It’s a very interesting and significant angle, and I appreciate the presentation. I would however yield to translations before studying up on Prof. Wijesekara’s Syntax of the Cases.
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Hey Gabriel,
Very legitimate concerns, I’d agree. And I’d readily admit that any source of optimism in the face of these problems comes from pie-in-the-sky ruminations of unexplored avenues in information technology that can be applied to this domain. I find it very easy to imagine in the near future that a lot of the drudgery in philology for scholars that might be a source of a sense of futility will be eliminated through meticulous automation (ie engendering less confusion for pedestrians like myself relying on their work).
uniformity
More specifically though, I tend to think that there really is an unambiguous and coherent model buried in these texts that all contemporaneous disciples internalized, to which the editorial uniformity can be ascribed.
lack of variation
And again from some uniform framework of the jhanas depicted in the repeated pericopes, I imagine variation in the case of jhanas comes from say the fairly dry and repetitive first of two Jhāna Saṁyuttas (SN 34) that doesn’t get a lot attention I think.
Eg: here are some messy and cryptic notes I've made earlier on it as overview
jhana samyutta
cow = no+no
ghee = yes+yes
yes+no
no+yes
cow->milk->cream->butter->ghee->cream-of-ghee
abc vs bcd
ab, ac, bc
bc, bd, cd
(kusala)
concentration samādhi
attainment samāpatti (MN 44)
maintenance ṭhiti (DN 2)
emergence vuṭṭhāna (MN 44)
preparing kallita
foundation ārammaṇa (SN 47.10)
range gocara (MN 43)
directing abhinīhāra (DN 2)
(kārī)
thorough sakkacca
continuous sātacca
appropriate sappāya
dhamma-talk
Generally speaking, you’re right. Dwelling on the descriptive has limitations of course. But such is the medium we’re afforded here I think. As Bhante Sujato points out elsewhere regarding a more practice-oriented section of this precious forum, “discussion of the descriptive” is not as onerous I think.
More specifically regarding the jhana pericope, though, and particularly from AN 5.28 as Mr. Bernay is apt to point out above, I get the sense actually that just the simile portion of the pericope actually is prescriptive in contrast to a descriptiveness of the portion prior that is more widely attested.
Aside from that though, I think part of the problem here is attributable to the nascency of the science in this domain. Again, but more pie-in-the-sky, I like to imagine some day that neural correlates to portions of some coherent & unambiguous model derived from the texts might pave the way.
Eg fun fact: There’s a study from some institution in Mexico that discovered EEG correlates to 'ASMR’s just a couple years ago or so—basically in the ‘Mu’ spectrum (7.5-12.5 Hz). What I think is particularly interesting here is that starting just from earlier this decade consumer EEG devices have become quite affordable.
But yes, veritably bakery-in-the-sky stuff.
And in the meantime, I personally take the discussions here as an opportunity mostly for studying the language in a way that’s immediately meaningful to me. Though Frank’s more…experimental comments above tempt a response…
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Thanks for the link! Could you say again what you’re specifically referring to? vācaṃ as the direct object of bhindati?
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No problem. The publishers be blessed.
Yeah…I agree 
My first instinct would be to jump to section 47, the Adverbial Accusative…but beyond that, I’d want to buckle down for it.
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Frank,
Thank you for sharing a slice of your practice here. I won’t be able to do your comment justice anytime soon so I’ll just try and capitulate my thoughts on the matter textually speaking.
To the present theme, which I think centres around what I’ll refer to as “Occam’s Jhana III: Volition and Talking in Jhana”, I think Gabriel’s analysis above touches on an important consideration: what is vitakkavicāra’s relationship to vacīsaṅkhāra, precisely?
And stepping back a bit here’s a quick lay of the land off the top of my head based on translations we have sans inter-corpus and grammatical/philological analysis:
- First, we have mano, kāya, vacī: three avijja-conditioned saṅkhāras (SN 12.2), with three respective cetanas (SN 12.25).
