Well let’s try Bhante! Can you explain an all outside of six-sense media? Buddha says it’s impossible to to do, and I tend to agree. Not just concerning ourselves with, but literally understanding / experiencing.
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What do you think is here the meaning of the world?
" As he thus dwells contemplating his own body as I body, he becomes perfectly concentrated and perfectly serene. Being thus calm and serene, he gains knowledge and vision externally of the bodies of others. He abides contemplating his own feelings as feelings,. . .he abides contemplating his own mind as mind,. . .he abides contemplating his own mind-objects as mind-objects, earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and having put away all hankering and fretting for the world. (DN18)
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Hi,
Nope, you can’t. But it’s not impossible that there would be such a thing, theoretically speaking.
In other words, I agree that the BUddha is saying “this is ALL you can experience/know”, “this is AL you need to understand”, and so forth. But that’s not exaclty the same as “this is ALL there really is in the entire universe”. The last would be hypothetical metaphysics, the others are practical.
THat’s what I meant. I don’t think we really disagree, just a matter of differetn emphasis.
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(Post must be at least 20 characters.)
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Hi Dogen,
Thanks again for this reference, and sorry I overlooked it earlier when I was just scanning the thread. (In a bit of a rush before a dhamma talk 
.)
I think it’s interesting that this sutta seems to say that the cessation of the world is not the cessation of craving itself. It seems to say craving ceases first. Then later (i.e. when the enlightened one passes away) the world ceases. That is what I was saying as well based on the Pali.
That also aligns with the origin of the world according to this sutta being the craving that leads to future existence, which I derived from a much denser sutta in Pali. (SN12.44, SN35.107)
Maybe you noticed that already, but I thought it was nice to point out.
I’ll look into this a bit further! This is exactly what I was hoping for when asking for feedback before writing a potential definite work! 
PS. I also like emptiness, as you may have realized from my “Englishized” name, from Suñño. 
It was based on that sutta you quoted, SN35.85, so it has special meaning to me:
“‘suñño loko, suñño loko’ti, bhante, vuccati.
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Hi @dogen, as Venerable @sunyo acknowledges in the very last paragraph of his essay sometimes the Teacher did not intend the idiosyncratic definitions but rather the ordinary common meaning of “the world.”
To prevent any possible misunderstandings, I should note that these creative redefinitions of ‘the world’ do not apply across the discourses. The term is used in conventional ways as well. Even Ānanda’s definition at §2 refers twice to the conventional world in the phrase, “that in the world with which you perceive and conceive of the world”. In the Kaccānagotta Sutta too, the expression “most of the world” simply refers to most people in the world.
As I said in my first response this gives away the game. I maintain that the sutta in question did not intend any idiosyncratic meaning. It appears we disagree.
As you acknowledged in another thread, your interpretation is solipsistic which I think is a useful step on the path. It is a close cousin to mind-only interpretations. It seems Venerable @Sunyo also shares an interpretation bending toward the solipsistic. It is useful because it lends itself to sponsoring doubt with regard to the substantial nature of the external world. Unfortunately, it does so while tending to reinforce the internal aka the view of the self. But no true distinction can be made between the internal and external.
I believe there exists a step beyond this on the path that preserves the doubt about external substances but also undermines internal substances and the view of the self. A step beyond where all such distinctions between the internal and external dissolve revealing the illusory and ephemeral nature of all such distinctions. The self of persons is empty and the self of phenomena as well. All is empty of self.
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You can say an apple truly exists. You can say the President of the United States truly exists. You can say a corporation, the Nile River, or any other conventional, dependent, ephemeral, illusory, void, hollow, empty, insubstantial thing truly exists. How you define ‘truly exists’ is up to you.
For me, to ‘truly exist’ means existing in a way that is not conventional, dependent, ephemeral, illusory, void, hollow, empty and insubstantial. That’s why I say you can’t eat a truly existing apple nor that apples truly arise nor truly cease. There is no essence to an apple and the perception of an apple is utterly dependent upon myriad conditions including the perspective - thoroughly shaped by kamma - of the being who perceives (or does not!) the “apple.”
Maybe I’ll ask two questions of you as a follow-up:
- Why must we say that an apple truly exists? What error do you perceive by saying an apple does not truly exist?
