My impression is: You are trying to proof that a stone does not truly exist with the most powerful microscope. You zoom in, and in, and further and further until a point there is nothing seen . And now you conclude…‘see i cannot find the stone, it does not truly exist, it has no ground, no footing, no core, no substance’. I feel this makes no sense.
Yes, the label/name ‘apple’ has no groundless footing. It does not exist because i see it. I do not create it. It has a material base. The growing of the apple is due to certain cause and condition that have nothing to do with me as observer. Birds are born from eggs, not from my mind. But labels like sparrow, chicken, swan, are born from my mind.
The President of the US indeed is only a function. A function has no material ground. But a banana has. That is its substance?
When a tree falls waves in the air, soundwaves are formed. But when there is no being with a mind, there is no sound heard, no sound is produced. So these soundwaves arise but will fade away.
But if there is a human being, or other being, sounds can be produced because soundwaves lead to sounds. I think the brain is here the most important. It translates, as it were, soundwaves hitting the eardrum into sounds.
I like that idea of a world-for-us. We live in an interpretated world but we also cannot say that this IS the world, or the All. We can also not say that we do this interpretation.
I do not really know how the Buddha saw this. But i believe it is not like this that sounds, smells, ideas, plans, tactile sensations, emotions, colour/forms, tastes are object of the senses. That are allready interpretations of the brain.
I won’t respond to all of your arguments in favor of natthikavāda meaning just materialist annihilationism because they are “preaching to the choir” as we say. Meaning I already agree with that.
But… isn’t it nice to discuss things we agree on for a change?
So if Ajita was an amoralist, I would agree that he must have reached that conclusion based on his more general view that there is no afterlife or fruit of action after this life
Yup, YOLO, basically! But I think it’s also a polemic by the Buddhists, just as we see in Christianity versus Atheism: “If you don’t believe in God (or rebirth), how can you even be moral?” I see this in MN60 especially.
On (n)atthikavāda vs (n)atthitā, I think you have a good point. As I said, I was too careless equating the two in an earlier response. Your further clarification helps make that clear. But they are also clearly closely related. I’d say it’s the context that makes for the difference, not the meaning of the words themselves. (I.e. Kaccānagotta Sutta = ultimate right view, MN60 = choosing useful view.)
On “the all”, I’ll have to reread that later to understand properly. For now, it may be the case. But I think you can understand if I say it all seems a bit more inferential than I’d like. I also still stand by my earlier feeling that to relate these ideas with sabbaṃ natthi seems strange. I suggest we leave this for now.
So, it was perhaps not so outlandish for Rohitassa to consider it possible to find a nirvana-like place by traveling to the ends of the earth.
Thanks @Charles! @Dabbha pointed this out also, based on another argument. I’ll rephrase it.
Thanks for your other thoughts also, and for your translation of SA233, which will find itself in a potential future version, as it supports my points very well.
The world arises out of senses and mind
And acts independently of senses and mind
And ends with the cessation of senses and mind
And continues without end
Both dependent on and independent of
Other senses and other minds
That have not yet
Reached cessation
This brings to mind a book: The Buddhist Cosmos: A Comprehensive Survey of the Buddhist Worldview; According to Theravāda and Sarvsātivāda sources by Punnadhammo Mahāthero.
The entire cosmos, from top to bottom, encompassing all its fascinating and terrifying variety, is saṃsāra. It is the arena of all manifestation, action (kamma) and result of action (vipāka). It is dependently arisen, contingent, imperfect, and all forms within it are impermanent and subject to change and dissolution. Every realm, every being, every formation (saṅkhāra) is marked by the three characteristics of imperfection (dukkha), impermanence (anicca) and emptiness of any self-essence (anattā).
Saṃsāra is suffering and change and it is all, in the last analysis, void. The noun saṃsāra is derived from the verb saṃsarati, “to move about continuously, to come again and again.” This is the essence of the idea of saṃsāra, that all the beings in the cosmos are continually engaged in endless transformation and movement.
