“none of the statements apply because to affirm any of them would be to affirm a kind of essence But for an unawakened one, we agree there is rebirth, even though there is no essence.”
but this is just a flat contradiction @Jasudho you just said that your explanation for the reason “there is rebirth” should not be declared is because it affirms an essence, then in the very same breath you say that “there is rebirth, even though there is no essence.”
Admit your refutation.
No one disputes that there are, as @Jayarava points out, numerous occasions when the buddha declared of renunciates that they had lived their last life and achieved nibbanna, nor that many renunciants declared this of themselves.
The question is how to reconcile this with the undeclared points.
people who take SN, and particularly SN5.10 and SN22.85 and so on as their jumping off point, and the Therevada Abbhidhamma and commentarial tradition as their principle exegesis, attempt to explain the undeclared by appealing to anatta, claiming that any of the 4 alternatives presupposes atta, and that is what the buddha is rejecting.
This explanation suffers from the defect that it is flatly contradictory with what is said in the canon, in that it is repeated over and over that unawakened people lack an atta just as awakened people do, but the unawakened are said to be reborn, so one of the limbs of the undeclared does apply to them.
@Jasudho attempts to resolve this by appealing to the traditional Therevada rationale, that is the “two truths”, presumably suggesting that “they are reborn” is a “conventional” truth, while the undeclared are “ultimate” truth. the problem with this explanation is that it suffers from exactly the same flaw as before, in that if it is only “conventionally” true that ordinary people are reborn, then by “ultimate” truth there is, once again, no difference between an enlightened person and an unenlightened one.
the second problem with the “two truths” doctrine is there simply isnt any evidence that ther was one in any of the EBT, as pointed out by @sujato in their excellent checklist.
As you yourself said above, there are plenty of other options, including the one I lean towards, which is to suspect, on textual grounds, that the undeclared was the original position with regard to post-mortem status, and the declared “they’re not reborn” was the later, more formulaic and less philosophically nuanced trope.
I take as my evidence the wide spread of the undeclared points, as listed above, in all the prose collections in all the languages, in comparison to the more explicit “they’re not reborn” tropes, the most literal of which, as I indicate above, tend to be confined in the collections.
eventually, when you read the texts again and again, and you here the arguments again and again, you are forced to decide what you think is the most convincing amongst the contradictory strategies. I have arrived at the point where I think that the evidence of textual development in the prose is overwhelming, and the philosophical problems in the Theravada account are overwhelming, so I am taking the one and abandoning the other.
In terms of understanding all this, I am not trying to understand anything more than what the buddha taught for many people it seems to me that they simply give up on this project as too hard and “don’t bother trying to figure it out.” and end up retreating into anti-intellectualism and reifying meditation.
I think this is a wrong turn because;
And what is the gratification of feelings?
Ko ca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādo?
It’s when a mendicant, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and remains in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected.
Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati.
At that time a mendicant doesn’t intend to hurt themselves, hurt others, or hurt both;
Yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ savicāraṁ vivekajaṁ pītisukhaṁ paṭhamaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, neva tasmiṁ samaye attabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na parabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na ubhayabyābādhāyapi ceteti;
they feel only feelings that are not hurtful.
abyābajjhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti.
Freedom from being hurt is the ultimate gratification of feelings, I say.
Abyābajjhaparamāhaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādaṁ vadāmi.Furthermore, a mendicant enters and remains in the second absorption …
Puna caparaṁ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vitakkavicārānaṁ vūpasamā ajjhattaṁ sampasādanaṁ cetaso ekodibhāvaṁ avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhijaṁ pītisukhaṁ dutiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati …pe…
third absorption …
yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā, upekkhako ca viharati, sato ca sampajāno sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṁvedeti yaṁ taṁ ariyā ācikkhanti: ‘upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ti tatiyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati …pe…
fourth absorption. At that time a mendicant doesn’t intend to hurt themselves, hurt others, or hurt both;
yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṁ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṁ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṁ catutthaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajja viharati, neva tasmiṁ samaye attabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na parabyābādhāyapi ceteti, na ubhayabyābādhāyapi ceteti;
they feel only feelings that are not hurtful.
abyābajjhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti.
Freedom from being hurt is the ultimate gratification of feelings, I say.
Abyābajjhaparamāhaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ assādaṁ vadāmi.And what is the drawback of feelings?
Ko ca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ ādīnavo?
That feelings are impermanent, suffering, and perishable: this is their drawback.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave, vedanā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā—ayaṁ vedanānaṁ ādīnavo.And what is the escape from feelings?
Kiñca, bhikkhave, vedanānaṁ nissaraṇaṁ?
Removing and giving up desire and greed for feelings: this is the escape from feelings.
Yo, bhikkhave, vedanāsu chandarāgavinayo, chandarāgappahānaṁ—idaṁ vedanānaṁ nissaraṇaṁ.There are ascetics and brahmins who don’t truly understand feelings’ gratification, drawback, and escape in this way for what they are. It’s impossible for them to completely understand feelings themselves, or to instruct another so that, practicing accordingly, they will completely understand feelings.
Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā evaṁ vedanānaṁ assādañca assādato ādīnavañca ādīnavato nissaraṇañca nissaraṇato yathābhūtaṁ nappajānanti, te vata sāmaṁ vā vedanaṁ parijānissanti, paraṁ vā tathattāya samādapessanti yathā paṭipanno vedanaṁ parijānissatīti—netaṁ ṭhānaṁ vijjati.
There are ascetics and brahmins who do truly understand feelings’ gratification, drawback, and escape in this way for what they are. It is possible for them to completely understand feelings themselves, or to instruct another so that, practicing accordingly, they will completely understand feelings.”
Ye ca kho keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā evaṁ vedanānaṁ assādañca assādato ādīnavañca ādīnavato nissaraṇañca nissaraṇato yathābhūtaṁ pajānanti te vata sāmaṁ vā vedanaṁ parijānissanti, paraṁ vā tathattāya samādapessanti yathā paṭipanno vedanaṁ parijānissatīti—ṭhānametaṁ vijjatī”ti.That is what the Buddha said.
Idamavoca bhagavā.
Satisfied, the mendicants approved what the Buddha said.
Attamanā te bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsitaṁ abhinandunti.
MN13
and
It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views:
Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, ānanda, bhikkhuṁ yo evaṁ vadeyya:‘A Realized One exists after death’;
‘hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death’;
‘Hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’.
‘Neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ.Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’
Yāvatā, ānanda, adhivacanaṁ yāvatā adhivacanapatho, yāvatā nirutti yāvatā niruttipatho, yāvatā paññatti yāvatā paññattipatho, yāvatā paññā yāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭati, tadabhiññāvimutto bhikkhu, tadabhiññāvimuttaṁ bhikkhuṁ ‘na jānāti na passati itissa diṭṭhī’ti, tadakallaṁ. Variant: yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭat
DN15
So the Buddha says that there is such a thing as knowing and seeing, and that that is how one is freed, so I am just trying to “know and see”, and therefore be freed. That is the whole point of Buddhism after all, isn’t it?