In the Anurādhasutta the Lord Buddha tells Anurādha that a Tathāgata is not form or not without form, and so Anurādha cannot comment on existence, non-existence etc. of a Tathāgata. He supports this by saying Anurādha hasn’t found a Tathāgata in the present life. But isn’t the Lord Buddha a Tathāgata - he has thus-gone and now set the wheel of dhamma in motion?
https://suttacentral.net/sn22.86/?view=normal&lang=en
This is one of my favorite sutta in all the Pali canon and quite profound and hard to understand. The Buddha instructs Anurādha to analyze the Tathāgata with penetrative insight. The Tathāgata exists and this sutta does not deny the existence of the Tathāgata, but this sutta is pointing out how the Tathāgata exists; as a completely dependent and conditioned phenomena that has no essence or substantial existence.
When we look at the person we think that the Tathāgata exists as a real and substantial thing that has an essence or core that can be found if we look hard enough. But with analysis we can see that this is just not true. No essence or core can be found in the body or in the mind nor can it be known as something apart from the body and mind. The Tathāgata cannot be found or appropriately thought of as somehow the combination of the body+mind either. The body and mind themselves exist without essence or core so how can the essence of a person be found in them?
The Tathāgata is just a mere designation and exists without any essence or core in a thoroughly dependent manner on the basis of designation. What’s hard to understand is that the body and mind also exist in this same manner. As mere designations without any core whatsoever. All phenomena exist like this. No phenomena can withstand penetrative analysis. No phenomena has substantial existence.
We think in our ignorance that persons exist in a substantial and real manner. They just don’t. That is not how persons exist nor how any phenomena exists. This sutta is pointing that out. Realizing how persons/phenomena actually exist dissolves the questions that inevitably arise that have as a basis the idea that persons/phenomena exist in a substantial way: the question of what happens to them with the death and break up of the body.
It is hard to understand and profound dhamma in this sutta so if you don’t get it at first keep at it. I’d also suggest studying it with SN 5.10, SN 22.95 and SN 22.85.
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Tathagata indeed set the weel of Dhamma in motion☺️
In order words some 2500 ago certain individual (puggala) was born in India. He was a prince and his name was Gotama. As far as ignorance -avijja is concerned - at that time his ontological status was the same as yours - certain individual who is known on Sutta Central as cyan.
When you reflect on your own being (bhava) and ask yourself “what am I?” - by this very act you affirm merely that you are - this is your ignorance on pre-reflexive level which you share with other individuals (puggalas) even ariyas.
But in your case -or so I assume - you see the answer for this question, you have more or less precise self-image of who you are. And this self-image is build entirely from various aspects of experience: matter, feeling, perception, determinations (intentions) and consciousness.
But this is your ignorance on reflexive level which is known as sakkayadithi, you think about yourself as a person who lives in the world. In other words you are an individual (puggala) who carries the burden of personality (sakkaya), you are someone, a person.
However in the case of the individual (puggala) known first as prince Gotama, later as the Buddha, while we are entitled to recognise that from birth to death there was precisely the same individual (puggala) - speaking objectively - by awakening this individual ceased to have an ontological status at all. Why? It is so, because this individual neither (subjectively) had any self-image- of himself as a person, nor he / it asserted the state of being (conceit “I am”) And this is precisely the case with any arahat, not only Tathagata as the Buddha. In order words arahat is an individual puggala without personality sakkaya.
In your particular case if you want to join to the noble Sangha of arahats, no point to worry much about “I am” . Subjectivity is associated with perception of permanence and by any kind of self-image you have about yourself you localise yourself in space and time. You are someone, person. But what you can expect by existing in space in time if not sickness, old age and death?
Fortunately, according to Lord Buddha you can escape death even now, by seeing any aspect of experience, starting from the body as: this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self. If you succeed in such desidentification, while objectively an individual known as cyan would continue to function, it would be functioning without personality (sakkaya). By pointing out that your self-identification is entirely built upon things which all are impermanent Lord Buddha gives you rationale for desidentification with them.
For example certain individual is born as woman and physically it will die as s woman, and with this nothing can be done, but even on wordly level we recognise puggala with the body of woman who has the self-image as being the man.
But in the case of woman puggala, there is no self-image at all so while objectively speaking there is such individual (puggala) subjectively there is nobody there, so Tathagata is not to be found even here and now.
What does womanhood matter at all
When the mind is concentrated well,
When knowledge flows on steadily
As one sees correctly into Dhamma.
