The ‘world’ in the Kaccānagotta Sutta

[Sunyo]

Hi Dunlop,

@Dunlop

Commentary I heard is not reliable.

The commentaries get a bad rep that they don’t really deserve.

@Dunlop

Have this statement overlooked the meaning of “a being” in SN 23.2?

This is a pun on the word satta (meaning both ‘being’ and ‘stuck’) that wasn’t meant be applied throughout the entire canon, to every instance of the word ‘being’. The suttas constantly speak of beings that are liberated, for example. The Buddha also repeatedly calls himself the best of all beings:

Mendicants, the Realized One, the perfected one, the fully awakened Buddha, is said to be the best of all sentient beings (satta) (SN45.139)

So is he the best at being stuck? he would be if that definition of SN23.2 applied.

@Dunlop

In Sutta, eternalism & annihilationism are read as views of self in different varying contexts

That’s how the commentaries understand them too, as do I. But you can’t explain everything in a single paragraph. Notice that I’m just summing up things there, announcing what I hope to address in detail in the future. (Also pinging @Vaddha because he quoted the same thing, which isn’t really part of the essay.)

I should phrase it something like this: “They refer to lasting existence after death (i.e. eternalism) and non-existence after a single life (the most prominent type of annihilationism). […] But that is for a future discussion.”

[Dunlop]

@Sunyo

The commentaries get a bad rep that they don’t really deserve.

I noticed SN 56.14 deleted, since SN 56.14 refers to suffering arising from craving. SN 56.14 still reads like a redaction because aggregates are only suffering when affected by grasping. The writer of SN 56.14 may have misunderstood the term ‘internal’.

@Sunyo

This is a pun on the word satta (meaning both ‘being’ and ‘stuck’) that wasn’t meant be applied throughout the entire canon, to every instance of the word ‘being’. The suttas constantly speak of beings that are liberated, for example. The Buddha also repeatedly calls himself the best of all beings:

I doubt it is a pun for the faculty of faith. Its is also in SN 5.10. Where exactly is the Buddha called the best of all beings? Iti 90? SN 45.139? AN 4.34? How often is this found in the suttas? Regardless, these worldly concepts do not render SN 23.2 & SN 5.10 to be a “pun”. In fact, it is probably the opposite. How perilous would it be to mistaken a pun for truth and truth for a pun.

and the Clear-eyed One is the best of humans.

dvipadānañca cakkhumā.

Dhp 273

@Sunyo

I should phrase it something like this: “They refer to lasting existence after death (i.e. eternalism) and non-existence after a single life (the most prominent type of annihilationism). […] But that is for a future discussion.”

It sounds questionable and Commentary. The reality is this meaning is absent in the Suttas.

[Sunyo]

Hi Dhabba as well,

Sorry I overlooked your post earlier.

@Dhabba

So in the context of buddhism being first and foremost a meditative path I don’t see how anyone would say Rohitassa’s quest may seem ”unbelievable or silly”…

Good point, thanks. It could be literal event. I personally don’t think it would be silly either, but was anticipating that it may seem that way to some people.

Still, I think the actual pragmatic point the sutta is trying to make is wider than only rebuking Rohitassa’s very specific method. It’s also trying to tell other people something, people who don’t have his ability.

@Dhabba

But I’ll gladly make the case based on suttas since the following is said in Acelakassapasutta SN 12.17:

I’m not exactly sure how this makes the case. Either way, I agree annihilationism is not limited to a single life. But it is the most prominent form of annihilationism. See also my reply to Venerable Vaddha and Dunlop. That discussion is for the future.

(It’s unfortunate three people objected to part of my post which wasn’t an actual part of the essay. But at least it confirms for me that there is a difference between writing which I spend time getting right before posting, and things I just type on the spot. )

@Dhabba

Can someone please explain in which world (plane of existence) the following is taking place?

This isn’t really about Dependent Arising, so the definition of the world of the Kaccanagotta Sutta is probably not directly related to this. I’ll leave it at that because I feel like you’re insinuating something here that is irrelevant to the topic. (Namely, moving the discussion to the nature of nibbāna again.)

