These are textual analyses, which are inherently intellectual.
That’s what I do here on SuttaCentral: analyzing suttas. If you (or others) are interested in a more practical approach, that’s what I tend to do in in-person situations, such as talks and retreats. Becuase I think it doesn’t work as well in a written medium, especially not an internet board.
To me, I can read a dozen books on meditation and the practical development of insight, but one personally addressed statement directly from a person who has such insights, is much more valuable than that, on all levels. So that’s what I hope to effectuate in others as well.
In contrast, when people try to explain technical sutta details and translatoins of Pāli in person, I tend to get confused. This is better done in writing, in my opinion.
I hope that explains it, not only for this essay but also future posts I make here. Because I would love it if you’d stop keep questioning me for only having theories.
Anyway, the last bit of my above reply to Vaddha may be of interest. At least you’ll see that I don’t think insight is intellectual. If from your perspective my views can only be intellectual, so be it, and that’s fine. But that’s not my actual point of view. I’m probably just as critical of an intellectual approach to actual insight as you are.
However, to get back on topic, I don’t think through insight we can know what certain words mean, what the Buddha meant by “the world”. Because these are ancient texts in ancient languages, with many implications, and we first of all have to understand them intellectually before we turn them into practice.
So let’s get back to the topic. My question is still there if you’re interested in answering it.
Also, again, this topic is not about nibbāna but about ‘the world’. It would be cool if not every thread turned into a discussion on nibbāna. That’s so boring!
I think the question is relevant to the overall topic regarding ”the world & khandhas” and how the immersion in question can only be attained thanks to Dependent Origination.
That is why I thought it was relevant, but we can avoid the whole ”nature of nibbāna thing”.
What I wanted to highlight was more the khandhas in relation to the world (with sutta quotes regarding Nibbāna contrasting this ) But the focus is still on the world/khandhas and DO
‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” - MN 136
This attainment, where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all, is only possible thanks to Dependent Origination.
The point is, without DO one is pretty much forced to side with any of the prevailing views be it: eternalism/annihilation, plurality/unity, mind-body the same or separate, all exists/ all does not exist and so on = ”Most of the world is stuck because it is attracted to things, takes them up, and adheres to them.” - SN 12.15
The Buddha refutes eternalism, partial-eternalism and annihilationism like this:
Having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, their unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is emancipated through non-clinging.
Now the immersion in AN 10.6 I asked about ends with the following:
It is in this way, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu could obtain such a state of concentration that he would not be percipient…of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in relation to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; of this world in relation to this world; of the other world in relation to the other world, but he would still be percipient.”
I thought it was a very relevant question if we now take into consideration: ”The World & The Khandhas”.
You wrote the following about how this perception is a reflection:
Yet the sutta says:
he would not be percipient of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in relation to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception
So that can only imply the reflection/perception being truly beyond this state and not in relation to it in any way.
And it also says:
he would not be percipient of this world in relation to this world; of the other world in relation to the other world.
This also suggests the reflection/perception is beyond all worlds.
The world is for the most part shackled by attraction, grasping, and insisting.
But if—when it comes to this attraction, grasping, mental fixation, insistence, and underlying tendency—you don’t get attracted, grasp, and commit to the notion ‘my self’, you’ll have no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is just suffering arising, and what ceases is just suffering ceasing. Your knowledge about this is independent of others.
When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for craving?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a condition for craving?’ you should answer, ‘Feeling is a condition for craving.’ - DN 15
‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” - MN 136
“Reverends, extinguishment is bliss! Extinguishment is bliss!”
When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But Reverend Sāriputta, what’s blissful about it, since nothing is felt?”
“The fact that nothing is felt is precisely what’s blissful about it.
The following sutta is about neither getting rid of nor accumulating the khandhas, but still remaining after getting rid of them:
They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’
This is called a mendicant who neither gets rid of things nor accumulates them, but remains after getting rid of them. They neither give things up nor grasp them, but remain after giving them up. They neither discard things nor amass them, but remain after discarding them. They neither dissipate things nor get clouded by them, but remain after dissipating them.
And what things do they neither get rid of nor accumulate, but remain after getting rid of them? They neither get rid of nor accumulate form, but remain after getting rid of it. They neither get rid of nor accumulate feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, but remain after getting rid of it.
And what things do they neither give up nor grasp, but remain after giving them up? They neither give up nor grasp form, but remain after giving it up. They neither give up nor grasp feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, but remain after giving it up.
And what things do they neither discard nor amass, but remain after discarding them? They neither discard nor amass form, but remain after discarding it. They neither discard nor amass feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, but remain after discarding it.
And what things do they neither dissipate nor get clouded by, but remain after dissipating them? They neither dissipate nor get clouded by form, but remain after dissipating it. They neither dissipate nor get clouded by feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, but remain after dissipating it.
When a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and the Progenitor worship them from afar:
‘Homage to you, O thoroughbred!
