I somehow missed this essay when you posted it. Just wanted to say ‘Nicely done!’. Thank you
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Venerable Yeshe. When I read the suttas, the Buddha is always teaching the aggregates are impermanent & not-self. This assumes the nature of the aggregates is unambiguous. If the nature of an aggregate was deceptive, it could not be classed as an aggregate. In Khajjaniya Sutta, each aggregate is undeceptively defined.
The aggregates do not read as though they are a dream or an illusion. It reads as though only false qualities (such as permanence, happiness, self) attributed to aggregates are a dream or illusion. I think the teachings of Tsongkhapa are not the same as the Buddha. I remember some people saying Phena Sutta says there are no aggregates however this must be a misunderstanding. Phena Sutta is teaching there are aggregates however the aggregates are fleeting & lack substance.
Venerable Yeshe. This quote you posted does not read as though it is about the aggregates. It reads as though it is about deceptions of self & permanence.
As much as I love my thread being bumped to the top od discuss and discover again, perhaps @Dunlop and @yeshe.tenley you could start another thread or find another more relevant thread to discuss the nature of the aggregates, as this thread is for the discussion of the abayakata.
Of course! For what it is worth, I have not attempted to engage in such a discussion nor have I mentioned the teachings of anything but the EBT’s. It would seem some are interested in engaging with me on non-EBT discussion based upon my username, but I am trying to discourage this to the best of my ability on threads such as this where the context is not appropriate. 
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To be or not to be: that is the answer.
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Excellent pun, however I think its worth pointing out that this is precicely not the answer early buddhism advocates:
Kaccāna, this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence.
dvayanissito khvāyaṁ, kaccāna, loko yebhuyyena atthitañceva natthitañca.
But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of non-existence regarding the world.
Lokasamudayaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā, sā na hoti.
And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of existence regarding the world.
Lokanirodhaṁ kho, kaccāna, yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya passato yā lok
…
“All exists”: this is one extreme.
Sabbamatthīti kho, kaccāna, ayameko anto.
“All does not exist”: this is the second extreme.
Sabbaṁ natthīti ayaṁ dutiyo anto.
Metta.
May you BE well!
(I hope your Pali studies are also going well. )
The choice is yours.
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@josephzizys The quoted segments you provided points towards conceptual discrimination I.e. ‘all exists or does not exist’ which is the fruit of the mental abstracting faculty of a human being. Mental abstraction serves both a utility and a function but can also become a bind to the untrained mind which becomes lost in conceptual thought streams or ‘a thicket of views’.
What is the ‘view’, or suchness, of just seeing without describing what is seen? In the seen, there is just the seen. In the heard, there is just the heard. What is the suchness of sound? What is the difference between just listening and then describing listening itself or what one is listening to? Why do the Noble One’s place emphasis on ‘in the seen, just the seen’ and such statements. Why do they stop there and not go into “it is or it is not eternal, it is or it is not this?”. There is gold found inquiring into such a question.
“IT exists or does not exist” is a judgement that is imputed. Language and words follow particular rules. Examining the causal relationships between things (mental, physical and any ‘thing’ here of) shows us what those rules are. Middle way seeing can show us the pulleys, cogs, tugs and levers that lay under ‘things’ that one takes for granted.
There was a talk by Ajahn Amaro. The title was ‘to be or not to be: that is the answer’. This is likely a play on Shakespeares to be or not to be with some connection to buddhist thought and metaphysics.
Seeing from the middle is like so. When A (deciding to initiate action) gives rise to B (picking up a match box) and then I initiate C (take match from box) and then D (flick the match onto the flint) then E (the effect of a flame) arises. This is less so a view and more so ‘the way something is’ I.e. a means that leads to a particular ends.
If I eat well, there is a likelihood that I may live longer years.
If I eat poorly, there is a likelihood that I will not.
