Sorry , I didn’t know it 
thanks , metta
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My understanding is that there were a couple schools of thought that debated whether mental functions like manasikara are distinct from consciousness or different modes of consciousness. Different Abhidharma writers believed different things, and they went back and forth. So, if a tradition decided they were distinct from consciousness, they wouldn’t think it logical for nama to include vijnana. If they thought everything mental was vijnana in different modes, then they included vijnana in nama’s definition.
It’s a great example of the pitfalls of overthinking things and the influence basic assumptions have on lines of thinking.
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In this case, the Pali tradition considers vijnana/vinna is different from manassikara ‘attention’, and thus nama’s defination includes manassikara, and adds phassa ‘contact’, which includes vijnana (i.e. phassa is a term for the ‘coming together’ of the sense-faculties, external objects, and consciousness ‘vijnana’, and conditioned by this phassa arise vedana ‘feeling’, sanna ‘perception’, and cetana ‘volition/activities’).
The SA or Sarvastivada tradition, however, considers manassikara is part of vijnana in a different mental mode, and thus nama’s definition includes vijnana, and does not need to add phassa and manassikara.
The contact in nama seems to be there to account for the formless attainments/realms, which are based on the concepts of “infinite space” etc. It appears to be linked to the designation contact of DN 15. This is treated somewhat differently to the 2nd contact seen, which deals more with ordinary sense experience. On the other hand it could also be there to account for awakening, since the Pali suttas view Nibbana to be an external dhamma which is cognised. The Sarvāstivādins also had this view I believe, albeit in their Abhidharma works rather than sutras (that I am aware of). Are there any Sarvāstivādin sutras which contain contact or attention, or both, within the definition of nama?
There are suttas which give sañña the role of labelling/conceptualisation. For example, here:
“Idha, bhikkhave, tadevekaccesu janapadesu ‘pātī’ti sañjānanti, ‘pattan’ti sañjānanti, ‘vittan’ti sañjānanti, ‘sarāvan’ti sañjānanti ‘dhāropan’ti sañjānanti, ‘poṇan’ti sañjānanti, ‘pisīlavan’ti sañjānanti. Iti yathā yathā naṃ tesu tesu janapadesu sañjānanti tathā tathā thāmasā parāmāsā abhinivissa voharati: ‘idameva saccaṃ, moghamaññan’ti. Evaṃ kho, bhikkhave, jana¬pada¬niruttiyā ca abhiniveso hoti samaññāya ca atisāro.
Here, bhikkhus, in different localities they call the same thing a “dish” (pāti) or they call it a “bowl” (patta) or they call it a “vessel” (vittha) or they call it a “saucer (sarava) or they call it a “pan” (dhāropa) or they call it a “pot” (poṇa) or they call it a “mug” (hana) or they call it a “basin” (pisīla). So whatever they call it in such and such a locality, he speaks accordingly, firmly adhering to and insisting on that, “Only this is true, anything else is wrong.” This is how there comes to be insistence on local language and overriding of normal usage.”
MN 139
The pali word used here “sañjānanti” is the 3rd person plural of sañña. Here we clearly do not have a case of perception simpliciter . Instead sañjānanti is being used in naming or designating. In other words, in using concepts in relation to X rūpa. This is done through sañña recognising the distinctive mark or nimitta of an object, which is then the basis for forming concepts about it. This ties in with DN 15’s adhivacanasamphasso (designation contact). If we look at Saṃjñā the connection with conceptualisation and language seems even more obvious:
Saṃjñā
संज्ञा saṃjñā [ saṃ-√ jñā ]
- to agree together, be of the same opinion , be in harmony with RV. AV. VS. ŚBr
- to appoint , assign , intend (for any purpose) AitBr
- to acknowledge, recognize, own, Pāṇ
- to know well, understand, R
- to cause to be of the same opinion or agree together AV. ; AitBr
- to cause to acquiesce or agree in (euphemistically said of a sacrificial victim, which ought not to be led forcibly to its death but made to resign itself), ŚBr. ; GṛŚrS. ; MBh. ; BhP. ;
- agreement, mutual understanding, harmony, TBr. ; ŚBr. ; Kathās.
- consciousness, clear knowledge or understanding or notion or conception, ŚBr.
Sam
सम् [ sam ]
- with
- together with
- along with
- together
- altogether
Opposite is वि [ vi ]
- apart
- asunder
- in different directions
- to and fro
- about
- away
- away from
- division
From the Proto Indo-European:
√ sem
- together
- one
ज्ञा [jñā]
- perceive, apprehend, understand (also with inf. [Pāṇ])
- experience, recognise, ascertain, investigate, RV
From the Proto Indo-European:
√ ǵneh₃
- to know
Saṃjñā = Together knowledge, united understanding. It likely refers to that by which we reach an agreement and common understanding, through designation/labelling and conceptualisation:
"It’s when in different localities the same thing is known as a ‘plate’, a ‘bowl’, a ‘cup’, a ‘dish’, a ‘basin’, a ‘tureen’, or a ‘porringer’.