Homage to you, supreme among men!
We don’t understand
the basis of your absorption.’”
So since DO is such a deep teaching that one can’t grasp in a logical/intellectual sense, we truly don’t know what cessation actually implies in relation to the world and the khandhas.
I don’t think we have any fundamental disagreements about this topic of the ‘world.’ I really just wanted to highlight some things I felt could be expressed with more balance (IMHO) so as to not lose the forest for the trees. But all in all, I don’t take issue with your general points
Yes
Makes sense This is probably part of what may have seemed to be disagreement. This part of the writing may have just had heavier emphasis on certain topics to the exclusion of others which are otherwise covered in different essays/chapters. Like I said, for me it was more a matter of phrasing and emphasis and so on which could lead to a less nuanced reading, not the main point.
Here we may disagree, though I’m not 100% convinced of one particular reading yet. But since you said we could discuss some of this here, I’ll mention a few points. Here is the relevant reference:
“Moreover, since there actually is (atthi) another world, their view that there is no other world (‘natthi paro loko’) is wrong view. […]
“Regardless, that individual is still criticized by sensible people in the present life as being an immoral individual of wrong view, a nihilist (natthikavādo). […]
“ Moreover, since there actually is another world, their view that there is another world (‘atthi paro loko’) is right view. […]
“ Regardless, that individual is still praised by sensible people in the present life as being a moral individual of right view, who affirms a positive teaching (atthikavādo).”
MN 60
I just don’t read this as talking about eternalism. The Buddha directly says that there actually does exist another world, i.e. the view of ‘atthi.’ There seems to be a clear correspondence between “natthi paro loko” and ‘natthikavāda’ versus “atthi paro loko” and ‘atthikavāda.’ I think Ven. Sujato’s translation “positive teaching” seems more or less correct, though I don’t think I’d phrase it exactly that way myself. Regardless, the point seems to be that they say the afterlife, kamma, etc. exist, and others say these things don’t exist. Similar to the atheist/theist meaning of nāstika/āstika, it seems relative to what people say exists or doesn’t. Notice too how Bhante Sujato translates the negative doctrine as “nihilism.” ‘Nihilism’ is basically a more or less literal rendering of ‘natthikavāda’ etymologically speaking. And just like ‘natthikavāda,’ ‘nihilism’ doesn’t always have the same meaning across contexts.
A “nihilist” is someone who rejects or denies some thing. A moral nihilist denies morality. A social nihilist might deny social convention. It also holds general connotations as being someone who rejects religious teachings and more affirmative doctrines. In the most broad sense, the fundamental religious doctrine people ‘believe in’ or not across cultures is perhaps the afterlife. Especially according to the context of the suttas.
On the other hand, the sutta clearly says ‘atthikavāda’ is right view, and it doesn’t say anything about an immortal self or eternal substance. It just affirms that e.g. rebirth is real. I just don’t think it makes much sense to take SN 12.15 as saying that someone with right view doesn’t believe that there is an afterlife and karma, nor do they deny the afterlife. I take it as denying annihilation and eternalism in regards to the afterlife, which is unambiguously accepted, and so in this sense ‘atthikavāda’ would remain.
MN 117 is believed to be an Abhidhamma influenced text which is talking about the supramundane path-moment that arises when people reach a certain attainment in Abhidhamma analysis. So I don’t think it is saying that the atthikavāda view is partially wrong view. I think it’s just saying it’s not the same as the right view that arises when somebody reaches an attainment, because their view would obviously be more than belief in rebirth. I think you would agree that the four noble truths don’t correct a mistaken general belief in rebirth! I think ‘with defilements…’ etc. is saying that before a noble attainment the person will be stuck in samsāra with defilements, but receive the mundane merit of practicing the factors of the path. Not that the view itself is defiled per se. Otherwise, the right intention, right speech, right action etc. would all be ‘defiled’ as well!
Just to clarify, I wouldn’t disagree! My example before about how the senses ceasing would be indirect was not to deny the possibility of the knowledge of ending. Just that when the sutta talks about the arising/ceasing of the world, I don’t read it as exclusively referring to future lives. It was more a bridge to turn to the topic of sense experience in relation to the sense faculties, rather than denying the distinction between them. SN 12.32 also discusses the arahant’s (Sāriputta) knowledge of ending via dependent origination
I assumed you would probably agree with that train of thought. I was just drawing it out so you could see the reasoning for some of my feedback. But either way, I don’t think we have disagreements on these points! And I assume you’ll have other writings on other aspects of the topic, just not in this particular section on the meaning of ‘the world,’ which makes perfect sense.
Interesting metaphor! The suttas give the simile of a well, as you know.
The only confusion I have here is that it doesn’t make sense to say blind or deaf people have “the general power or ability” to see or hear. They don’t; that’s why they’re called blind/deaf. (Taking the more strict and narrow sense of ‘blind/deaf’ here, not the capital letter sense of people in the Blind/Deaf community who may still see or hear to some extent). To me, the passage in the Indriyabhāvanā Sutta is more talking about the eye organ, or saying that their faculty of vision doesn’t work. I don’t read it as saying they still have vision, which would seem contradictory.
