Ven. Ñāṇananda, Nibbana and Phenomenological Existentialism

Discussion
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81

Not only that, but Buddha specifically says he “does not debate with the world” because he is not proposing anything against common sense. He can not be contradicted by logic. (that’s how he won all those debates with wanderers of other sects btw) Whathever things he discovered through special knowledge, they are all in line with logic not against it. Whathever a wise man in the world would agree upon, the Buddha agrees too.

Ironically, this statement is made in the sutta that existentialist buddhism hate the most (the one about thing existing). SN 22.94

At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.

“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.

There are things in buddhism (rebirth, what is nibbana etc.) that can not be understood through 5 minutes of reading. There are things that require understanding the whole teachings. Just like one can not undertand the engine of an airplane in 3 minutes. But there is nothing that can be contradicted. While everything else can be refuted. (materialism, idealism etc.) Despite having some things that can not be understood on the spot, Buddhism can not be contradicted while other views can. It is in this way that Buddha won all those debates and Buddhism took over all of india in just 2 centuries. It was a good environment for debates because if a wanderer got refuted in a debate, all his disciples would leave to the winner of the debate. Sadly, such a debate culture is nonexistent in the west today. And the postmodernist view is against this, claiming debates have no purpose and there is no objective truth. Postmodernism is the one responsible for ideas like “despite strongly disagreeing, we both are right and it is just a matter of what works for different persons” - an anti-debate mentality. Luckily this anti-logic postmodernist view is only popular in the english world, especially in the US and not in continental europe or other parts of the world.

The way to refute postmodernism is done in 1 line, by showing it is self-refuting: If “logic has it’s limits” and there is no objective truth, then the postmodernist view itself has no value and can never be considered correct. It is a self-refuting view.

82

Honestly, it is hard for me to make any sense out of this. I have never read any other account of the passage you quoted that interprets it as describing anything that could be called the “synthesis of a self”. Nor do I think there are any significant examples of propositions in Buddhist doctrine that are plausible candidates for what Kant described as the synthetic a priori.

83

I think the Buddha was clear: he refrained from debating with the world simply because 99% of the things the world wants to debate are entirely irrelevant to the goal of Buddhist practice, and so debating them is, from the point of view of either one seeking that goal or one teaching others to achieve that goal , a massive waste of time. The Buddha taught his followers what they needed to know and how to comport themselves. Then he said: “Here is a tree. Sit under it and practice mindfulness of breathing.”

84

Come on, we have already talked about it in this very thread, just scroll up :smirk:

85

That is an attitude found in Zen or Mahasi and is not the attitude the historical Buddha had. He debated innumerable times with wanderers of other sects. There are suttas where Buddha praises bhikkus for refuting other in debates, saying “it is good from time to time, to refute those wanderers of other sets in a debate in the way this bhikkhu has done”. There is even a sutta where Buddha admonishes some bhikkhus because they did not know how to debate. The particular bhikkus won a debate but did so just because the others were stupid and did not know how to debate either, and then Buddha continues and explains them how to debate that point properly. (I’m speaking about the sutta with the simile of the baby).

In ancient india, there was a very pro-debate culture and the winner of a debate got all the disciples of the loser in the debate. And it is because of this that buddhism became the dominant religion in almost all of india in just 2 centuries.

In ancient India, Greece and Tibet, the art of argumentation was an extremely important (and prestigious) activity. To win a formal debate was to demonstrate the truth of one’s school of thought or spiritual faith. The Buddha was a potent and charismatic debater who threatened the intellectual complacency of many Brahmins. The famous consequence of losing a debate in India was to lose one’s students, who would all convert to the winning school of thought. In Buddhist Tibet, monastic universities still put heavy emphasis on training students for debate, which is an essential part of the monastery curriculum.