On this basis I think there is a case for nāma to be heavily involved in naming in both the suttas and the āgamas.
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I think a question is still open as to which version would be closer to the original meaning? Is SA 298 closer, or has it succumb to later editing under the influence of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma? The Theravādin version seems somewhat closer to how nāmarūpa was understood just prior to and likely during the Buddha’s time. I don’t see the same in SA 298. The Theravādin suttas generally seem to retain a better memory of the philosophical and religious milieu the Buddha found himself in. For example, SN 12.15 appears to be addressing the Upanishadic arguments of “sarvām asti” which, if we follow Gonda, likely refers to Brahman. We see this again in SN 12.48, which seems to be a direct reference to debates found in the Chāndogyopaniṣad. If we look to the northern texts the apparent Upanishadic connection in SN 12.15 is missing through the loss of “Sabbam atthī” in that parallel, and instead reads as a criticism of all ontic claims, whilst SN 12.48 lacks any northern parallel at all.
Sound like speculation.
Elsewhere in the Pali Canon, nāmarūpa is used synonymously with the five aggregates; see Pali- English Dictionary (PTS), p. 350 on Nāma. Cf. Namarupa - Wikipedia
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Sound like speculation of phassa ‘contact’ for the SN 12 collection on nama.
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Yes, that’s one of the definitions of sanna, which changes depending on usage and context. It’s not a blanket definition.
saññā: notion
saññā: idea
saññā: attitude
saññā: mental image
saññā: mental imagery
saññā: perception
saññā: modes of perception
saññā: state of refined awareness
sañjānāti: to label
sañjānāti: to perceive
papañcasaññā: entrenched perception
In the case of nama-rupa, it still doesn’t mean that’s what nama-rupa does. I don’t think it’s correct to take one component of several components and define the entire mechanism by one component, assuming that is the correct definition of that one component (sanna = labeling), which is another discussion all together. That’s like defining an entire motor by its spark plug.
I think the PDF by Analayo linked by Bhante explains pretty well the multi-faceted function of nama-rupa. To me, it’s like a motor, or mechanism that takes the fuel for defilements and churns/produces it, but can also be switched to a different mode “yoniso manasikara” instead of “ayoniso” to weaken the defilements which is why I brought up manasikara.
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It’s no more speculative than saying contact is there because later Theravādins class attention as being separate from “consciousness”.
Its not speculative to note that the Buddha would have lived around debates regarding the sarvām, which the Upanishads equate with Brahman (sarvām/sabbam being the “whole one” or “the complete one”). Its also not speculative to note that SN 12.15 refers directly to this, nor is it speculative to note that when the Buddha shows concern for existence and non-existence its framed in terms of an ātman rather than ontic claims. We only see evidence of concern with that when we get to later debates and Nāgārjuna. SN 12.48 is even more explicit with the connection, when we compare it with the Chāndogyopaniṣad:
“How is it, Master Gotama: does all exist?”
“‘All exists’: this, brahmin, is the oldest cosmology.”
“Then, Master Gotama, does all not exist?”
“‘All does not exist’: this, brahmin, is the second cosmology.”
“How is it, Master Gotama: is all a unity?”
“‘All is a unity’: this, brahmin, is the third cosmology.”
“Then, Master Gotama, is all a plurality?”
“‘All is a plurality’: this, brahmin, is the fourth cosmology. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle….”
SN 12.48: Lokāyatikasutta—Bhikkhu Bodhi (suttacentral.net)
Compare with
In the beginning, son, this world was simply what is existent—one only,
without a second. Now, on this point some do say: ‘In the beginning this world
was simply what is nonexistent—one only, without a second. And from what is
nonexistent was born what is existent.’
2"But, son, how can that possibly be?" he continued. "How can what is existent
be born from what is nonexistent? On the contrary, son, in the beginning this world
was simply what is existent—one only, without a second.
3 "And it thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let me propagate myself.’ It
emitted heat. The heat thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let me propagate
myself.’ It emitted water. Whenever it is hot, therefore, a man surely perspires; and
thus it is from heat that water is produced. 4The water thought to itself: ‘Let me be-
come many. Let me propagate myself.’ It emitted food. Whenever it rains,
therefore, food becomes abundant; and thus it is from water that foodstuffs are pro-
duced.
