This is difficult to follow, like a 
Twighlight Zone episode. Please explain it more clearly, including references to relevant suttas. Thank you.
Are you saying the right view is an arahant ceases to be conscious when ignorance ceases?
In the 1-life interpretation DO is structural not temporal. If ignorance ceases at 22:45 tomorrow (arahantship) that means volitional formations cease at 22:45, that means consciousness cease at 22:45 etc. You can not have ignorance cease at 22:45 and consciousness cease 5 years later.
In the suttas, do people lose consciousness after attaining enlightenment ?
Please speak in Buddhist language rather than use Western words from philosophy.
Again, I asked: Are you saying the right view is an arahant ceases to be conscious when ignorance ceases? Thanks
[quote=“dxm_dxm, post:62, topic:2990”]
In the suttas, do people lose consciousness after attaining enlightenment ?[/quote]
No. So what are you implying? 
Please speak in Buddhist language rather than use Western words from philosophy.
Again, I asked: Are you saying the right view is an arahant ceases to be conscious when ignorance ceases?
Thanks
No, that is a wrong view that is a direct logical result of a 1-life interpretation of pattica. You can not have ignorance ceasing tomorrow at 22:45 and consciousness ceasing 15 years later. Not in the 1-life interpretation where the process is structural not temporal.
[quote=“dxm_dxm, post:64, topic:2990”]
No, that is a wrong view that is a direct logical result of a 1-life interpretation of pattica.[/quote]
I think the problem is the interpretation of the word ‘nirodha’, for which ‘cessation’ may not be an accurate translation. 
Please read SN 22:53 carefully, which may provide insight into what is meant by the samudhaya & nirodha of consciousness. 
Also, AN 3.76.
It is you that is regarding consciousness as something static, like in your colored 2 dimensional horizontal drawings. In reality, such drawings should be 3 dimensional, including a vertical component, like an upside-down pyramid.
D.O. seems to be referring to the ‘tainting’ of consciousness by ignorance or asava. Ignorance is one of the taints (asava) (refer to MN 9, final part). Please also consider SN 46.55 about how the taints - as the five hindrances - color, pollute & obscure the clear seeing of consciousness.
That you believe ignorance materialistically creates consciousness sounds like Western materialism to me. I doubt ignorance neurologically ‘creates’ consciousness. Instead, ignorance probably only ‘pollutes’ consciousness. Thus when nirodha occurs, what remains is an unpolluted undefiled consciousness, per AN 1.49. 
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- What should be a better tanslation for “nirodha” ?
- At paranibbana, is there any consciousness left or non at all ? Are you a believer in the “consciousness with no objects” of Thanissaro ? If not, then explain me how can consciousness disappear. What is it’s origin and what is it’s cesation ? On what is it dependent and how will it cease without reminder ?
Ajahn Buddhadasa was an old Thai monk (now gone) who received many honorary doctorates from Thai universities and was chosen to represent Thailand at the 6th Buddhist Council. This old monk suggested the translation of ‘nirodha’ as ‘quenches’. Thus, when ignorance quenches, formations quench; when formations quench, consciousness quenches.
The below might also help, by PA Payutto, considered Thailands foremost scholar.
A problem with the word “nirodha”
The word nirodha has been translated as “cessation” for so long that it has become standard practice and any deviation from it leads to queries. Even in this book I have opted for this standard translation for sake of convenience and to avoid confusing it for other Pali terms (apart from lack of a better word). In fact, however, this rendering of the word “nirodha” as “ceased” can in many instances be a mis-rendering of the text.
Generally speaking, the word “cease” means to do away with something which has already arisen or the stopping of something which has already begun. However, nirodha in the teaching of Dependent Origination (as also in dukkhanirodha, the third of the Four Noble Truths) means the non-arising, or non-existence, of something because the cause of its arising is done away with. For example, the phrase “when avijja is nirodha, sankhara are also nirodha,” which is usually taken to mean “with the cessation of ignorance, volitional impulses cease,” in fact means “when there is no ignorance or no arising of ignorance, or when there is no longer any problem with ignorance, there are no volitional impulses, volitional impulses do not arise or there is no longer any problem with volitional impulses.” It does not mean that ignorance already arisen must be done away with before the volitional impulses which have already arisen will also be done away with.