- But then there are six sensory cetanas (SN 22.56), each with vitakkavicāras (AN 7), in which we find mano and kāya but not vacī.
- And then we have it that mano experiences the other five sensory domains (MN 43), including kāya.
- And for vacī, all we have is that vitakkavicāra “break into”* it (MN 44).
- And finally cetana is part of nāmarūpa (SN 12.2), which I presume is what the nāmakāya and the rūpakāya (DN 15) are “made up of”.
I’d want to look for an accounting of atleast all these pieces somehow in any cogent model.
Miscellaneous notes:
I’d admit that it’s a question to which I have no answer at the top of my head.
I presume you mean “…second jhana if first jhana…”. And you’re relying of course on a direct equation of vitakkavicāra with vacīsaṅkhāra.
Edit: @frankk Thank you for the reference and clarification.
I’d urge that we not risk misrepresenting what the Ajahn does or does not teach. I believe the prescriptive portion of his book is readily available here. I’d invite you to cite anything you disagree with there in regards to “Occam’s Jhana III”.
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I meant exactly what I said, Speech/vaca ceases in first jhana. Here’s the exact words of the Buddha.
SN 36.11 rahogata discourse
atha kho pana, bhikkhu,
mayā anupubba-saṅkhārānaṃ nirodho akkhāto.
paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa vācā niruddhā hoti.
dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa vitakkavicārā niruddhā honti.
My approximate english translation of the first and second jhana lines.
(for) first jhana attainment, speech {has} ceased.
(for) second jhana attainment, thoughts (and) evaluation {have} ceased.
In Vimt. (vimuttimagga), Arahant Upatissa’s comments on that sutta passage is very similar to how I described in my meditation experience. That the physical act of moving the vocal cords of your anatomical body made up of four elements, will knock you out of first jhana.
I’ve read Ajahn B’s “Meditation, bliss, beyond” more than a few times, and many more times the specific passages on how he interprets jhana and 16 APS (anapanassati). I’ve spent about 10 years practicing in a hard core Burmese Vism. Jhana system meditating 5-10 hours a day consecutively for months at a time, primarily using the Vism. interpretation of 16 APS, and more than 10 years practicing Ajahn Lee and Thanissaro’s system of 16 APS and Jhana. I’ve spent over 10 years carefully scrutinizing the relevant EBT passages in 16 APS and jhana.
On the contrary, I’d urge anyone who has either studied the EBT carefully and/or have extensive practice in meditation to ask Ajahn Brahm to justify his interpretation of jhana and 16 APS which requires a strained reading of the EBT passages to support it, compared to the straightforward EBT reading taught by Ajahn Lee, Ven. Thanissaro, and Arahant Upatissa’s 16 APS in vimt, with lots of supporting evidence from the EBT agama world as well.
Here’s a prime example. In A.Brahm’s “Meditation, Bliss, Beyond”, read the section that talks about the 4 jhana similes in AN 5.28. You’ll notice the pink elephant in the room, namely, what does the word kaaya mean, it’s used so repeatedly in that sutta? The only explanation A.Brahm offers is a brief sentence, something like, “at least that’s how I understand the similes (not involving anatomical body)”.
When I asked Ajahn Brahmali recently about the same passage with 4 jhana similes, and pointed how the massively high body count “kaaya” in that sutta, his only response was (paraphrasing from memory), “kaaya in the pali suttas means a heap or collection of things.” What I know about human nature is you’re not going to hold anything back if you have good evidence to share that supports your case. I didn’t see good evidence in “meditation, bliss, beyond”, and Ajahn Brahmali’s recent response to me tells me there’s probably no new [scriptural EBT] evidence that’s turned up since A.Brahm’s book was published.