- If the goal is to relinquish or give up desire for apples which do you think is more conducive to meeting that goal? Perceiving them as truly existing or not truly existing?
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Not really… I’m just remarking here not to further the discussion, merely to emphasise why the teacher’s explanation in this formula doesn’t reinforce a sense of self:
- World is born of craving. (SN12.44, SN35.107, SA233)
- World is six sense fields. (SA233) / Alternatively, “All” is six sense fields and their contact (SN35.23)
- World is empty. (SN35.85)
- World is wearing away (impermanent, not self, dukkha). (SN35.82)
- Noble Eightfold Path is the way to the cessation of The World. (SN12.44, SN35.107, SA233)
- Existence / Nonexistence is the wrong duality to understand World; Arising/Cessation is the correct duality to understand the world. (SN12.15)
Whenever possible, I do not interject with further explanations or commentaries to obvious and self-explanatory expositions of the teacher. All these bullets are specifically what the suttas say, and I don’t bother to say “it means this” or “that means that”. This is how Loka is explained in the suttas.
With metta. 
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Yes, it is explained in these ways and sometimes used in these ways, but it is also used in the common non-idiosyncratic conventional sense not necessarily in accordance with those explanations. This is acknowledged by Venerable @sunyo in the last paragraph of this essay.
The question is in which sense did the Teacher intend in this particular sutta. I say all of them where no true distinction was intended or implied between the internal and external. The sutta meant to undermine believing in such true distinctions.
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Precisely, which is why you remember my views being closer to soplisticism (in a different discussion) because for that particular discussion, that was closer to these bullets than the alternative. But my true views are completely in line with what I’ve just laid out.
There, however, seems to be an emphasis on inner sense media as The World (especially in SA233 and in some Nikaya suttas), which is an interesting point. Personally, I would even be more on the schizo scale of complete indifference between what’s supposed to be the seer and sight; however, Buddha seems to remark that the capacity of sense media, even without their corresponding external sense contact, is The World. Which is an interesting thing to consider for the implications (many possibilities: textual error, authentic teaching, perhaps a gradual dissipation involves first the disappearance of what seems to be the external contact, then the inner sense media, and then complete cessation).
Anyway, glad we cleared up!
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Hi, Bhante!
Yes, I agree in terms of the suttas. I think atthikavāda and natthikavāda seem to consistently refer to the idea specifically of survival or non-survival after this life. I.e. the idea that there is an afterlife, or there is only this life. I will just mention again though that I don’t think these are the same as atthitā and natthitā. Obviously they’re related. But I think atthitā/natthitā are about the eternal existence (eternalism) or becoming-non-existent (annihilation) of a particular entity. Whereas I think ‘atthikavāda’ is the doctrine (vāda) that the after life exists (atthi), and the opposite for ‘natthikavāda.’ This is different from the extremes of existence and non-existence, or from say the parallel concept in the undeclared points (abyākatavatthū). There, ‘atthi’ and ‘natthi’ have more the sense of existential continuity of a real entity. Not the mere affirmation or negation of rebirth.
This is why I said I agreed more or less with ‘positive teaching.’ I take “the doctrine that [the afterlife] exists” to mean ‘atthi’ in the sense of affirming the conventional existence of the afterlife. But it isn’t taking an eternalist position. Likewise, ‘natthika’ I take to be denying the conventional existence of the afterlife. The reason that this overlaps with annihilationism is therefore not because the opposite is eternalism, but rather because annihilationists also think that there will at some point in time be no afterlife, and natthikavāda inherently believes that there is some existing thing/world which has a substantial end, no matter when that end is. Some annihilationists do or did think there was in afterlife, and in that sense they would reject the materialist natthikavāda (as 6 do in DN 1) but still fall under the wrong view of natthitā. Ajita himself says:
“both the foolish and wise get annihilated and destroyed when their body falls apart, and after death they no longer exist.”
DN 2 (your translation)
Either way, it’s perfectly plausible that “doctrine of survival” and “doctrine of non-survival” is what is intended. I think we could relate this to the “atthi devā?” question, where the Buddha does say that he affirms that gods survive. He just tries to qualify it by specifying that he teaches the gods existence in a way based on conditions, not in an eternal meaning. So again, ‘atthikavāda’ here even in the meaning of ‘survival’ isn’t necessarily the same as ‘atthitā’ in the more philosophical sense, where it specifically means survival of the same entity existing through time, versus the non-existence of an entity that existed before in time (natthitā).