Conditionality, causation and middle way seeing are at the heart of the seasoned dharma-farers modus operandi. Conditionality leads to a ‘?’ where the answer is “it depends”. The realisation of the Noble One’s comes close to ‘realising the suchness of things as they are’ and does away with eternalism & annihilationism all together for a good reason. One of those reasons is vecause the flow of life in nowness itself is not a fixed term or abstraction. The word is not what is being described in itself but point to what is described. Is direct seeing a mental abstraction? The Noble One sees map and territory - knowing the prior has a function action but rests in the latter.
Discerning the difference between the two is crucial.
I mean, i spent days going through every example of the “it is ir it is not eternal” question in the 4 principle nikayas and posting every explination in the suttas given for leaving such questions undeclared in the original post of this thread, so again, i have to say i am not sure what you mean by your explination.
Yeah, again, i list every explination for the abayakata in the original post, and “flow of life in nowness itself is not a fixed term or abstraction” is not one of them.
Good luck with your journey.
The dharma isn’t dependent upon fixed words written down in the Canon. It is experientially realised. I’m sharing my two cents on this matter: that is all.
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This site is literally for the discussion of these texts, see the faq:
I am here to talk about the ebt, I get that many here are here to talk about their own experience of buddhism and that’s fine, but it’s not actually the purpose of this site, and I am not personally looking for spiritual advice, no matter how well meaning the people are who think that their “experience” has granted them a capacity to explain to others what “the dharma” is and isn’t.
Dharma is pretty clear cut. I saw the title of the post, clicked and shared. Thanks for sharing the rules. Too late now however.
Those were my two cents. You’re free to pay no attention to them.
some investigations into Sāriputta and Koṭṭhita as a pair has led me to another interesting undeclared points sutta, and to notice that I miss a few occurrences in my initial posts. the first ommision is in DN, at DN29 which adds another undeclared point, namely;
Pleasure and pain are eternal,
‘Sassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …
or not eternal,
asassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …
or both eternal and not eternal,
sassatañca asassatañca sukhadukkhaṁ …
or neither eternal nor not eternal.
nevasassataṁ nāsassataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …
Pleasure and pain are made by oneself,
sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …
or made by another,
paraṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ …
or made by both oneself and another,
sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca sukhadukkhaṁ …
or they have arisen by chance, not made by oneself or another. This is the only truth, other ideas are silly.’
asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ, idameva saccaṁ moghamaññan’ti.
MN25 gives another example of the undeclared but there’s no new info.
But the one I wanted to highlight is SN12.67, which applys the undeclared to each of the links in the 10DO.
“Well, Reverend Sāriputta, are old age and death made by oneself? Or by another? Or by both oneself and another? Or do they arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
“kiṁ nu kho, āvuso sāriputta, sayaṅkataṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ, paraṅkataṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ, sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca jarāmaraṇaṁ, udāhu asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ jarāmaraṇan”ti?“No, Reverend Koṭṭhita, old age and death are not made by oneself, nor by another, nor by both oneself and another, nor do they arise by chance, not made by oneself or another.
“Na kho, āvuso koṭṭhika, sayaṅkataṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ, na paraṅkataṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ, na sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca jarāmaraṇaṁ, nāpi asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ.
Rather, rebirth is a condition for old age and death.”
Api ca jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan”ti.“Well, Reverend Sāriputta, is rebirth made by oneself? Or by another? Or by both oneself and another? Or does it arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, āvuso sāriputta, sayaṅkatā jāti, paraṅkatā jāti, sayaṅkatā ca paraṅkatā ca jāti, udāhu asayaṅkārā aparaṅkārā adhiccasamuppannā jātī”ti?“No, Reverend Koṭṭhita, rebirth is not made by oneself, nor by another, nor by both oneself and another, nor does it arise by chance, not made by oneself or another.
“Na kho, āvuso koṭṭhika, sayaṅkatā jāti, na paraṅkatā jāti, na sayaṅkatā ca paraṅkatā ca jāti, nāpi asayaṅkārā aparaṅkārā adhiccasamuppannā jāti.
Rather, continued existence is a condition for rebirth.”