Where nirodha should be rendered as cessation is when it is used in reference to the natural way of things or the nature of compounded things. In this sense it is a synonym for the words bhanga, breaking up, anicca, transient, khaya, cessation or vaya, decay. For example, in the Pali it is given: imam kho bhikkhave tisso vedana anicca sankhata paticcasamuppanna khayadhamma vayadhamma viragadhamma nirodhadhamma: “Monks, these three kinds of feeling are naturally impermanent, compounded, dependently arisen, transient, subject to decay, dissolution, fading and cessation.”[S.IV.214] (All of the factors occurring in the Dependent Origination cycle have the same nature.) In this instance, the meaning is “all conditioned things (sankhara), having arisen, must inevitably decay and fade according to supporting factors.” There is no need to try to stop them, they cease of themselves. Here the intention is to describe a natural condition which, in terms of practice, simply means “that which arises can be done away with.”
As for nirodha in the third Noble Truth (or the Dependent Origination cycle in cessation mode), although it also describes a natural process, its emphasis is on practical considerations. It is translated in two ways in the Visuddhimagga. One way traces the etymology to “ni” (without) + “rodha” (prison, confine, obstacle, wall, impediment), thus rendering the meaning as “without impediment,” “free of confinement.” This is explained as “free of impediments, that is, the confinement of samsara.” Another definition traces the origin to anuppada, meaning “not arising” and goes on to say “nirodha here does not mean bhanga, breaking up and dissolution.”
Therefore, translating nirodha as “cessation”, although not entirely wrong, is nevertheless not entirely accurate. On the other hand, there is no other word which comes so close to the essential meaning as “cessation.” However, we should understand what is meant by the term. In this context, the Dependent Origination cycle in its cessation mode might be better rendered as “being free of ignorance, there is freedom from volitional impulses …” or “when ignorance is gone, volitional impulses are gone …” or “when ignorance ceases to give fruit, volitional impulses cease to give fruit …” or “when ignorance is no longer a problem, volitional impulses are no longer a problem.”
Even in the forward mode, there are some problems with definitions. The meaning of many of the Pali terms are too broad to be translated into any single English words. For instance, avijja paccaya sankhara also means “When ignorance is like this, volitional impulses are like this; volitional impulses being this way, consciousness is like this; consciousness being this way, body and mind are like this; …”
PA Payutto
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[quote=“dxm_dxm, post:66, topic:2990”]
2) At paranibbana, is there any consciousness left or non at all ? Are you a believer in the “consciousness with no objects” of Thanissaro ? If not, then explain me how can consciousness disappear. What is it’s origin and what is it’s cesation ? On what is it dependent and how will it cease without reminder ?[/quote]
Iti 44 explains there are two kinds of Nibbana, where one kind of Nibbana has consciousness and the other kind of Nibbana (a.k.a. Parinibbana) has no consciousness. Thus, your questions here seem to be irrelevant; as are the materialistic two-dimensional words “disappear” & “cessation”.
As for Parinibbana, it seems simply to be an auspicious word for the ending of life of a Buddha because a Buddha does not “die”. It seems to be wrong view to refer to the “death” of an arahant (see SN 22.85; MN 140, etc)
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About Buddhadassa - no doubt he was a famous guy. But Buddha was even more famous than him. So famous that Buddhadasa copied his name.
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So why does in the case of a non-arahant, consciousness “descend into the womb” and the being has to live another life, while in the case of an arahant that does not happen ?
Buddha was more famous than Buddhadasa and Buddhadasa was more famous than Dxm_Dxm. The interpretations of translations Dxm_Dxm reads are not necessarily the same understanding of the Buddha. Instead, they are merely subjective interpretations of subjective translations.
Buddhadasa copied his name from Pali evening chanting where as Dxm copied his/her name from a cough syrup called Dextromethorphan.
Buddhassaahasmi daaso va (women:daasi va) Buddho me saamikissaro
I am indeed the servant of the Buddha, the Buddha is my great Master.
Buddha was more famous than Buddhadasa and Buddhadasa was more famous than Dxm_Dxm.
Buddhadasa copied his name from Pali evening chanting where as Dxm copied his/her name from a cough syrup called
But you have not answered my second question
What Ajahn Buddhadasa shared in common with Ajahn Sujato & even Bhikkhu Bodhi is the questioning of the composition of the DN. You can search this site for some discussions.