I think I’d disagree, not that I’m an expert on Ven. Nāgārjuna’s writings. But the notion of ‘absolute existence’ is just eternalism, and ‘absolute nonexistence’ is annihilationism. He says as much in his treatise. I don’t take it that he was highlighting a different concept; rather, he was applying ‘eternalism’ and ‘annihilationism’ to Buddhist theories at the time. Most Buddhists would probably deny being intentional eternalists or annihilationists because the Buddha said these are wrong views. So Nāgārjuna was pointing out that, if they looked closer, (later) Buddhist theories can also fall into the same errors.
DN 1 for example talks about partial eternalism where some aspects (body) are taken to be impermanent, but others (mind) are taken to be permanent. I also checked the commentary to DN 1 on annihilationism which confirmed my initial reading of the text: when it says ‘break up of the body,’ I think it is meant to refer to the passing away of the self in each respective realm; not a one-lifetime annihilation (apart from the first annihilationist view, which limits the self to the material human one). This is also what the commentary says. So this could be called a form of ‘partial annihilationism’ maybe, given that they believe in survival after death to a certain extent, but they also think that eventually the self can be annihilated. Bhikkhu Bodhi writes about this in his introduction to his book on DN 1 as well.
I think we could say Nāgārjuna was generally accusing people of partial eternalism/annihilationism. They might not have held that everything was ultimately a manifestation of eternal brahman. But they held that certain aspects of the world were eternal or annihilated.
One important note, as I think you’re aware, is that the discussion of ‘the All’ is not in any parallels to SN 12.15 AFAIK. Not that it is problematic in the Pāli, but we shouldn’t necessarily read it as a view of “most of the world,” because that passage seems more to apply to the atthitā/natthitā distinction. Where we do see the extremes related to the All come up is SN 12.47 and SN 12.48, both of which are specifically in conversation with brahmins:
“Mister Gotama, does all exist?”
“‘All exists’: this is the oldest cosmology, brahmin.”
“Then does all not exist?”
“‘All does not exist’: this is the second cosmology.”
SN 12.48
The passage from SN 12.47 is identical minus the names to SN 12.15, so it’s possible it was copied over because of the related idea. Both make the distinction between the All/the world and existence/non-existence. And as you point out, ‘the All’ is generally synonymous with ‘the world’ in the Buddhist sense.
I think what’s unique about SN 12.48 is that it says ‘all exists’ is ‘the oldest cosmology,’ and it is (again) specifically in dialogue with a brahmin cosmologist. So someone who speculates on metaphysics and science and so on, presumably, like some Greek philosophers.
For sure. ‘Sarva’ is frequently referenced in the Upanisads. I don’t know about its older uses in older Vedic literature. But clearly at the time of the Buddha it held this more metaphysical and spiritual meaning in these contexts, and his redefinition of it seems to be in dialogue with that.
You should re-read Chapter 6 of the Chāndogya Upanisad, especially the first ~4 sections (it’s pretty short). ‘Idam’ is often shorthand for ‘idam sarvam’ or ‘this world,’ as is expressed in the translation. They say that some people maintain the world is from non-existence, and instead they defend it is from existence. They also have similes about an underlying substance for existence, precisely what I’d say the Buddha critiqued as the first view in DN 1 for example. Because it’s a form of eternalism which accounts for change as happening to or within an underlying eternal substance. For the Buddha, change is taken empirically to negate substance. Rather than say that rebirth, for example, is the same underlying existence taking different shapes, names, and appearances, he focuses specifically on the impermanent and ephemeral nature of the process to deny the view of existence/eternalism/substance.
The Buddha’s focus on sense experience negates metaphysical speculation about things behind conditional appearance. That serves as a refutation to the views that things are eternal or annihilated.
Personally, as may be clear from above, I’m not convinced of this translation. Mostly because I think the Buddha was clearly engaging in a specific philosophical dialogue with views at the time, and I don’t think these views were just about whether a being survives or is annihilated. The Whole or All existing is something more sophisticated than that, as is clear from the discussion in the Chāndogya Upanisad.
This same speculation seems to have captivated ancient philosophers. The Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides (who probably preceded the Buddha by a bit of time) also thought that ‘All exists (eternally; pure being)’ was true, and that the change we perceive with our senses was how things “seemed.” And of course to this day, metaphysicians/cosmologists debate these points, some still arguing that there is an underlying eternal reality, others arguing for some kind of annihilation.
Hope this is of help in your writing. All the best, Venerable.
I think you are misunderstanding something fundamental here Bhante. What is true of “us” is true of all conditioned things. What is true of the atta substance is true for all other substances as well, namely they can’t be found. There are no such things. The first fetter to be given up is that of the aggregates being substantial, truly existing, real. That applies to rupa too.