One to whom it might occur,
‘I’m a woman’ or 'I’m a manʹ
Or ‘I’m anything at all’—
Is fit for Māra to address.”
SN 5 : 2
So first one should abandon sakkayaditthi, and it is useful to have a clear vision of the two levels of ignorance, ego in itself - notion “I am” and self-image. Both have to be abandon, but one has to start from abandoning of self-image.
'I urge the following dilemma. If your Ego has no content, it is nothing, and it therefore is not experienced; but if on the other hand it is anything, it is a phenomenon in time.'—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality
“I am” in itself has no content, sakkayaditthi is taking for granted that I am and exist as phenomenon in time by creating self-image based on self-identification with things in space and time. So the state of puthujjana is that of being (bhava) but consciousness of arahat does not support the state of bhava and so
“Bhikkhus, when the gods with Indra, with Brahmā and with Pajāpati seek a bhikkhu who is thus liberated in mind, they do not find [anything of which they could say]: ‘The consciousness of one thus gone is supported by this.’ Why is that? One thus gone, I say, is untraceable here and now. MN 22
The reason why the Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra- , and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana , who, in this sense , actually and in truth is to be found. Nanavira Thera
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@knigarian so for you persons have ontological status but Ariya beings don’t?? Before awakening persons really and truly exist, but after awakening they don’t?? That somehow persons really and truly exist in a way the Tathāgata himself does not?? This is quite odd and mistaken to my mind.
The ontological status before and after awakening of a person remains exactly the same. The existence of a person - to whatever degree they exist - is exactly the same before and after awakening. Whether Tathāgata or Ariya being or puggala. All the same ontological status and it remains that way. There is no difference.
To credit your reading we’d have to look at the questions that the Teacher placed to Anuradha and substitute a puggala for the Tathāgata. The upshot of your reading is that for one or more of those questions a puggala can be found or appropriately associated with one or more of the five khandas.
That a puggala can be found in the body or the mind, or the body+mind, or apart from the body or mind, or the body+mind, or as the combination of body+mind or something. So which is it? Which questions would be answered differently with puggala as subject versus Tathāgata as subject and why?
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Puthujjanas definitely have an ontological status. And as long as they don’t realise that their ontological status is dependently arisen on the present condition - ignorance, namely: with ignorance as condition being (bhava) they will continue to have it.
Ariyas as sekhas - let’s forget about them, since their situation is ambiguous, they share some qualities of puthujjana and some of arahat.
But arahats definitely don’t have an ontological status since arahat and nibbana are synonymous terms and nibbana is defined by the Lord Buddha as cessation of being here and now.
This is quite odd and mistaken to my mind.
That’s fine. It can be explained by the fact that my description of what constitute ignorance is mistaken, or by the fact that you don’t understand your own upādāna which itself depend on ignorance.
Others may have mixed up 6 sense contacts and self.
There’s no self, but 6 sense contacts can be directly experienced, is the whole of experience, in fact.
When using the term tathāgata, the Buddha was using it in the ultimate sense of having a self. Since there’s ultimately no self, it cannot be found even when the Buddha was alive. What we call the Buddha is a labeling of certain 5 aggregates which are now long gone.
5 aggregates, 6 sense contacts are the ultimate things. They can be directly perceived and known to exist or not. They are impermanent, suffering, not self, empty of self.
Emptiness cannot be applied to self, as there’s no such thing as a self to apply emptiness to. Same with all the concepts including existence or non-existence. The self is a delusional thing. A mirage. Doesn’t actually exist.
This is where I believe a lot of people mixes these two things up. When the 6 sense contacts, 5 aggregates are also called foam, mirage, due to it’s impermanent nature, and empty of inherent existence.
Let’s look at a mirage to analyze further. The light that reaches the eye to form mirage certainly exist. The misconception of the oasis at that location in the desert exist as ignorance, the oasis doesn’t exist.
Similarly, the 5 aggregates, 6 sense contacts exist, the misconception that these are mine, me, or I am these exist as ignorance, but the I, me, mine doesn’t exist.
The difference between arahant and unenlightened people is that arahants have the 5 aggregates, 6 sense contacts, but no ignorance that they are self or the “I am” conceit.
For everyone always, there’s no I, me, mine.
This analysis avoids the potentially confusing terminology of ontological status, exist etc.
Then I ask again, what questions would you answer differently by replacing the Tathagata with the puggala? Can a puggala be found in form? Etc?