[Green]

@Sunyo

This is a pun on the word satta (meaning both ‘being’ and ‘stuck’) that wasn’t meant be applied throughout the entire canon, to every instance of the word ‘being’. The suttas constantly speak of beings that are liberated, for example. The Buddha also repeatedly calls himself the best of all beings:

The Buddha uses conventional language and knowledge, and ultimate. SN23.2 is really important because it explains that how we experience ourselves as living beings, humans, arises from clinging.
I believe experience confirms this. Without clinging there is not a conception of me being a living being, me being a human, etc. Such ideas/impressions arise from conceivings the khandha’s as me, mine, my self.

There are not really beings being liberated but Buddha uses such conventional expressions.

[Sunyo]

@Green

There are not really beings being liberated but Buddha uses such conventional expressions.

Exactly. But sometimes people don’t realize that the Buddha uses conventional language all the time. So we should allow ourselves to use it too.

[NgXinZhao]

@Sunyo

Are you saying that the views of (non)existence are false because they are not, in a sense, “experienced” by the arahant after death? (I hope you get what I’m trying to describe clumsily.) That’s one way to think about it. But it seems a bit convoluted to me. Perhaps I’m not completely understanding you?

I think the terms atthitā and natthitā should be understood more objectively. One problem is, the translations ‘existence’ and ‘nonexistence’ aren’t particularly helpful, especially if not placed in the context of rebirth. These terms refer to specific views about existence after death, namely personal eternal existence or the destruction of the person when they die (e.g. “the self = body”). The Pāli commentarial tradition also explains them as such.

There is a lot of support for this in earlier texts too. I’ll argue for it in detail later. For now, a Sanskrit text) uses nāstitā (=natthitā, ‘nonsurvival’ or “nonexistence”) as a substitute for uccheda (‘annihilation’). And in SN12.17 the middle teaching of Dependent Arising is said to avoid eternalism and annihilationism. That is what atthitā and natthitā refer to. It’s better to think of them as “the notion that one still exists” and “the notion that one no longer exists” (after death). That’s more literal as well, because atthi is a verb (“exists”), not a noun (“existence”).

Sorry. More context on my comment is that those who don’t believe in nothing after parinibbāna often points to this sutta that says non-existence notion is not there when one sees origination of the world. I use loosely all the words here. They interpret the denial of annihilation position above to include that after death of arahant cannot be nothing or non-existence.

So my comeback is that the condition for the notion of non-existence is no longer fulfilled after death of arahant. Totally no arising is seen. Therefore, for those of us who are still alive, we can use that notion of non-existence to apply to after parinibbāna, there’s nothing.

All these above doesn’t need to use notion of self, just using arising and ceasing and there’s no more arising after parinibbāna.

[Sunyo]

@NgXinZhao

So my comeback is that the condition for the notion of non-existence is no longer fulfilled after death of arahant.

I think I understood you correctly, then, Venerable.

A problem I see with that explanation is that the notions of atthitā and natthitā are already abandoned by one with right view, not by the arahant after death. So it seems you would have to reason further, concluding that the noble one already knows that after parinibbāna there can’t be a notion of non-existence. So therefore they also don’t have a notion of nonexistence.

That wouldn’t be wrong technically, but I don’t think that’s what the sutta is about. It seems a bit convoluted.

I think the problem starts when accepting the understanding of natthitā as nonexistence in general, which is not how it should be understood. Natthitā is view of natthikavāda, the doctrine of nonsurvival, which is, as said in DN23: "There is no afterlife. No beings are reborn spontaneously. There’s no [postmortem] fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”

A noble one knows there is rebirth (they see the origination of the “world”), so they can’t fall into this view. (Plus the knowledge of anatta is also involved in avoiding annihilationism more generally.)

Anyway, I’ll get back to atthitā and natthitā another time to explain that in detail. Hopefully before the rains.

[NgXinZhao]

@Sunyo

Natthitā is view of natthikavāda, the doctrine of nonsurvival, which is, as said in DN23: "There is no afterlife. No beings are reborn spontaneously. There’s no [postmortem] fruit or result of good and bad deeds.”

A noble one knows there is rebirth (they see the origination of the “world”), so they can’t fall into this view.

This is not accepted by those who claim nothing after parinibbāna is annihilation. They think that even with rebirth, as long as after death there’s nothing ( what we claim to be the nature of parinibbāna), then it belongs to the non-existence notion or annihilation view.

So I don’t link non-existence to the requirement of not believing in rebirth. Just that after death there can be totally nothing at all. Believing in rebirth is already a given for us Buddhist discussing this. It’s just that those who reject nothing after parinibbāna thinks of end of rebirth as not nothing.

