Vitakka vicāra (Jhana-factors)

I would concur. Made of pure perception (saññāmayo), perceptions from the sixfold base which are of the consciousness element. :cold_sweat:

With internal sense bases divested of external elements, and decidedly even divested of internal elements. Consisting only of the consciousness element and equanimity.

I would want to further posit that first jhana would then be complete divestment, withdrawal, relinquishment of the internal sense bases from external elements.

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Thanks Frank. This was the point I have been waiting for you to raise. It appears to be the mainstay of those who argue that sukha is a feeling rooted in a physical sense base, given that SN 48.36 uses the adjective kāyika to describe sukha. But first, a clarification, if you do not mind.

You say -

If we take sukha in 3rd jhana definition to be “sukha vedana”, sukha vedana contains both sukhindriyam and somanass-indriyam,

What exactly do you mean by “contain”? Presumably, you’re thinking of SN 48.38?

Now, coming to the substantive bit of your proposition -

i know 3rd jhana doesn’t say somanassa. but the fact that somanassa is used in the samisa sukha sets up the dichotomy there, meaning “sukha” in samisa and nira-misa take on the sukha-indriyam (physical pleasure definition) of SN 48.36.

I propose not to examine sukha, as it is a great deal more difficult to tease apart sukha from somanassa; as a hint, think of the last time you were happy about a pleasant memory, and then when you were equanimous about that same pleasant memory.

Instead, I will look at the dukkha indriya and how it is distinguished from the domanassa indriya. For simplicity, I’ll drop the term indriya, and just look at dukkha and domanassa.

The most well-know example of this dukkha and domanassa dichotomy would be SN 36.6. That sutta refers to the 2 types of feelings like two darts. It uses the same predication used in SN 48.36 to describe the 2 types of feeling, namely kāyika and cetasika.

While it does not say that cetasika dukkha is domanassa, it does use this pericope for domanassa/grief -

socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati

he sorrows, grieves and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught (per BB)

So, clearly, SN 36.6 also follows the SN 48.36 typology in putting dukkha into 2 distinct baskets, the kāyika and the cetasika.

Now, the interesting question would be - can the mind, when contacting mental data give rise to painful kāyika feeling, or must the mind experience only painful cetasika feeling? This is what MN 148 posits (abriged to the anusayas and the consequences) -

Bhikkhus, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust lies within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion lies within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance lies within one…

Ditto for the other 4 “physical” senses

Dependent on the mind and dhammas, mind-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one delights in it, welcomes it, and remains holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust lies within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one sorrows, grieves and laments, weeps beating one’s breast and becomes distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion lies within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one does not understand as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance lies within one…
(per BB)

To make it clear that the dukkha/ painful feeling above is not a cetasika dukkha, the sutta continues -

Dependent on the mind and dhammas mind-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises a feeling felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. When one is touched by a pleasant feeling, if one does not delight in it, welcome it, and remain holding to it, then the underlying tendency to lust does not lie within one. When one is touched by a painful feeling, if one does not sorrow, grieve and lament, does not weep beating one’s breast and become distraught, then the underlying tendency to aversion does not lie within one. When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one understands as it actually is the origination, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance does not lie within one.

So, you see, the mind is more than equipped to contact the dukkha indriya as a mental phenomenon. Kāyika feelings therefore include feelings engendered at the mind,

Why the heck are the sukha and dukkha indriyas called kāyika? I would say why not? If we get pass our own predilection for reading kāyika to mean “of the physical body” and go back to its most basic meaning in connection with a “heap”, then it becomes so easy to read the kāya in kāyika as “the (entire) heap of sense faculties”, while cetasika is contrasted as “(only) the mind-faculty”.

Which brings me to the thought experiment. When confronting an unpleasant memory, do you necessarily grieve?

If all that the mind feels are cetasika feelings, there would be no point to sense restraint of the mind in this pericope -

Having cognized a mental phenomenon with the mind, a bhikkhu does not grasp its marks and features. Since, if he left the mind faculty unrestrained, bad unwholesome states of longing and dejection might invade him, he practices restraint over it; he guards the mind faculty, he undertakes the restraint of the mind faculty.

The kāyika feeling at the mind is inexorable; the cetasika feeling is optional.

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A few quotes:

An 3.101, iddhis description: He dives in and out of the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if it were dry land.

Vinaya (Pr 1): It would be good, Master, if I inverted the earth, so that the monks might enjoy the nutritive essence of the water-plants.”
“But what will you do with those creatures, Moggallāna, who are supported by the earth?”
“Master, I will make one of my hands broad, like the great earth,and I will make those creatures who are supported by the earth go there. Then with the other hand I will invert the earth.