In the sutta in question, Buddha explains that he “does not debate with the world” not in a literal sense that he shuts up and sits like Zen. He explains that he “does not debate with the world” and rather “the world is debating with me” - because he does not contradict anything a wise man is saying. What he says can be agreed upon by any wise human. The passage again:

At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

This refers to the fact that there are no points where logic says one thing and Buddha says another that is contradicting logic because of some supernormal knowledge. The supernormal knowledge that he has obeys logic and confirms logic - only that he knows more than can be knows by a normal person. But this knowledge does not contradict logic, like saying things don’t really exist like illusionist/existentialist do. This is the point of the sutta I’ve quoted. He continue with a refutal of illusionist in the next passage.

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86

I think you are wrong:

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.09.0.than.html

“Well then, lord, if — having other views, other practices, other satisfactions, other aims, other teachers — it’s hard for me to know whether perception is a person’s self or if perception is one thing and self another, then is it the case that the cosmos is eternal, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless?”

“Potthapada, I haven’t expounded that the cosmos is eternal, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless.”

“Then is it the case that the cosmos is not eternal, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless?”

“Potthapada, I haven’t expounded that the cosmos is not eternal, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless.”

“Then is it the case that the cosmos is finite… the cosmos is infinite… the soul & the body are the same… the soul is one thing and the body another… after death a Tathagata exists… after death a Tathagata does not exist… after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist… after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless?”

“Potthapada, I haven’t expounded that after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist, that only this is true and anything otherwise is worthless.”

“But why hasn’t the Blessed One expounded these things?”

“Because they are not conducive to the goal, are not conducive to the Dhamma, are not basic to the holy life. They don’t lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding. That’s why I haven’t expounded them.”

“And what has the Blessed One expounded?”

"I have expounded that, ‘This is stress’… ‘This is the origination of stress’… ‘This is the cessation of stress’… ‘This is the path of practice leading to the cessation of stress.’

“And why has the Blessed One expounded these things?”

“Because they are conducive to the goal, conducive to the Dhamma, and basic to the holy life. They lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calm, to direct knowledge, to self-awakening, to Unbinding. That’s why I have expounded them.”

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87

And this one:

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.09.0.than.html

“Only here is there purity”
— that’s what they say —
“No other doctrines are pure”
— so they say.
Insisting that what they depend on is good,
they are deeply entrenched in their personal truths.

Seeking controversy, they plunge into an assembly,
regarding one another as fools.
Relying on others’ authority,
they speak in debate.
Desiring praise, they claim to be skilled.

Engaged in disputes in the midst of the assembly,
— anxious, desiring praise —
the one defeated is
chagrined.
Shaken with criticism, he seeks for an opening.

He whose doctrine is [judged as] demolished,
defeated, by those judging the issue:
He laments, he grieves — the inferior exponent.
“He beat me,” he mourns.

These disputes have arisen among contemplatives.
In them are elation,
dejection.
Seeing this, one should abstain from disputes,
for they have no other goal
than the gaining of praise.

He who is praised there
for expounding his doctrine
in the midst of the assembly,
laughs on that account & grows haughty,
attaining his heart’s desire.

That haughtiness will be his grounds for vexation,
for he’ll speak in pride & conceit.
Seeing this, one should abstain from debates.
No purity is attained by them, say the skilled.

Like a strong man nourished on royal food,
you go about, roaring, searching out an opponent.
Wherever the battle is,
go there, strong man.
As before, there’s none here.

Those who dispute, taking hold of a view,
saying, "This, and this only, is true,"
those you can talk to.
Here there is nothing —
no confrontation
at the birth of disputes.

Among those who live above confrontation
not pitting view against view,
whom would you gain as opponent, Pasura,
among those here
who are grasping no more?

So here you come,
conjecturing,
your mind conjuring
viewpoints.
You’re paired off with a pure one
and so cannot proceed.

88

And this one:

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.4.13.than.html

“Those who, dwelling on views,
dispute, saying, ‘Only this is true’:
do they all incur blame,
or also earn praise there?”
"[The praise:] It’s such a little thing,
not at all appeasing.[1]
I speak of two fruits of dispute;
and seeing this, you shouldn’t dispute —
seeing the state
where there’s no dispute
as secure.
One who knows
doesn’t get involved
in whatever are
commonplace
conventional
views.
One who is uninvolved:
when he’s forming no preference
for what’s seen, for what’s heard,
why would he get
involved?