I won’t respond to all of your arguments in favor of natthikavāda meaning just materialist annihilationism because they are “preaching to the choir” as we say. Meaning I already agree with that. I think it makes sense to take Ajita Kesakambali as holding one consistent view, namely, that of materialism/physicalism. He wasn’t necessarily denying social morality based on what he says. He himself seems to have taken on certain vows and precepts! Such as using an ascetic garment. It’s possible he was a moral nihilist, which is one of the Buddha’s critiques of that view. I think the Buddha saw that risk in a view that denies the consequences of actions after life. So if Ajita was an amoralist, I would agree that he must have reached that conclusion based on his more general view that there is no afterlife or fruit of action after this life.
Yes, I think that makes sense.
I’m not set on one interpretation. I think the concepts mentioned there are useful either way in this more general sense. I’m just not sure if the authors were intending a more specific Abhidhamma reference as I’ve heard suggested. Either way, it doesn’t make a difference for our purposes here
I agree it’s confusing and we can’t make quick conclusions. But just a few points:
- As you have argued, I don’t think “all does not exist” is necessarily the best translation.
- The idea that things do exist is not in contrast to natthitā. Annihilationism is the idea that really existing things are annihilated.
So based off of the arguments in the CU that surround the discussion as well (such as the discussion of clay/etc. being existent substances out of which everything is made and back to which they return), this is how I would sum up the arguments there as a mere hypothesis:
- Some people say that all this stuff we see existing arose out of non-existence. That would mean that when the stuff is destroyed, it returns back to non-existence and is annihilated. The core of “the all” is non-existence, not pure true existence. So when things arise and cease, they are created and then destroyed. There is no existing essence in them.
- The teacher rejects this. Instead, he says everything started with existence, and therefore that is the essence of the world. When we see things arise and cease, they aren’g actually being destroyed into non-existence. Actually, it’s more like when you make things out of clay. If you make a figure out of clay, and the figure is destroyed, the clay still exists. In the same way, all the different names and forms of the world really exist, and the appearance of them being created and destroyed is not 100% true. There is an eternal substance (existence) underlying Everything or the universe as one complete, existing Whole.
So again, this would basically fall back to eternalism/annihilationism. It’s clear that in the CU they are arguing for a kind of universal eternalism. So the fact that they reject the non-existence view means it is probably annihilationist. And when I think out his reasoning and arguments, it makes sense to suppose that in their understanding, if everything was based in non-existence, it wouldn’t be able to survive and exist after it appeared to end. So they would conclude it is annihilated. It’s like, rather than everything being made of moldable clay or metal (existence), they are made of dry clay, which is destroyed when it breaks (non-existence).
I would propose a reading of the sutta more like this:
- The All really exists; therefore, the things we see have an eternal nature.
- The All does not really exist; therefore, the things we see will be destroyed when their existence ends.
These extremes are followed by the question (in the suttas) of “oneness” vs. “plurality.” If everything is a oneness or a plurality are also rejected by the Buddha. Which is also a hint that this is about a kind of universal, cosmic metaphysics related to eternal existence or substances.
I think the Buddha redefines ‘sabbaṁ’ to move away from speculation about the metaphysical cosmos, as he does in the undeclared questions. Instead, he is trying to get the brahmin to see that his idea of “the All” is actually just based in conditionally appearing and disappearing sense experiences, and the fact of dependent arising and impermanence means that we cannot pin down some real “All” nor can we say things exist only to return to non-existence/annihilation. Dependent arising steps beyond those notions for the “middle way.”
I may get back to you on the annihilationists in DN 2, Venerable. But just so you know, the commentary and Bhikkhu Bodhi’s introduction discuss how the other six annihilationsits do believe in rebirth. And I think I understand why. Short story: I think they equate the soul with the body, but they differ on which “body” they equate with the soul. Some of them thought the immaterial realms were the soul, it seems. I think when they say ‘break up of the body’ it is just an editing error, or, as the commntary says, it is their own terminology because they don’t thinm the soul is a separate thing, even if the immaterial realms are the fundamental ‘body’ or core that is destroyed.
All the best!
