Well, if you have to dismiss every passage of the EBTs that do not agree with your preconceived views as inauthentic then Ockham’s razor takes a serious toll at your credibility.
As for the body pericope in DN 9, why are you reading the porridge etc as being in apposition to form, when they are in apposition to body? Which syntactic rule are you
applying?
I read both form and porridge being in apposition to body. It doesn’t change anything. I take it that the various descriptions that follow all describe the body that is rupi, and are not mutually contradictory (which would sound ludicrous).
In addition, pls see DN 9 which restricts the porridge to the olarika acquisition of self. The manomaya acquisition of self does not have it. Which should explain why even if SN 22.79 is authentic, it probably only applies to the olarikas.
I think you might have a point here, although the absence in DN 9 of a proof that the mind made body is physical is not the proof that it is not physical.
If we take into consideration the meaning of rupi in both the above quotes from DN 2 and the iddhi description, we could conclude with much stronger evidence that actually the mind-made body is physical, even though it does not feed on rice. It is also said at DN 9 to be “complete in all its parts and not inferior in its faculties” (sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo). Although this is open to interpretation, it is not at odds with an interpretation of the mind-made body being physical, and may actually lean that way since in order to have all the sense faculties of a regular human body one needs to have at least some degree of materiality.
In any case, we are still pretty far from demonstrating that an interpretation of kaya as meaning a “body of (purely) mental phenomena” is the correct one, as was claimed earlier in relation to the fist jhana simile.
I’m actually moving away from the Comy understanding of the “body” in jhana as functioning adnominally, preferring the reflexive pronominal “himsef”.
As for the absence of proof in DN 9 that the body is physical, what is your view of MN 28’s allowance for the Form Aggregate arising with mental contact? Is that Form Aggregate physical?
I’m more disciplined in my suspicions about suttas than portrayed. When I read it, I heard Buddhagosa. Have you seen any other sutta using such dubious etymology?
There’s a similar pun in SN 35.82 with lujjati for loka.
Exactly as physical as the four great dynamics I’d say. But really, doesn’t the issue narrow to whether the mind-made acquisition of self takes up space?
I would regard the “cetaso ekodibhāva” of the second jhāna as sort of the embryonic completion of the mind-made acquisition of self. Namely, as a self-acquisition that is complete in all its parts, as per “abhisandeti, parisandeti, paripūreti, parippharati”, but without development in its faculties. Here is where I would posit that the ultimate sutta of the Majjhima, the Indriyabhāvana Sutta MN 152, comes into play.
Sorry I couldn’t resist the invitation for interpretation.
How would you parse mind-made, given its Upanisadic roots to refer to the Self made of mind?
Perhaps we can start a separate thread on MN 152? If that sutta is solicited as the Buddha’s criticism of those who ablate the senses, then where does that leave the Formless attainments? This is precisely Wynne’so argument that the Formless attainments are not Buddhist but sentimental longings of the disciples who were annihilationists.
Ven Analayo makes the convincing argument that MN 152 is not about sense ablation per second being criticised, but about sense restraint. With sense ablation, what opportunity would there be for development of the senses?
Good question… While I’m due for studying the daunting number of bahubbihi forms, I would want to go with the instrumental made-with-mind, reserving a truly comprised-of-mind acquisition for the formless.
Interesting that such a position might be held given all else about the formless attainments, unless such a position holds what would have to be some extensive textual corruption.
I’ll see if I can’t frame the issue somehow in a new thread, unless @Piotr or anyone else wants to take the liberty.
This is just a friendly reminder about the Universal Rules for Dhamma Discourse and to continue to use speech that’s both right and kind in discussions and even disagreements.
For Analayo, it would be the chapter on MN 152 in Vol 2 of the MN Comparative Study. I vaguely remember Wynne’s title to be Something meditation or another
And yes, everything about the formless and Cessation is impugned. Of course, if Wynne could be convinced to chuck the standard dictionary definition of rupa and arupa as material and immaterial respectively, he may have to reconsider his position, given that it’s not sense data which is ablated, but the cessation of experience/dukkha despite sense data.