Then I repeat again, Suttas recognise 9 puggalas, 8 ariyas + puthujjana. And since arahat is puggala without any ignorance the term puggala - an individual - isn’t necessarily connected with ignorance. In other words your question is rather nonsensical since this is what puggala precisely is impermanent set of aggregates namely matter, feeling, perception, determinations and consciousnes.
Since generally your posts are on higher level than that question, I assume that it comes from certain lack of meritorical knowledge of Suttas, in particular I believe you don’t clearly see distinction between 5 khandhas which stands for arahat, and pañc’upādānakkhandhā 5 aggregates subjected to upādāna which stands for puthujjana.
And matter, feeling, perception, determinations, and consciousness as such are just impermanent aspect of experience. And as such are quite real phenomena: “They are…” But assertion that things are and assertion “I am” are on quite different level since in the case of arahat there is puggala - set of khandhas which functions automatically without any subject or someone who insists: my body, my feeling …
But the Dhamma is taught to certain individual puggala in order to liberated him from notions “I” and “mine” . Selfhood is associated with perception of permanence that’s way putting emphasis on impermanence of aggregates Buddha shows that puthujjana is a victim of the wrong self-identification with aggregates. In other words it is the task of puthujjana to transform his experience from pañc’upādānakkhandhā to “merely” pañc’kkhandhā.
At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Volitional
formations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.
“There is, bhikkhus, a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it.
“And what is that world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through? Form, bhikkhus, is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … [140] … and elucidated by the Tathāgata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … and elucidated by the Tathāgata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Bhikkhus, just as a blue, red, or white lotus is born in the water and grows up in the water, but having risen up above the water, it stands unsullied by the water, so too the Tathāgata was born in the world and grew up in the world, but having overcome the world, he dwells unsullied by the world.” SN 22: 94
There is tendency, in Theravada commentaries and other traditions to undermined reality of puggala as such, simile of chariot, which is used in Suttas is used to abolished reality of puggala. But in Suttas, simile of chariot has different didactic, puggala indeed is the set of impermanent components, but that means that it cannot be seen as a self, it doesn’t mean that chariot isn’t real phenomena per se:
. It is quite possible that the notion of paramattha sacca, ‘truth in the highest, or ultimate, or absolute, sense’ was in existence before the time of the Milindapañha; but its use there (Pt. II, Ch. 1) is so clear and unambiguous that that book is the obvious point of departure for any discussion about it. The passage quotes the two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the following argument. The word ‘chariot’ is the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts. Therefore, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no chariot. Similarly, an ‘individual’ (the word puggala is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhā), and, ‘in the highest sense’, there exists no individual. That is all.
9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question ‘Is this a chariot?’, it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not. If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle—it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked ‘Is this a heap of components?’, he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says ‘In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts’, all he is saying is ‘It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot’. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhā) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhā cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual ‘In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere asemblage of khandhā’ is to be unintelligible.
10. What, now, is the reason for this argument? Why has this notion of ‘truth in the highest sense’ been invented? We find the clue in the Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII) quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then repeats in essence the argument of the Milindapañha, using the word satta as well as puggala. It goes on, however, to make clear what was only implicit in the Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is to remove the conceit ‘(I) am’ (asmimāna): if it is seen that ‘in the highest sense’, paramatthato, no creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that I exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was felt to be necessary. The assutavā puthujjana identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he proceeds to regard as ‘self’. He learns, however, that the Buddha has said that ‘actually and in truth neither self nor what belongs to self are to be found’ (see the second Sutta passage in §4). Since he cannot conceive of the individual except in terms of ‘self’, he finds that in order to abolish ‘self’ he must abolish the individual; and he does it by this device. But the device, as we have seen, abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that the passage in the Milindapañha makes no mention at all of ‘self’: the identification of ‘self’ with the individual is so much taken for granted that once it is established that ‘in the highest sense there is no individual’ no further discussion is thought to be necessary. Not the least of the dangers of the facile and fallacious notion ‘truth in the highest sense’ is its power to lull the unreflecting mind into a false sense of security. The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress.
Most surely, the rainbow exists - after all, it is seen, experienced, photographed, talked about, and celebrated. To say it doesn’t would be to invite scorn and criticism from those who have seen one.
Most surely too, the rainbow does not Exist - it cannot be pinned down, isolated, put into a box or annihilated. To say it does would be to invite scorn and criticism from those who have gone looking for one.
This is why the Buddha teaches by the middle…
With moisture as condition, clouds come to be. With clouds as condition, raindrops come to be. With a sprinkling of sunlight, light gets refracted. Thus, with sunlight and raindrops as condition, the rainbow comes to be.