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Adding “inner” and “outer” to the sense fields just puts them into the context of the twelve sense fields. The “inner” sense fields are the six senses that are part of practitioner’s body: the sense organs. The “outer” sense fields are the external objects that are sensed (sights, sounds, etc.). When the six kinds of consciousness are added to this list, we arrive at the eighteen elements or domains of experience.
Inner and outer in Buddhist language generally mean what’s inside a person’s skin and what’s outside of it; so it assumes the point of view of the practitioner. Inner things possessed by other people are also external (another person’s body is an external body rather than an internal body in the four abodes of mindfulness).
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I have seen you in the past write here that it works for you to see things as not truly existent. You become dispassionate. But i think this does not work for me. I cannot see the nice woman form as not truly existent, or an apple, or a nice meal or some landscape that arouses a sense of wonder, or an icecream. It just has no meaning for me. It is to forced for me. I can understand that these signs say a lot about me, but to think that the woman form does not truly exist or an icecream?
The whole idea of truly existent or absolute existent things is strange. They cannot be caused, right? They certaintly cannot exist based upon causes and conditions. And they cannot be compounded things liable to desintegrate. For some reason then they must have always existed and always exist.
Like my 
ignorance. It is really a strange concept.
Sometimes this is seen as the idea of a soul. But the soul , isn’t this created by God in Christianity and can God not destroy the soul if he wishes? If that is all true the idea that atta and soul are alike is not true.
By the way, i am also not so convinced that sakkaya ditthi as tendency really refers to substantialist view. Sujato translates it like that or interprets is that way, but i feel the sutta’s explain it differently.
For example, regarding the body as mine is a sakkaya ditthi. Is that a substantialist view? hmmm??
I believe, sakkaya ditthi is not so philosophical but a mental tendency to form self-images with a structure…this I am, or I am this…
But i also realise, it is close. But i feel, we must prevent seeing Dhamma as philosophy.
Your criterium for truly existend is an ontological one, i think, but i believe phenomenological there are also valid reason to say that something truly exist. For example, i hallucinate and those things i see do not truly exist, but those things i do not hallucinate truly exist.
I also feel that idea of substance is so complicated. Is energy a substance? Can you really arrive at nothing with deep analyses?
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Thank you Venerable. Given the lack of distinction between the inner and outer sense fields in certain schools (and as it popped up with the disccussion with @yeshe.tenley ) it seemed curious to me that SA233 mentions specifically the inner sense base as the world, and I understand this is a very conscious choice in translation whose implications are of great importance and food for thought.
Thanks again for the briefing!
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There’s a couple things that occur to me when reading the OP.
One is that the Sanskrit word āyatana outside of Buddhist phenomenology lit. meant a special place, especially places where rituals were performed. It could refer to the site where a house was built, the location of a sacred fire, or a place where sacrifices were performed, to give a few specific contexts. Buddhists took this word for special places and used to refer to the components of sensory and mental experience. This, I suppose, is why they are often translated as “fields” in English. But understanding this makes it less incongruent to define the “world” as a collection of “places” that are sensory sites or domains. It carries the metaphor of experience as a physical location to completion.
[An interesting side note is that early Chinese translations of āyatana were apparently of different word like S. āyātana that meant an “entry” (入). This was “corrected” in later translations of Sanskrit as “place” (處). SĀ combined these two readings to arrive at “entry place” (入處). These early Chinese translations begs the question as to whether āyatana was really the original word, though the metaphor of the world being a set of āyatanas certain does make its own sense. Perhaps both terms (āyatana and āyātana) were current during a certain period of time.]
Another point I would make is that in ancient times the paradigm of heaven > earth > hell was not so settled as later medieval mythology makes it seem to us today. That is, there were beliefs that heavenly and hellish places could exist on the surface of the earth. The concept of hell as an underworld and a place of punishment was a later development that combined the Greek concept of the underworld with the Indian theory of rebirth and karma. There’s direct evidence of alternative understandings in DA 30’s description of the Buddhist hells, which places these hells not beneath our feet but along the edges of the world. The world was conceived as flat and taking the shape of a wheel, with two massive mountain ranges circling it. The eight major hells were arranged around this perimeter between these mountain ranges, in a valley of perpetual darkness.
The northern continent of Uttarakuru was also described as a strange and heavenly place. Many of the things described as existing there mirror descriptions of the desire realm heavens and the paradise-like world that existed at the beginning of creation, before the devolution of devas into humans.