I’ve posted this previously, where a Skt text arranges arupa, apratigha and anidarsana according to the waxing syllables synonyms principle. This goes back to Bhante Sujato and Ajahn Brahmali 's research into DN 11’s anidassana consciousness as being nothing more than the arupa. There’s nothing implied about materiality here; it’s all about the appearance of experience.
And the epitome of this is in DN 15’s treatment of namarupa and contact. Perhaps we could have a discussion about that sutta’s discussion of how impingement and conceptualisation revolve around each other. Reading the Pali, there’s no place for materiality to creep in, when all it takes as interesting is the appearance of contact, and how these facilitate language (or the misappropriation of language).
“The Origin of Buddhist Meditation”, looks like. Carried by ahandfulofleaves.org, thankfully…
While I can appreciate where this is coming from much more now, I’m still holding out for a proper accounting of AN 10.7 et. al.
That would be awesome. I’d also wonder whether it lends any clues to the issue of space vis-à-vis the section on the ‘seven stations for consciousness’.
Mmhmm, that’s a good one, thank you.
Circling back, @silence, what do you think about the reframing of the jhāna issue as one that concerns the question of whether the mind-made self-acquisition takes up space or not? An illustration of the difference, afaict, being here.
Hee hee. I have such a pedestrian explanation of this exotic state that it’s simply outrageous. It’s tied to the monkey simile in SN 12.61 and an examination of whether AN 10.7 contains an exhaustive listing of all that is contactable.
Compared to MN 1, that AN 10.7 list of contactable things is incomplete. In fact, MN 1 includes Nibbana.
Clearly, the SN 12.61 simile is highly suggestive of the one-contact at a time model. Just because an arahant does not perceive solidity despite solidity should not be puzzling. One could be surrounded by different sense fields but one can only contact one at a time.
It boils down to where one’s attention is directed. If an arahant elects to contemplate Nibbana, everything else simply do not contact.
I’m gonna have to be weary of what qualifies as outrageous to you.
As I see it, though, whether or not the samādhi is as potentially ‘mundane’ as you explain, that there is percipience of seemingly Nibbāna itself indicates the presence of a consciousness (as per MN 43 et. al. “conjoined feeling, perception, and consciousness”).
So whereas in kāma-world there is internal & external name-body & form-body, in form-world there is only internal name-body & form-body, and in formless-world there is only name-body, I’d consider it tenable to say ‘mere-instance’ of feeling-perception-consciousness sans name-body is in Nibbāna.
This is the view I hold notwithstanding proper textual comparison of the relevant pāli & āgama sutras.
It comes back to DN 15 and its 2 types of contact (discussed also in its DA 28 parallel). What would be interesting is whether the arahant’s perception of Nibbana in AN 10.7 is impingement contact or designation contact. While the natural temptation is to classify it under the latter, how do we reconcile it with “nibbana.m sukha.m”? It seems that sukha as hedonic tone is the domain of impingement.
there’s really no perfect term to describe the different jhana schools. even within the EBT sutta jhanas, you can see there’s quite a bit of disagreement. by vism. jhana, i’m referring to jhana as taught in visuddhimagga, which is quite different than a straightforward EBT-OR reading of the suttas.
thanks bhante, i’ll be more careful in the future to be precise on my usage of kaaya.
an example of what i mean by metaphorical is how Bhante Sujato translated 3rd jhana, “sukhanca kayena patsamvedi”, something like, “he personally experiences happiness.”
in contrast to how most translations in english from pali, as well as agama EBT parallels, have something equivalent to “he experiences pleasure with the [anatomical] body.”
the MN 10 satipatthana parallel in the EBT MA has the four jhana similes explicitly stated in full under kaya-nupassana. the other excercises included 31 body parts, 9 stages of corpses, sati and sampajano in relation to various postures, and four elements. those are all unequivocally referring to an anatomical body.
in the standard 16 APS (anapanasati ) steps, which recurrs so frequently in the suttas, the prelude to that has
“nididati, pallankam abujhitva, ujum kayam panidaya”
he sits down, cross-leg-posture (he) bends-into, straight body he aspires to.
again, this is unequivocally the anatomical body. it would make no sense to cross your legs in seating and straighten your atman, or your personal experience. he’s straightening his spine, his back.
