I don’t think the Buddha was writing a book when he spoke- he was involved in the immediate issue of projecting the meaning of his words, into the mind of the listener. The necessarily did not involve definitions but the immediacy would have required using well worn terms. Having said that he asked some discourses to be memorized for posterity and those (ie all that we have) do have some definitions. I think problems began when redactors or later lost access to meanings and started playing word games with the Dhamma.
I don’t have the suttas in mind right here.
And note also that I usually refer only to suttas that have parallels in the SA. I think this is sufficient to have the gist of EBT Buddhism. So what I say below has to do with suttas with // in SA.
Often, the Buddha seems to play on words in the same sutta. That is to say to give different possible meanings for a word within a sutta, or even within a sentence.
And samma seems to be the case.
What goes into the container that is the word samma is so ecclectic.
Sama speech might be translated as “appropriateness of language”. While sama view, might be translated as “correct regard on dhamma”. While again, samma samādhi, might just mean “(right would be redundant) meditative concentration towards oneneness”.
As you say, samma in this context means ‘in one’ (opposite of miccha = ‘separate’).
It is ekatta vs. puthutta (ekatva vs. pṛthutva).
It is “one” vs. “many” (manifoldness).
However “oneness” does not mean “together” in Buddhism. It means getting rid of one thing, to enter a new one.
There is the problem of saṃ & vi - of sam & micha - of ekatta & puthutta - And there is the solution of eka.
Eka is about choosing one among two (or several) things.
It is making an end of something to get into something else (higher).
As in “making an end of” vitakka and vicāra to enter the second jhāna (absorption), with its ajjhatta sampasādana, cetaso ekodibhāva.
Or making and
Again, jhāna means absorption, as well as “making an end of” something.
E.g. to enter the third jhāna (absorption), you must “make an end of” delight/pīti - you must “jhāna” delight/pīti. You must “jhāna” pīti to be upekkhako (equanimous), sato (mindful), sampajāno (clearly discerning) and having sukhañca kāyena (pleasure with the body). You must terminate something, to get into something else.
It is not like in late Vedism, where eka = saṃ. Viz. making one out of the manifoldness.
By the way, why not translate the common 2nd jhāna extract - where samādhi first appears) :
vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharāti.
by
with the stilling of abstract and concrete thoughts - with a citta manifested as transcended (ekodibhāvaṃ), without abstract thought (avitakkaṃ), without concrete [(diffused, rambling and doubtful)] thought (avicāraṃ), produced by a meditative concentration towards oneneness (samādhijaṃ), and with delight and pleasure (pītisukhaṃ), (a bhikku) enters upon and abides in the second jhana.
What I’m saying is that when the Buddha discusses the development of samādhi, he isn’t talking about miccha-samādhi or samādhi as the basic function of the mind. Also, it is very probable that ‘sammā’ is solely to distinguish from miccha-samādhi or used when the Eightfold Path is discussed.
So, if there is to be a comprehensive study of what sammā-samādhi is, it would inevitably require also looking at the passages where samādhi is defined.
So far, the only conclusions that one can infer from counting and comparing Suttas (which isn’t inherently conclusive) is that:
A few Suttas define sammā-samādhi as jhānas.
A small number of Suttas define sammā-samādhi as something else other than jhāna.
A small number of Suttas define samādhi as something else other than jhāna.
A large number of Suttas define samādhi as jhāna.
Clearly, it seems that sammā-samādhi is not solely jhāna. However, the insistence and contant repetition of sammā-samādhi and samādhi being the 4 jhānas (and also jhāna being a requirement for Nibbāna and Non-Returning) points to jhāna being highly important.
Both propositions use the deictic pronouns “this” (ayaṃ and idaṃ) to refer back to the listings.
It appears to me that in Pali syntax, what we have here is a predicative nominal proposition, ie “A is B”. We can certainly infer that every instance of A is definitely B. However, can we necessarily infer that B is limited only to A, ie the proposition “B is A” is necessarily true?
If one asserts that one can infer a priori that Right Concentration consists only of the 4 Jhanas from the predicative nominal statement in SN 45.8, that would be falsified by the other attested usages of the predicative nominal in other passages.
Taking another passage from MN 9, look at the section dealing with “unwholesomeness”. Some examples are given, and the predicative nominal statement is made that they are all called “unwholesomeness”. Clearly, nobody would on the basis of this infer that the list of unwholesomeness is limited to that list, given the articulation of other forms of bad kamma elsewhere.