So if we take the use of loko in SN 12.15 as a physical simile, it is done in a “Sineru-centric” way (I’m borrowing P. Mahāthero’s term):
This is neither a geocentric nor a heliocentric model, but rather a Sineru-centric one. The fundamental image is the truly immense Mount Sineru at the centre of the world-system around which everything else is arrayed. Beyond this single world-system there are an infinite number of other worlds, arrayed in horizontal and vertical hierarchies.
In his essay, Ven. Sunyo makes comparisons with SN 2.26 where Rohitassa asks about reaching “the end of the world by traveling to a place where there’s no being born, growing old, dying, passing away, or being reborn.”
SN 2.26 uses gacchati (to go, walk, move around) for “[reaching] the end of the world by traveling to a place where there’s no being born, growing old, dying, passing away, or being reborn.” That is, it’s clearly a reference (by Rohitassa) to conventional travel across the external universe which is a Sineru-centric one nonetheless. In other words, I’m trying to keep my modern sensibilities from contaminating the cosmological realities of the Buddha’s time.
This is where I appreciate Punnadhammo Mahāthero’s work:
The modern scientific cosmology, if detached from the materialist view, is compatible with Buddhist teachings in a way that the old geocentric model of concentric spheres is not. This was not immediately apparent and the impact of western science on the Buddhist world did cause some intellectual problems. But it was fairly quickly resolved and never reached the level of the crisis of faith which occurred in the west when Christianity was confronted with science.
For example, in Japan Sato Kaiseki wrote a carefully researched book attempting the impossible task of reconciling the observable facts of astronomy with a Sineru centred cosmological system. His Zen teacher, Ekido took a brief look at it and threw it back at him saying, “How Stupid! Don’t you realize that the basic aim of Buddhism is to shatter the triple world …? Why stick to such worthless things and treasure Mount Sumeru? Blockhead!”
The precise configuration of the universe is not essential to the Four Noble Truths. The classical Buddhist model of Mount Sineru and the multiple ten thousand fold world-systems was, as has been said, not developed in order to explain astronomical observations. This was never a primary concern. Instead, the Buddha and his followers, like Buddhaghosa, were much more concerned with understanding the mind and accounting for the various levels of consciousness. Even here, the concern in the end is a practical one. How can a living being enmeshed in the manifold world transcend it all and achieve total liberation?
And Punnadhammo Mahāthero says this even though he has written a 700-page book on Buddhist cosmology .
As an afterthought, it’s a pity that Alan Moore’s epic Jerusalem is way too long and dense for a modern Western take on cosmology and samsara, complete with edges and corners and ghosts and dizzying realms… that said, it is an amazing piece of work.
I don’t think the Heavenly Spiritual abode Jesus Christ or Krishna talks about us controversial or not to be mentioned in Buddhism. In fact I think it is the essence of where the Teachings come from and where the Dhamma resides, and certainly not Samsara.
Sorry for not replying earlier, and thanks for joining in!
I’m not sure where you think my fundamental misunderstanding lies, since I’m speaking about “practical consequences” in that bit you quoted. So I’ll ask a counter question to figure out what you exactly mean. I’ll assume by “all other substances” you mean in the entire universe there is nothing whatsoever that has true essence.
Question is: Do I indeed need to understand this?
If so, how am I to know this?
Let’s say on the beach 30km from here there is one single grain of sand that has true essence. It won’t ever be destroyed. It is just like, a true God particle. Or, in a galaxy far far from here there is a kind of unknown particle which we don’t know about that is fundamental. Or, perhaps black matter is fundamental, with true essence.
How can I really understand that this is not the case? How do I know with certainty that these suggestions of mine are wrong?
My answer would be: It doesn’t matter, for that’s not the “world” I should be interested in knowing the true nature about. (Note: this is an extreme example for sake of illustration.)
Yes. Since time uncountable we’ve had the deeply etched habit of substantial thinking. This thinking acts as a condition for craving and grasping. If you are not absolutely sure that nothing has true essence, then you will not have completely undermined and uprooted this deeply etched habit. A tiny grain of substantial thinking will remain and based upon this craving and grasping will have root.