I spent a fair amount of time auditing Ven. Thanissaro’s interpretation of jhana and 16 APS as well. By letters, phone calls, and face to face talks sometimes. While I don’t agree completely with 100% of all of his interpretations on not just samadhi but Dhamma has a whole, whatever passage I audited, I could see his conclusions came from a careful, straightforward reading of the text, regardless of whether I agreed with him on that point or not.
With Ajahn Brahm’s interpretation of Jhana and 16 APS, there’s a consistent pattern of cherry picking to justify an interpretation, that is, taking a quote out of its original context and trying to retrofit it in a different incongruent context that fits awkwardly. Two prime examples of this: step 3 of 16APS, “sabba kaaya patisamvedi…”. The “whole body of breath” quote he uses to justify his interpretation, that “kaaya” means “whole body of breath (not anatomical body)”. If you carefully study the “whole body of breath” quote in its original context, it’s part of a series of 4 descriptions to show how the corresponding 4 tetrads of 16 APS are exactly the same 4 tetrads of 4sp (satipatthana). I won’t go into detail on that here, but I can if there’s a need.
Now here’s the thing. It’s one thing if you want to say, the body of breath is a type of anatomical body, and I want to practice 16 APS by ignoring the other parts of the body and focusing only on the breath. Go ahead, knock yourself out, there’s nothing wrong with that. To be precise, you’re taking a position of, “I think this is the most effective way to practice 16 APS, among the many ways it can be done which involve an anatomical body.”
But Ajahn Brahm, and vism. , is taking a much stronger position. They’re saying in step 3, the kaaya/body, is ONLY a breath body that excludes the anatomical body. This is tantamount to saying Arahant Upatissa in Vimt., and Ajahn Lee (a fellow Thai forest meditation master in the Ajahn Mun lineage), Ven. Thanissaro, the EBT lineages in the agama world, are teaching 16 APS and Jhana incorrectly.
Which is fine, if you can prove it. Where’s the proof? Let’s see it. I don’t care about who’s right, who’s wrong, I’m only interested in truth. Show me truth, and I’ll follow. Show me strained arguments, I will rightly question it.
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If you don’t mind sharing your view on this, what would you say to those whose experiences fall in line with Ajahn Brahm’s position? What are they experiencing?
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@frank, this is a seperate topic that touches fundamental doctrine in general. Could you please create a new discussion for it? there is actually a lot to say about this, and I would love to see others joining that discussion, who are otherwise not interested in vitakka-vicara.
And if you allow me a general note, in the scriptures we can find faith, but not truth. If we had the Buddha speaking through the suttas things would be easier, but in fact we don’t know through which suttas he speaks, which are inspired by him, which are in full accordance with but not personally by him, which are brahmin intrusions etc. We can work out what is plausible, probable, coherent, but not what is true. This is trivial and affects every collection (kāya ;)) of texts, but I think needs to be repeated here.
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They are experiencing what Grzegorz Polak describes as “yogic meditation” where the practitioner tries to be “sitting like a log of wood, trying to stop his senses and his mind” (Mahabharata).
Another way of describing this is what Ajaan Fuang in Thanissaro Bhikkha - Jhana Not by the Numbers reports him calling them “the state of non-perception (asaññi-bhava)”. I believe this non-perception state which appears in some suttas is not coming from the Buddha but a “late” addition coming from the Bhramanic tradition (again see Polak).
Instead the four jhanas as described in the suttas are not a yogic practice at all. When one experiences piti and sukha (a mixture of bodily and mental pleasures, depending in what jhana one is in) then full awareness of one’s body and mind is there.
In jhana one for example, my experience of vitakka-vicara is : “woa, that’s so nice …”
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Erik, I have the same experience as Alaber for first jhana and would consider that to fall within a straightforward reading of EBT-OR first jhana. In the EBT relevant passages in reference to the first jhana “pocket”, between 5 sensual pleasure cords, 5 hindrances, and second jhana, it might not always explicitly call out vitakka, vicara, first jhana by that name, but because it’s sandwiched in the pocket we can make some reasonable inferences what’s going on with those terms, such as in the cook sutta. One sutta on its own, who knows for sure, but when you see 5 or 6 suttas like that, then you start feeling pretty confident.
