Right. So again, the Tathagata is not asking the question. An unenlightened one is. And from this standpoint – with the questioner assuming some enduring essence to the Tathagata is the questions, is refuted or is told “doesn’t apply” since what’s la led a Tathagata isn’t reborn nor not reborn.
It’s like asking if blue is reborn, not reborn, both, neither. What can be said except “Not so” or “Doesn’t apply.”
What gets esoteric, at least for me, are the conceptual gyrations around the Tetralemma. Clearly, we’re all free to choose what we wish to look into and discuss.
But it’s not in the 4NTs, not in DO, not in DL, not in the suttas on the Three Characteristics, and not in the 37 “Wings of Awakening.”
We don’t know the particular circumstances or people being addressed in many of the suttas and I don’t think we can ask the suttas to say things in the way we want, or expect, them to say in any given situation.
However, I’m guessing we agree that a foundational teaching in the Nikāyas is that no self or enduring essence is present in/as any conditional “things”/experiences.
Working from this foundational premise is what I’m getting at.
In this way, to ask if a Tathagata is reborn or not, or whatever misses the point
Again, what’s the response to “Is blue reborn?” “Not reborn?” “Neither?” 'Both?"
It’s not that there is no “blue.” And yet…
you say “right” but then you say a bunch of stuff that seems to miss my point entirely;
if the explanation is that there is no enduring essence, and having no enduring essence makes asking about rebirth like asking about the color blue being reborn, then there is no difference between the tathagata and the normal person, they are both blue, and therefore for both “they’re reborn” doesn’t apply.
but we are told that "they’re reborn does apply to the unawakened person for example here;
And what is the ignoble quest? Katamā ca, bhikkhave, anariyā pariyesanā?
It’s when someone who is themselves liable to be reborn seeks what is also liable to be reborn. Themselves liable to grow old, fall sick, die, sorrow, and become corrupted, they seek what is also liable to these things. Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco attanā jātidhammo samāno jātidhammaṁyeva pariyesati, attanā jarādhammo samāno jarādhammaṁyeva pariyesati, attanā byādhidhammo samāno byādhidhammaṁyeva pariyesati, attanā maraṇadhammo samāno maraṇadhammaṁyeva pariyesati, attanā sokadhammo samāno sokadhammaṁyeva pariyesati, attanā saṅkilesadhammo samāno saṅkilesadhammaṁyeva pariyesati.
And what should be described as liable to be reborn? Kiñca, bhikkhave, jātidhammaṁ vadetha?
Partners and children, male and female bondservants, goats and sheep, chickens and pigs, elephants and cattle, and gold and money are liable to be reborn. Puttabhariyaṁ, bhikkhave, jātidhammaṁ, dāsidāsaṁ jātidhammaṁ, ajeḷakaṁ jātidhammaṁ, kukkuṭasūkaraṁ jātidhammaṁ, hatthigavāssavaḷavaṁ jātidhammaṁ, jātarūparajataṁ jātidhammaṁ.
These attachments are liable to be reborn. Jātidhammā hete, bhikkhave, upadhayo.
Someone who is tied, infatuated, and attached to such things, themselves liable to being reborn, seeks what is also liable to be reborn. Etthāyaṁ gathito mucchito ajjhāpanno attanā jātidhammo samāno jātidhammaṁyeva pariyesati.
So just to recap, the issue is that normal people, whether they have an essence or not, and whether they assume an essence or not, are liable to be reborn.
But, the tathagata says that while “they’re reborn” no longer applies to the awakened (that’s good, that’s the whole point of the noble quest after all), “they’re not reborn” doesn’t apply either.
your explanation fails to elucidate the distinction, since neither the unenlightened nor the enlightened have or ever had, an essence, but one of the four statements applies to the essenceless unawakened person, whilst none of the four statements apply to the essenceless awakened person.
What I’m saying is it depends on the context of the teaching(s) being offered.
Since both realized and unrealized beings cannot ultimately be pinned down and have no essence, when looking at the teachings from this standpoint, they’re like “blue” and “doesn’t apply” is taught.