Those for whom precepts
are ultimate
say that purity's
a matter of self-restraint.
Undertaking a practice,
they devote themselves to it:
'Let's train just in this,
and then there would be purity.'
Those who say they are skilled
are [thus] led on to becoming.
But if one of them falls
from his precepts or practice,
	he trembles,
having failed in his actions.
He hopes for, longs for, purity,
like a lost caravan leader
	far from home.

But one who's abandoned
	precepts & practices[2] 
		— all —
things that are blamable, blameless,[3] 
not hoping for 'pure or impure,'[4] 
would live in compassion & peace,
		without taking up peace,[5] 
detached.

Dependent
on taboos, austerities,
or what's seen, heard, or sensed,
they speak of purity
through wandering further on
through becoming & not-,
their craving not gone
for becoming & not-.[6] 
For one who aspires has longings
& trembling with regard to preconceptions.
But one who here
has no passing away & arising:
Why would he tremble?
For what would he long?"

“The teaching some say is 'supreme,'
is the very one others call 'lowly.'
Which statement is true
when all of these claim to be skilled?”

"They say their own teaching is perfect
while the doctrine of others is lowly.
Thus quarreling, they dispute,
each saying his agreed-on opinion
		is true.
If something, because of an opponent's say-so,
	were lowly,
then none among teachings would be
	superlative,
for many say
that another's teaching's inferior
when firmly asserting their own.
If their worship of their teaching were true,
in line with the way they praise their own path,
	then all doctrines
	would be true —
for purity's theirs, according to each.

The brahman has nothing
led by another,
when considering what's grasped
among doctrines.
Thus he has gone
beyond disputes,
for he doesn't regard as best
	the knowledge of a teaching,
	any other mental state.[7] 

'I know. I see. That's just how it is!' —
Some believe purity's in terms of view.
	But even if a person has seen,
	what good does it do him?
Having slipped past,
they speak of purity
in connection with something
		or somebody 	else.
A person, in seeing,
sees name & form.
Having seen, he'll know
only these things.
No matter if he's seen little, a lot,
the skilled don't say purity's
in connection with that.

A person entrenched in his teachings,
honoring a preconceived view,
isn't easy to discipline.
Whatever he depends on
he describes it as lovely,
says 	that it's purity,
	that there he saw truth.

The brahman, evaluating,
isn't involved with conjurings,
doesn't follow views,
isn't tied even to knowledge.[8] 
And on knowing
whatever's conventional, commonplace,
he remains equanimous:
	'That's what others hold onto.'

Having released the knots
that tie him down,
the sage here in the world
doesn't follow a faction
when disputes have arisen.
At peace among those not at peace,
he's equanimous, doesn't hold on:
	'That's what others hold onto.'

Giving up old fermentations,
not forming new,
neither pursuing desire,
nor entrenched in his teachings,
he's totally released
from viewpoints,
	enlightened.

He doesn't adhere to the world,
is without self-rebuke;
is enemy-free[9] 
with regard to all things
seen, heard, or sensed.

His burden laid down,
the sage totally released

	is improper / is free from conjuring
	hasn't stopped / isn't impassioned
isn't worth wanting / doesn't
					desire,"[10] 

			the Blessed One said.
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89

Hi DKervick

I hope you did not misunderstand me. In my view, I think it is impossible for there to be a “synthesis of a self”. What I had alluded to was -

You can synthesize a proposition about the Self, even if the Self is not synthesized, if one is a fan of the synthetic a priori.

I would agree with you that Buddhist doctrine does not appear to populated by synthetic a priori propositions. The synthetic a priori propositions are in fact set out in DN 1, and put into the mouths of the non-Buddhists.

I was just remarking to a friend here that I’ve been obsessed with DN 15. The reason for it seems trivial from a Buddhist perspective, but this is another sutta besides MN 22 that uses classical syllogism. It’s to be found eg -

“It was said: ‘With craving as condition there is clinging.’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If there were absolutely and utterly no craving of any kind anywhere—that is, no craving for visible forms, craving for sounds, craving for smells, craving for tastes, craving for tangibles, or craving for mental objects—then, in the complete absence of craving, with the cessation of craving, would clinging be discerned?”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for clinging, namely, craving.

