Translating Vitarka and Vicāra to and from Chinese

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Regarding vitarka and vicara, the Abhidharmakoshabhasya discussions in chapter 2, karika 33 are also relevant (since they come from the same northern tradition that the Agamas are from, and it is from about the same time that they were translated into Chinese).

Let me reproduce some of the content (from Gelong Lodro Sangpo’s translations of Poussin’s French translation of the Chinese) below:

The first part of Karika 33 says, roughly:

Vitarka and vicāra are the grossness and subtleness of citta.

In the Bhasya, a debate ensues on the nature of this Vaibhasika definition for vitarka and vicāra because some Sautrantikas say a mind cannot be both gross and subtle at the same time. The Vaibhasikas retort that it is possible, like a mix of water and vinegar. The Sautrantikas then put forth their own definition, that they are “constituents for speech” [vāksaṃskāras], and quote a sutra.

The debate goes as follows:

[Objection to the Vaibhasika presentation:] - How can initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra) be associated (samprayukta) with thought (citta) both at the same time? Can thought be gross and subtle at the same time?

[Answer:] - According to one opinion, (1) investigation is to be compared to cold water, (2) thought is to be compared to fermented curd which floats on the surface of this cold water, (3) initial inquiry is to be compared to the warmth of the light rays of the sun which shine upon the fermented curd. Because of the water and the sun, the fermented curd is not too melted nor too coagulated. In the same way, initial inquiry and investigation are associated (yukta) with a thought: thought is neither too subtle because of initial inquiry, nor too gross because of investigation.

[Reply:] - But, we would say, it follows from this explanation that initial inquiry and investigation are not grossness and subtleness of thought but the cause (nimitta) of its grossness, the cause of its subtleness: the cold water and the warm light rays of the sun are not the solidified state and the fluid state of the ghee but the causes of these two states.

Other objections are presented: - Grossness and subtleness of thought are relative [apeksika] factors. They involve many degrees: (1) [in regard to different stages,] the thought of the first meditation (dhyana) is subtle in relation to the thought of the realm of desire, but gross in relation to the thought of the second meditation; (2) in regard to the same stage, the qualities and the defilements can be more or less gross or subtle, since they divide into nine categories … Thus, if initial inquiry and investigation are grossness and subtleness of thought, we would be forced to admit that they both exist up to the highest stage of the realm of immateriality. But they have ceased from the second meditation onwards. - On top of that, grossness and subtleness cannot establish a specific difference: thus one cannot differentiate initial inquiry and investigation.

The definitions of (the Sautrantika):
According to another opinion, initial inquiry and investigation are “constituents for speech” [vāksaṃskāras]. The Sutra says in fact:

It is after having initially inquired, after having investigated (vitarkya;
vicārya) that one speaks, not without having init1ally inquired, not without having investigated.

The constituents for speech that are gross are called vitarkas; those that are subtle are called vicāras. [According to this explanation, by vitarka and vicāra one should not understand two distinct factors, but rather the collection of thought and thought-concomitants which provoke speech and which are sometimes gross, sometimes subtle.]

Can initial inquiry and investigation be simultaneous?

(The Vaibhasika:) - What contradiction [virodha] is there in the case where two factors (dharma)-the first (i.e., vitarka) being gross and the second (i.e., vicāra) being subtle-are associated with one and the same thought?

(The Sautrantika:) - There would not be any contradiction if these two factors had a specific difference or difference in type; for example, sensation (vedana) and ideation (samjna)–although the first is gross and the second subtle–can coexist. But, when considering the same type, two states, a weak state and a strong state, a gross state and a subtle state, cannot coexist.

(The Vaibhasika:) -There is a specific difference between initial inquiry and investigation.

(The Sautrantika:)- What is this difference?

(The Vaibha~ika.) - This difference is difficult to speak about [durvaca]; but it is manifested (vyakta) through the weakness and strength of thought.

