But it’s not metaphorical. The basic meaning of kāya is something like “heap,” and the meaning “physical body” is derived from this. The Critical Pali Dictionary, which is the best Pali dictionary available, does not even list the meaning “body” under kāya, but rather “bodily constituents” (or something to that effect), that is, a heap of stuff.
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I’m sorry Frank, but I really have no interest, nor see any utility, in personal testament. What concerns me is text. Isn’t this forum about what texts mean?
We see all too often snide comments being made (present company excluded) about sutta-jhanas versus Vsm-jhanas, and I have to remark that I have yet to see one so-called suttantika in this thread being able or prepared to discuss the Pali material critically. What we have are not sutta-jhanas versus Vsm jhanas, but suttas-jhanas versus English translation jhanas.
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The simile, appears to me that ‘one does not cling to self’ that he is able to experience jhana. When the ice is melted, where has the ice gone? Even if you were to take it as body, where is the body then? It is melted, gone!
[quote]
breaking through into jhana was to make sure his face, neck, head were really relaxed. [/quote]
He was doing 1st tetrad (& i take it only just the 1st loop, that is base on my own interpretation, of course). The word ‘key’ means that it is important, once get past this, practice become much easier once 1st tetrad is completed.
If i tell you this:
At the age of 20 i meditated without a teacher for 1 month plus, and only after another 20+ yrs that i meditate again in a retreat, on the 5th day, i experience this
Did i attained 2nd Jhana in 5 days?
My teacher told me to let it pass, stay with the breath.
It is not easy to let it pass, but try that and see what happen. Just Stay with your breath!
Hi Sylvester, thanks for your reply. I hope my answer will also not cause offence but I will state things as I see them.
It seems to me that what you consider “taking to its end” my reasoning is nothing but caricaturing it and then attacking that caricature.
I have not said that the Buddha would never use a physical vehicle for a nonphysical tenor. I said it is unlikely that he would have done so if two interpretations were possible, one being with physical tenor and the other being a nonphysical tenor. This is not the case in any of the similes you have provided, as evidently (in what seems to be your most effective attempt to debunk my argument) the manomaya kaya is physical since it is explicitly said to be endowed with form (rupim) and the term manomaya does not mean it is not physical. I am sure you can only agree on this.
Now you can try to dismiss this argument altogether by saying that people knew exactly which one it was without having to be told. To me this is another unproven assumption that does not satisfy the lex parsimoniae and that faces counter arguments as well. For example when that happens in our language we do get confused sometimes. At the time of the Buddha foreigners existed and also the dialects in different places were different so the Buddha seems to have explained in detail most of the key concepts of the Dhamma to prevent such misunderstandings and when he did not the general meaning is unambiguous even though sometimes the detailed meaning is up for discussion.
I think you should be able to analyse this sentence -
So imameva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.
and agree that nothing in the syntax prevents the pronominal reading, nor prefers the nominal reading (ie the physical body) over the pronominal (ie his/himself). In fact, the PTS entry for this usage of kāya in relation to the jhanas explains it pronominally.
Yes I agree but again what I am saying is that the simile that follows has the function of giving a hint to which is the correct interpretation and I don’t take arguments of authority over opinions expressed in PTSD.
For the rest I do not disagree that kaya can refer to something else than the physical body but I don’t see how any use of the word in any other context weakens my argument as the latter is based on the simile, not just on an interpretation of the expression mentioning the word kaya.
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I hope this forum is not just about texts! I hope we are all here to practice the end of Dukkhā.
Texts provide a bit of help but also a lot of confusions, as I have noticed since this Forum has started.
That’s why for me, testimonies such as today’s Frankk is vital for progressing into my practice.
Shall we ask Banthe Sujato to create a forum dedicated to practitioners willing to share their experiences?
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Actually, I disagree. Could you furnish an EBT definition of “form” that is untainted by Abhidhamma?
Sue Hamilton has pointed out that the Comy and modern understanding of form being limited to the 5 senses is an Abhidhamma thing. If one goes back to the Upanisads, the 4 great elements are not lumpy little things that are physical, but hold secret correspondences/upanisads to the pranas (“breaths”) like speech.