To argue for end of rebirth is nothing left, I have to save the notion of non-existence. Therefore I point out the condition for that notion not to apply is when arising is there. When there’s arising, one cannot say a thing is non-existent. But when there’s no more arising, the notion of non-existence can be used.

@Sunyo

A problem I see with that explanation is that the notions of atthitā and natthitā are already abandoned by one with right view, not by the arahant after death.

Since arahants after death has no mind or body or soul to even refer to them, of course no concept can occur to them. So all these notions are used by living beings. If you link natthitā view to be must not believe in rebirth, then of course, the stream winner would already abandon that. If we don’t link it to not believe in rebirth, then my explanation above can be used to refute those who thinks notion non-existence cannot be used to apply to describe after parinibbāna.

[Sunyo]

@NgXinZhao

my explanation above can be used to refute those

Has it worked?

@NgXinZhao

This is not accepted by those who claim nothing after parinibbāna is annihilation.

How about you?

Anyway, it seems we’re just trying to do different things. My aim here is to help us all understand what the suttas are trying to tell us, not argue others based on interpretations of words that I don’t share, that I don’t see reflected in the suttas.

But your argument is interesting nevertheless, I never thought of it before that way.

[NgXinZhao]

@Sunyo

How about you?

I am more of an opportunistic thinker. So far I don’t see super strong reason to link annihilation views to only must not believe in rebirth. I do agree that it’s a good way to just say nothing after parinibbāna doesn’t count as annihilation because we defined it as only applicable to those who don’t believe in rebirth.

Another way is to link annihilation to must only apply to a soul. So since there’s no soul, annihilation doesn’t apply for nothing after parinibbāna.

I guess the 3rd way is what I wrote then. Glad it’s new to you.

@Sunyo

Has it worked?

No one is able to refute it or argue back based on this so far. Nor do I see they got converted to our view. Whereas, the first 2 methods seems to be not so convincing to those who believe something after parinibbāna.

[NgXinZhao]

@Green

Is it really because one knows? Really? Does one know? I feel this is a serious issue.

If you’re trying to sniff out people who are attained here, do know that it’s an inappropriate question to ask, due to forum rules and our vinaya rules.

[Dhabba]

@NgXinZhao

No one is able to refute it or argue back based on this so far.

Hello Venerable,

Let me have a go at it!

However one chooses to translate atthitā & natthitā I sincerely hope you understand why none of us who reject ”mere cessation” will ever embrace this view of yours.

It has already been refuted in the suttas:

“Channaṁ, āvuso, phassāyatanānaṁ asesavirāganirodhā natthaññaṁ kiñcī”ti?

“Natthaññaṁ” (na-atthaññaṁ): means “nothing else” or “there is nothing.”

“Natthaññaṁ” (na + atthi + aññaṁ):

• na: negation, “not.”
• atthi: “there is” or “exists.”
• aññaṁ: “else,” “other,” “different.”
• Natthaññaṁ: “there is nothing else,”

So even if we render this using the word nonsurvival instead of ”nothing else exists” we get:

“With the complete fading away and cessation of the six fields of contact, ”there is nonsurvival’”, thus saying, one proliferates the unproliferated”

How can what you claim is the truth…

With the complete fading away and cessation of the six fields of contact, ” ”nothing else exists”” ”there is nonsurvival’” ”there is non-existence”

…also be considered as proliferating the unproliferated?

And just to set the record straight before this goes the other way where I’ll be forced to answer your questions while you avoid answering my questions in this post regarding how what you claim is the truth is actually considered in the suttas as proliferating the unproliferated:

I’ve never claimed Nibbāna is ”something”.

I’ve only quoted the suttas that say one can still perceive beyond all planes of existence and quoted those suttas hinting at how Nibbāna involves light. That’s all.

So if this sutta quoting by me is proliferating the unproliferated, then both The Buddha and Sāriputta are also, according to you, proliferating the unproliferated.

So please don’t turn this around about how ”Something else exists” is equally wrong.

Instead please explain how you are actually not proliferating the unproliferated when claiming:

• With the complete fading away and cessation of the six fields of contact, ” ”nothing else exists”” ”there is nonsurvival’” ”there is non-existence” ?
  

Edit: I would also like to add the following -

Please don’t claim that Ananda, who is the one asking these questions regarding the complete fading away and cessation of the six fields of contact, assumes there is a
”Self” and that is why he is asking such questions.