What’s the point of the teaching on the aggregates? That what we take to be a substantial self isn’t so. Rather what we take to be real is relative to the other aggregates, dependent.
"No store of broken states, no future stock; Those born balance like seeds on needle points. Breakup of states is foredoomed at their birth; Those present decay, unmingled with those past. They come from nowhere, break up, nowhere go; Flash in and out, as lightning in the sky"
Niddesa
"Like a tiny drop of dew, or a bubble floating in a stream; Like a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, Or a flickering lamp, an illusion, a phantom, or a dream. So is all conditioned existence to be seen."
And why do they believe that? Because at a deeper level they have taken one or more of the aggregates to be real, independent, substantial. That’s the root of the problem. Thinking if you exist or not after death is a view which grows from that fundamental error. Once that error is corrected then those views no longer arise, and one won’t see nibbana as an eternal something or an eternal nothingness. Cessation after all is merely a convention. It only applies to sense experience
“When an iron bar is struck by heat and flame the heat gradually dissipates, and where it has gone no-one knows.
In the same way for the rightly released, who have crossed the flood of sensual bonds, and attained unshakable happiness, where they have gone cannot be found.”
It could be the Kena Upsanisad was either already formed or in formation around the time of Buddha. It is also a principal Upanisad, so it is a good one to look at in relation to these discussions.
I don’t understand your overall point, I’m afraid. I would’ve rephrased it and ask if I got it right, but to be frank I don’t even have a hunch… I think you’re insinuating a bit too much and it would be helpful if you were more direct about it. If you’d like to clarify, please bring it back up again in the topic on that perception instead of here. (A paradoxical perception in the Pāli discourses?)
As to this quote, I think I do understand. And I disagree with the first part (intellect) but would disagree with the second. The aim of Buddhism is clearly to have actual knowledge of cessation. The Kaccanagotta sutta says that as well, to have “knowledge independent of others” (and independent of the intellect too).
@Sunyo If you really want to understand what “Loko” means in this context, you have to understand the first part if the first sentence. Duality is not restricted to the human realm. Duality means Sammuti. So, in this case, “Loko” is the same a Loka Dhatu. It is all encompassing. It is everything the singularity of Nibbana, or Asankhata, is not.
You’ve proposed a thesis that the proper understanding of the Kaccanagotta sutta includes a definition of ‘the world’ that is found in other suttas. Based upon this you said:
by ‘the world’ the Buddha meant not only what is perceived through the senses, but primarily the senses themselves. It refers to the entire being, in other words, not just its experiences.
That is - in your view - the Kaccanagotta sutta is about the origin and cessation of ‘the entire being’ aka a person, an individual, a human being. I disagree and that’s why I said that your essay, “seems inextricably tied up with a view of the self.”
Yes, I understand what you mean, but I disagree.
Agreed.
Perhaps, but I don’t think so. You’re proposing that we narrow the meaning of ‘the world’ in the Kaccanagotta sutta to a particular idiosyncratic meaning found in other sutta, but I don’t think that would be correct nor wise. The focus of the Kaccanagotta sutta should not be on the person, the individual, the being, the self … even if its a conventional self as opposed to an ultimate self. The sutta is about the world and everything in it and not just the person.
Good question. Yes, I’ll bite the bullet. I think ‘the world’ in the sutta was using the common non-idiosyncratic definition of the world. In fact, I’d say that ‘the world’ in the sutta should be understood as encompassing all the relevant definitions, both idiosyncratic and otherwise.
To put it as plainly as I can, I think the sutta is talking about the inadequacy of all these meanings of ‘the world’ and everything in it; they don’t point to substantive things that could be said to exist (arise) or to not exist (cease).
When you directly see the non substantive arising of [insert any dependent phenomena] with right understanding you won’t have the notion that it can substantively cease. When you directly see the non substantive cessation of [insert any dependent phenomena] with right understanding won’t have the notion that it ever substantively arose.
Samsara and the beings in it are imprisoned by the deeply etched habit thinking that [insert any dependent phenomena] truly arises and then truly ceases; aka substantive / ontological / delusional thinking. Upon giving up this delusional thinking utterly, there is no longer any basis for finding any essence or substance in [insert any dependent phenomena]. Thinking otherwise provides the condition for just suffering arising and suffering ceasing.
[insert any dependent phenomena] is just a thoroughly dependent thing that is ephemeral, illusory, void, hollow, non-substantive and thus utterly unworthy of any desire, clinging, grasping whatsoever.
I suspect where we disagree is that for you the self of persons is the focus and that this self of persons is not a substantive thing and you think the kaccanagotta sutta is speaking only about the self of persons with regard to existence or inexistence. However, I think the sutta is talking about both the self of persons and the self of phenomena with regard to existence and inexistence.
Why must something exist in an absolute manner to say it truly exist? If i eat a truly existing apple, then it is truly not-existing anymore afterwards. The apple also has truly arisen, otherwise it would not exist and i was not able to eat it.