Chāndogyopaniṣad, translation Olivelle, p.247
We can’t be certain of anything of course, but on the basis of these texts the Theravādin suttas seem to retain a better memory of the kind of debates the Buddha would have been aware of an involved in. To be fair however, there is a sutra which also seems to retain said memory which is not found in the southern suttas:
Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park.
At that time the Blessed One said to the monks: “The existence of what is the cause, by clinging to what, by being fettered and attached to what, by seeing what as the self, do living beings have a view like this and speak like this: ‘In this way myself and another are entirely not two, not different, no less than that?’”
The monks said to the Buddha: “The Blessed One is the root of the Dharma, the eye of the Dharma, the foundation of the Dharma …”
SA 153: 不二—Bhikkhu Anālayo (suttacentral.net)
Elsewhere in the Pali Canon, nāmarūpa is used synonymously with the five aggregates; see Pali- English Dictionary (PTS), p. 350 on Nāma. Cf. Namarupa - Wikipedia
I’m not sure what your point is here? The 5 aggregates and nāmarūpa, when not used in its original Upanishadic sense, are equivalent. That doesn’t necessarily mean it is a later idea. We see two different types of nāmarūpa in the suttas and āgamas. One is the old Upanishadic conception, the other closely related yet slightly innovative and new. Refer to DN 15 to see the use of both types in one sutta.
Not clear (content and expression)? Some concreate details are needed to support your views.
If you are interested I can refer you to this short paper which sets out the argument:
Nāmarūpa; a Linguistic Perspective
(99+) (PDF) Nāmarūpa; a Linguistic Perspective | Liudmila Olalde - Academia.edu
What are the two different types of nāmarūpa in the suttas and āgamas?
One being involved in processing or understanding sense experience, the other as an external sense object/individual. In DN 15 we see both through designation contact and the nāmarūpa which grows up etc after the descent of consciousness, although I am somewhat limited here in that I can’t examine all versions of this sutta. However, I realise you restrict yourself to SA/SN. Looking there we find nāmarūpa as being a condition for sense experience in the standard 12-link list, which given the etymology of Saṃjñā heavily supports the idea of it having a role in cognition. We also see another use of the term in suttas/agamas like SN 12.19/SA 294 where nāmarūpa are external objects. This is an old conception of nāmarūpa. For example, we see it here:
सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति ॥ ६.३.२ ॥
seyaṃ devataikṣata hantāhamimāstisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti || 6.3.2 ||
That god [Existence] decided: ‘Entering into these three deities [fire, water, and earth], as the individual self, I shall manifest myself in many names and forms’.
Chāndogyopaniṣad
Where nāmarūpa is the phenomenal world of external objects and individuals. What nāmarūpa means therefore depends on the context, which I suppose is true of any word or sentence.
Thanks for explaining that. I was having trouble understanding what you meant earlier.
OK you mean, using SuttaCentral
“through designation contact” (similar to other suttas about dependent origination):
When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for name and form?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’
‘Atthi idappaccayā nāmarūpan’ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ.
“and the nāmarūpa which grows up”
If consciousness were not conceived in the mother’s womb, would name and form coagulate there?”
Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṁ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ mātukucchismiṁ samuccissathā”ti?
…
“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name and form achieve growth, increase, and maturity?”
“Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ vuddhiṁ virūḷhiṁ vepullaṁ āpajjissathā”ti?
I’m really not sure how to understand that passage…
Hi Mike. I would take this:
“and the nāmarūpa which grows up”
If consciousness were not conceived in the mother’s womb, would name and form coagulate there?”
Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṁ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ mātukucchismiṁ samuccissathā”ti?
…
“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name and form achieve growth, increase, and maturity?”
“Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ vuddhiṁ virūḷhiṁ vepullaṁ āpajjissathā”ti?
and would change it to this, to express how I read it:
“and the individual grows up”
If consciousness were not conceived in the mother’s womb, would an individual coagulate there?”
…
“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would the individual achieve growth, increase, and maturity?”
Based on the old Upanishadic use of nāmarūpa.
For this type of nāmarūpa, do you refer to the definition of it according to SN12.2 = SA 298 (mentioned before). Pages 162-3 from the-fundamental-teachings-of-early-buddhism_Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (140.3 KB)
If so, why do you say the following?
You need to explain clearly why the DN15 sutta contains both types of nāmarūpa?
For this type of nāmarūpa, I can see clearly the comparative study presented by Choong (mentioned before).Pages 184-188 from the-fundamental-teachings-of-early-buddhism_Choong Mun-keat 2000.pdf (357.3 KB)
But I do not see why “This is an old conception of nāmarūpa” based on your example?