(The Sautrantika:) - The weakness and strength of thought does not demonstrate the presence of two specifically different factors, since one and the same type is sometimes weak, sometimes strong.

According to another opinion-i.e., ours-initial inquiry and investigation are not associated with one and the same [ekatra] thought. They exist in turn.

The footnotes to this translation contain some interesting quotations from other works.

K.L. Dhammajoti comments:

according to the Sautrantika "vitarka and vicara are not real entities but merely two designations for the gross and subtle states of citta. Their difference is one of degree, not of kind. Vasubandhu explains that their operation is not simultaneous but alternate.

The Nyayanusara by Samghabhadra states:

[Objection:] Grossness and subtleness being mutually contradictory, vitarka and vicara should not be co-nascent in the same citta.

[Answer:] Although the substances of the two co-exist in one and the same citta, the predominance of their activities differs in time. Hence they do not contradict each other. It is like equal parts of water and vinegar in combination: Although there is equality in substance (i.e quantity), there is a predominance in activity [of the one over the other]. In a gross citta, the activity of vicara is impaired as a result of the predominance of the activity of vitarka; so that though [the former] exists, it is difficult to detect it. In subtle citta, the activity of vitarka is impaired as a result of the predominance of the activity of vicara; so that though [the former] exists, it is difficult to detect it.

One might argue that this analogy is not valid inasmuch as the activity of vinegar predominates at all times. This objection is not reasonable. I do not say definitely that the vinegar is to be compared to vitarka and water [to] vicara; only that which predominates in activity is like vinegar: Within the citta, whichever of the two dharmas, vitarka and vicara, predominates in activity, is to be compared to vinegar; that whose activity is feeble is to be compared to water. Hence it is not the case that one and the same citta is at once gross and subtle; as vitarka and vicara, though coexisting in the citta, operate at different times.

Louis de La Vallée-Poussin comments:

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So, we can see here two divergent understandings of these terms in the northern tradition. Vaibhasika thinks that it refers to two qualities of thought or mentation which co-exist (i.e. grossness and subtleness).

Sautrantika sees them as specific mental activities which are associated with nama. In this Sautrantika understanding, before one speaks, first one applies the mind to a thought initially (this is a grosser activity, presumably because it takes more mental energy to direct the mind to some new object initially), then one examines said thought (a subtler activity apparently). Furthermore they do not exist in the same state of mind, they instead exist one after the other in turn (first you place, then you maintain that and examine).

Vibhasikas object to this because the first dhyāna is said to have both vitarka and vicāra (which they think supports their view), but Sautrantika retorts that this is only a general statement, in fact in any particular moment of the first dhyāna, there are only four factors. This is because vitarka and vicāra do not occur at the same time, and they are merely designations for two activities of the mind (and not two real independent existents).

IMO, this makes sense if you think of the meditative process as placing the mind on the object and keeping it there (and placing it back when the mind falls away etc).

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I certainly have great respect for the challenge of the translator when it comes to terms like these. There are certain words from the suttas that can’t be adequately substituted for a single English word. But a translator needs to translate! A particular choice of words points the hearer in a certain direction and subtle differences in a compass point ends up in a different place.

Personally, I find these two terms to be excellent examples of the value of putting time and effort into fully comprehending the meaning of certain terms and then leaving them untranslated in ordinary Buddhist conversation.

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Yeah, I can see that reading given the way meditation is often cultivated. The thing about 覺 that doesn’t fit that reading is that it generally isn’t an intentional act. A person doesn’t intentionally wake up from a nap or intentionally notice a sound in the room, etc. It’s a passive mental function. So, I imagine it more as the “noise” that bubbles up in a mind that isn’t completely focused yet. Something arises, which is a bit of a surprise in that initial moment, then it gets attention. Like the bell metaphor found in many Indic commentaries.