I think we’re paraphrasing and extrapolating something Buddha explains explicitly.
Luckily for us, Buddha explains things thoroughly in certain passages.
SN35.82 is our entrance:
“Sir, they speak of this thing called ‘the world’. How is the world defined?”
“It wears away, mendicant, that’s why it’s called ‘the world’. And what is wearing away? The eye is wearing away. Sights … eye consciousness … eye contact is wearing away. The painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by eye contact is also wearing away.
The ear … nose … tongue … body … The mind … ideas … mind consciousness … mind contact is wearing away. The painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact is also wearing away.
It wears away, mendicant, that’s why it’s called ‘the world’.”
Let’s take a look at World Sutta, Lokasutta SN12.44 (as well as SN35.107):
“And what, mendicants, is the origin of the world? Eye consciousness arises dependent on the eye and sights. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. Feeling is a condition for craving. Craving is a condition for grasping. Grasping is a condition for continued existence. Continued existence is a condition for rebirth. Rebirth is a condition for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be. This is the origin of the world.
Ear consciousness arises dependent on the ear and sounds. … Nose consciousness arises dependent on the nose and smells. … Tongue consciousness arises dependent on the tongue and tastes. … Body consciousness arises dependent on the body and touches. … Mind consciousness arises dependent on the mind and ideas. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. … Rebirth is a condition for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be. This is the origin of the world.
And what is the ending of the world? Eye consciousness arises dependent on the eye and sights. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. Feeling is a condition for craving. When that craving fades away and ceases with nothing left over, grasping ceases. When grasping ceases, continued existence ceases. … That is how this entire mass of suffering ceases. This is the ending of the world.
Ear consciousness arises dependent on the ear and sounds. … Nose consciousness arises dependent on the nose and smells. … Tongue consciousness arises dependent on the tongue and tastes. … Body consciousness arises dependent on the body and touches. … Mind consciousness arises dependent on the mind and ideas. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for feeling. Feeling is a condition for craving. When that craving fades away and ceases with nothing left over, grasping ceases. When grasping ceases, continued existence ceases. … That is how this entire mass of suffering ceases. This is the ending of the world.”
Iti112 explains deeper, linking World to Suffering:
“Mendicants, the world has been understood by the Realized One; and he is detached from the world. The origin of the world has been understood by the Realized One; and he has given up the origin of the world. The cessation of the world has been understood by the Realized One; and he has realized the cessation of the world. The practice that leads to the cessation of the world has been understood by the Realized One; and he has developed the practice that leads to the cessation of the world."
This is further explained in SA233 (perhaps @cdpatton can explain precisely the chinese of “What is the world? It’s the six inner sense fields”):
It was then that the Bhagavān told the monks, “Now, I will discuss the world, the world’s formation, the world’s cessation, and the path to the world’s cessation. Listen closely, and well consider it!”
“What is the world? It’s the six inner sense fields. What are the six? The inner sense field of the eye … ear … nose … tongue … body … the inner sense field of the mind.
“What is the world’s formation? It’s craving, delight, and greed for a future existence. Those things are attached to its formation.
“What is the world’s cessation? There’s craving, delight, and greed for a future existence. The attachment of those things to its formation is stopped without remainder. Having been abandoned, rejected, and ended, then one is free of desire, and it ceases, stops, and disappears.
“What is the path to the world’s cessation? It’s the eightfold path, which is right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right method, right mindfulness, and right samādhi.”
After the Buddha spoke this sūtra, the monks who heard what the Buddha taught rejoiced and approved.
And for fans of suññata, this should be a delight in SN35.85:
Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One … and said to him: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘Empty is the world, empty is the world.’ In what way, venerable sir, is it said, ‘Empty is the world’?”
“It is, Ānanda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to self that it is said, ‘Empty is the world.’ And what is empty of self and of what belongs to self? The eye, Ānanda, is empty of self and of what belongs to self. Forms are empty of self and of what belongs to self. Eye-consciousness is empty of self and of what belongs to self. Eye-contact is empty of self and of what belongs to self…. Whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—that too is empty of self and of what belongs to self.
“It is, Ānanda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to self that it is said, ‘Empty is the world.’”
Buddha is explicit on a few things:
The world is born of contact (DO), world ends with the ending of contact / DO.
World is six inner sense fields (all possible chinese translations talk about this inner six sense fields specifically).
World is empty.
World is wearing away (impermanent, not self, dukkha).
Noble Eightfold Path is the way to the cessation of The World.
Existence / Nonexistence is the wrong duality to understand the World; Arising/Cessation is the correct duality to understand the world.
So, talking about “Person’s Experience” or “World and everything in it” outside of contact, trying to understand Loka in any other way is a mistake - Origin of the world is the contact itself, Loka is specifically the inner sense fields according to chinese sources, and with N8P and nibbāna comes the end of the world, which is a desirable thing. There’s apparently not a distinction of world existing outside of contact from the inner sense fields. This contact itself is the origin of the world.