So, it was perhaps not so outlandish for Rohitassa to consider it possible to find a nirvana-like place by traveling to the ends of the earth. Later on, it would make less sense as these ideas of earth as a purely ordinary place were cemented in popular imaginations.
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There are a myriad of philosophical configurations, putting together various sources and methods of inquiry, that can shortly put this to rest, for now. Broadly, lazily, and crudely, I could approach it like this:
Existence is not a proper property (Hume, et. al.) Existence is not a property that objects possess or lack, but a correspondence between a concept and the world.
Concepts, on the other hand, are bounded logical spaces that extend over time, over mind. For you an apple might be only and always, say, a red edible fruit, sweet or tangy, whatever interest-based form it takes based on personal experience, etc. For a worm, who knows? For someone else an apple might be an object of study. For someone else, merely a product. For yet another person, all of these. Different logical spaces, different boundaries, different levels of perception, different timescales.
For truth, however, the apple is the world: it is the entire logical space extended across all time and all timescales evaluated by all possible sense fields and levels of perception and attention, plus ensuing actions: the apple is the world as is the one who sees it plucks it eats it and turns it into waste and inseparably, both, independent of mind. This includes its possible or eventual nonexistence (or should we say, out of minded-ness). The mother tree, the seed, the chemicals before there were even trees, the future possibilities of one single apple, the apple growing on the tree, the apple rotting on the floor, the rot interrupted by a fridge. And even in this case, the apple is still not a thing. It is, at best, a specter leaving behind a trail of memories and establishing the conditions for more specters leaving more trails.
Now, where does that leave us regarding existence considering the world as such and the concepts as such and the mind as such?
The best we can come up with is the Middle. It does not have “existence” once its emptiness has been realized (no independence from the world and all its aspects and factors, no intrinsic apple-ness), but it does not have non-existence either, for it is indeed rendered before us, fully apprehensible by the senses. And still, the senses are empty, too, aren’t they? They have logical spaces over time, and so on and so forth. This is the world, isn’t it? Empty of cores, just ghosts, never present, never findable. But, luckily for us, at least somewhat fathomable.
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True, but I do believe the research you have cited on ayatana doesn’t include the Aitareya Upanisad or the Taittiriya Samhita, both which use ayatana. Here ayatana is more than simply a dwelling place (seat). It is a divinely allocated place (emergent or manifest) for the strivings of men and gods to obtain their needs and desires (it seems in order to physically manifest).
Aitareya
I-ii-1: They (tad), these divine beings (devatāḥ) abandoned (sṛṣṭā) into the great flood (asminmahatyarṇave), fell upon (prāpatan) him (tam) afflicted with (anvavārjat) hunger and thirst (aśanāyāpipāsābhyām). They said, “Make known (prajānīhi) to us a dwelling place (āyatanam) that has been established (pratiṣṭhitāḥ) for us to eat food (annamadāma).”
I-ii-2: An ox was fetched (gamanayatta) for them. They said, “for us, truly, this is not enough (alam).” A horse was fetched (ashvamanayatta) for them. They said, “for us, truly, this is not enough (alam).”
I-ii-3: A man was fetched (puruṣamānayattā) for them. They said, “Oh!” (bateti), well made (sukritam). Indeed, a man (puruṣaḥ) is well made. They bespoke each into its own dwelling (yathāyatanam), “Enter.”
I-ii-4: Fire (agniḥ), having become (bhūtvā) the power of speech (vāk), entered (prāviśat) the head (mukhaṃ); air (vāyuḥ), having become (bhūtvā) the power of breath (prāṇaḥ), entered (prāviśat) the nostrils; the sun (ādityaḥ), having become (bhūtvā) the power of sight, entered (prāviśat) the eyes; all directions (diśaḥ), having become (bhūtvā) the power of hearing (prāviśat), entered the ears ; herbs and trees, having become (bhūtvā) hairs (as the power of touch), entered (prāviśat) the skin; the moon (cadramāḥ), having become (bhūtvā) mind (manaḥ), entered (prāviśat) the heart (hṛdayam); death (mṛtyuḥ), having become (bhūtvā) descending breath (apāna), entered (prāviśat) the navel (nābhim); water, having become (bhūtvā) semen (retaḥ), entered (prāviśat) the penis (śiśnam).