If you believe this is possible you will also believe it is possible that deeply deeply inside the body there is a tiny single grain that has true essence and craving will have a ground to attach. Or you’ll believe that it is possible that some tiny grain of essence exists in the external object you perceive and craving will have a ground to attach.
Lots of people grow quite attached and crave after their romantic partner. Doesn’t your hypothetical allow a tiny grain of essence to exist within them? Are they in ‘the world’ that you think matters? How about mother and father? Most people I’d say grow quite attached and crave after the continued existence of mother and father. If a tiny grain of essence resides within them or you haven’t uprooted completely the belief that no such essence exists, doesn’t craving and grasping still have ground to attach?
What do you think Venerable, doesn’t that sound correct and match with experience of how persistent and difficult it is to uproot craving?
eṣa ma ātmāntarhṛdaye’ṇīyānvrīhervā yavādvā sarṣapādvā śyāmākādvā śyāmākataṇḍulādvaiṣa ma ātmāntarhṛdaye jyāyānpṛthivyā jyāyānantarikṣājjyāyāndivo jyāyānebhyo lokebhyaḥ || 3.14.3 ||
3. My Self within my heart is smaller than a grain of rice, smaller than a grain of barley, smaller than a mustard seed, smaller than a grain of millet, smaller even than the kernel of a grain of millet. The Self in my heart is larger than the earth, larger than the mid-region, larger than heaven, and larger even than all these worlds. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 3.14.3
Sorry to interrupt Upāsika Ceisiwr’s question, venerable! But just because I actually already wrote about this, I thought I would link you to three previous comments of mine. I argued that the findings of physics and so on are not generally in the same category as Buddhist emptiness, and it is a separate field of investigation than what the Buddha was discussing. But at the same time I also said that we do need to know that everything is insubstantial, including grains of sand. I don’t see them as incompatible. I think you would agree.
Yes. The universe is nothing but our six senses and their objects, and all of that is dependently originated. Anything dependently originated is without substance.
Question is: Do I indeed need to understand this?
If so, how am I to know this?
Let’s say on the beach 30km from here there is one single grain of sand that has true essence. It won’t ever be destroyed. It is just like, a true God particle. Or, in a galaxy far far from here there is a kind of unknown particle which we don’t know about that is fundamental. Or, perhaps black matter is fundamental, with true essence.
How can I really understand that this is not the case? How do I know with certainty that these suggestions of mine are wrong?
Yes, because understanding that means you understand that an atta can’t be found anywhere, no matter how hard we try. You could argue that outside of our experience a grain of sand with an essence is possible, but that’s no different to arguing that outside of our experience an atta is possible. Substances of course are beyond our experiences, since qualities, which are what we directly experience, are said to inhere in them. For the Master though talk of anything besides qualities is mere humbug. It’s beyond our range.
The Great Eye declared that the prime substance we take as true is nothing but the 5 aggregates which, in truth, stand in dependent relation to with each other. One of those is rupa which includes not only our bodies but the physical aspect of our experiences as well be that a tree, a car or Alpha Centauri. Science however operates from the assumption of substance, in this case matter. To start from there is to start from the original sin, so to speak. In truth nothing can be found to be independent of mind, and mind can’t be found to be independent of objects. Objective reality then, as we find in physics, is merely a convention that we take as real due to the taints. The asavas of course are what flood our mind with ignorance and perceptions of pleasure and substantial existence in what is truly an unsatisfactory and empty world.
So in short to see the emptiness of self is to see the emptiness of substance in all things, including your grain of sand in the Andromeda galaxy. This is why Arahants and Bodhisattas experience the same awakening.
Could you reasonably do so, though? A grain of sand is experiential. It is defined and comprehended through sight, sound, … mental characteristics and qualities. So if there were a ‘grain of sand,’ it would have to be an experience. To think otherwise is sheer misunderstanding. To my mind, at least! We can say the same of the ‘attā.’ To posit such a thing beyond experience would require positing something using experiential referents. At which point it would no longer be beyond experience.
