I have tried in vain to find the the above phrase in the Suttas. Can someone direct me to where it is please?
With Metta
Found in the Questions of King Milinda.
See, for instance:
Ooh, yes, this is a search bug. It should be ignoring punctuation. I thought we had resolved that.
Thanks so much.
With Metta
Short commentary by Ven Nanavira:
NA CA SO
Na ca so na ca añño, âNeither he nor anotherâ. This often-quoted dictum occurs in the Milindapañha somewhere, as the answer to the question âWhen a man dies, who is rebornâhe or another?â. This question is quite illegitimate, and any attempt to answer it cannot be less so. The question, in asking who is reborn, falls into sakkÄyaditthi. It takes for granted the validity of the person as âselfâ; for it is only about âselfâ that this questionââEternal (so) or perishable (añño)?ââcan be asked (cf. PATICCASAMUPPÄDA, ANICCA [a], & SAKKÄYA). The answer also takes this âselfâ for granted, since it allows that the question can be asked. It merely denies that this âselfâ (which must be either eternal or perishable) is either eternal or perishable, thus making confusion worse confounded. The proper way is to reject the question in the first place. Compare Anguttara VI,ix,10 <A.iii,440>, where it is said that the ditthisampanna not only can not hold that the author of pleasure and pain was somebody (either himself or another) but also can not hold that the author was not somebody (neither himself nor another). The ditthisampanna sees the present person (sakkÄya) as arisen dependent upon present conditions and as ceasing with the cessation of these present conditions. And, seeing this, he does not regard the present person as present âselfâ. Consequently, he does not ask the question Who? about the present. By inferenceâatÄ«tÄnÄgate nayam netvÄ having induced the principle to past and future (cf. GÄmini Samy. 11 <S.iv,328>)[a]âhe does not regard the past or future person as past or future âselfâ, and does not ask the question Who? about the past or the future. (Cf. MÄraâs question in line 2 of PARAMATTHA SACCA §1.) (The Milindapañha is a particularly misleading book. See also ANICCA [a], PATICCASAMUPPÄDA [c], RĆȘPA [e], & PARAMATTHA SACCA §§8-10.)
Footnotes:
[a] Dhammâanvaye ñÄnam is knowledge dependent upon the inferability of the Dhammaâi.e. knowledge that the fundamental Nature of Things is invariable in time and can be inferred with certainty (unlike rational inference) from present to past or future. See NidÄna/Abhisamaya Samy. iv,3 <S.ii,58>. In other words, generalization without abstractionâsee MANO [b].