I’ve known some meditators who never experienced first, second, third jhana (at least in a form recognizable to them), they dropped directly into a samadhi where their body disappeared, sounds disappeared, breath slowed down and/or stopped. IMO the 4 jhanas are not meant to be an exact science of a perfect roadmap of how samadhi progresses for everyone, but an approximate guide that fits the experiences of most people.
Note that any responses to this msg, not relevant to vitakka and vicara, should be directed to other threads.
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What matters to me is if the practice I do free me from suffering i.e. desires, aversions and delusions. I don’t believe insights can do that.
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I wonder how this ruminative experience can be consistent with the DN 9 injunction against thinking in a jhana -
Cetayamānassa me pāpiyo, acetayamānassa me seyyo. Ahañceva kho pana ceteyyaṃ, abhisaṅkhareyyaṃ, imā ca me saññā nirujjheyyuṃ, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā uppajjeyyuṃ.
Thinking is bad for me. Not thinking is better for me. If I were to think and will, these perceptions of mine would cease, and grosser perceptions would appear.
(correcting Ven Thanissaro’s mistranslations of the pronoun and verb into singulars, when they are plurals)
Echoed in its parallel DA 28 on the exact same terms. This surely is an EBT position, no?
The reason why I asked @chansik_park to put up the poll in post 305/342 was to demonstrate the dreadful inconsistency the ruminative interpretation of vitakkavicāra faces with these suttas which do not allow any form of thinking or verbalisation to occur within a jhana. Well, to be more precise, if one does think or verbalise, bye bye Jhana! Why else would speech have ceased in the First Jhana?
So, if vitakkavicāra are not thinking and pondering, what else could it be in the First Jhana, without violating the injunction against thinking in DN 9 and DA 28? I would have thought that this little gem would have pointed in the direction of another sutta usage of vitakka and vicāra -
Those suttas on the person who dwells “as a dhamma-contemplator with reference to rūpavitakka/ rūpavicāra” follow the sequence starting with the sense bases, then consciousness, then contact, then feeling, then perception, then volition, then craving, then vitakka, and then vicāra . Are these thoughts, or something somewhat different?
Take a look at these threads -
(post 7 onwards)
The clue given in MN 78 is quite unmistakable. This vitakkavicāra in the First and Second Jhana pericopes maps neatly onto MN 78’s kusalā saṅkappā (wholesome aims), insofar as both end in the Second Jhana.
Does one need to saṅkappaṃ saṅkappeti (he resolves on the resolve) continuously in the First Jhana to qualify as having vitakkavicāra ? Apparently not, since the mind has a certain momentum based on what one “think and ponder” frequently : MN 19 -
Bhikkhus, whatever a bhikkhu frequently thinks and ponders upon, that will become the inclination of his mind.
Although the verbs used are anuvitakketi and anuvicāreti, I don’t think they detract from the point of the sutta in addressing kāmavitakka, vyāpādavitakka and vihiṃsāvitakka as being unhelpful.
I believe that vitakkavicāra of the First Jhana is that residual desire/wish/aim that are the opposites of the 3 types of wrong saṅkappa. What’s left for this phenomena to do may be connected to the bathman and soap simile.
This is rather odd statement, @Sylvester. As I see it this text describes what happens at the threshold of cessation, i.e. if cessation ought to happen mind has to stop to function. I can’t see how you want to apply this passage to the jhānas.
Hi Piotr
I am not quite sure what you mean. Could you please explain?
How would your reading resolve the statement that thinking and willing would cause “these perceptions” to cease and grosser perceptions would arise? It does not appear that Cessation alone is dependent on there being no thinking and willing.
Might you be using Ven Thanissaro’s translation linked from SC?