Api ca bhavapaccayā jātī”ti.“Well, Reverend Sāriputta, is continued existence made by oneself? …” …
“Kiṁ nu kho, āvuso sāriputta, sayaṅkato bhavo …pe…
“Is grasping made by oneself? …” …
sayaṅkataṁ upādānaṁ …
“Is craving made by oneself? …” …
sayaṅkatā taṇhā …
“Is feeling made by oneself? …” …
sayaṅkatā vedanā …
“Is contact made by oneself? …” …
sayaṅkato phasso …
“Are the six sense fields made by oneself? …” …
sayaṅkataṁ saḷāyatanaṁ …
“Well, Reverend Sāriputta, are name and form made by oneself? Or by another? Or by both oneself and another? Or do they arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
sayaṅkataṁ nāmarūpaṁ, paraṅkataṁ nāmarūpaṁ, sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca nāmarūpaṁ, udāhu asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ nāmarūpan”ti?“No, Reverend Koṭṭhita, name and form are not made by oneself, nor by another, nor by both oneself and another, nor do they arise by chance, not made by oneself or another.
“Na kho, āvuso koṭṭhika, sayaṅkataṁ nāmarūpaṁ, na paraṅkataṁ nāmarūpaṁ, na sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca nāmarūpaṁ, nāpi asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ, adhiccasamuppannaṁ nāmarūpaṁ.
Rather, consciousness is a condition for name and form.”
Api ca viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan”ti.“Well, Reverend Sāriputta, is consciousness made by oneself? Or by another? Or by both oneself and another? Or does it arise by chance, not made by oneself or another?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, āvuso sāriputta, sayaṅkataṁ viññāṇaṁ, paraṅkataṁ viññāṇaṁ, sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca viññāṇaṁ, udāhu asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ viññāṇan”ti?“No, Reverend Koṭṭhita, consciousness is not made by oneself, nor by another, nor by both oneself and another, nor does it arise by chance, not made by oneself or another.
“Na kho, āvuso koṭṭhika, sayaṅkataṁ viññāṇaṁ, na paraṅkataṁ viññāṇaṁ, na sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca viññāṇaṁ, nāpi asayaṅkāraṁ aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ viññāṇaṁ.
Rather, name and form are conditions for consciousness.”
Api ca nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan”ti.
combining this with MN43
“Feeling, perception, and consciousness—
“Yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṁ—
are these things mixed or separate?
ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā udāhu visaṁsaṭṭhā?
And can we completely disentangle them so as to describe the difference between them?”
Labbhā ca panimesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetun”ti?“Feeling, perception, and consciousness—
“Yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṁ—
these things are mixed, not separate.
ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā, no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely disentangle them so as to describe the difference between them.
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetuṁ.
For you perceive what you feel, and you cognize what you perceive.
Yaṁ hāvuso, vedeti taṁ sañjānāti, yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vijānāti.
That’s why these things are mixed, not separate.
Tasmā ime dhammā saṁsaṭṭhā no visaṁsaṭṭhā.
And you can never completely disentangle them so as to describe the difference between them.”
Na ca labbhā imesaṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṁ paññāpetun”ti.
gets us to a point very remincient of Nagarjuna.
Oh, and another one that is again, quite fascinating;
AN4.24
“In this world—with its gods, Māras and Brahmās, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its gods and humans—whatever is seen, heard, thought, known, attained, sought, and explored by the mind: that I know.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samārakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya diṭṭhaṁ sutaṁ mutaṁ viññātaṁ pattaṁ pariyesitaṁ anuvicaritaṁ manasā, tamahaṁ jānāmi.In this world—with its gods, Māras, and Brahmās, this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its gods and humans—whatever is seen, heard, thought, known, attained, sought, and explored by the mind: that I have insight into.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samārakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya diṭṭhaṁ sutaṁ mutaṁ viññātaṁ pattaṁ pariyesitaṁ anuvicaritaṁ manasā, tamahaṁ abbhaññāsiṁ.
That has been known by a Realized One, but a Realized One is not subject to it.