the next occurence of kaya in 16 APS comes in
step 3, “…sabba kaya patisamvedi…”
entire [anatomical] body (he) experiences… (as he breathes …in…out…)
in MN 19, the buddha talks about how excessive thinking leads to his body “kaya” getting tired. Similarly, in padipoma sutta (SN 54.8), an important discourse that shows all 16 APS gradually leading to nibbana through 16 benefits (9 meditative attainments part of it). The first of those benefits listed is “so my (kaya) body not be fatigued, nor my eyes”, the same anatomical body that MN 19 was referring to. Towards the end of the sutta, on the section where nibbana is being realized,
“so **kaya-**pariyantikam vedanam vedayamano. kaya-pariyantikam vedanam pajanati.” experiencing a feeling limited to body, he understands, I experience a feeling limited to the body."
Again, no reason to think “kaya” is referring to anything other than anatomical body here.
In SN 46.2 kāya sutta,
the title refers to using the simile of the body that requires food as nutriment.
“Bhikkhus, just as this body, sustained by nutriment, subsists in dependence on nutriment and does not subsist without nutriment, so too the seven factors of enlightenment, sustained by nutriment, subsist in dependence on nutriment and do not subsist without nutriment.
anatomical body there is clear.
later in the sutta:
“And what, bhikkhus, is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity? There are, bhikkhus, tranquillity of body, tranquillity of mind:61 "
" frequently giving careful attention to them is the nutriment for the arising of the unarisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity and for the fulfilment by development of the arisen enlightenment factor of tranquillity.
The body and mind dichotomy makes it very clear anatomical body is what “kaya” refers to there. It would be very cruel of the Buddha to take “kaya sutta”, using the simile of the anatomical body needing food, and then actually he meant Kāya is a body of mental of aggregates, an atman, or personal experience, or a body of breath.
There are other places where the “body and mind” dichotomy using kāya in a samadhi context or an important supporting role could only mean anatomical body.
Why would anyone assume 3d jhana and 3 step of 16 APS is referring to something other than the anatomical body, when there’s so many congruent references in close proximity? You would only reach for something like the formless attainment or nibbana attainment nuance of “kāya” if the simple obvious explanation wasn’t working.
How is this reconciled with the standard refrain on the five strings of sensuality though?
[…] Tactile sensations cognizable via the body — agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. These are the five strings of sensuality. (MN 105)
Do the EBTs indicate any way to have pleasure in the anatomical body that is not part of the five strings of sensuality?
The one way I’ve found that this might be reasoned is to take the analysis of dependent origination at SN 12.2, particularly for that of the saḷāyatanā, as illustrative rather than exhaustive, leaving a more exhaustive analysis of the six bases as six-internal and six-external for places like MN 137 and MN 148.
And so this way, the conventional notion that the saḷāyatanā function identically to the six indriyā within dependent-origination might be dispelled, leaving the six internal āyatanā to stand for the internal variety of the four great dynamics in MN 28:
What, friends, is the earth element? The earth element may be either internal or external.
What is the internal earth element? Whatever internally, belonging to oneself, is solid, solidified, and clung-to; that is, head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, contents of the stomach, feces, or whatever else internally, belonging to oneself, is solid, solidified, and clung-to: this is called the internal earth element.
Now both the internal earth element and the external earth element are simply earth element.
Edit: Of course, whether we call it “anatomical”, “physical” or “material” I think would be open to interpretation here given the stuff that comprises the other three elements, or at least the “or whatever else internally” bit.
I like the idea and think it would be nice to maybe come up with a new category, something like a “Practice Corner”, a space for people to share their impressions, experiences and questions regarding their undertaking of the fourth e nobbling task of developing / cultivating / practicing of the path to the end of suffering?
I note however that it will be crucial people get ready to agree to disagree and maybe in that specific subcategory avoid at all costs the sad and harmful dead-end / "one is right all others are wrong"sort of debate pattern / way of discussion we usually see when the texts alone are the topic of conversation!
I fear the more deadly toxin to that praxis forum will be endless attempts to protect one’s teacher or tradition from careful scrutiny against the texts.