The later Chinese translations do imply an intent, a searching or seeking for both vitarka and vicara. To me, it’s very possible that the two translations represent earlier and later interpretations, which is why I try to be loyal to the early version and not consider a mistake and erase it.

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In that case it is possible that the Chinese Agama translations favored the Kashmiri Vaibhasika interpretation, since a gross mental process seems to be more in line with what you are describing.

That being said the use of 覺 could just have been a case of using a common word for a more specific technical term. In that case, it would be interesting if we knew a bit more about the translators of the Agamas. Do we know anything about them and their sectarian affiliations?

edit, I found this:

The Madhyama-āgama was, according to the information that
has come down to us, translated into Chinese during the period
397–398 C.E. under the leadership of the Kashmirian monk Gautama Saṅghadeva.According to what appears to be a general consensus among most scholars so far, the Madhyama-āgama collection would have been transmitted by reciters belonging to the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

  • Madhyama-āgama Studies by Anālayo, p. 1.

I guess this brings us back to the issue we’ve discussed before here. Do we translate looking at the Indic original term, as we think it was understood in early Buddhism, or do we translate the text we have in front of us, as was understood by the translators / reciters / recorders of said source text? No easy answer here I am afraid, but at least we know what the Vaibhasikas had in mind when it came to these terms.

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It isn’t a sectarian issue, rather one of time period. Basically, the pre-Xuanzang consensus had settled on 覺 and 觀, then he changed the convention to 尋 and 伺. Translators after him, who were translating Sanskrit, followed his lead. I haven’t looked at it super-closely, such as looking at the really early translation attempts or when exactly the switch-over happened. But that’s my impression from looking at various Chinese translations over the years.

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I choose to use “thought” for 覺 and reflection for 觀, due to the fact that in many passages they have that contextual meaning. I realized that sometimes in classical Chinese the texts were intended to be read in a contextual rather than literal way.

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This is very interesting to me. I do not know Chinese, but ancient Vietnamese is very similar to ancient Chinese, so I can understand the meaning of these combined words in Vietnamese.

In Vietnamese, 覺 觀 means “giác quan” which means the five senses’ consciousnesses (In Vietnamese they are: thị giác, thính giác, vị giác, khứu giác và xúc giác which mean eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness,…)

This fits perfectly well with my own understanding of jhana. As I understand, jhanas is the training for direct knowledge; however, direct knowledge only arises when the six senses’ consciousnesses cease. This is a gradual process; therefore, we will need to eventually shut down the six senses.

Shutting down the six senses’ consciousnesses does not mean the six senses are no longer working or disappear. It just means that we no longer provide the condition for their consciousnesses to arise, or they no longer have any effectiveness on us. For “thị giác or eye-consciousness” to work, we will need the eye and its external objects. This is objective consciousness.

To me, what we normally call “consciousness or vinnana” is simply this objective consciousness. Why? Because that’s all we know about consciousness. We have no idea what subjective consciousness or direct knowledge is. Therefore, whatever we refer to consciousness or vinnana, it is simply this objective consciousness.

This objective consciousness is the problem that prevents us from seeing the truth, so we will need to end it. However, it is not easy to do so; therefore, we must go step by step.

To shut down the six senses’ consciousnesses , we first need to eliminate their nutriments. Sensual desire is the nutriment for the five senses, ill will, doubt, anxiousness, worry, sloth and torpor are foods for the mind.

After eliminating the hindrances, the six senses do not immediately go away. They are still active. However, they are calm and steady and no longer chasing their objects or having any effectiveness. Seeing this, joy and happiness arise.

Since the six senses are still active in the first jhana, we can still see, hear, smell…, but the mind no longer clings to them. The mind is instead eventually immersed in internal joy and happiness. It is attracted by this internal joy and happiness. However, at this stage, the mind is not yet fully immersed in internal joy and happiness, so the five senses’ consciousnesses still have some effect on it. This is why noise, smell or touch is an obstacle for the first jhana. This is why seclusion is needed.