Hey Sylvester,
yes I think that this sutta and MN 111 imply that - of these states - only cessation depends on being no thinking (cetayati/citta) and will (abhisaṅkhāroti/cetanā).
Could you explain what is the significance of this plural vs singular form of “perception” that you’re referring to? I don’t seem to get how this could change the meaning of this passage. Maybe because I’m not native English speaker (obviously 
).
On the first point, I am of the view that DN 9 quite clearly states that-
- Cessation is attained by not thinking or willing.
- Thinking and willing causes the jhana to end and be replaced by coarse perceptions.
Are you disputing no.2? If so, how would you understand the passage I gave?
I don’t see any contradiction between no 1 and no 2, as the former suggests thinking prevents entry into Cessation, while no 2 suggests that thinking prevents abiding in the attainments once achieved.
As for the plural/singular business, pls take a look at Ven Thanissaro’s translation. Can you see how he’s mistranslated the plural pronoun and the noun “perceptions” into the singular? This creates the false impression that thinking and willing become problems only in the attainment of Nothingness, but not in the earlier 6 attainments.
Yes I do. I would take “coarse perceptions” to mean any of perceptions that were mentioned before “the peak of perception”. I don’t get why you take it to mean exclusively kāmasaññā.
BTW: the passage we’re discussing is preceeded by:
Tassa saññagge ṭhitassa evaṃ hoti…
As he stands at the peak of perception, it occurs to him…
Which implies that this “Thinking is bad…” sentence applies only to this highest state of mind.
Would you mind to comment on MN 111 which explicitly states that will and thought are present in the jhānas?
For your 1st point, I can agree that a brief interlude of thinking would cause one to drop down one attainment. But what happens if the thinking is non-stop? The moment one tries to stop thinking, that feeds the thinking and the downward spiral continues.
As for the 2nd, I believe the translation is flawed. You would be familiar with the idiom “tassa evaṃ hoti” typically translated as “it occurs to him”. What happened to the "tassa "? Warder helpfully notes that this idiom is actually comprised of a subordinate clause and main clause. “Tassa” as the subordinate clause would be “Regarding that,” and “evaṃ hoti” would be the main clsuse “it occurs to him”. “Tassa evaṃ hoti” = “Regarding that, there was thus” followed by whatever comes in the quotation.
Now, Ven Thanissaro treats the ṭhitassa as making up a genitive absolute. Strange that he would treat the past participle as having no consequence of having occurred in the past. Never mind this minor travesty. But absolutus constructs are themselves subordinate clauses. In Ven Thanissaro’s translation, he’s treated one subordinate clause (the putative genitive absolute) being inserted enclitically into another subordinate clause “tassa”. Are you aware of such an unusual phenomenon being attested in the Pali elsewhere?
The far easier reading would be to note that the pronoun ta and ṭhita are both in the genitive. Now, I take Warder’s allowance for past participles to double up as substantive nouns. That binds the pronoun and noun together by their joint genitive relationship. The simple reading of “Tassa saññagge ṭhitassa” would be “Regarding that stationing in the peak of perception,”.
The passage in DA 28 in fact does not have a genitive absolute. Where the subordinate clause stands, it has 彼得此想 已. Notice the 已, indicating that the thought occurs after the attainment.
As for MN 111, let me see if I can locate my old posts on DW. Very Abhidhamma feel, don’t you feel?
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(regarding first jhana vitakka and vicara)
This is why there’s second jhana and beyond, where vitakka and vicara cease. The vitakka and vicara can have a range of freedom in first jhana, it doesn’t have to be only the most restrictive case possible. That’s why the Buddha used those terms (vitakka and vicara). If he had wanted to use the most restrictive sense, he could have used pali equivalents for residual thought momentum, or mind connecting to a nimitta, or something like that.