There is no mentioning of any Self in the sutta and claiming such things would still contradict what you wrote earlier:

@NgXinZhao

This is exactly what stream winners get. Total annihilation of defilement of self view.

[Vaddha]

@Sunyo

It means understanding the cessation of the mind and body (or six senses, if you will) at parinibbāna. But to understand this you don’t have to directly experience it. The Buddha himself also said he knew rebirth was ended while he was still alive.

Right, i.e. to understand the arising and ceasing of dukkha/saṁsāra. I agree that that seems to be the intended meaning, as with the four noble truths or most matrixes of “x/arising/cessation/path” despite the specific word (‘sakkāya,’ ‘dukkha,’ ‘loka,’ ‘phassa,’ ‘jarāmaraṇa,’ etc.).

@Sunyo

If this book I’ve been talking about ever comes to pass, I’ll devote a section or chapter on the actual insights of right view as well, in connection to the Kaccanagotta Sutta.

To my mind, it is just that the way the post was written seemed to abstract the idea of the senses from the lived dependent experience of them a bit. Which I think is part of the initial hesitance from myself and perhaps Venerable Brahmali. True, the teaching here is not just about the everyday rise and fall of sense experience, but rather the arising and ceasing of a whole new “world” of sense experience via rebirth; but this still relates to the fact that the current “world” is due to our having the senses and sense experience in this life. And I believe that it is on the basis of this world that the sutta describes that someone can gain insight into the general principle of dependent arising and non-self.

I feel part of the idea in the text is that someone can understand non-self or “just dukkha arising; dukkha ceasing” by looking at the structure or nature of sense experience, which is void and ephemeral. Or the structure of life in general, however you want to talk about it. This then would have to be understood on the saṁsāric scale of course, which is where ignorance and craving come in as the ‘fuel’ or threads connecting sense experience across saṁsāra.

But I’d say it’s also the fact that the arising of “the world” consists of empty, conditional phenomena. Focusing exclusively on rebirth and non-rebirth of a being can start to turn away from the fact that this is supposed to be a description of rebirth that does not fall into eternalism (same being behind the process) or annihilationist (the being is the process and is annihilated at its end). I write a bit more on this below.

@Sunyo

But 3 not exactly, because right view also involves a temporary cessation of experiences as a result of letting go of all attachment. This is how the mind can start to link the cessation of craving to the eventual cessation of existence at parinibbāna.

The reason I framed the post like that is because I figured that this was your stance based on other comments you’ve made. I am just trying to highlight the same point as I made above more or less. While rebirth is crucial here, so is the empty nature of rebirth as described by dependent origination, which is what makes the Kaccānagotta Sutta or descriptions of Buddhist rebirth in general special.

Many people believed in rebirth at the time of the Buddha, and many seem also to have believed in the end of rebirth. Apart from what we hear of other views in Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, there is also the whole discussion around the undeclared points. As far as the suttas are concerned, different people held that an enlightened being (in their system; I suppose one who ended rebirth) either existed, did not exist, both, or neither after death. So the “existing” or “not existing” after the end of rebirth in these schools we can assume were actual views that some people held. So it would be meaningful for the Buddha’s system to transcend that tetralemma.

What makes dependent arising and the Buddha’s description of rebirth unique is his understanding of conditionality and emptiness. They didn’t realize the empty nature of it, so either the being continued forever and ever or was annihilated. But the Buddha analyzed the actual experience of beings and pointed out that it is made of mere conditional appearances, not essences or substances. I think this is a crucial aspect of the Kaccānagotta Sutta. To me it is more than just “not eternal heaven, not physicalist annihilation.” Those views are of course included. But I read it as encompassing all views of existence or annihilation in terms of sentient beings, and this is possible because of the analysis of sense experience and how rebirth arises and ceases without recourse to substances. And so I think it’s best to avoid turning “the senses” into a different kind of substance or essence which are either annihilated or continue existing. Their empty nature as described via the 12 links seems crucial.

I’ll just repeat myself a bit though and say that this doesn’t mean it’s all about the empty nature of existence in this life. The crucial component of the continuation of it due to ignorance/craving is part of the explanation and the emptiness. The two go hand in hand. It’s the emptiness of the whole rebirth process which is revolutionary—in this life, between, and after.