AN 8.30: Then the Blessed One, realizing with his awareness the line of thinking in Ven. Anuruddha’s awareness — just as a strong man might extend his flexed arm or flex his extended arm — disappeared from among the Bhaggas in the Deer Park at Bhesakala Grove, near Crocodile Haunt, and re-appeared among the Cetis in the Eastern Bamboo Park, right in front of Ven. Anuruddha. There he sat down on a prepared seat.

I thought we were discussing in general the possibility of a connection between mental and bodily phenomena. It seems to me that it is a triviality that bodily contact can arise as a consequence of mental phenomena. First I decide to take that glass of water and then as a result a contact between my finger and the glass arises. In a plausible scenario, mental activity translates as a bodily feeling through inner processes. That does not mean that the mind feels the body or the body feels the mind. If there was no connection whatsoever, body and mind would be completely separate, which is obviously not the case. Or am I misunderstanding your point?

Not necessarily. Saying there is a cause-consequence relationship between bodily and mental phenomena (which seems obvious to me) is not the same as saying the mind “cognizes” the body or vice versa.

Are you therefore saying that ALL mental states are mere epiphenomena of physiology (be it neurology or immunology)?

I don’t know about this, and it’s certainly not my point.

We agree on this

I would rather think it is not the case. It seems to me that the kāma refers to contacts that trigger raga (or sometimes dosa) in other words it is connected with samisa vedana. The bodily contacts that would be present in the jhanas would be connected to niramisa vedana, so there would be tactility-born pleasure that would not be part of kāma.

Well, that is still not so clear as far as I am concerned. And it sounds… improbable.

But does the presence of “imameva” in “imameva kāyaṃ” not already prove that kāya is to be understood adnominally? Is there any case of ayaṃ referring to an adverb?

Where does this expression occur in the EBTs?

Seriously, I don’t understand anything to the points you are making above. Would you indulge me and improve their clarity with more detailed explanations? After reading this, I still think the mind feels both kayika and cetasika vedana and I don’t see how this means that sukha cannot be physical. Perhaps you can enlighten me?

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[details=…] @Sylvester

I might frame it that the decidedly kāyika pītisukha that Frank mentions does not always engender cetasika sukha.

Eg: Aggisutta SN 46.53

I would also posit that what we colloquially take as mental, eg memories, are also decidedly of the four great physical dynamics.
[/details]

It seems that it’s usually/always in abbreviation.

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So we find ourselves to be riders of the lost expression :grinning:

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I think you mean “elission”? Yup. Tucked away in the elided peyyalas.

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Then you have understood my point, which is the same position as yours. It is however different from Frank’s point that kāyika is exclusively "physical ". That was the point I was belabouring.

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In my current view I regard it as due diligence. While I’m not certain of your exact question here and the acuity to look it up eludes me at the moment, I think if the ever-transitivity of the four jhāna verbs (abhisandeti et. al.) can be demonstrated, it provides an extra leg to stand on.

Okay, I located it in SN 14.9 and SN 14.10.

As for the “imameva kāyaṃ” bit, the same expression occurs with unequivocal reference to the physical body, multiple times:

AN 10.60: 31 body parts:
“katamā cānanda, asubhasaññā? idhānanda, bhikkhu imameva kāyaṃ uddhaṃ pādatalā adho kesamatthakā tacapariyantaṃ pūraṃ nānāppakārassa asucino paccavekkhati — ‘atthi imasmiṃ kāye kesā lomā nakhā dantā taco maṃsaṃ nhāru aṭṭhi aṭṭhimiñjaṃ vakkaṃ hadayaṃ yakanaṃ kilomakaṃ pihakaṃ papphāsaṃ antaṃ antaguṇaṃ udariyaṃ karīsaṃ pittaṃ semhaṃ pubbo lohitaṃ sedo medo assu vasā kheḷo siṅghāṇikā lasikā muttan’ti. iti imasmiṃ kāye asubhānupassī viharati. ayaṃ vuccatānanda, asubhasaññā.

AN 6.29: charnel ground observations:

“puna caparaṃ, bhante, bhikkhu seyyathāpi passeyya sarīraṃ sīvathikāya chaḍḍitaṃ ekāhamataṃ vā dvīhamataṃ vā tīhamataṃ vā uddhumātakaṃ vinīlakaṃ vipubbakajātaṃ. so imameva kāyaṃ evaṃ upasaṃharati — ‘ayampi kho kāyo evaṃdhammo evaṃbhāvī evaṃanatīto’”ti

MN 119: referring explicitly to the four elements:

“puna caparaṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu imameva kāyaṃ yathāṭhitaṃ yathāpaṇihitaṃ dhātuso paccavekkhati — ‘atthi imasmiṃ kāye pathavīdhātu āpodhātu tejodhātu vāyodhātū’ti.