From the standpoint of ignorance and craving being present, as in DO, there is perpetuation of selfless processes and rebirth applies in the context for the unawakened but not for the awakened.
Same for “blue.” In the context of human perception – there’s not inly blue, but various shades of blue. But from the standpoint of photons and wavelength frequencies “blue” doesn’t apply and nothing can be said about “blue” arising, disappearing, both, or neither.
I think the Buddha taught from different standpoints in different contexts and mixing them can lead to issues. I think this apples to the points we’re discussing here.
But for the, as you say, “essenceless awakened person” none of the statements apply because to affirm any of them would be to affirm a kind of essence, even to say “they’re not reborn.” In this context is blue reborn?
That’s why, in this context, none of the four statements apply to an awakened one.
But for an unawakened one, we agree there is rebirth, even though there is no essence.
Also, and this is interpretive, the four statements as applied to awakened ones can be seen as discouraging the conceptualization and papañca that tends to frequently take place regarding the Tatthagata and anything beyond the six senses. One point – not saying the only point – here is to have people drop their ideations about this.
Like: don’t bother trying to figure it out. Analysis will only get one so far.
Regarding the frequency of the Tetralemma, my point is not that it’s of no interest or importance. Only that it’s not cited or taught as intrinsic in the core doctrines I cited.
Except when it does. If you read certain suttas and translate the Pali in a certain way, then “no longer reborn” apparently does apply to an awakened one. Not saying I agree with this, just pointing out that this is one translation and interpretation I have seen including from @Jasudho here.
What objective principles do you use to arrive at what are “core” doctrines versus what are not “core” doctrines? On what objective basis are you saying that those suttas containing the tetralemma are not “core?” Same questions for “intrinsic.”
“none of the statements apply because to affirm any of them would be to affirm a kind of essence But for an unawakened one, we agree there is rebirth, even though there is no essence.”
but this is just a flat contradiction @Jasudho you just said that your explanation for the reason “there is rebirth” should not be declared is because it affirms an essence, then in the very same breath you say that “there is rebirth, even though there is no essence.”
Admit your refutation.
No one disputes that there are, as @Jayarava points out, numerous occasions when the buddha declared of renunciates that they had lived their last life and achieved nibbanna, nor that many renunciants declared this of themselves.
The question is how to reconcile this with the undeclared points.
people who take SN, and particularly SN5.10 and SN22.85 and so on as their jumping off point, and the Therevada Abbhidhamma and commentarial tradition as their principle exegesis, attempt to explain the undeclared by appealing to anatta, claiming that any of the 4 alternatives presupposes atta, and that is what the buddha is rejecting.
This explanation suffers from the defect that it is flatly contradictory with what is said in the canon, in that it is repeated over and over that unawakened people lack an atta just as awakened people do, but the unawakened are said to be reborn, so one of the limbs of the undeclared does apply to them.
@Jasudho attempts to resolve this by appealing to the traditional Therevada rationale, that is the “two truths”, presumably suggesting that “they are reborn” is a “conventional” truth, while the undeclared are “ultimate” truth. the problem with this explanation is that it suffers from exactly the same flaw as before, in that if it is only “conventionally” true that ordinary people are reborn, then by “ultimate” truth there is, once again, no difference between an enlightened person and an unenlightened one.
the second problem with the “two truths” doctrine is there simply isnt any evidence that ther was one in any of the EBT, as pointed out by @sujato in their excellent checklist.
As you yourself said above, there are plenty of other options, including the one I lean towards, which is to suspect, on textual grounds, that the undeclared was the original position with regard to post-mortem status, and the declared “they’re not reborn” was the later, more formulaic and less philosophically nuanced trope.
I take as my evidence the wide spread of the undeclared points, as listed above, in all the prose collections in all the languages, in comparison to the more explicit “they’re not reborn” tropes, the most literal of which, as I indicate above, tend to be confined in the collections.
eventually, when you read the texts again and again, and you here the arguments again and again, you are forced to decide what you think is the most convincing amongst the contradictory strategies. I have arrived at the point where I think that the evidence of textual development in the prose is overwhelming, and the philosophical problems in the Theravada account are overwhelming, so I am taking the one and abandoning the other.