So long story short, I don’t think the scale should tip too far over to correct certain misconceptions. But I don’t disagree with the emphasis you give. I think theatthitā/natthitā having to connotations with continued existence is certainly very often overlooked.

@Sunyo

But right view does not involve a cessation of the senses themselves, which I think we can reasonably say stay intact (at least the “physical” ones) even when all experience stops.

@Sunyo

As long as we are alive, whether enlightened or not, the senses are still intact, but there isn’t necessarily experience coming from them all the time.

Yeah, I think within reason, there’s no need to posit that the senses cease if sense experience is temporarily suspended. I think we could understand this as part of the meaning of “indriya” or faculty. They are the potential or capability of sensing things. So even when they are not active, it’s a question of whether the faculty or potential is there. In deep sleep, someone might not hear anything. But if the faculty of hearing is present, they could be woken up from sleep by a loud noise. Because the ‘faculty of hearing’ is the potential there.

@Sunyo

That isn’t to say that multiple-lifetime annihilation isn’t also avoided by the middle teaching. It is. But whether natthitā explicitly refers to this view, I don’t think so.

I addressed this some above, and I don’t want to veer off there if you plan on having another thread about it. I acknowledge the connection between natthitā/natthikavāda and one-life physicalism though. But as you may know, āstika/nāstika can mean Theist vs. Atheist in India now, and could also refer to philosophies which accepted the authority of the Vedas or not. The words can take on different shades of nuance. Plus, when ‘natthikavāda’ is used, it is contrasted with a positive word, ‘atthikavāda.’ But in SN 12.15, the Buddha is rejecting both atthitā and natthitā. I would assume he’s not saying that we should give up belief in rebirth!

The way I read the person who linked SN 12.17 is as highlighting this part:

Suppose that one person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement leans toward annihilationism.
SN 12.17

I think that even some Buddhists seem to express an idea like the one above. The idea being that their actions done in this life will have consequences for someone else in a future life, a different person. Like packing someone else’s lunch. But we can set this aside for now and leave it for a later time! Maybe this will just contribute to any writing you do on the subject.

@Sunyo

What exact distinction are you referring to?

Hopefully this reply clarifies a bit further to the extent necessary for feedback Let me know if something I’ve said is unclear.

All the best, bhante!

[Meggers]

@Vaddha

And I believe that it is on the basis of this world that the sutta describes that someone can gain insight into the general principle of dependent arising and non-self.

Going by suttas on the All there is no other world for us to depend on, except this fathom long body (temporally enworlded) to discover things as they are. This is phenomenology, just not from within the Western tradition. It is his own historically situated working out of things.

The epistemology is for the most part the same as Kant’s. Knowledge is grounded in the senses. Empirical. Additionally, Kant moved the humanities in the direction of empiricism, and there’s a whole toolkit of empirical methods now long available to those who are properly and well trained in the humanities or adopt interdisciplinary tactics, both qualitative and quantitative. Buddha obviously brought a multitude of methods and approaches with him as well.

I have read some scholars who chose to describe Buddha as a hedonist, because they encountered his aesthetics, but he is not. It’s just surprising for Westerners to encounter full fledged philosophy in other cultures that is easily as sophisticated as the twin orbs of the West, to which everything in our culture “is but a footnote.”

Kant believed something different about “the moral law,” however, in the starry heavens and in him, which seems to come from the Stoic idea of evidence of the divine in the pleasing patterns so visible in creation.

[sujato]

Thanks for the essay, insightful as always.

FYI, I think I recently found the precedent for the opening phrase, “the world for the most part depends on the duality of atthitā and natthitā.” The phrasing makes it sound like he is referring to a belief widely held in the world, but while there are plenty of similar or related ideas I haven’t been able to pin down a very close parallel until now.

It seems the reason for that is a shift in terminology. This is from a recent note I made on this:

The Buddha is indicating that he is referring to a widely held belief. Compare the prominent saying: “This is twofold (dvayaṁ), there is no third: truth and falsehood. The gods are truth, humans are falsehood” (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1.1.1.4, 3.3.2.2, 3.9.4.1). The word for “truth” here is satya (Pali sacca), which like atthitā (“existence”) is an abstract noun from the root as, “to exist”. The word for “falsehood” is anṛta, a form not used in this sense in Pali, which uses the simple negative. The gods are truly real because they are immortal, whereas transient humans are not truly real. Satya and anṛta are a standard pair in pre-Buddhist Sanskrit, harking back to Rig Veda 7.49.3a. Consider also the hymn of creation at Arthavaveda 10.2.14c: “Who placed truth in him, who falsehood, who mortality, who immortality?”