MN 36: again unequivocally the body

so kho ahaṃ, aggivessana, imameva kāyaṃ assāsento pāṇinā gattāni anumajjāmi. tassa mayhaṃ, aggivessana, pāṇinā gattāni anumajjato pūtimūlāni lomāni kāyasmā papatanti tāyevappāhāratāya.
Simply from my eating so little, if I tried to ease my body by rubbing
my limbs with my hands, the hair — rotted at its roots — fell from my
body as I rubbed, simply from eating so little.

And actually, from the jhana similes themselves (AN 5.28/DN 2 etc.), it is completely unequivocal. The body in 4th jhana is explicitly said to be seated (nisinno, but I guess some will argue that this is only metaphoric):

catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. so imameva kāyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena pharitvā nisinno hoti; nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena apphuṭaṃ hoti. seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, puriso odātena vatthena sasīsaṃ pārupitvā nisinno assa; nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa odātena vatthena apphuṭaṃ assa. evamevaṃ kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu imameva kāyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena pharitvā nisinno hoti; nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena apphuṭaṃ hoti. ariyassa, bhikkhave, pañcaṅgikassa sammāsamādhissa ayaṃ catutthā bhāvanā.

he enters and remains in the fourth jhana: purity of equanimity and
mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He sits, permeating the body
with a pure, bright awareness, so that there is nothing of his entire
body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness.
"Just as if a man were sitting wrapped from head to foot with a white cloth so that there would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even so, the monk sits, permeating his body with a pure, bright awareness. There is nothing of his entire
body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness. This is the fourth
development of the five-factored noble right concentration.

I find this very difficult to argue against.

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The physicality of the body is a relative term though, right?

At the extreme, in DN 15, there’s mention of a nāma-kāya. So one might imagine that formless beings have a body that is not physical. The expression also occurs in MN 121 at the culmination of the formless attainments.

But aside from that I think the point still stands:

To wit, your question:

Is a solid question to answer. However, as proof beyond reasonable doubt, being a question of non-existence, I think it would be much easier to target the set of verbs -sandeti et. al. to demonstrate their potential ever-transitivity since these verbs would occur in far fewer instances than ayaṃ.

Unless you’ve already found an intransitive case of any of the four verbs? :cold_sweat:

As far as I am concerned, the description of 4th jhana practice and simile above removes all doubt.

Granted but I think the bar for doubt here should be set higher in order that we might find some reliable conclusion to these long discussions.

I’ve made a tiny bit of progress on -sandeti forms, just enough to get a sense of whether the problem is tractible, and I’ve yet to find an intransitive case…so…I’m crossing my fingers.

Otherwise, the fallback would be with regards to your ayaṃ-as-adverb question…

Personally, I don’t see how a mental body could “sit”. Could you underline what may still be doubtful here?

Interesting point. I would ask whether nisinno is always unambiguously used in such a context as to adopt a sitting posture with the legs of a human’s anatomical body.

Eg Could it always be translated as “remains”, ie in the abstract, instead?

But then there is the simile of a person physically sitting wrapped in a white cloth. So if kaya doesn’t mean the physical body and nisinno “seated” well that is very much misleading, and a very big pedagogic mistake in my opinion for someone who has proven time and again to be very careful at how he formulated his teaching. Ockham’s razor and common sense should apply.

Providing evidence of that would befall the deniers, all the more that it looks pretty outlandish. I am not going to try and imagine counter arguments to every outlandish postulate that could be opposed.

Well, for one, if we take the word “foot” out of the equation there for sasīsaṃ, the emphasis changes I think.

But even then if we want to use the argument that because there’s a physical body in the fourth metaphor, it’s a physical body everywhere, the other three metaphors would have to be consistent with that. But rather each metaphor offered is emphasising some particular aspect of the image (eg sprinkling, flowing, floating, covering) imho.

I think it’s always been just the one, ie kāyaṃ as adverbial or patient…

Edit: I mean, if we want to establish a solid philological/hermeneutical consensus and build upon it and enrich the model with all else to be found in the suttas right?..There’s a lot of stuff in there…

Moreover I don’t know if I’m in a bubble here going over these texts again and again but I feel like these texts are so much more wieldy as a result of these incisive argumentations.

The presence of a cloth over the body also proves it is physical.

Well I have argued the same for the first jhana simile, quite successfully I think, so that makes the first and the fourth. It would not be very far-fetched to assume it also applies in between to number two and three, although I am not even trying to entertain that.

But then when we start digging, there is “nisinno” not meaning seated but “remaining”, “rupa” not referring to materiality etc. etc. the number of unsubstantiated assumptions growing exponentially as the discussion proceeds.

I am afraid consensus is something we will never reach. But personally, I try to save time for practice, so I only need to convince myself after having attentively listened to what people who disagree have to say, for good measure.