In support of this, she demonstrates this by showing how the standard vibhanga suttas on the 4 elements point towards a conceptual description of each element. I need not point out that MN 28 posits mind-contact giving rise to the Form Aggregate.
There’s nothing in the EBTs (but see below) to suggest that “form” is anything more than the appearance of experience.
Where the Abhidhamma change began to limit form to the 5 senses is probably traceable to the Sarvastivadins. Whether by design or textual corruption, some of their sutras depart from the standard namarupa presentation and began an ontological bifurcation of nama = immaterial aggregates, rupa = material aggregate. I suppose I could locate my old posts in DW on this, but if you research this yourself, you’ll have no difficulty locating the Sarva’s sutras that redefine namarupa.
If you can read the primary materials in the original language, you’ll find that the culprits for the confusion are not the texts but the translators who take liberties.
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So if I understand well, your argument is now that rupim does not refer to something physical. This seems utterly unconvincing to me. It is clearly at odds with passages like this one (DN 2 and many other suttas):
‘ayaṃ kho me kāyo rūpī cātumahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsūpacayo anicc-ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaṃsana-dhammo
'This body of mine is endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother and father, nourished with rice and porridge, subject to inconstancy, rubbing, pressing, dissolution, and dispersion.
also
Could you furnish an EBT definition of “form” that is untainted by Abhidhamma?
I believe there is one at SN 22.79:
Kiñca, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ vadetha? 'Ruppatī·ti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'rūpa·nti vuccati. Kena ruppati? Sītena-pi ruppati, uṇhena-pi ruppati, jighacchāya-pi ruppati, pipāsāya-pi ruppati, ḍaṃsa-makasa-vātātapa-sarīsapa-samphassena-pi ruppati. 'Ruppatī·ti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'rūpa·nti vuccati.
"And why do you call it ‘form’? Because it is afflicted, thus it is called ‘form.’ Afflicted with what? With cold & heat & hunger & thirst, with the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, & reptiles. Because it is afflicted, it is called form.
I think the case is crystal clear.
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That part of SN 22.79 looks suspicious. Are the 2 words even etymologically related?
If so, are manomaya brahmas so afflicted as they fly about feeding on rapture?
As for the body pericope in DN 9, why are you reading the porridge etc as being in apposition to form, when they are in apposition to body? Which syntactic rule are you applying?
In addition, pls see DN 9 which restricts the porridge to the olarika acquisition of self. The manomaya acquisition of self does not have it. Which should explain why even if SN 22.79 is authentic, it probably only applies to the olarikas.
Well, if you have to dismiss every passage of the EBTs that do not agree with your preconceived views as inauthentic then Ockham’s razor takes a serious toll at your credibility.
As for the body pericope in DN 9, why are you reading the porridge etc as being in apposition to form, when they are in apposition to body? Which syntactic rule are you
applying?
I read both form and porridge being in apposition to body. It doesn’t change anything. I take it that the various descriptions that follow all describe the body that is rupi, and are not mutually contradictory (which would sound ludicrous).
In addition, pls see DN 9 which restricts the porridge to the olarika acquisition of self. The manomaya acquisition of self does not have it. Which should explain why even if SN 22.79 is authentic, it probably only applies to the olarikas.
I think you might have a point here, although the absence in DN 9 of a proof that the mind made body is physical is not the proof that it is not physical.
If we take into consideration the meaning of rupi in both the above quotes from DN 2 and the iddhi description, we could conclude with much stronger evidence that actually the mind-made body is physical, even though it does not feed on rice. It is also said at DN 9 to be “complete in all its parts and not inferior in its faculties” (sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo). Although this is open to interpretation, it is not at odds with an interpretation of the mind-made body being physical, and may actually lean that way since in order to have all the sense faculties of a regular human body one needs to have at least some degree of materiality.
In any case, we are still pretty far from demonstrating that an interpretation of kaya as meaning a “body of (purely) mental phenomena” is the correct one, as was claimed earlier in relation to the fist jhana simile.
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I’m actually moving away from the Comy understanding of the “body” in jhana as functioning adnominally, preferring the reflexive pronominal “himsef”.