The italicised text is the Second Noble Truth, while the bolded text is the Third Noble Truth. Via classical syllogism, the 2nd Noble Truth can be expressed as the Modus Tollens (If A, then B), while the 3rd Noble Truth is expressed as the Modus Tollens (If not-B, then not-A). Both logical operators are logically equivalent and derivable from one another via transposition.

Here, we see the sutta using the 3rd Noble Truth to “prove” the 2nd Noble Truth, using transposition of Modus Ponens into Modus Tollens. This appears to be the case also in its parallel DA 13.

This transposition between the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truths is also apparent in suttas such as MN 38 and SN 12.65, although not given as formal a treatment as DN 15 and DA 13. However, see EA 38.4 which also presents the transposition quite formally.

Now, this does not prove that the Buddha was open only to analytic _a priori_s via syllogisms, but I would be quite surprised that the Buddha would have been receptive of the synthetic variety, given DN 1’s catalogue of invalid reasoning.

While there are certainly conditions (paccaya) that act as sufficient conditions for their sequel (eg consciousness with name-&-form; craving with “clinging”), not all of the conditions will always deterministically lead to the sequel. Eg Non-Returners can attain Cessation, simply by not abhisaṅkharot-ing, even if there’s a trace of avijja left; or the fact that sense-restraint can arrest the torrent of craving, despite feeling.

This is the problem with the existentialist’s “structural” interpretation of Dependant Arising. By treating the chain as predictive in an a priori sense, it fails to take into account paradoxes that occur with non-Arahants. If there is any “structure” to Dependant Arising, it is the structure of necessity, not of determination. This much is clear from the DN 15 presentation, where the 3rd Noble Truth is the flip-side of the same coin that holds the 2nd Noble Truth.

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90

From OP:

I myself prefer to think of this brand of Theravada Buddhism as ‘phenomenological existentialism’, as it is also concerned with interpreting the Buddha’s Teaching in the light of existentialist philosophers like Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sarte, etc. - and vice versa.

They are not hiding behind their sunglases about this either. The nanavira/nanamoli website describes itself as “pathpress - an existentialist approach to Buddhist teachings”. And they quote much more from Heidegger, Husseler, Satre, etc. than from the suttas in their books.

91

[quote=“Sylvester, post:89, topic:2990”]
If there is any “structure” to Dependant Arising, it is the structure of necessity, not of determination. [/quote]

That’s a nice way of putting it.

If there is craving, then suffering will inevitably arise. It’s because we are so enamored of our intellect, we think we can steer the course of events in a way that would somehow make our lives stress-free while still hankering after a thousand different trophies, driven by God knows what. Shestov traces this to Necessity (yes, with a capital N :slight_smile:) and even begins his book (Athens and Jerusalem) with two quotes dealing with it. His obsession with this subject pervades the entire book and like Schopenhauer, when he died, he was reading the Upanishads…

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92

Hi Sylvester, Thanks for this observation.

It’s an important point, but I find it difficult to figure out whether this is an over-interpretation by enthusiasts for the approach. I would also point out that Ven Ñāṇananda’s analysis appears to be quite distinct from Ven Ñāṇavīra’s in a number of ways. I don’t see the same “here and now” emphasis, for example, which is the crux of the issue you’re pointing out.

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93

I consider that such points of discussion are irrelevant in regards to the problem of Nanananda or Nanavira been in line with what Buddha taught. Although there might be small differences on particular points, the conclusions are the same: solipsism. Things don’t really exist, every being in the world is a philosophical zombie, logic has no value etc. Witch qualifies both of them as postmodernist existentialist.

As I have previously said, these kind of writings are full of elementary logical mistakes. What is written in them is not important. What is important is the conclusions they arrive at, witch are the standard postmodernist conclusions. Some argue that postmodernism is hard to define because things wrote in such books are very different since they don’t obey principles of logic so do not need to follow the same thinking line. The thing by witch you define postmodernism is the conclusions at witch these thinkers arrive, witch are all the same. This is why Nanananda qualifies as a postmodernist just as Nanavira.