Taṁ tathāgatassa viditaṁ, taṁ tathāgato na upaṭṭhāsi.If I were to say that ‘I do not know … the world with its gods’, I would be lying.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samārakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya diṭṭhaṁ sutaṁ mutaṁ viññātaṁ pattaṁ pariyesitaṁ anuvicaritaṁ manasā, tamahaṁ na jānāmīti vadeyyaṁ, taṁ mamassa musā.If I were to say that ‘I both know and do not know … the world with its gods’, that would be just the same.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave …pe… tamahaṁ jānāmi ca na ca jānāmīti vadeyyaṁ, tampassa tādisameva.If I were to say that ‘I neither know nor do not know … the world with its gods’, that would be my fault.
Yaṁ, bhikkhave …pe… tamahaṁ neva jānāmi na na jānāmīti vadeyyaṁ, taṁ mamassa kali.So a Realized One sees what is to be seen, but does not conceive what is seen, does not conceive what is unseen, does not conceive what is to be seen, and does not conceive a seer.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathāgato daṭṭhā daṭṭhabbaṁ, diṭṭhaṁ na maññati, adiṭṭhaṁ na maññati, daṭṭhabbaṁ na maññati, daṭṭhāraṁ na maññati;
He hears what is to be heard, but does not conceive what is heard, does not conceive what is unheard, does not conceive what is to be heard, and does not conceive a hearer.
sutvā sotabbaṁ, sutaṁ na maññati, asutaṁ na maññati, sotabbaṁ na maññati, sotāraṁ na maññati;
He thinks what is to be thought, but does not conceive what is thought, does not conceive what is not thought, does not conceive what is to be thought, and does not conceive a thinker.
mutvā motabbaṁ, mutaṁ na maññati, amutaṁ na maññati, motabbaṁ na maññati, motāraṁ na maññati;
He knows what is to be known, but does not conceive what is known, does not conceive what is unknown, does not conceive what is to be known, and does not conceive a knower.
viññatvā viññātabbaṁ, viññātaṁ na maññati, aviññātaṁ na maññati, viññātabbaṁ na maññati, viññātāraṁ na maññati.Since a Realized One is poised in the midst of things seen, heard, thought, and known, he is the poised one.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathāgato diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabbesu dhammesu tādīyeva tādī.
And I say that there is no better or finer poise than this.
‘Tamhā ca pana tādimhā añño tādī uttaritaro vā paṇītataro vā natthī’ti vadāmīti.Such a one does not take anything
Yaṁ kiñci diṭṭhaṁva sutaṁ mutaṁ vā,
seen, heard, or thought to be ultimately true or false.
Ajjhositaṁ saccamutaṁ paresaṁ;
But others get attached, thinking it’s the truth,
Na tesu tādī sayasaṁvutesu,
limited by their preconceptions.
Saccaṁ musā vāpi paraṁ daheyya.Since they’ve seen this dart
Etañca sallaṁ paṭikacca disvā,
to which people are attached and cling,
Ajjhositā yattha pajā visattā;
saying, ‘I know, I see, that’s how it is’,
Jānāmi passāmi tatheva etaṁ,
the Realized Ones have no attachments.”
Ajjhositaṁ natthi tathāgatānan”ti.Metta
and
AN6.95
“Mendicants, these six things can’t be done.
“Chayimāni, bhikkhave, abhabbaṭṭhānāni.
What six?
Katamāni cha?
A person accomplished in view can’t fall back on the idea that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, or that they’re made by another, or that they’re made by both. Nor can they fall back on the idea that pleasure and pain arise by chance, not made by oneself, by another, or by both.
Abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo sayaṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ, abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo paraṅkataṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ, abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo sayaṅkatañca paraṅkatañca sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ, abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo asayaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ, abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo aparaṅkāraṁ adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ, abhabbo diṭṭhisampanno puggalo asayaṅkārañca aparaṅkārañca adhiccasamuppannaṁ sukhadukkhaṁ paccāgantuṁ.
Why is that?
Taṁ kissa hetu?
It is because a person accomplished in view has clearly seen causes and the phenomena that arise from causes.