When the mind is fully immersed in internal joy and happiness with no room for the five sense’s consciousnesses to enter, the five senses no longer have any effect on the mind, so they stop and be stilled, we are in the second jhana…

Since this is my own understanding of jhana, so I will keep it short, just to show why I think 覺 觀 is the five senses’ consciousnesses . These five senses’ consciousnesses are present in the first jhana, and they are inactive in the second jhana. That is what I understand.

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That’s my feeling too.

I’d translate accordingly, and add a footnote.

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That won’t do, since this ‘awareness’ is supposed to be dropped for 2nd jhana.

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Ah! Didn’t know that :thinking: “Willful attention”?? :see_no_evil:

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Translators who are at a loss vacillate from one option to the next. There’s no vacillation in translating vitarka and vicara in the dhyanas, even though there’s lots of it in the dhyana formulas themselves. Across the board, for centuries, they were quite content to translate the two words as 覺 and 觀. So, this is not an explanation. At some point, we have to respect how they understood the words and stop trying to imagine they were confused or mistaken.

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After these words had been established, I think it’s not so much as the monks were confused or mistaken from then on.

I can understand the need to stick to these translations then even if they later regard these translations to be inaccurate or wrong, as these words were very likely to be used when the monks taught. So, if they changed the translations too soon, the non-scholarly students may get confused.

To take a relative recent example in the English world, in the 70s, some Buddhist scholars began to come up with new English translations. These translations were met with resistance, not because they were less accurate, but because they were regarded as potential source of confusion.

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Sure, I can understand how a person can come this type of view about it. Technical words are always problematic for readers who don’t have the background explanation to understand them properly. However, there’s no reason to think Chinese Buddhists didn’t understand these words properly. They studied Abhidharma, Sutras, and primer commentaries like the Dazhidulun that explained contexts.

My own view at this point after investigating it quite a bit is that Buddhists in general didn’t actually think that much about what exactly these two words were supposed to mean. There’s very little discussion of them in Abhidharma works aside from a few illustrations or basic explanations. There are no great debates and arguments about it for the most part. It wasn’t an issue.

That makes it difficult for us in modern times because they didn’t leave very much behind for us to read about it. And so, we are the ones who are at a loss. Much of it stems from the Theravada tradition reinventing itself as a early Buddhist dhyana school and turning these ill-defined technical words into major points of ideology and instruction. Modern Theravadins are extremely interested in these little sticking points in the dhyana formulas, but Buddhists outside of Theravada Buddhism could care less about it. It’s not an issue. They think about other things.

So, my basic conclusion is that all of this is a modern problem rather than an ancient one. Modern people arguing about words that can be interpreted in various ways, which were left that way intentionally because ancient people didn’t think it warranted much definition.

However, aside from that situation, I do think the the change in translation in Chinese sources may very well represent a change in the language and traditions of Indic Buddhism. The 6-7th centuries were a time of change in the Buddhist world, and those changes were felt in China. One major change was the switch from Prakrit as the language of EBTs to Sanskrit. Xuanzang was translated S. vitarka and vicāra, whereas the translators of Agamas were translated G. vitaka and vicara. They were also translating with the views of Buddhist schools of Central Asia and Kasmir. Xuanzang represents the views of scholar monks in Nalanda. Etc. There is a discontinuity that took place that’s easy to forget when we think of Chinese Buddhism in isolation from what was happening outside of China. Schools like the Dharmaguptakas were disappearing from Central Asia and Buddhism in general was in decline in the region as Christians and other religions displaced them after the collapse of the Kusana dynasty. Buddhism in general was switching over to Mahayana discourse and identities. The old Agama traditions were falling by the wayside when they were translated to Chinese.

So, yeah. It’s complicated. And also not so complicated. I think @freedom is on the right track as far as how these words were understood by the people who translated the Agamas in the 4th-5th centuries.

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