Buddha said contemplating weather things exist or not is one of the unconjurables. He said contemplating such things will lead only to vexation and madness. Not to mention wrong view. The solipsist view is the first wrong view listed in the “wrong views” section of SN :

1 (1) Winds
At Savatthı. “Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what,
by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: ‘The winds
do not blow, the rivers do not flow, pregnant women do not give
birth, the moon and sun do not rise and set but stand as steady
as a pillar’?”
[…]

94

This is such a general statement that it is difficult to have a coherent discussion about it. Perhaps you could explain how Ven Nananada’s analysis is structural in the same sense as Nanavira’s. I didn’t get that impression from reading the Nibbana Sermons, but I may have missed something.

95

This is such a general statement that it is difficult to have a coherent discussion about it.

Quote me 3 paragraphs at random and I’ll show you 3 elementary logical mistakes

96

Well, you can find the Nibbana Sermons here:
http://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/

“This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations,
the relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving,
detachment, cessation, extinction”.

97

What I proposed was actually quite an interesting challlange. Quote 3 paragraphs from him and let’s see if there are 3 logical mistakes in them or not.

98

OK, let’s start at the beginning:

http://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Nibbana_Vol_1-1.pdf

The wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, as well as many others, accused
the Buddha of teaching a doctrine of annihilation: Sato sattassa
ucchedam vināsam vibhavam paññāpeti. Their accusation
was that the Buddha proclaims the annihilation, destruction and nonexistence
of a being that is existent. And the Buddha answered them
fairly and squarely with the fire simile.

“Now if a fire is burning in front of you dependent on grass and
twigs as fuel, you would know that it is burning dependently and not
independently, that there is no fire in the abstract. And when the fire
goes out, with the exhaustion of that fuel, you would know that it has
gone out because the conditions for its existence are no more.”

As a sidelight to the depth of this argument it may be mentioned
that the Pāli word upādāna used in such contexts has the sense of
both ‘fuel’ as well as ‘grasping’, and in fact, fuel is something that
the fire grasps for its burning. Upādānapaccayā bhavo, “dependent
on grasping is existence”. These are two very important links in the
doctrine of dependent arising, patticca samuppāda.

The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought
that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But
what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is
true for the fire is true for existence as well. That is to say that existence
is dependent on grasping. So long as there is a grasping, there
is an existence. As we saw above, the firewood is called upādāna be-
cause it catches fire. The fire catches hold of the wood, and the wood
catches hold of the fire. And so we call it firewood. This is a case of
a relation of this to that, idappaccayatā. Now it is the same with
what is called ‘existence’, which is not an absolute reality.

99

Lol. I don’t even know what to start with.

100

The highlighted part has nothing to do with Buddha explanation. First of all, Buddha refuted the annihilationist because they believed in a self that gets destroyed while he said there was never a self to begin with. Nanananda quote about the fire has nothing to do with annihilationist and is about the question of weather an arahant exists after death, or does not exist etc. - question that Buddha rejected because it was a wrong question. It showed a lack of understanding on the questioneer part. Like asking what color did the helichopter from the Little Red Riding Hood children story had. Asking such a question is wrong since there is no helichopter in the story.

The simile with the fire is given as an example to show only the 5 aggregates exist and not a self observing them. And, when the aggegates disappear there is nothing left. Like a fire that gets extinguished. There never was a self to begin with, there was just a fire (the aggregates) that cease without reminder. Aggregates were never self, there was never a self to begin with.

As a sidelight to the depth of this argument it may be mentioned
that the Pāli word upādāna used in such contexts has the sense of
both ‘fuel’ as well as ‘grasping’, and in fact, fuel is something that
the fire grasps for its burning. Upādānapaccayā bhavo, “dependent
on grasping is existence”. These are two very important links in the
doctrine of dependent arising, patticca samuppāda.