Perhaps it would be fruitful to base all the discussions here on these explicit criteria. There’s no reason to assume Loka in Kaccānagotta Sutta is anything outside of these definitions.
Which is why, for example, we have Buddha and monks discussing with devas, brahmas, centaurs, and there’s never a distinction made between imaginary or personal or real/unreal, but whenever there’s contact, there’s the world, which is to be discarded entirely.
The world exists. Means to experience the world exist. Experiences of the world exist via those means.
This is all true and explained wonderfully by the Lord Buddha. However, the context of the “world” in many of the quoted text is that the Lord Buddha was explaining to humans what is their world but NOT THE world. (The same is true of DO, for example. The classic DO explanation does not apply non-human beings.) If this were not the case, then beings that did not possess six senses, basically any being outside of the Kamaloka, would be free of the world. I am sure that the Lord Buddha did not teach that Arupaloka beings are free of the world because they have no senses.
So, the meaning of the “World” in the Kaccanagotta Sutta should not be viewed in the light of other Suttas but in the light of what is duality, which is where the sutta starts.
Citations from the nikayas/agamas? These sound like inferences.
As I explain later in the post World arises and ceases as a process; it doesn’t exist/notexist as an object. And as we see in the examples, World arises depending on contact; it ceases depending on uprooting the conditions for contact.
This is a big proposition, certainly needs a sensible proof, which I doubt exists in the suttas. There’s no reason to assume Loka means anything other than Loka anywhere in the suttas.
“All” and “World” is six-sense media.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all.
“If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” SN35.23
Loka and Sabba link in SN22.90:
“All exists”: this is one extreme.
Sabbamatthīti kho, kaccāna, ayameko anto.
“All does not exist”: this is the second extreme.
Sabbaṁ natthīti ayaṁ dutiyo anto.
So, what is Sabba, Loka? It’s explicitly six inner sense fields (according to Agamas), the suffering born of contact - that is all The World there is.
As for arupa realms - there’s still mental formations in formless realms, which is the mind base.
~
We’ve established that Buddha is explicit on a few things:
The world is born of contact (DO), world ends with the ending of contact / DO.
World is six sense fields (all chinese translations talk about inner six sense fields specifically, so the faculty of eye with or without sight).
World is empty.
World is wearing away (impermanent, not self, dukkha).
Noble Eightfold Path is the way to the cessation of The World.
Existence / Nonexistence is the wrong duality to understand the World; Arising/Cessation is the correct duality to understand the world.
I will explain the 6th point here:
Carrying on from my last post, let’s look at the chinese parallels, SA301:
One who rightly sees and knows, as it really is, the arising of the world, does not hold to the non-existence of the world. One who rightly sees and knows, as it really is, the cessation (passing away) of the world, does not hold to the existence of the world.
Again in SA 262:
’Kaccāna, rightly contemplating the arising of the world as it really is, one will not give rise to the view of the non-existence of the world. Rightly contemplating the cessation of the world as it really is, one will not give rise to the view of the existence of the world."
Arising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world.
The most important thing here seems to be the atthitañceva and natthitañca. I think an explicit aim of these suttas, is not the duality itself, but the duality of presence/non-presence, survival/extinction and su, as understood by a view of the world which contains Attas, souls, things that are and destroyed, in contrast to the duality of Samudo/Nirodha.
There are no things that exist or otherwise, but there are processes that arise and cease: No eternal presence or complete annihilation, just a flow of actions dependently originated.
But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. Lokasamudayaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti.
And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of existence regarding the world. Lokanirodhaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti.
The verbs are the important part: Loka is not something that natthitā or atthitā, but it’s something samudayaṁ and nirodhaṁ. The duality of Atthitā/Natthitā is wrong; the duality or Samuda/Nirodha is correct.
I think I agree with what you say but with the caveat that the “things” we need to understand is limited to the six senses, not all things.
Interested which suttas exactly you’re referring to here? In SN12.2 the sense fields of Dpendent Arising are also defined as the inner faculties speifically.
I also see no fundamental disagreements. Even textually we mostly agree, it seems. Now we’re just fiddling in the remaining margins.
You bring up some good points, some of which I will have to consider again later. Especially a good point on atthikavāda. I agree that it is not exactly equal to eternalism. I wrote that too hastily. It should be considered, in MN60 at least, as a wider notion of survival that doesn’t necessarily entail eternalism. Though it might inadvertently include eternalism too.
But I would still maintain that atthikavāda is specifically a doctrine of survival, not a “positive teaching”. Likewise, natthikavāda is the doctrine of nonsurvival specifically, not nihilism.