As for the absence of proof in DN 9 that the body is physical, what is your view of MN 28’s allowance for the Form Aggregate arising with mental contact? Is that Form Aggregate physical?
I’m more disciplined in my suspicions about suttas than portrayed. When I read it, I heard Buddhagosa. Have you seen any other sutta using such dubious etymology?
There’s a similar pun in SN 35.82 with lujjati for loka.
Exactly as physical as the four great dynamics I’d say. But really, doesn’t the issue narrow to whether the mind-made acquisition of self takes up space?
I would regard the “cetaso ekodibhāva” of the second jhāna as sort of the embryonic completion of the mind-made acquisition of self. Namely, as a self-acquisition that is complete in all its parts, as per “abhisandeti, parisandeti, paripūreti, parippharati”, but without development in its faculties. Here is where I would posit that the ultimate sutta of the Majjhima, the Indriyabhāvana Sutta MN 152, comes into play.
Sorry I couldn’t resist the invitation for interpretation. 
Indeed!
How would you parse mind-made, given its Upanisadic roots to refer to the Self made of mind?
Perhaps we can start a separate thread on MN 152? If that sutta is solicited as the Buddha’s criticism of those who ablate the senses, then where does that leave the Formless attainments? This is precisely Wynne’so argument that the Formless attainments are not Buddhist but sentimental longings of the disciples who were annihilationists.
Ven Analayo makes the convincing argument that MN 152 is not about sense ablation per second being criticised, but about sense restraint. With sense ablation, what opportunity would there be for development of the senses?
Good question… While I’m due for studying the daunting number of bahubbihi forms, I would want to go with the instrumental made-with-mind, reserving a truly comprised-of-mind acquisition for the formless.
Interesting that such a position might be held given all else about the formless attainments, unless such a position holds what would have to be some extensive textual corruption.
I’ll see if I can’t frame the issue somehow in a new thread, unless @Piotr or anyone else wants to take the liberty.
Do you have a reference for Wynne and Analayo?
Hi everyone,
Thanks for your contributions on this thread!
This is just a friendly reminder about the Universal Rules for Dhamma Discourse and to continue to use speech that’s both right and kind in discussions and even disagreements.
Thank you
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For Analayo, it would be the chapter on MN 152 in Vol 2 of the MN Comparative Study. I vaguely remember Wynne’s title to be Something meditation or another 
And yes, everything about the formless and Cessation is impugned. Of course, if Wynne could be convinced to chuck the standard dictionary definition of rupa and arupa as material and immaterial respectively, he may have to reconsider his position, given that it’s not sense data which is ablated, but the cessation of experience/dukkha despite sense data.
I’ve posted this previously, where a Skt text arranges arupa, apratigha and anidarsana according to the waxing syllables synonyms principle. This goes back to Bhante Sujato and Ajahn Brahmali 's research into DN 11’s anidassana consciousness as being nothing more than the arupa. There’s nothing implied about materiality here; it’s all about the appearance of experience.
And the epitome of this is in DN 15’s treatment of namarupa and contact. Perhaps we could have a discussion about that sutta’s discussion of how impingement and conceptualisation revolve around each other. Reading the Pali, there’s no place for materiality to creep in, when all it takes as interesting is the appearance of contact, and how these facilitate language (or the misappropriation of language).
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And in SN 23.2 for satta.
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“The Origin of Buddhist Meditation”, looks like. Carried by ahandfulofleaves.org, thankfully…
While I can appreciate where this is coming from much more now, I’m still holding out for a proper accounting of AN 10.7 et. al.
That would be awesome. I’d also wonder whether it lends any clues to the issue of space vis-à-vis the section on the ‘seven stations for consciousness’.
Mmhmm, that’s a good one, thank you.
Circling back, @silence, what do you think about the reframing of the jhāna issue as one that concerns the question of whether the mind-made self-acquisition takes up space or not? An illustration of the difference, afaict, being here.
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Hee hee. I have such a pedestrian explanation of this exotic state that it’s simply outrageous. It’s tied to the monkey simile in SN 12.61 and an examination of whether AN 10.7 contains an exhaustive listing of all that is contactable.
Praytell. I’m ready to be outraged. 