(None of the antecedent causes are Permanent Entities in and of their own right - and neither is the conditioned phenomenon we call a rainbow!)
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I believe this sutta points to: A mind without identification, without attachment, can not be described in terms of what it normally grasps at (rupa, sanna, sankhara, vedana, vinnana’s) and is clung to.
If there is grasping at arising volition , that can be described as a willing mind. If there is grasping at feelings as a feeling mind. If there is graspsing at arising thoughts as a thinking mind. If there is grasping at sentiments, as sentimental mind. If there is grasping at sense objects as a sensing mind, etc.
But how would one describe the mind that does not grasps? It cannot be described in terms of what is grasped. Maybe as fully open and liberated, freed? But what is that? I believe this freed mind cannot really be traced, pinpointed. It is like a completely empty openess. It has no limits, no boundaries to find (AN10.81), no structures to stumble on. No coarseness to be felt. Maybe one can say that it is no aggregation at all. Like this freed mind must not be seen as something build up?
Still one can also not say that the mind that cannot be traced or pinpointed does not exist. Only, if one would seek it, one cannot find it.
I believe this is also what is meant when the sutta’s teach that an awakened one is untracable for Mara and after death. I do not believe that this refers to non-existence, mere cessation after a last death. Mara can only affect the mind in which things can still establish due to grasping. Mara cannot influence a total open-heartedness, Nibbana.
But this view does not justify asankhata as real and also as something that must be known, according the suttas’.
Your view more or less suggests Nibbana is not real. There is no asankhata, nothing constant, nothing stable, nothing not-desintegrating, no base for peace…no base for stability…while SN43 really says that the Buddha teaches the Path to what is stable, constant, not-desintegrating, the Truth etc…
…and why would a rational person speak about mere cessation at a last death as the Truth, as the constant, the stable, the not desintegrating? Why would one talk about a flame that extinguishes because of lack of fuel as the stable, the constant, the Truth, the not-deintegrating? It makes no sense, right?
. If there would really be no base for stability, like many here seem to believe, then this is the consequence: …one who is stable is most deluded!
How can a mind detached from all 5 khandha’s still be seen as having khandha’s?
For what it is worth, i agree with this. The mind of a worldling is only more defiled but not fundamentally different. As water that can be very defiled and clean. But water is water.
It is never like this that one really becomes something or someone else. One cannot change from this into that. Like water also does not become something else when it is purifed.
Mind cannot become something else then it already is.
Sutta has this simile of a skin of a cow being cut of the tendons and sinews and put back onto the skinless cow. The cow still has the skin, but no attachment to the skin.
The skin here refers to the 5 aggregates, the tendons, sinews etc refers to clinging, attachment etc.
Why is nothing not real?
If nothing is not real, then it cannot be the case that fire can get extinguished. Since it is the case that fire can get extinguished and we can say no fire there, therefore we can say there is a state of no fire, and it is real.
When there’s no fire, it’s stable, because fire is seen to be moving as the flame, whereas there’s no moving when there’s no flame, the no moving is referred to as stable. etc. It’s all similar to the question: what is so happy about nirodha samāpatti when nothing is felt?
Exactly because nothing is felt that it is happy.
Understand dependent origination and cessation. Mind arises due to ignorance. When ignorance ceases without remainder, all parts of the mind ceases without remainder. The pure and the impure parts, they all cease at the death of an arahant.
And what does the cow refer to?
Do you really think about Nibbana as nothing?
What i know is: Nibbana is described as extinguishment of the 3 fires which becomes with coolness, peace, being at ease in a world burning. Or as mind without clinging, detached, limitless. Or as mind that does not construct (cessation of bhava) etc
But Nibbana is never describes as nothing nor as mere cessation. That is always intentionally avoided, i believe.
Also unconscious, nothing is felt…
that idea of nothing felt or perceived as the goal or the end of ones suffering is called vibhava tanha. People want to stop the exist. They see delight in becoming non-existent, and finally feel nothing and perceive nothing anymore. That is how they delight in something that will happen in the future. I feel, mere cessation is in principe the same, only it takes rebirth into account. But it is the same delight in something that will happen in the future; the same idea of no feeling anymore, no perceptions anymore, finally peace. The same idea that the end of suffering comes with stopping to exist.
I know, we have all discussed this many times. @yeshe.tenley is right, but i feel it is also quit a thing to think about Nibbana as nothing. Would it be possible that anyone of us could change their minds 
analogies are not perfect.