DN 15 in particular does not accord with the stock teachings about D.O. (such as SN 12.2 & MN 38), which unlike your interpretation of DN 15, are said to be:
…visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for themselves.
MN 38
However, to give DN 15 the benefit of the doubt, ‘nama-rupa’ is defined in DN 15 (unlike SN 12.2) as ‘describing form’, which is the Brahmanistic meaning of ‘naming-forms’. DN 15 then discusses delineations of ‘self’.
Thus, for a woman to ‘describe’ & ‘delineate’ the embryo in her womb as “my baby” and “my child”, her consciousness must first descend into her womb.
It is similar to having a stomach ache. To know you have a stomach ache, first consciousness must descend into the stomach.
This many not be a common interpretation but it fits into the criteria of: visible here and now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, onward leading, to be experienced by the wise for themselves.
So why does rebirth happen ?
[quote=“dxm_dxm, post:73, topic:2990, full:true”]
So why does rebirth happen ?[/quote]
According to the Nanananda-like view, ‘re-birth’ as the re-arising of ‘self-view’ can happen due to ignorance. This type of re-birth can happen 1000s of times in one day.
It is like if a person loses $100,000 playing poker. The person generates all kinds of ‘self-views’ based in the sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief & despair of losing $100,000. Instead of that mind seeing only aggregates & sense objects comprising of cards, wooden tables, computer screens, computer images, digital money, paper money, etc, this ignorant mind sees ‘selves’ & ‘persons’ losing “my money”.
SN 22.81 describes how this type of visible or knowable ‘re-birth’ occurs.
Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling , who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self. That regarding, bhikkhus, is a formation. That formation—what is its source, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that formation is born.
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My friend, we have spammed and derailed this topic. This topic is about the existentialist 1-life interpretation of pattica, not about the materialist buddhist interpretation. Materialist do not know on what consciousness depends, that is why it’s called “the hard problem” of materialism. Nobody has been able to answer why a creature as primitive as an insect with 4 neurons can have consciousness but a supercomputer not.
This is not your battle to fight my friend. This topic is about existentialist buddhist not secular buddhist. I suggest this conversation to be split into “Buddhadasa 1 life interpretation” so we do not derail the Nanananda 1-life interpretation witch does believe in rebirth. I came to this topic to debate the existentialist interpretation not the secular buddhadasa interpretation.
[quote=“dxm_dxm, post:75, topic:2990”]
“Buddhadasa 1 life interpretation” so we do not derail the Nanananda 1-life interpretation witch does believe in rebirth.[/quote]
The Buddhadasa model believes in ‘re-birth’ however not a ‘re-birth’ of a same thing and a ‘new birth’ of a new ‘self-view’. More or less, it is ‘re-birth’ or ‘new-birth’ or ‘birth-again’ or whatever.
As for Nanananda, to return to topic, please quote his view of ‘rebirth’ so we can objectively & cordially discuss it.
Personally, I have never read the entire writings of Nanananda (since they are simply too long & convoluted for my attention span) but mostly the proselytizing of his internet disciples.
Thank you.
How embarrassing for me. I should have read the source rather than gain impressions from Bhikkhu K. Ñāṇananda’s internet Western disciples. 
Bhikkhu K. Ñāṇananda is talking about DN 11 & DN 15, where ‘nama-rupa’ appears to have the Brahmanistic meaning of ‘naming-forms’ based on the theory the DN was composed for proselytizing to Brahmans.
The object of the last thought is ‘nāma-rūpa’ which is indicative of the next birth. It makes an imprint in the mother’s womb, like a light shade of the mind but until consciousness goes and joins with it, there is no animation. Even if consciousness unites with it and animates it, if it slips out during the period of pregnancy, an apparent miscarriage will result. Instead of a child, a lifeless ball of flesh will come out, because consciousness has slipped out due to some karmic reason. Consequently, no being will be born out of that ‘nāma-rūpa’ into ‘this state of existence’ or ‘itthatta’.
This amounts to saying that if consciousness does not get a footing in name-and-form, there is no state of existence. There is no question of birth again. What the Arahants have done is to bring consciousness to such a state where it gets no footing on name-and-form. In other words, it is the state of unestablishedconsciousness (appatiṭṭhita viññaṇa).
By constant reflection on those lines, the mind is made to get disenchanted with the earth-element, thereby making it fade away from the mind. It is a mind liberated from the four elements that does not take birth in a mother’s womb.