In terms of understanding all this, I am not trying to understand anything more than what the buddha taught for many people it seems to me that they simply give up on this project as too hard and “don’t bother trying to figure it out.” and end up retreating into anti-intellectualism and reifying meditation.
I think this is a wrong turn because;
And what is the gratification of feelings?
Ko ca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādo?
It’s when a mendicant, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and remains in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected.
Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati.
At that time a mendicant doesn’t intend to hurt themselves, hurt others, or hurt both;
Yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, neva tasmiṁ samaye attabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na parabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na ubhayabyābādhāyapi ceteti;
they feel only feelings that are not hurtful.
abyābajjhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti.
Freedom from being hurt is the ultimate gratification of feelings, I say.
Abyābajjhaparamāhaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādaṁ vadāmi.
Furthermore, a mendicant enters and remains in the second absorption …
Puna caparaṁ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā ajjhattaṁ sampasādanaṁ cetaso ekodibhāvaṁ avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhijaṁ pītisukhaṁ dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati …pe…
third absorption …
yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā, upekkhako ca viharati, sato ca sampajāno sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṁvedeti yaṁ taṁ ariyā ācikkhanti: ‘upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ti tatiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati …pe…
fourth absorption. At that time a mendicant doesn’t intend to hurt themselves, hurt others, or hurt both;
yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṁ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṁ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṁ catutthaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, neva tasmiṁ samaye attabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na parabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na ubhayabyābādhāyapi ceteti;
they feel only feelings that are not hurtful.
abyābajjhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti.
Freedom from being hurt is the ultimate gratification of feelings, I say.
Abyābajjhaparamāhaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādaṁ vadāmi.
And what is the drawback of feelings?
Ko ca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ ādīnavo?
That feelings are impermanent, suffering, and perishable: this is their drawback.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā—ayaṁ vedanānaṁ ādīnavo.
And what is the escape from feelings?
Kiñca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ nissaraṇaṁ?
Removing and giving up desire and greed for feelings: this is the escape from feelings.
Yo, bhikkhave, vedanāsu chandarāgavinayo, chandarāgappahānaṁ—idaṁ vedanānaṁ nissaraṇaṁ.
There are ascetics and brahmins who don’t truly understand feelings’ gratification, drawback, and escape in this way for what they are. It’s impossible for them to completely understand feelings themselves, or to instruct another so that, practicing accordingly, they will completely understand feelings.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā evaṁ vedanānaṁ assādañca assādato ādīnavañca ādīnavato nissaraṇañca nissaraṇato yathābhūtaṁ nappajānanti, te vata sāmaṁ vā vedanaṁ parijānissanti, paraṁ vā tathattāya samādapessanti yathā paṭipanno vedanaṁ parijānissatīti—netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjati.
There are ascetics and brahmins who do truly understand feelings’ gratification, drawback, and escape in this way for what they are. It is possible for them to completely understand feelings themselves, or to instruct another so that, practicing accordingly, they will completely understand feelings.”
Ye ca kho keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā evaṁ vedanānaṁ assādañca assādato ādīnavañca ādīnavato nissaraṇañca nissaraṇato yathābhūtaṁ pajānanti te vata sāmaṁ vā vedanaṁ parijānissanti, paraṁ vā tathattāya samādapessanti yathā paṭipanno vedanaṁ parijānissatīti—ṭhānametaṁ vijjatī”ti.
That is what the Buddha said.
Idamavoca bhagavā.
Satisfied, the mendicants approved what the Buddha said.
Attamanā te bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsitaṁ abhinandunti.
MN13
and
It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views: Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, ānanda, bhikkhuṁ yo evaṁ vadeyya:
‘A Realized One exists after death’; ‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death’; ‘Na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death’; ‘Hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’. ‘Neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.
Why is that? Taṁ kissa hetu?