I wasn’t actually working on this text, I just stumbled on it, so I haven’t looked into it in too much detail. But the connation with mortality/immortality is clearly there.

[Dunlop]

@sujato

The phrasing makes it sound like he is referring to a belief widely held in the world

SN 12.48 makes it sound like worldviews/weltanschauung.

“Mister Gotama, does all exist?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, sabbamatthī”ti?

“‘All exists’: this is the oldest cosmology, brahmin.”
“‘Sabbamatthī’ti kho, brāhmaṇa, jeṭṭhametaṁ lokāyataṁ”.

“Then does all not exist?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, sabbaṁ natthī”ti?

“‘All does not exist’: this is the second cosmology.
“‘Sabbaṁ natthī’ti kho, brāhmaṇa, dutiyametaṁ lokāyataṁ”.

“Well, is all a unity?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, bho gotama, sabbamekattan”ti?

“‘All is a unity’: this is the third cosmology.
“‘Sabbamekattan’ti kho, brāhmaṇa, tatiyametaṁ lokāyataṁ”.

“Then is all a plurality?”
“Kiṁ pana, bho gotama, sabbaṁ puthuttan”ti?

“‘All is a plurality’: this is the fourth cosmology.
“‘Sabbaṁ puthuttan’ti kho, brāhmaṇa, catutthametaṁ lokāyataṁ.

Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:
Ete te, brāhmaṇa, ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṁ deseti:

SN 12.48

lokāyata - Name of a branch of brahmin learning (D.i.11, etc.); the name signifies that which pertains to the ordinary view (of the world) - i.e., common or popular philosophy - much the same as lokakkhāyika (popular philosophy). For a discussion of the word see Dial.i.166 72.

This includes predicting whether there will be plenty of rain or drought; plenty to eat or famine; an abundant harvest or a bad harvest; security or peril; sickness or health. It also includes such occupations as arithmetic, accounting, calculating, poetry, and cosmology.

seyyathidaṁ—suvuṭṭhikā bhavissati, dubbuṭṭhikā bhavissati, subhikkhaṁ bhavissati, dubbhikkhaṁ bhavissati, khemaṁ bhavissati, bhayaṁ bhavissati, rogo bhavissati, ārogyaṁ bhavissati, muddā, gaṇanā, saṅkhānaṁ, kāveyyaṁ, lokāyataṁ

DN 1

[Green]

@Sunyo

So would you then say the Buddha’s “world” is the mind only? I don’t think that would be right, although I would have less problems with that than certain other interpretations which take the definition of the world as the six senses even more unliterally.

Hi Sunyo,

We can go in details but i think in general i see in your writings the tendency that the kind of knowledge and vision of a noble has, is intellectual. For example, about cessation. About the cessation of rupa, vedana, sanna, sankhara, vinnana. Or the bliss of when nothing is felt or perceived, and even the cessation of suffering. Nibbana. At least that is what i tend to see in your writings.

But the sutta’s teach that Nibbana, asankhata, stilling of formations, cessation can be directly known. Not intellectually, not by reasoning, logic but directly. I also see this is what Abhdihamma teaches.
Nibbana is just as real as the khandha’s and also can be known, experienced. Nibbana is surely not the concept of extinguishment, right?

I also believe that the knowledge of the arising and cessation of the khandha’s; the arising and ceasing of senses and all that is sensed and felt; the cessation of the world in this very body…all such is is not conceptually or intellectually known, but also directly known.

Surely there is also support for all this in the sutta’s but i am not gonna discuss this again and again.

[Sunyo]

@Vaddha

To my mind, it is just that the way the post was written seemed to abstract the idea of the senses from the lived dependent experience of them a bit.

Hi Venerable,

It surely does. But it’s a textual analysis first and foremost, so it’s a natural result. I’m not writing a practice manual here.

@Vaddha

And I believe that it is on the basis of this world that the sutta describes that someone can gain insight into the general principle of dependent arising and non-self.

I don’t disagree with that, actually. But this “world” can not be separated from rebirth either, of course. We have to understand how it arose in context of the wider past.