Don’t mix up nibbāna with remainder with nibbāna without reminder. The remainder is the body and mind freed from defilements.
Ideas are not craving. Anyway, the craving is cause of suffering, is the craving part, not the non existence part. It is due to craving that the non existence part is not possible, so it is an overreach. Eventually, we have to let go of the craving to get to nibbāna in order to get to nibbāna.
Idea wise I addressed it here: Nature of Parinibbāna - General Theravada topics - Classical Theravāda
Comparison of highest happiness wise, it makes no sense to downgrade parinibbāna with anything at all.
No, vinnana srises due the ignorance. Not mind. No vinnana can arise without mind, i believe.
The combination of avijja and sankhara (first two nidana’s of PS) means: with avijja as condition, a proces of building up, initial construction starts in the mind (sankhara’s arise). A direction, inclination arises in the mind to see what stirs the mind. It is like the mind wants to see who knocks on a sense-door and directs all its mental factors onto that, like a coachman directs all his horses. And when it meets with the sense-object, it contacts it, feels it, recognises it, a vinnana has arises. A moment of becoming aware of something sensed.
Avijja does not create mind but it is the main cause why mind becomes engaged with the senses and is being caught by that. This develops further.
Avijja causes subconscious grasping, initial attachment, and conscious wrong attention feeds that. It causes mind to become loaded and burdened.
One cannot say that mind is caused by avijja but avijja is also effective and arising in the mind when avijja anusaya is triggered.
I do not think so. When avijja ceases, mind does not become attached anymore. It does not become limited, narrow, coarse. A arahant has no avijja but one cannot say mind has ceased.
You should view it in 3 lifetimes model.
Past life ignorance, volitional formations, craving, clinging, becoming makes for this life’s rebirth relinking consciousness, name and form, 6 sense bases, contact, feeling.
Mind reborn anews this life, and once reborn, consciousness and name and form mutually sustain each other. So the next chance for them to collapse without arising is at death.
But if there’s still volitional formations, craving, clinging, becoming, in this life, then the conditions for rebirth is fulfilled and a new mind for the next life arises again.
Components of mind in the 5 resultant group are:
- consciousness,
- inside name are: perception, feeling, intention/volition, contact and attention.
- mind base amongst the 6 sense bases
- contact, specifically, the 6 sense consciousness and mind base, mind objects.
- feelings.
All 4 aggregates of the mind are covered in the above and there’s no beyond this which is called mind.
That is how with the ending of ignorance, future life mind ceases. This life mind is sustained by past kamma already.
Without this 3 lifetimes picture, one is bound to come to a wrong understanding of the process of liberation.
I try to prevent we discuss the same things over and over again.
For me it remains all the same: you, and others here too, look upon anything that arises, ceases, and changes as real, or like you said:
It is like that you never direct the mind towards what is here and now already dispassionate, empty, undirected, peaceful , stilled, no formation seen arising and ceasing. Like you denie that this really can be distinguished. Like you (i do not mean you personally) really see only formations arising and ceasing. Really?
I believe…this is not oke. But oke, what has a lay person to tell a monk?
Still, without being disrespect, and without issues of power, status, might, i sincerly believe this lack of awareness of what is here and now not seen arising, and ceasing, is a problem.
But you believe i have a problem… when i say that not all i know and see is seen and known as a formation.
We have a lot of problems
But i sincerly believe that this focus on formations, without any feeling for what is not seen arising and ceasing; peace, emptiness, openess, stilling, is a problem.
Why are you all so reluctant to think about asankhata as something that is just as real as seeing formations arising and ceasing (sankhata). Why can’t both be real?
Seeing Nibbāna is focusing on the cessation part of the arising and ceasing and only that until no arising is seen, then all ceases, no more arising. That’s it. That’s going beyond, to the other side, a stream winner. At least according to Burgs, who’s following Pa Auk method who’s following Visuddhimagga.
Given that you’re still a believer in self, green, I don’t think we can take your personal experience as seriously of a stream enterer level. Thus, the logical conclusion is, whatever you think of as not arising and ceasing that you personally witness, it’s a concept, or delusion.
Just repeating the correct dhamma doesn’t imply any attainment on our parts. It’s possible to come to an intellectual understand of right view without experiencial, directly seeing it. So when you reply, you don’t need to speculate on the attainments or none of the people who defend the dhamma. Just see that it’s dhamma working its way out to expression via our bodies and minds.