A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’ Yāvatā, ānanda, adhivacanaṁ yāvatā adhivacanapatho, yāvatā nirutti yāvatā niruttipatho, yāvatā paññatti yāvatā paññattipatho, yāvatā paññā yāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭati, tadabhiññāvimutto bhikkhu, tadabhiññāvimuttaṁ bhikkhuṁ ‘na jānāti na passati itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ. Variant: yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭat
DN15
So the Buddha says that there is such a thing as knowing and seeing, and that that is how one is freed, so I am just trying to “know and see”, and therefore be freed. That is the whole point of Buddhism after all, isn’t it?
So for you the undeclared and the tetralemma are “core” doctrine, right? I think you’ve been transparent in pointing out on what objective principles you are relying and I thank you for that.
But if I am not badly mistaken - which I very well might be - some of the other undeclared points are not about Realized Ones but are about “beings” even though in many places the Teacher talks about people and persons and even beings and so on. He uses words like “I” and “mine” even though he says he put a stop to “I” making and “mine” making too I think. How do you reconcile these?
I applaud you and admire your perseverance and dedication to intellectually honesty. You don’t seem to shy away from hard questions at all.
By “core” I’m loosely using that idea for what what are clearly distinguishing and essential teachings in the suttas – 4NTs, DO, DL, Three Characteristics, for examples.
I’m not trying to make definitive statements here. Just that these teachings appear to be indispensable.
I agree those are core for me as well. But you said the tetralemma and undeclared points are not core. How do you objectively define “core” or do you just mean they are not core to you?
No, as I said I’m pointing to different contexts.
I’m not my grounding my understanding or practice to the Tetralemma and its debatable points. You appear to love it and you’re free to do so and enjoy that. Best wishes.
Nope.
With respect to the presence of ignorance and craving, there is rebirth, as in DO. That’s all.
No conventional and absolute in the Two Truths sense. Just different contexts.
Sure. And other people know and see it differently.
In what position are you to ascribe the motivations or lack thereof to others in ways you cannot know?
Well in this instance i am simply qouting what you yourself said.
More broadly, I ascribe motivations to people im exactly the same way we all do, by observing thier actions and statments and inferring from these, just as you do when you say “you appear to love it”.
That said, I am not claiming that you in particular are anti-intellectual, or that you reify meditation, in fact, I think you are one of the posters on here that does seem to be able to actually sustain an intellectual debate, and for that I am thankful.
What i am saying is that i think some of the same arguments you use are used by others in an anti-intellectual “shut up and meditate” fashion, and I think that is problematic.
The argument being made by @josephzizys is a reductio ad absurdum or proof by contradiction:
For all statements made by the Buddha, the Buddha would not declare, “they are (not/both/neither) reborn” for essencelessness.
There exists a statement by the Buddha where the Buddha declared that “they are reborn” applies to an unawakened individual.
An unawakened individual is without essence.
Therefore, a statement has been made by the Buddha where the Buddha declared that “they are reborn” for something without essence.
4 & 1 are in contradiction, so 1 is false.
And to steel-man the argument recently made by @Jasudho :
1 is indeed not true “for all statements by the Buddha.” There are times when the Buddha would say “I have not declared X is (not/both/neither) reborn” for an essencless process, and the reason for doing so in this case would be to emphasize the essencelessness or lack of any substantial “thing” which could be reborn. There are other times where the Buddha would say “they are (not) reborn” and in these instances the Buddha was not concerned with emphasizing the essencelessness.
Keep in mind here that logic applies to statements or propositions. In what follows, P can be any statement or proposition.
The law of the excluded middle is sometimes formulated: NOT (P AND NOT-P).
Within the parentheses, the statement P AND NOT-P effectively means “P is both true and false”. This statement is a contradiction. What NOT (P AND NOT-P) says is that a statement cannot be both true and false at the same time. The law of the excluded middle says that such contradictions are invalid, by definition. This is simply an application of the law of non-contradiction: P OR NOT-P. Either P is true or P is false; the statement “P is both true and false” doesn’t make sense for any P.
While Aristotle himself recognised that these propositions about logic cannot be inferred from first principles. He concluded that one could not think clearly about anything unless they applied.