I-ii-5: To him (puruṣaḥ), hunger and thirst (aśanāyāpipāse) said, “For us too, make provisions (prajānīhi)." He said, "Go into these (etāsu) gods. To divinity (devatā) not of your own (asvā) I apportion (bhajāmi). Inherit together (bhaginyau), in these. For in whatever god an offering (haviḥ) is seized (gṛhyate), hunger and thirst cohere (bhavataḥ).
Taittiriya
In the beginning, this was nothing but playful (salīlam) waters (āpo). Prajāpati becoming wind in her moved. He saw her, and becoming a boar, he seized her. She, becoming Visvakarma, he spread. She extended and became the earth. Hence the earth is called the extended.
In her (earth) Prajāpati made effort. He produced the gods, the Vasus, Rudras and Adityas. The gods said to Prajāpati, ‘Let us have offspring.’ He said, ‘As I created you by sacrifice, so you too must seek offspring in sacrifice.’ He gave to them Agni as a dwelling place (āyatana), saying, ‘Strive with that dwelling place (āyatana).’
They strove with Agni as a dwelling place (āyatana). After a year they produced one cow. They gave it to the Vasus, Rudras, and Adityas, saying ‘Guard it.’ The Vasus, Rudras, and Adityas guarded it. It produced for each, the Vasus, Rudras, and Adityas, three hundred and thirty-three. Thus she (the waters) became the thousandth.
The gods said to Prajāpati, ‘Cause sacrifice to be made to us with a thousand.’ He caused sacrifice to be made by the Vasus with the Agniṣṭoma (fire sacrifice). They won this world and gave (the thousandth). He caused sacrifice to be made by the Rudras with the Ukthya (praise). They won the atmosphere and gave (the thousandth). He caused sacrifice to be made by the Adityas with the Atiratra (night sacrifice). They won yonder world, and gave (the thousandth).
So then, the atmosphere was broken. Therefore the Rudras are murderous, for they have no dwelling place (āyatana). And so they say, 'The mid-most day of the three-day night is not fixed, for it was moved."
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Yep, not everything works for everyone. Mileage may vary. The words I use often seem interpreted by others as overly philosophical or technical, but I try to keep it real. In the end giving up desire and grasping and craving is the test.
You say it doesn’t work for you to see that the woman form is not truly existing or icecream is truly existing. But why do you push back? Why do you think it important to defend the true existence of these things? Why do you keep returning to defending otherwise when I say they don’t truly exist? Maybe examine this?
Ah! So if you accept that an apple does not truly exist, then you are afraid you’ll be forced to accept that hallucinations and an apple have the same kind of existence - !not true existence! - that is to say you’re afraid it leads to losing a grasp on reality? If you say an illusion is not truly existing and an apple is not truly existing, then you’re forced to accept that an apple and an illusion are on the same groundless footing??
Why? A banana tree has no core. You peel it back layer after layer and you’ll find no core. An illusion has no core. It is easy to see that the President of the United States is just a convention with no substance behind it. What is so complicated about this?
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@Dogen This discussion has moved on since my previous post and so I won’t dwell on the matter, save to respond to two points that you raised.
In my first three sentences I was merely being economical with words. By “the world existing”, I was referring to sights, sounds, smells, etc… “Means” was referring eyes, ears, nose, etc… “Experience” was referring to eye consciousness, ear consciousness, etc… I am sure you agree that these three come together. I apologise if this was a source of confusion.
The second point is that you say,
In fact, beings associated with the nevasannanasannayatana realm have no “mental formations” and no mind base. The Cittas are Vipaka. The Cetasika are temporarily suspended. This does not fit the model of the world of humans and this is point I was trying to make by saying that “world” in its complete sense - not just as it applies to humans - is the meaning referred to in the sutta. This is why I say that Loka/Sankhata Dhatu, or the World, is everything that Nibbana/Asankhata Dhatu is not.
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One thing led to another; I was actually looking for info on monks being allowed to draw. Food for thought? Time for a breather?
AN 10.69
Blockquote
I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying in Savatthi at Jeta’s Grove, Anathapindika’s monastery. Now at that time a large number of monks, after the meal, on returning from their alms round, had gathered at the meeting hall and were engaged in many kinds of bestial topics of conversation:…
… tales of diversity, the creation of the world & of the sea; talk of whether things exist or not.
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