@Vaddha

While rebirth is crucial here, so is the empty nature of rebirth as described by dependent origination

Yes, thanks for pointing this out. I realize this, and wanted to discuss that later. This essay-of-sorts was just about understanding what ‘the world’ means. But it is also empty of a self, as I noted briefly near the end.

Same applies to some other thoughts you brought up. If this essay seems to miss some points its because I’ve sort of planned out a whole book coming together from separate essays. That doesn’t mean it’s not good to discuss these things now. That’s actually one of the reasons I was asking for feedback, so we can discuss things all together. I’m just explaining the specific “emphasis [I] give” in this essay and why some “crucial aspect[s] of the Kaccānagotta Sutta” are missing. They’re on the drawing board.

@Vaddha

Plus, when ‘natthikavāda’ is used, it is contrasted with a positive word, ‘atthikavāda.’

Since it’s directly opposed to the natthikavada, it seems to me just be a synonym for eternalism. It’s also opposed to annihilatinism (e.g. in DN2). When it is praised occasionally (e.g. MN60) it is because it leads to a belief in karma and good rebirths. In other words, I consider it semi-right view, the right view which MN117 says is “accompanied by defilements, partakes of good deeds, and ripens in attachments.”

Back to what we discussed earlier:

@Sunyo

The arahants including the Buddha also regularly use the future tense to refer to things they know [will cease]

Venerable, I actually realized there is a better sutta to make this point in context of the six senses:

A mendicant who is an adept understands the six faculties: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. They understand: ‘These six faculties will totally and utterly cease without anything left over. And no other six faculties will arise anywhere anyhow.’ (SN48.53)

That is to say, the adept (asekha, i.e. arahant) understands that this is their last life, their last sense faculties, their last “world”. That is how the cessation of the six senses is understood by the arahant, also in context of Dependent “Cessation”. By the stream winner it is understood similarly, as a cessation after a limited number of lives (though they don’t know how many exactly).

For this, you don’t have to directly experience this specific cessation of the six senses. The fact that the Buddha uses a future tense (will cease) indicates that he hadn’t. And he hadn’t, because while you’re alive it’s impossible to have a direct cessation of the senses, although it can be understood.

Notice also the “anywhere” in the above quote, which refers to a place of rebirth. It doesn’t make much sense to use “anywhere” (kuhiṃ)—which elsewhere refers to physical places—to refer to some kind of momentary rearising of the senses that would happen alongside the arising of experiences.

I realize from your last post that you accept this. Just pointing it out again.

And to clarify further why the fruit of stream entry is a direct witnessing without being a direct experience in the moment: Imagine you have a crystal ball which you somehow just know is 100% accurate. Whatever you see in that ball is definitely going to happen. Now, if you look in that ball, would it be reasonable to say things like: “I see the future”, “I see the outcome of this and that election, this and that soccer game”? In my view, yes. Likewise, stream enterers “see” the future cessation of the senses (or the cessation of the aggregates, if you will). And in addition, their “crystal ball” also tells them why and how this comes about.

A crystal ball sounds a bit hocus-pocus, so I’m not completely happy with this analogy I just made up, but I think you get the point. Either way, from the pre-stream-entry perspective, the insights of stream entry are not any less strange than the possibility of such a ball really showing the future. So maybe it’s not such a bad analogy. The crystal ball itself representing the clear mind when the hindrances are abandoned.

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Now, would the below sum up our discussion and clarify the position I take in the essay? (Also asking Ven. @Brahmali) It’s an extra few paragraphs for the final writing, potentially.

Also, do you know if anybody has written more officially about the empirical perspective you described, even if just in a marginally related footnote? (To add as a reference, since I don’t like arguing without references in writing, because it tends to inadvertently create straw men.)

[…] This definition too does not limit the world just to perceptions or experiences. It includes the body and mind as well, and hence it refers to the entire being with its sense faculties.

From a certain perspective one may argue that there is no real difference between these two interpretations of ‘the world’. The argument goes something like this: Without certain experiences (for example of sights), we are not aware of the corresponding sense faculty (the sense of sight). Therefore, when such experiences cease, the corresponding sense faculty ceases too, at least empirically. So we cannot talk about the sense of sight separately from an experience of sights, and likewise for the other senses. This way of thinking seems much less convincing when we consider the Buddha’s reinterpretation of ‘the world’ that includes the physical body (kaḷevara), but I can understand where it is coming from.

