciousness were excluded, it wouldn’t be hard for the Buddha to say so. But he never does.
Because they’re still alive, versus those who attained parinibbāna, who aren’t. This is explained in MN43, though not in great detail.
Anyway, this seems a very indirect way to argue in favor of a nibbānic consciousness. Because nowhere it’s said that the cessation of perception of feeling there is still consciousness. Instead, consciousness, perception, and feeling are said to be intrinsically connected in the same MN43. So when perception and feelings cease, consciousness ceases as well.
Your explanation seems a bit contrived. The boundless consciousness doesn’t have to refer to higher gods. Regardless, no Pāli edition attributes the quote to the Buddha correctly. The Thai, Sri Lankan, and PTS editions all unmistakenly attribute it to the Brahma. The Chinese parallel has resembling words attributed to the Bhrama. It’s only the Burmese that in a broken fashion, because it misses a quotation marker iti, half attributes it to the Buddha. Ven Thanissaro follows this broken version.
While I think this is an interesting reading of the passage, I personally don’t find it very plausible. It sounds really confusing. “Does something else no longer exist?” What something else? It’s very odd grammatically, and it isn’t the most natural reading of the Pāli. It’s possible, but I tend to think there’s a more plausible reading.
‘Natthi kiñci’ is what one perceives in the dimension of nothingness. So to say “there is nothing” can sound like making a statement about ‘nothingness.’ This statement can be misleading and ‘proliferate’ — or build up concepts and notions — what is not able to be proliferated: the cessation of all experience. In other words, any description of the lack (or cessation) of all experience and consciousness always uses words and concepts that are based on experience, because that’s what language is based around. The presence of some experience with characteristics that can be described is an assumed reality behind our words. When we say ‘nothing,’ it actually is a perception of absence, so there is perception (and consciousness → experience → not nibbāna). So it’s best not to equate nibbāna (extinguishment) with these things and speak only of cessation instead.
Just another potential reading I think is a little bit less contrived personally.
I’m not objecting to your interpretation, and I agree that may also be implied. As I said:
“there is nothing” can sound like a place where there is nothing, or like the Nothing being a thing.
But my interpretation is not grammatically odd. The commentary may not think it’s odd either, for it says the phrase refers to annihilation.
And it does agree better with the statements on the tathagata after death.
But that’s different. This says “na atthi aññaṃ kiñci”. Something else. Else than what? Something else than the six senses. So something else ceases alongside the six senses. That’s what I think is the point. The word aññaṃ makes a difference. And I think in the four phrases it means essentially the same thing: i.e. something beyond the six senses.
Regardless, I think we agree it doesn’t mean to imply that nibbāna is a type of consciousness.
Sorry, I meant it sounds odd in English, but by extension in Pāli. I shouldn’t have used the word grammatically. It’s just very ambiguous phrasing: “Does something else not exist?” I think it is a perfectly grammatical reading as you say, just that it doesn’t sound natural to me. But to say “is there not anything else?” sounds very clear and natural.
But yes, regardless we agree, and I also think your reading is a potential meaning of it too. I just personally find it a little bit less clear. I think we have both shed light on why the phrasing is confusing though lol. There are many readings which imply wrong ideas!
Yeah, this is good to keep in mind in interpreting it I think as well. Your explanation highlights the problem of ‘self’ more which is a benefit of favoring that reading. It’s just that the phrase in and of itself is not problematic: there is not something else besides the six senses, and so to say “na atthi aññam kiñci” is actually not incorrect necessarily, only if read a certain way.
The English is a bit odd, I agree. But I was trying to explain what the Pāli can mean, not make up the best translation.
I also agree it may be technically correct but in other ways not. As I said earlier, that may be why Sāriputta says, “don’t put it like that” instead of just yes or no. So statements of such a nature are of course hard if not impossible to convey in English. If you have a better suggestion, then I’m all ears.
Are you claiming this refers to a consciousness outside of the six senses? If so it seems you have lost sight of the context, no offense. This sutta is about dependently originated consciousness and how it comes to cease. Just one example:
"Where consciousness is not established and doesn’t grow, name and form are not conceived. "
This refers to the link between consciousness and nāmarūpa in dependent arising. Particularly, it refers to the cessation of these factors.
Just read the sutta as a whole rather than just this simile of the light beam, and then also place it in the wider context of SN12 to which it belongs. Particularly SN12.2 which defines consciousness in this context as the six types of consciousness. Then it should be clear that no consciousness outside of the six senses is ever implied here.
Edit: sorry the threat is going a bit fast. I didn’t see that @1hullofaguy already made the same points.
Yes, and each time it refers to dependently originated consciousness. It not establishing and not growing means it will cease because it has no object. (I take this “not establishing” to refer to it not being reborn, see here. But however we exactly interpret it doesn’t really matter, because it definitely doesn’t refer to a consciousness outside of the six senses.)
I think this phrasing in English is the most close to the Pāli in meaning in a way that captures the same ambiguity. Just an idea. Also the annihilationist reading is growing on me. I think you’re right it is probably what is meant.
I think the discussion in this thread is beyond me for now. So I will reflect every once in a while. But I cannot thank you enough for all your time and effort to share your knowledge.
Just one last thing. The photos I am attaching are from MN translated by Bhante Nanamoli and Bhante Bodhi. Doesn’t the passage about the boundless consciousness seem to be ascribed to the Buddha?
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. The sutta is entirely about dependent origination (really dependent cessation. The simile is describing what happens when the conditions consciousness is dependent upon do not arise. Again and again, the suttas tell us that when sankharas ceases, vinnana ceases. So even if this simile doesn’t use the term “nirodha/cessation,” we have to keep in mind the million suttas which do, eg