For example, if we repudiate the law of the excluded middle and argue that P AND NOT-P is a valid statement, then P can be both true and false. Showing that P involves a contradiction is the same as showing that P does not a contradiction. This repudiates whole idea that a contradiction is invalid . And therefore, the presence of a contradiction is not proof that any given statement is false or invalid; since what is false is true and vice versa. If anyone decides that the law of the excluded middle is superfluous, then pointing out that my view entails a contradiction has no relevance. It might be true that my view entails a contradiction, but it is also false.
Rejecting the law of the excluded middle means giving up the method of proof by contradiction.
If one asserts that Nāgārjuna is able to show that all views entail contradictions, then one has to embrace the law of the excluded middle, since the whole notion of “contradiction” relies on it. On the other hand if all statements entail contradictions (P), then it is, ipso facto, equally true to say that no views entail contradictions (NOT-P). And logic breaks down again.
The reason we still talk about Aristotle’s three laws 2000+ years later is that logic doesn’t work without them. They are axioms that have to be accepted if we wish to practice logic at all. None of them is optional. And the authors of the Pāli suttas and the Prajñāpāramitā sutras had a good grasp of this. Standard logic applies when reading Buddhist texts of any period, including the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
The imasmin sati idam hoti formula itself depends on all three laws. If we take the statement to be: “a condition must be present for the effect to arise”; then “a condition” is a condition (identity); a condition is either present or absent (excluded middle); a condition cannot be both present and absent (noncontradiction). Historically, no Buddhist has ever argued for the partial presence of a condition, partially bringing about an effect.
While it is relatively laborious to find because the references are scattered throughout the book, this has all been well documented by K. N. Jayatilleke in Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.
As I understand it, the question of the existence/non-existence of a tathāgata after death is not unanswerable because following their last death a tathāgata is conceived to be in some weird ontological state or non-state or some combination of these (with shades of the discredited Copenhagen interpretation of the Schrodinger equation).
Such questions are unanswerable precisely because a tathāgata is not reborn. The fact that they are not reborn means we don’t know and therefore cannot say what state they might in, or even what states it might be relevant to consider. This is because our sphere of knowledge is limited to saṃsāra, i.e. the realms of rebirth, including the devalokas and Niraya.
There is no hard and fast distinction between natural and supernatural in Pāli, so heavens and hells are, at least in theory, open to being known in much the same way as the other realms. While it is a magical feat for a tathāgata to disappear from the human realm and appear in, say, a Brahmāloka to converse with Brahmā, it never involves knowing the unknowable.
The problem is epistemic rather than metaphysical. The answer is simply “We don’t know”, because such things are outside our sphere of knowledge and thus unknowable. Since it is an epistemic question, metaphysical terms like “existence” and “non-existence” simply don’t apply.
And just as the conflict dependent arising and karma doctrines led to innovations, especially in dependent arising, so too the unknowability of the Buddha led to numerous innovations. Buddhists appear to have found this intolerable and so invented ways to allow a Buddha to be knowable: for example, visualizing the Buddha in imagination (buddhānusmṛti), or the more substantial ideas of Akṣobhya and Amitābha coming from alternate universes (buddhakṣetra), or cosmic ādi-buddhas like Mahāvairocana, who may be conceived of as pre-existing outside of space and time or perhaps encompassing all of space and time.
The unknowability itself became intolerable and led Buddhists to posit more epistemically friendly buddhas that we can talk about to our heart’s content.
You have confused the LEM with the law of non contradiction,
“ In [logic], the law of non-contradiction (LNC ) (also known as the law of contradiction , principle of non-contradiction (PNC ), or the principle of contradiction ) states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time, e. g. the two propositions "p is the case " and "p is not the case " are [mutually exclusive]. Formally, this is expressed as the [tautology] ¬(p ∧ ¬p). The law is not to be confused with the [law of excluded middle] which states that at least one, “p is the case” or “p is not the case”, holds.”
What is called “constructivist logic” is certainly possible without the LEM and does not break down.
The point is removing the 4NTs, the Three Characteristics, and DO for example, leaves us without Buddhism as we have it in the Pali Nikāyas.
Whatever would be left would likely be called something else, a different spiritual path.
This is not to say how people should practice or what they should believe.
