I was investigating the role of attachment (‘upadana’) in the Dependent Origination and an issue arose in relation to the common translations of the suttas (which include):
Katamañca bhikkhave upādānaṃ? Cattārimāni bhikkhave, upādānāni: kāmūpadānaṃ, diṭṭhūpādānaṃ, sīlabbatūpādānaṃ, attavādūpādānaṃ. Idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave upādānaṃ.
And what, bhikkhus, is clinging? There are these four kinds of clinging: clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and vows, clinging to a doctrine of self. This is called clinging.
What is attachment? There are four kinds of attachment: sensuous attachment, attachment to views,attachment to rules and rituals and attachment to the “I” concept.
And what is clinging? These four are clingings: sensuality clinging, view clinging, precept & practice clinging and doctrine of self clinging. This is called clinging.
SN 12.2
SN 12.12 is an interesting sutta since it appears to negate the view that there is a ‘self’ or “I” that experiences or creates sense contact, feelings, cravings & attachments but that ‘existence/becoming’ arises because of attachment.
MN 64 is another interesting sutta, since, based on its translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi, the five fetters (many of which are common to the four types of attachment) are described as manifesting/arising as “notions”. To quote:
For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? … A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘teachings,’ so how could doubt about the teachings arise in him? …A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘rules,’ so how could adherence to rules and observances arise in him? A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘sensual pleasures,’ so how could sensual desire arise in him?.. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘beings,’ so how could ill will towards beings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendencies… lie within him.
MN 18 may also be useful here, since it states:
With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels (vedeti), one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives (sañjānāti), one thinks about (vitakketi). What one thinks about, one objectifies (papañceti).
My discussion topic is about two alternate viewpoints:
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Are the translations “attachment to” accurate, since these translations appear to infer that the things (sensual pleasures, views, rules & self-ideas) attached “to” arise prior to the attachment?
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Or, alternately, does attachment (‘upadana’) refer to both ‘taking up’ (‘grasping’) a sense object & also developing notions/ideas of sensual pleasure (e.g. ‘beauty’; ‘deliciousness’; ‘sexiness’, etc), views, rules & ‘self’?
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In other words, can or should terms ‘kāmūpadānaṃ’, diṭṭhūpādānaṃ’, sīlabbatūpādānaṃ’, ‘attavādūpādānaṃ’ be translated as ‘attachment as/of sensuality’, ‘attachment as/of views’, ‘attachment as/of rules’ & ‘attachment as/of self-ideas’?
The 2nd alternative using the joiner “as/of” may be similar to Thanissaro’s literal translation below:
And what is clinging? These four are clingings: sensuality clinging, view clinging, precept & practice clinging and doctrine of self clinging. This is called clinging.