Ditto for the proposition “pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā”, another predicative nominal proposition that is misinterpreted to mean that only the 5 Clinging Aggregates constitute Suffering.
I suspect you could make a clarificatory contribution there. For example, I’m looking at SN 56.11’s phrase:
Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering.
This “in brief” seems to suggest that, of all the various sorts of suffering here, they are all included in the idea “the five aggregates subject to clinging” - all varieties of suffering are rooted in that clinging there.
Using that same structure, it seems to me that there are all sorts of samadhi on offer, but the ones that come together under the banner of “samma-” are all of them undergirded by jhana, in the same way that all suffering is undergirded by clinging.
You seem to suggest that this is incorrect; how so?
nice work on that!
This quote is one of many examples where “directed-thought & evaluation” fits perfectly, where as “coarse and subtle thinking” doesn’t fit so well, and “mind glued to a white kasina” doesn’t work at all.
“The world is tightly fettered by delight;
Thought is its means of investigating (making concrete representation?*).
Craving is what one must forsake
In order to say, ‘Nibbāna.’”
“Nandīsaṃyojano loko,
vitakkassa vicāraṇaṃ;
Taṇhāya vippahānena,
nibbānaṃ iti vuccatī”ti.
We are so used to different definitions of concepts - so why are we inflexible with samma-samadhi? I think it’s the pedestal that we put the 8NP on. My mindset at least is “Maybe the Buddha had ‘creative’ definitions with minor concepts, but surely there was a fixed set about the fundamentals of the dhamma!”
So I’d expect him to be fix on the 4NT, the 8NP, the paticcas. - That I had this dogmatic assumption is interesting
“Bhikkhus, (1) for an immoral person, for one deficient in virtuous behavior, (2) right concentration lacks its proximate cause. When there is no right concentration, for one deficient in right concentration, (3) the knowledge and vision of things as they really are lacks its proximate cause. When there is no knowledge and vision of things as they really are, for one deficient in the knowledge and vision of things as they really are, (4) disenchantment and dispassion lack their proximate cause. When there is no disenchantment and dispassion, for one deficient in disenchantment and dispassion, (5) the knowledge and vision of liberation lacks its proximate cause. AN5.24
The samadhi that leads to liberation can be defined differently, other than the jhanas: AN4.41
Samadhi seeing sense bases (and not jhana)- knowledge and vision of things as they really are: SN35.99
Samadhi seeing the three kinds of feelings (and not jhana) can lead to liberation:SN36.1
The thing to note here is that dukkha has been declined into its nominative case dukkhaṃ. In my view, this is a nominative of label, which turns it into a proper name, ie “Suffering” in capital S.
It is not a mere substantive noun any longer. As the name for an abstraction, it can be as large or as small as what the texts populates it with.
So, the question would be, does the adverb saṃkhittena (in brief) say that every form of Suffering is included in the pañcupādānakkhandhā? In my view, clearly not.
We have a clear proposition -
yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin’ti.
“Whatever is felt is included in Suffering”
eg SN 36.11
Given that feelings are dependently arisen on contact, regardless of whether one is an arahant or a worldling, they are still included in Suffering. Even if an arahant does not take up the feeling, it is still Suffering on account of the feeling’s impermanence.
That’s my understanding of how predicative nominal propositions in Pali should be understood. We simply cannot assert logical equivalence from such predicative nominal propositions.
My sense of all these expositions on the constituents/composition of each of the samma factors is that they were intended to encourage practitioners to pursue and develop those factors. I don’t think any of the analyses were motivated by a desire to give a map of reality. If the Buddha says “The Jhanas is* Right Concentration”, our task is not to waste time wondering what else makes up Right Concentration; the tool has already been identified and we’re invited to use it.
pardon the singular copula. Just can’t expel the singular deictic pronoun of the Pali.
PS - SN 56.11 is probably unique as a text in which a saṅkhittena pronouncement is not followed up by a vitthārena exposition. It’s just the nature of these texts - economy of narrative. But judging from some of the parallels we studied in Bhante Sujato’s class, the First Discourse probably took place over several days, and what has survived of the teachings is just the gist.
Unless you’re a proponent of dry insight samadhi that can attain arahantship without jhāna quality of the four jhanas, the samadhi of SN 36.1 is the samadhi of someone in one of the 4 jhanas. See AN 9.36 for another prominent example of someoe, while in jhana, using that samadhi to attain arahantship.