Bhikkhu K. Ñāṇananda
Yes! I completely agree with @Brahmali
As someone who is incredibly fortunate to be influenced by both traditional and non-traditional Buddhist conditioning, I can’t help feeling that so called “Secular Buddhists” are appropriating aspects of my religion, things that are sacred and deeply significant to me and distorting the textual facts around them and then spreading this around as if it’s the truth. I cannot help feeling very offended.
There are many Buddhist traditions. I wildly, deeply, disagree with many of their teachings and practices. But I see them as all having a strong common core and view their adherents as brothers and sisters in the Dhamma - at least to some degree.
On the outside “Secular Buddhism” seems to fit in with all of the other Buddhist traditions; the external face of Practice may look similar, the emphasis on meditation, metta, on psychological development and virtue and valuing of an everyday use level of insight. Yet there is neither depth nor distinctive direction; I see every other Buddhist tradition that I know of as having both of these.
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Thanks for this!
I think it’s very important to trace the Phenomenologist’s appeal to the “categorial intuition” to a development that occurred in Continental philosophy.
Despite Kant’s heroic attempt to rescue philosophy from Hume’s Fork, the consensus is that he has largely failed to justify the synthetic a priori as a legitimate epistemological device. The synthetic a priori forms the bedrock of Buddhist phenomenology in the form of the categorial intuition that is supposed to transcend syllogism.
My favourite retort to that is to ask if the Buddha Himself would have approved of the synthetic a priori as a legitimate means of “knowing”. We can see His attitude to this in DN 1. Taking one simple example -
In the first case, bhikkhus, some recluse or a brahmin, by means of ardour, endeavour, application, diligence, and right reflection, attains to such a degree of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated, [purified, clarified, unblemished, devoid of corruptions], he recollects his numerous past lives: that is, (he recollects) one birth, two, three, four, or five births; ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty births; a hundred, a thousand, or a hundred thousand births; many hundreds of births, many thousands of births, many hundreds of thousands of births. (He recalls:) ‘Then I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life. Passing away thence, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his numerous past lives in their modes and their details.
“He speaks thus: ‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself. What is the reason? Because I, by means of ardour, endeavour, application, diligence, and right reflection, attain to such a degree of mental concentration that with my mind thus concentrated, I recollect my numerous past lives in their modes and their details. For this reason I know this: the self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.’
On the basis of several hundreds of thousands of lifetimes being witnessed, that person reaches the conclusion on the existence of a Self. The conclusion of the Self’s existence is synthesized from premises that do not contain any implication of a Self. This is a typical synthetic a priori, much like the theistic Argument from Design ridiculed by Hume.
DN 1 is replete with other examples of the synthetic a priori that are not acceptable. Until the phenomenologists come to grip with the canonical rejection of this form of epistemology, they are (as you rightly put it) arguing against logic and reason. I believe the Buddha was happy to employ logic, given His use of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens in MN 22 to deny the existence of the “Self”.
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[quote=“Sylvester, post:79, topic:2990”]
recollects his numerous past lives:[/quote]
How does the quoted translation of “lives” (for “nivasa”) reconcile with both the translation of “abodes” (for “nivasa”) & the overall message of the teaching in this translation of SN 22.79?
Did the Buddha have past “lives” comprised of one single khandha, as SN 22.79 seems to infer?
At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who recollect their manifold past abodes all recollect the five aggregates subject to clinging or a certain one among them. What five?
When recollecting thus, bhikkhus: ‘I had such form in the past,’ it is just form that one recollects. When recollecting: ‘I had such a feeling in the past,’ it is just feeling that one recollects. When recollecting: ‘I had such a perception in the past,’ it is just perception that one recollects. When recollecting: ‘I had such volitional formations in the past,’ it is just volitional formations that one recollects. When recollecting: ‘I had such consciousness in the past,’ it is just consciousness that one recollects.
How does the term “satta” in the definition of “jati” (“birth”) in SN 12.2 reconcile with the definition of “satta” found in SN 23.2 and SN 5.10?
And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings (satta) into the various orders of beings (satta)… SN 12.2
“Why now do you assume ‘a being’ (satta)?
Mara, is that your speculative view?
This is a heap of sheer formations:
Here no being (satta) is found.
“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’
SN 5.10
Thanks