From an experiential standpoint, from second jhana as a frame of reference, you can then explore the other side of first jhana and know for yourself how much lattitude thought and evaluation can have in first jhana. The Buddha in the EBT doesn’t seem to try to pin down vitakka and vicara for first jhana in too much detail, preferring instead to show the general quality and context. Enough to let us know if we may be doing it. Even in English, or whatever one’s native familiar language dialect is, you can’t accurately pin down “thought and evaluation” of first jhana and communicate that to another person. You can only give a general idea.
What I was agreeing with Alaber is that having the thought “Am I in first jhana” while i’m in first jhana, is not enough to destroy my first jhana. I don’t think it’s necesary to add complexity of saying, you exited first jhana while you were having the thought and were able to instantly go back into it afterwards. There’s no need to be that nitpicky for first jhana. There’s second jhana and it’s better. The thing that should be emphasized for first jhana is that one has learned how to sustain a stream of thoughts for a good period of time that are connected with Dhamma, rather than 5 sensuality cords or 5 hindrances, while at the same time having enough kaya and citta passadhi to get frequent bursts of piti-sukha. That’s a really big deal. Getting the mental process and technique correct, and the physical part of relaxing coordinated, this is the skillset to get you through all four jhanas.
If one were to for example stare at a candle flame, or a color disk, or a mind created visual image of a breath nimitta, as the primary way to get into jhana, it’s really missing out on the important part of EBT first jhana. Yes it can produce a fabulously deep samatha, but first jhana is not emphasizing that. There are nine successive samadhi attainments to gradually appease and phase out the body, the distinctive part of the Buddha’s jhana that separates it from other religous traditions is the mental part that simultaneously develops wisdom.
This is interesting. Is this based on an experiential testament, or a textual testament?
But did such terms even exist in that layer of the texts? The phenomenon may be there, but what denotation could the Buddha have used to convey this? Your argument is essentially insisting that each Pali word can have only one meaning and that polysemy does not exist in that language. This is plainly wrong, going by this very simple example - in AN 10.60, ten perceptions (saññā) are discussed. If you are correct, every instance of saññā would be easily identifiable by its verb sañjānāti (perceives). Yet, not once does sañjānāti appear in AN 10.60. Instead, “perception” is defined by verbs like paṭisañcikkhati (reflects), paccavekkhati (reviews), the set of pajahati, vinodeti, byantīkaroti, anabhāvaṃ gameti (abandons, dispels, terminates, obliterates [leaving aside the issue of how the causatives are to be rendered]) etc etc. I could make the same rhetorical plea - why did the Buddha use saññā when the nouns derived from those verbs exist?
Where can I find this in the suttas? The sort of latitude you are asking that we accord to “experience” might be OK if it did not contradict a sutta. But, here the experience pleaded contradicts DN 9. Should we chuck that sutta out, just to make some accomodation for “experience”?
I would be quite keen to see this either presented or argued.
Again, this is flatly contradicted by DN 9.
Frank, what you are asking for is not simplicity, but the abrogation of both textual testament (AN 9.35) and critical reasoning, all in service of your experience. Bearing in mind that this platform is for the study of the texts of Early Buddhism, and not the promotion of the Thai Forest Tradition, don’t you find your plea quite misplaced?
And again, you’ll have to take that up with the Pali redactors. If they put in so much care in framing every one of the “insight” pericope with the locative absolute formed with past participles, what good reason do you offer to persuade us to abrogate the plain old meaning that insight occurs after the jhanas? Even the Chinese translators of this pericope took great care to render to this locative absolute precisely, to indicate that eg insight occurs after the jhanas by using 已 -
我 已 得如是定心清淨，無穢無煩，柔軟善住，得不動心
eg MA 157
彼 已 定心，清淨 無穢，柔 濡 調伏，住無動地
DA 20
Further, what possible reason could you offer to discount AN 9.35 which completely denies your model of insight whilst in jhana? Or are you going to cite the Thai Forest Tradition as being correct, while the suttas are wrong?
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