I mean it can be argued. Rationalists argue for substances all the time. In terms of our tradition though they are arguing for things they can never ever know about, because if they knew them directly they wouldn’t be substances. They are forever beyond sense experience, in that phantom world of the noumenon.
I don’t think we have a fundamental disagreement, then, but a fundamental agreement. The world is, for all purposes, the empty and temporary six senses and their experiences.
Even to ask the question whether we can know if there is anything beyond them or not, is, imo, to miss the point. Because that is already going beyond them. That’s a more subtle pragmatic point I was making.
Right. I suppose what I’m questioning though is if ‘noumenon’ is even a meaningful concept, other than as a term for a misconception. If something is defined as that which is non-experiential but nevertheless exists, I think we’ve already assigned qualities to it (‘exists,’ ‘beyond the senses’) which make use of experience-grounded concepts and referents.
I think we could replace ‘noumenon’ or ‘unseen seer, unheard hearer’ with “the gvosderchuquel” and “zwaflle.” They seem to have meaning only in terms of the reactions they evoke among their proponents.
Basically this. Though not just the pragmatic aspect. I think the question itself might be literally non-sensical when analyzed. But I’m not entirely sure. Either way, we get the point!
Hi Ven! Well now I don’t need to finishing writing that reply! Kidding. But basically, my point was pretty much just what you wrote above. I think “anattā” and “empty of substantial existence” are the same thing but said with different phrases because of historical reasons and so on. Things are anattā because they are temporary, dependent, insusbtantial, empty. The Ābhidhammikas and other philosophers thought that they could narrow “non-self” to something very narrow, and also posit that dhammas can have substantial existence. I think Nāgārjuna was just pointing out that that is the same as what the suttas call an “attā,” but using very detailed philosophical argumentation. Hope to get back to you soon. Also, I have a reference for you that you had asked for!
David Kalupahana’s “Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: Philosophy of the Middle Way” talks about empiricism in terms of Nagarjuna. He also thinks, AFAIK, that Nagarjuna was re-establishing the orthodox view of the suttas. I have only skimmed it though, so I don’t know much about his arguments or specifics.
One of the major criticisms of Kant was that he claimed all we can know are our sense experiences (phenomenon), but that there is a noumenon. This is a contradiction. I feel the Abhidhamma, by which I mean Theravadin, is helpful here. We directly experience cold, sweet, red and sour through the sense doors. From this the mind base constructs the idea “an Apple”. The Apple is a substance which has the characteristics. To Kant, Vedanta, Jainism etc the Apple is real. It’s a substance which persists through time, is ontologically independent of mind and bears the characteristics we experience. In the Dhamma though it’s a mental construct. Being a fabrication of the mind, how can it be mind independent and so real? It can’t be. The same with the atta.
It’s nice to have some agreement since we had a respectful disagreement regarding the nature of Jhana. You asked though why it’s important to understand that even Jupiter is without substance. My reply is because understanding that is to understand that Jupiter is nothing more than the 12 sense bases. In truth Jupiter is a fabrication of mano. Deeper still, Jupiter is there because we take the atta to be there. When we see the atta is just a convention we see that Jupiter is the same. Both can’t be found. The emptiness of self and dhammas go hand in hand. They are the same way of looking at experience. It’s like how seeing anicca, dukkha and anatta or the 4NT is to see the same thing from different aspects. Non duality.
In the Theravadin sub-commentaries they even go as far as saying that whilst there is an emptiness of a self the dhammas themselves have a self of their own.
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The world is, for all purposes, the empty and temporary six senses and their experiences.
Kidding. But basically, my point was pretty much just what you wrote above. I think “anattā” and “empty of substantial existence” are the same thing but said with different phrases because of historical reasons and so on. Things are anattā because they are temporary, dependent, insusbtantial, empty. The Ābhidhammikas and other philosophers thought that they could narrow “non-self” to something very narrow, and also posit that dhammas can have substantial existence. I think Nāgārjuna was just pointing out that that is the same as what the suttas call an “attā,” but using very detailed philosophical argumentation.