That’s for sure. The next step though is to take it into practice.

Hi Sylvester,
I understand sentence by sentence and word by word what you’re saying, but I’m having trouble putting it together and seeing what point you’re driving at.

I don’t think it’s just my personal tendency to read a simple plain, “anatomical body” into “kāya”. I believe most of the Buddha’s original disciples, especially in the later period of his ministry when he’s gotten famous and popular, are going to have a majority of non-brahmin non-educated folks.

Even the highly educated folks of the Buddha’s time had to eat, sleep, and do things with their anatomical body. I highly doubt the first thing they think of when they hear “kaya” is “heap of any mental or physical, concrete or abstract collection of things.”

In a previous post, I listed numerous examples of “imameva kayam” where anatomical body is clearly what is meant by kaya. I’ll add that to the wiki post in the near future.

Perhaps somebody can add to the same wiki the evidence where kaya, in the context of samadhi, and meditative practices directly supporting jhana, that don’t mean anatomical body.

I have not read the critical pali dictionary entry on “kaaya” yet, but I have a pretty good guess on how kaaya took on the non-anatomical meanings in the case of formless attainments and nibbana.

most of of us tend to take our anatomical body as the seat, the center, the vessel of our “self”, or “soul”. This is a timeless principle. Perhaps etymologically, kaaya originally just meant a heap of things, but once it became common to use “kaya” as the anatomical body, I’m pretty sure that would have become the “first choice”, the first thing people think of during the Buddha’s time when they heard that word. They would only reach for “heap of things” or another nuance of meaning as needed, when “anatomical body” didn’t fit. Now think of how kaya is used as a word in reference to touching Nibbana or the formless attainment. I also have a good guess why this happened. Something isn’t taken as real unless you can see, it hear it, touch it with your body. So even though you can’t actually physically touch Nibbana or the formless attainment, that’s the sense that’s being conveyed when “kaaya” is used in that situation. You didn’t imagine nibbana, it wasn’t hearsay, it’s not conjecture, you directly experienced nibbana. It’s as real as the anatomical body you have to feed and nourish.

edit: addition. Here’s the english definition of body. Look at how #1 is anatomical body. “Heap or collection of things” is #4, and the more abstract things even further on the list. Imagine the “kaya” in the buddha’s dictionary woudl be similar.

bod·y
ˈbädē/
noun
noun: body; plural noun: bodies

1.
the physical structure of a person or an animal, including the bones, flesh, and organs.
"it's important to keep your body in good condition"
synonyms:	figure, frame, form, physique, anatomy, skeleton; More
soma;
informalbod, soul case
"the human body"
    the trunk apart from the head and the limbs.
    "the blow almost severed his head from his body"
    synonyms:	torso, trunk
    "he was hit by shrapnel in the head and body"
    a corpse.
    "they found his body washed up on the beach"
    synonyms:	corpse, carcass, skeleton, remains; More
    informalstiff;
    cadaver
    "the body was exhumed"
    the physical and mortal aspect of a person as opposed to the soul or spirit.
    "a duality of body and soul"
    informal
    a person's body regarded as an object of sexual desire.
    "he was just after her body"
    informaldated
    a person, often one of a specified type or character.
    "a motherly body"
2.
the main section of a car or aircraft.
"the body of the aircraft was filled with smoke"
3.
the main or central part of something, especially a building or text.
"information that changes regularly is kept apart from the main body of the text"
synonyms:	main part, central part, core, heart
"the body of the essay"
    the part of an email containing the message, as opposed to information such as the subject and sender.
    "put your name, address, and daytime phone number in the email's body"
4.
a large or substantial amount of something; a mass or collection of something.
"a rich body of Canadian folklore"
synonyms:	expanse, mass, area, stretch, tract, sweep, extent More
"a body of water"
quantity, amount, volume, collection, mass, corpus
"a growing body of evidence"
    a group of people with a common purpose or function acting as an organized unit.
    "a regulatory body"
    synonyms:	association, organization, group, party, company, society, circle, syndicate, guild, corporation, contingent
    "the representative body of the employers"
5.
technical
a distinct material object.
"the path taken by the falling body"
6.
a full or substantial quality of flavor in wine.
    fullness or thickness of a person's hair.
    "designed to add body to limp and straight hair"
    synonyms:	fullness, thickness, substance, bounce, lift, shape
    "add body to your hair"
7.
(in pottery) a clay used for making the main part of ceramic ware, as distinct from a glaze.
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The basic structure of this particular limb of the argument is basically:

Frank: Jhana has physical body because of the word kāya
Ajahn Brahmali: Kāya is an abstract term
Frank: There are lots of instances where kāya is concretely physical body. Eg kāyika vs cetasika
Sylvester: Kāyika vs cetasika is actually an instance of abstract usage

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