However, it is not the perspective of the discourses. Blind and deaf people are still said to have the faculties of sight and hearing, literally ‘the eye’ and ‘the ear’.¹ It is also said that even if the sense faculties are intact, still no consciousness will arise if there is no sense impression (or ‘contact’).² The sense faculties are the sense organs or, better perhaps, the general power or ability to be aware of certain things.³ While we are alive, these faculties exist even when not functioning. They are even indicated to exist for meditators who attain a complete cessation of awareness.⁴ So experiences depend on the senses, but the senses do not directly depend on experiences in return. More relevantly, while experiences arise and cease from moment to moment, the sense faculties arise only at birth and will completely cease only when the enlightened being passes away.⁵ The same is true for the body.⁶ And the same is therefore also true for the “world” that is the being.

But why did the Buddha redefine ‘the world’ as such? […]

1. MN152
2. MN28
3. Compare Sujato, Introduction to SN: “The ‘inner’ aspect is the sense organs, for example the ‘eye’ or the ‘ear’, which make it possible for an organism to experience the outside world by receiving sense stimuli.” See also Sunyo, Seeds, Paintings and a Beam of Light note 153.
4. MN43 and SN41.6
5. For the arising of the senses at birth see for example the definition of ‘birth’ at SN12.2, which includes “obtaining the sense faculties”. For the cessation of the senses at parinibbāna see for example SN48.53.
6. Enlightened ones are repeatedly said to “bear their final body”, for example at MN56, SN1.25, AN4.35, Iti38, and Thag2.41. See also Thag16.1: “This body will break up, and there will not be another.”

[Sunyo]

@sujato

The phrasing makes it sound like he is referring to a belief widely held in the world

Hi Bhante

Thanks for your reply. I’ll study that footnote later as well as the Upanishadic passages it refers to. There’s always a lot of information densely packed in your notes, and I don’t want to rush a reply.

As for the line I quoted above, I considered that too: atthitā and natthitā are views of “most of the world”. I think this is actually an important point the Buddha is making. In this light, it is worth considering that the notions of absolute existence and nonexistence (like these terms are understood by Nāgārjuna but also many modern Buddhists of all schools) seem to be (nearly?) absent in the Pāli canon. DN1 doesn’t discuss them at all, it seems to me, which is particularly telling considering its comprehensiveness. But what it does discuss in detail is eternalism and annihilationism.

What I am not completely sure about here is sabbaṃ atthi and sabbaṃ natthi. You wrote, in line with others, that these are notions of absolute existence and non-existence. In the Pāli canon there isn’t much to go by to conclude this very firmly, however. Yet they are still the notions of “most of the world”, so we would expect this to be addressed frequently.

On this I have tentative thoughts similar to my thoughts on “the world”. I think we should apply here the definition of the ‘all’ as the six senses and their contents (SN35.23), since it is almost equivalent to the definitions of ‘the world’. I further think this redefinition also has pragmatic implications behind it. To say “all exists” to other religionists may have meant (proto)scientific ideas about the universe, but the Buddha is again telling us to focus on the “all” that is the being. To say this “all” that is the being “exists” means, again, to say it exists forever after death, just like King Pasenadi’s “devas exist”. So that’s why I translate it as “all survives”.

What would you say in response?

Also relevant may be the gradual development of the term ‘all’ in Brahmanism. In a study of the term in the early Vedic texts, Jan Gonda concluded that “the basal meaning ‘undivided, complete’ […] prevails in this corpus. The idea of ‘all’ being mostly denoted by viśva, seldom […] by sarva.” (Article here, p.497ff) That is to say, it meant that some Wholeness existed (e.g. Brahman), not that everything existed. If I remember correctly, it is more of a religious, soteriological concept than a scientific one. Interesting in our context is:

“This radiant and immortal person […] he is just this Self (attan), this existence which is not subject to death, he is Brahman, he is Whole (sarva).” (BU2.5.10, tr. adopted from Gonda)

yaś cāyam asminn ākāśe tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo yaś cāyam adhyātmaṃ hṛdy ākāśas tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo 'yam eva sa yo 'yam ātmā | idam amṛtam idaṃ brahmedaṃ sarvam

Whether this refers to a pervasive All or a complete Whole, it does equate the idea of an existing All quite directly to eternalism.

It’d be interesting if the Vedic/Jain text have anything to say on a non-existing All, but I’m not aware.

Others please also chip in if you want.