Thank you. I had a look through the linked post. Each of the examples given make sense with the word not, and the words no longer don’t really add anything. So the translation of no longer seems to be one of preference rather than necessity.
In addition, in one of the examples, no longer is made redundant by formerly held, because only one of these is necessary to infer a past principle:
SN6.5: Na me, mārisa, sā diṭṭhī, yā me diṭṭhi pure ahu “I no longer hold that view, dear sir, the view that I formerly held.” (Bodhi)
It makes more sense to think that the speaker says I do not hold that view, then clarifies that he formerly held that view.
The fact that all four statements are wrong doesn’t require that they be wrong for the same reason.
Still, if you say there is nothing, you will imagine some version of nothingness. Perhaps being asleep or anesthetised. However whatever you might imagine will not be true; at the very least because you are trying to conceive a negative, which is impossible. A negative can only be conceived in contrast with a positive.
I’m not sure what your it is referring to in this context…
Now that is an interesting question. No, I’m not implying a nibbanic form for the other four. However, there is something to be said about how dukkha and nirodha can be understood to avoid this dichotomy.
I understand the concern you’re raising here, but will create a separate thread to address it at some point, so that the various implications can be discussed.
[EDIT] @Sunyo, you can now find a complete answer to this in a new thread I created here.
A person with a beating heart is alive, however their brain can be dead. As such, the mere fact that the body is alive shouldn’t be enough to allow someone who has ceased all consciousness to become conscious again unless we say that consciousness is just the product of brain activity.
On this part in MN43:
Feeling, perception, and consciousness—these things are mixed, not separate.
It seems to only apply in a specific way.
Suppose you perceive a sight, but that sight does not result in the arising of a feeling. Then you’ve successfully teased apart feeling and perception; because perception is present while feeling is absent.
Similarly, perception results in recognition, which is a function of memory. If you were to have no memory or reference point, the first moment you were aware of something would result in cognition without perception; thus consciousness is present while perception is absent.
So, I would understand this line is in the following way:
To the extent that there is feeling, there is perception and consciousness.
To the extent that there is perception, there is consciousness.
You can infer consciousness from feeling and perception. But you cannot infer feeling and perception from consciousness.
He does; however, the suttas where this is mentioned (e.g. MN49 below, the light simile, speaking of the deathless as a dimension etc.) are all dismissed in various ways.
I believe it has to do with the limitations in vocabulary when it comes to describing two distinct things.
As an example. Suppose someone who hasn’t experienced a vacuum is asked to point to empty space. So they point to empty space. Then the person is asked about the properties of that empty space. If they answer that the space is breathable, would that be correct? No, because empty space is also empty of air. However someone who has never known a vacuum could not possibly know that.
The air occupies the space, so from that person’s perspective, space is breathable. The person may even decide to use the word space to refer to air. If you were to say that there is a space that does not have the property of breathability, the person would get confused.
Tying this back to consciousness. In just about all cases, certain properties are tied to consciousness because that is all that people know. However, just as breathable space and non-breathable space are different, consciousness affected by clinging and consciousness unaffected by clinging are different. In addition, just as breathable space and non-breathable space have very little in common (i.e. air is very different to a vacuum), consciousness affected by clinging and consciousness unaffected by clinging also have very little in common.
They share the same name only because we only have experience of one of them.
Is it really? There are other angles to consider. In the sentence prior, Baka lays down a challenge to the Buddha:
‘Well, good sir, if you have directly known that which is not within the scope of experience based on all, may your words not turn out to be void and hollow!
It makes sense that the challenge is then answered by the Buddha in the next statement:
Consciousness that is invisible, infinite, entirely given up—that’s what is not within the scope of experience based on earth, water, fire, air, creatures, gods, the Creator, Brahmā…
Having laid down the challenge, why would Baka not allow the Buddha to answer?
Further, if Baka doesn’t let the Buddha answer and continues to speak; why would Baka say that consciousness that is invisible etc. is beyond Brahma when he is a Brahma and has good reason to have confidence in his abilities?
And finally, having admitted that it is beyond Brahama, why would Baka then say that he will vanish?
Although a majority of versions attribute the passage to Baka, such an attribution makes no sense at all, in light of the narrative within the sutta.
Any attribution of the passage to Baka needs to start by resolving these inconsistencies.