Tathā hissa, bhikkhave, diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa hetu ca sudiṭṭho hetusamuppannā ca dhammā.
These are the six things that can’t be done.”
Imāni kho, bhikkhave, cha abhabbaṭṭhānānī”ti.
Oh and one more one more, the blind men and the elephant sutta is an undeclared points sutta;
Ud6.4 Ud6.5 Ud6.6
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Anyway, here is the bare list, which I think might be complete? of the undeclared points in the sutta pitaka:
DN1
DN2
DN9
DN15
DN24 * on views about the origin of the world
DN28 * eternalists
DN29
MN25
MN43 * about difference with regard to the aggregates
MN63
MN72
MN74 * about views
MN102
SN12.17
SN12.18
SN12.24
SN12.25
SN12.26
SN12.46
SN12.67
SN16.12
SN22.86 * existence after death
SN22.86
SN24 entire and particularly
SN24.18
SN33 entire and particularly
SN33.1
SN41.3
SN44 entire and particularly
SN44.1
SN44.3
SN44.6
SN44.7
SN44.10
SN44.11
SN56.8
SN56.41
AN4.24
AN4.38
AN4.173
AN6.95
AN7.54
AN10.20
AN10.93
AN10.95
AN10.96
Ud6.4
Ud6.5
Ud6.6
Is anyone aware of any agama suttas that explore the topic and are not parallels to the above?
Is purification of knowledge and vision extinguishment by not grasping?”
“Kiṁ nu kho, āvuso, ñāṇadassanavisuddhi anupādāparinibbānan”ti?“Certainly not.”
“No hidaṁ, āvuso”.“Then is extinguishment by not grasping something apart from these things?”
“Kiṁ panāvuso, aññatra imehi dhammehi anupādāparinibbānan”ti?“Certainly not.”
“No hidaṁ, āvuso”.…
If the Buddha had declared purification of knowledge and vision to be extinguishment by not grasping, he would have declared that which has grasping to be extinguishment by not grasping.
Ñāṇadassanavisuddhiñce, āvuso, bhagavā anupādāparinibbānaṁ paññapeyya, saupādānaṁyeva samānaṁ anupādāparinibbānaṁ paññapeyya.But if extinguishment by not grasping was something apart from these things, an ordinary person would become extinguished.
Aññatra ce, āvuso, imehi dhammehi anupādāparinibbānaṁ abhavissa, puthujjano parinibbāyeyya.For an ordinary person lacks these things.
Puthujjano hi, āvuso, aññatra imehi dhammehi.
MN24
Just thought I would add this one as it is another example of the part of the undeclared I find most chewy, that is we see another refusal to agree to a bivalence principle, or excluded middle.
You can also maybe see it in SN 22.82:
“But sir, is that grasping the exact same thing as the five grasping aggregates? Or is grasping one thing and the five grasping aggregates another?”
taññeva nu kho, bhante, upādānaṁ te pañcupādānakkhandhā udāhu aññatra pañcahi upādānakkhandhehi upādānan”ti?“Neither. Rather, the desire and greed for them is the grasping there.”
SN 22.82
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yes, this again looks like a P or -P type proposition that is rejected; is grasping the aggregates or is grasping something other than the aggregates is a good example too of a situation where “the presupposed entity does not in fact exist” fails as an explanation of the phenomena, as grasping and aggregates are both clearly implied to be real things here, but identity between or distinction from is still denied.
My sense is that this picture of early buddhist thought, in which phenomena are treated by analysis of what must be undeclared versus what can be declared, that is conditionality, is the crux of the arguments presented in the long discourses, especially DN1 DN2 and DN9.
I think that by the time of the development of texts like MN148, and later the systematics of SN, we begin to se the emergence of the reductionism with regard to persons position that replaces or at least obscures the undeclared/conditionality pocture.
This becomes a full blown metaphysics in the various abbhidhammaika projects, and this in turn is “corrected” by Nagarjunas Madyamaka.
Nagarjuna therefore revives “early” buddhism.
This is an unpopular view on this forum because of the preponderance of Theravada practitioners here.
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