The latter is also true for the similar view of materialist Ajita Kesakambala in DN2, which is just summed up by the king Ajātasattu as “I was taught annihilationism.” Here’s my tentative translation, with some explanatory brackets:
Ajita Kesakambala said to me: “Your Majesty, nothing is really offered, sacrificed, or oblated [to the other world]. There are no [postmortem] fruits or results of good and bad deeds. There is no hereafter. One’s mother and father will no longer exit. There are no [spontaneously?] reborn beings. There are no attained and practiced renunciants and brahmins in the world who say there is a hereafter after seeing so for themselves with special powers. A person consists only of the four elements. After they die, the earth [of their body] returns to the general mass of earth, the water to the general mass of water, the fire to the general mass of fire, and the air to the general mass of air, and the faculties pass into the void. Four men carry the dead person on a bier. The eulogies are only heard as far as the cremation ground [i.e. not by the dead]. Only bleached bones will remain. The idea of offerings [to the dead] is formulated by idiots: oblations just turn to ashes. When anyone teaches a doctrine of survival (atthikavāda), it is just baseless, false nonsense: both the foolish and wise get annihilated and destroyed when their body falls apart, and after death they no longer exist.”
So, venerable sir, when I asked Ajita Kesakambala about a fruit of the renunciant life which is visible in this life, he answered by explaining annihilation.
Since Ajita goes into so much detail explaining materialism and the nonexistence of an afterlife, I would argue all his specific statements (on karma, offerings, etc) must be directly related to this, not to general moral nihilism or alike. Just like the views of the other spiritual leaders in the sutta, his statements form one big coherent set of views, not a disjointed set of various types of nihilism. Otherwise also, why would Ajātasattu sum it up the way he did?
I can’t really argue the details now, but just to give some quick ideas:
The denial of results of karma specifically concern post-mortem results. (A parallel at SA154 instead says: “There is no arising in good realms or arising in bad realms as the result of deeds.”)
The denial of what is offered refers to offerings going to the gods and ancestors, as well as the idea that food given to holy people was stored up in the afterlife for the donor, i.e. merit. These don’t exist. So it concerns results of offering in the afterlife. Later Buddhists of course thought it was denying Buddhist ideas of merit. But it’s specifically denying a more common worldview of the time, that the Vedas, which was all tied up in spiritual offerings. (As it uses very specific Vedic terms like yiṭṭhaṁ and hutaṁ. Which by the way refers to the thing offered, not to the act of offering—obscured in some translations. Saying “oblations just turn to ashes”, which sums up this view, means that they don’t go to another world. Also, what kind of person would even say there literarily are no offerings in the entire world?)
Denial of another world just means denial of an afterlife.
Denial of this world should be taken as part of the denial of the other world. It’s part of the entire two-world theory (here and hereafter) that is denied. (I freely translate it as “hereafter” mainly because that’s what this theory practically comes down to.)
Denial of the existence of mother and father means they don’t exist after death. (Since natthi can refer to the future. It could maybe also be a reference to the pitrs (ancestors) of the Vedas, lit. Fathers.) (Of the various views of Ajita this one is the most problematic for my thesis, because my future interpretation of atthi is admittedly a bit free in this case. But then, everybody struggles with it. I don’t find any other suggestion more convincing, including the one of the commentaries.)
It seems clear to me that the non-supramundane right view of MN117 (“there is another world, etc.”) is just a reversed phrasing of a shorter version of this annihilationist doctrine (“there is no other world, etc.”). This non-supramundane right view I’m convinced was formed with the specific intent to oppose materialism and all it entailed. Not in MN117 specifically, but in the canon at large.
The same would then also be true for the right view of MN60, which is phrased the same and is indeed said to be “directly opposed” to the other view. It is also addressed to people who are on the fence between the opposing doctrines of “some recluses and brahmins”, making them pick a position on this dilemma, so that it leads to right practice. It doesn’t exactly explain ultimate right view. (As you say, true right view entails much more.) It just emphasizes one aspect of right view, that of rebirth (or survival more generally). The other dilemmas in MN60 emphasize other aspects of right view.
(Btw, MN117 has late elements but I think is essentially correct about the two right views. I think “factor of the path” just means the right view of the noble path, i.e. true right view, having nothing to do with path moments.)
It is also telling how the wrong view is summed up in MN60, namely just as “there is no other world”:
Since there actually is another world, one who holds the view ‘there is no other world’ has wrong view.
The suttas almost always just restate things at length, especially views like this, so this abbreviation is not just for sake of brevity alone. I mean, “there is no other world” is not just a reference to a wider set of disconnected ideas. This statement by itself encompasses the basic spirit behind all those ideas, that of nonsurvival after death.
First off all, “since there actually is another world” (i.e. rebirth) by itself seems to deny the entire wrong view. Which means it also denies the idea that there is no results of karma, etc. So these results of karma must be connected to rebirth.
The wrong view is also simply summed up as “there is no other world”. The other ideas (no karma, gifts, etc) are not treated separately. So it seems they should fit into the banner “there is no other world”, just as they would have to fit under annihilation in DN2.