  1. This has nothing to do with the sutta. He is trying to make a case for fuel of the fire been the existentialist idea of “assumption”. The idea that things don’t really exist but only appear to exist because of the internal process of assuming them to be real. We know that the fuel of the 5 aggregates is craving not assumption otherwise there would not be any need for monks.

So we have here a mistranslation to make a case for his views, we have solipsism witch is listed as a wrong view - but we have no attempt at a logical argument so that I could point out a logical mistake. This is a simple claim not a justification of a claim based on logic.

The eternalists, overcome by the craving for existence, thought
that there is some permanent essence in existence as a reality. But
what had the Buddha to say about existence? He said that what is
true for the fire is true for existence as well. That is to say that existence
is dependent on grasping. So long as there is a grasping, there
is an existence. As we saw above, the firewood is called upādāna be-
cause it catches fire. The fire catches hold of the wood, and the wood
catches hold of the fire. And so we call it firewood. This is a case of
a relation of this to that, idappaccayatā. Now it is the same with
what is called ‘existence’, which is not an absolute reality.

Lol. Buddha did not say existence is dependent on grasping. And he did not say the fire runs because of grasping. He said it runs based on clinging and ignorance. Two things not just one. What grasping refers to in buddhism is conceit. Conceit and clinging go hand in had. They are both underlying tendencies that have to be removed. But they are not one and the same. For example there might be the simple craving to take a drug for an addict. In a particular moment this craving appear. It has little to do with the conceit underlying tendency and more to do with the “taking delight” underlying tendency/hidrance. There exist 5 hidrances (witch are underlying tendencies too) and the overall underlying tendency of conceit. The underlying tendency for conceit actually is dependent on craving and lack of wisdom. Therefore it is removed through increasing wisdom (by doing the 6 contemplations) and through removing craving overall by reducing craving. This is why some might be pulled by wisdom or pulled by tranquility. And the path ends with removing all craving and all conceit.

Nanananda view also leads to the problem of “thinking your way to enlightenment” that has appeared in some mahayanist sects too because of solipsist thinking.

Removal of craving is done through seclusion and through cultivating the 7 factors of enlightenment. They are the things that make the hidrances disappear. When this is perfected, the person will achieve jhana, as shown in MN 39 and other such suttas.

Removal of conceit is done mainly through the 6 contemplations. But since conceit is dependent on craving and then it reinforces craving, both need to be cut. That is why they are always developed simultaniously. This is why Buddha said one might be pulled by wisdom and another by tranqulity. The 6 contemplations are to be done after achieving stream entry:

When Dīghāvu declares that he already possesses these qualities, the Buddha tells him that since he is established in the four factors of stream-entry, he should “strive further to develop six qualities that partake of true knowledge” (cha vijjābhāgiyā dhammā): “You should dwell contemplating the impermanence of all formations, perceiving suffering in what is impermanent, perceiving non-self in what is suffering, perceiving abandonment, perceiving dispassion, perceiving cessation.”[36] Dīghāvu assures the Blessed One that he is already practising these contemplations, and the Master leaves

This is also why jhana alone does not lead to enlightenment. There needs to be jhana and also the contemplation of how even this is constructed while in jhana in order to destroy all conceit. This is why it is called “liberated through wisdom”.

First step of the path is intelectualy understanding that there is no self and therefore become “acomplished in view”. This is done through contemplating higher teachings found in SN chapter 2,3,4. After the person undertands there really is no self, there will not be any wrong view left. There will be only the underlying tendencies left. Like a machine still working in a way because of inertia. The underlying tendency of conceit and the 5 hidrances will still he present. Their elimination will lead to no volitional formations for further existence to be produced by the machine. And when the machine will die, the aggregates will break apart and cease without reminder. A machine that runs on craving internally produced and recycled will auto-destroy due to cutting it’s own fuel.

I am curious what role does seclusion and reduction of craving have to play in Nanananda view since his thinking, like all others before him, leads to the “thinking your way to enlightenment” or “cleansing your view to enlightenment” by stopping to assume things are real, by destroying this assumption process. So what need is there for monks in this view ? This also leads to the conclusion that every liberal arts collage professor is enlightened. The more hardline the solipsist, the more enlightened.