And interestingly, it’s basically only this summary “there is no other world” that is referred to as natthikavāda in MN60. (Likewise for atthikavāda, which basically only refers to “there another world”.) So even if we don’t agree that the other statements (on no karma etc) are not directly linked to rebirth, then still ,natthikavāda only really refers to the latter. Jayatilleke also says:
The absence of a belief in survival is taken to be the defining characteristic of a Materialist, who is as a consequence called one who subscribes to the natthikavāda in the Pāli Nikāyas. This is clear from the use of the term natthikavāda in the Apaṇṇaka Sutta [MN60], where it is employed to denote the theory that ‘there is no next world’ (natthi paro loko) (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p94)
Now it says those who hold natthikavāda are also immoral, but the sutta also explains why: because they don’t believe in an afterlife.
Though only a section title, in DN23 natthikavāda likewise simply describes the materialistic annihilationism of Payasi, not any wider kinds of nihilism. From Payasi’s arguments it seems apparent his denial of the results of karma is about the afterlife only. For instance, he asks his relatives to come visit him after death and tell him that there are indeed results of karma.
Those two suttas (MN60 and DN23) are iirc the only instances of natthikavāda that give any useful context. Both show it is nonsurvival, as Jayatilleke also concluded from one of them. So I’m not so keen on Venerable @Sujato’s “nihilism”, which I think is too wide and misses the key point. (Same for “positive teaching” for atthikavāda.)
For atthikavāda there is also very little context. Apart from MN60, it occurs in the bigger quote on materialist annihilation like that of Ajita, where it refers to the opposing view. If we agree that Ajita was just a materialist who denied the afterlife, not a complete nihilist, this tells us something about atthikavāda as well. Namely that it is not just general affirmation but affirmation of the afterlife specifically, along with merit leading to the afterlife.
But here again, even if we don’t agree that the view of Ajita is just materialist annihilation, then still it seems to me atthikavāda only refers to a specific part of Ajita’s quote. Hence my translation:
“When anyone teaches a doctrine of survival (atthikavāda), it is just baseless, false nonsense: both the foolish and wise get annihilated and destroyed when their body falls apart, and after death they no longer exist.”
I read this also as a summary of his entire view, that of materialistic annihilation. Venerable Bodhi also translates: “Those who declare that there is (an afterlife) speak only false, empty prattle.” (Brackets in the original.) Walshe translates, like me, “doctrine of survival”.
Me too! I think then the meaning of cakkhu includes both the organ and the “power”, sometimes means mainly one, sometimes the other. Either way, the general point I make you seem to agree on, that the senses don’t depend on experience.
I don’t disagree that there is something more going on in this dialogue. But I when I read the CU, I was not convinced that this is what is being referred to. There seemed to be a lot of inferential steps involved to connect the two. To say for example that “all does not exist” equals “In the beginning this world was nonexistent—one only, without a second. And from what is nonexistent was born what is existent”—this seems to not align to me for various reasons. One being that the CU view actually also says that things exist. Not at the very beginning of the universe, perhaps, but now they do. That view is not what you would naturally phrase as “all doesn’t exist”.
As for the Pāli Canon, all we really have to go by is just the statements “all exists” and “all does not exist” and we’re left to our own devices to figure out what is meant. So to say the Buddha was engaging in a philosophical dialogue goes a bit far for me, though I get your point.
But I would say by redefining the “all” he kinda did the opposite, effectively refusing to engage the dialogue (whatever it was) about the “all”. Now, since sabbaṃ has different meanings to the Buddha and others, sabbaṃ atthi would also. I think the translation “all survives”, while not conveying the whole underlying dialogue, does convey some of the implications which are lacking in “all exists”, especially the implications which are important for a practicing Buddhist rather than a cosmological Brahmin.
But yes, I brought it up because I’m not fully satisfied with it myself either. I’m making this up on the fly, which is why discussions like this can be helpful, but perhaps some middle way like “all must exist” and “all can’t exist”—which to me have a bit more of a future connotation than “all does(n’t) exist”, especially in the latter case, while also reflecting better the original cosmological implications…
I’ll reconsider everything later, including the points I haven’t addressed. Thanks again, Ven! It’s helpful.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all.
“If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: ‘Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all’—that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain.” SN35.23
Thanks, I’ll add this in a future version! That sutra makes my general point very well.
Wrt ‘all’ I think it’s again a reverse thing, just like ‘world’. The Buddha isn’t saying what ‘all/everything’ literally is, but what ‘all’ we should be concerned with. And that if this ‘all’ disappears, the greater All (“universe”) disappears too, from one’s inner pov.
Because I would love it if you’d stop keep questioning me for only having theories. 
)
The suttas give the simile of a well, as you know.
I would’ve rephrased it and ask if I got it right, but to be frank I don’t even have a hunch… I think you’re insinuating a bit too much and it would be helpful if you were more direct about it. If you’d like to clarify, please bring it back up again in the topic on that perception instead of here. (