SN 36.1 samādhi-suttaṃ
SN 36.1 samādhi-suttaṃ
SN 36.1 concentration-discourse
♦ 249. “tisso imā, bhikkhave, vedanā.
(there are) Three (of) these, *********, feelings.
No I’m not. People are so used to thinking in binary samatha OR vipassana terms. The Suttas are always about AND- BOTH samatha and vipassana are required.
It isnt appropriate to take one sutta and draw a final conclusion based just on that. It has to be placed in the broader dhamma(-vinaya). So I think a samadhi of 1-4 jhanic intensity must arise even if the 4 jhanas are not developed on their own. It some situations stream entry has been arrived at by people who would not have had the ability to develop jhanas due to various reasons. But they are said to posses the stream which is the noble eightfold path. This means they must have Sammasamadhi to a 1-4 jhanic degree, but entwined with insight.
I’m a bit confused about the topic. Like I touched on, I don’t understand why only sammā-samādhi is being looked over, when passages discussing samādhi should be as well.
Furthermore, what is the purpose of the topic? Is it to find if sammā-samādhi is not soley jhāna, but comprises some other types of samādhi as well? Or is it to incorrectly reduce the importance of jhāna by quantifying Suttas that describe sammā-samādhi?
Another definition of right concentration, found in a few discourses, does not mention the absorptions (see DN II 217; MN III 71; SN V 21 and AN IV 40). One of these discourses is the Mahācattārīsaka-sutta, a discourse which defines right concentration as unification of the mind (cittassekaggatā) developed in interdependence with the other seven path-factors (MN III 71). This definition highlights the fact that in order for concentration to become ‘right’ concentration, it needs to be developed as part of the noble eightfold path.
Judging from other discourses, the expression ‘unification of the mind’ is not confined to absorption concentration, since the same expression occurs in relation to walking and standing (AN II 14) or to listening to the Dhamma (AN III 175), activities which would not be compatible with absorption attainment. This suggests that this second definition of ‘right concentration’ would also include levels of samādhi that have not yet reached the depth of absorption concentration. In fact, the formulation of this second definition makes it clear that the decisive factor qualifying concentration as ‘right’ is not merely the depth of concentration achieved, but the purpose for which concentration is employed.
A similar nuance underlies the qualification sammā, ‘right’, which literally means “togetherness”, or to be “connected in one”. This thus indicates that the criterion for describing concentration as sammā, as ‘right’, is whether it is developed ‘together’ with the other factors of the noble eightfold path. Of central importance here is the presence of right view, as the forerunner of the whole path, without whose implementation concentration can never be reckoned sammā.
I think those who dislike MN 117 on account of its apparent “lateness” can also draw the same conclusion from SN 45.8. This centrality, inseperability of and absolute dependance of Right Concentration on Right View in the Path may not be so obvious in the Pali SN 45.8, but if we look at the Chinese parallels, it would appear that orginally, the analysis in SN 45.8 was part of a longer set of discourses.
I think the SA preserve this framework better, given that the purpose of the Noble Eightfold Path is set out in SA 783 (the parallel to SN 45.5), and the analysis of the factors follows right after in SA 784 (parallel to SN 45.8). The settings of the narratives do not matter that much to me.
Even more explicit in this connection is SN 45.1 (= SA 749), which requires Right View to enable its sequelae to arise.
There’s much to be commended in the suggestion made by others in this thread that perhaps the sense carried by Right Concentration is best understood in the context of its occurrence. If it is in the context of the Noble Eightfold Path, it should be understood as part of an integrated totality and not be divorced from the Third Noble Reality. This would resolve those situations where the Jhanas are attained by worldlings (eg AN 4.123) and why in those circumstances, the Jhanas attained in those contexts would not qualify as sammā due to the absence of Right View.
Along with MN 117 (and a few other passages), where samma samadhi is defined as ekagga citta + the other 7 factors in 8aam (noble eightfold path), this resolves that dilemma with the ordinary 4j (jhanas).
However.
The point of the thread, my original reason for probing into this, is because the human mind takes short cuts in trying to quickly make sense of our perceptions of the world. Again and again when we read enough suttas, we constantly see 4j formula followed by nibbida, viraga, … nirvana. With the SN 45.8 definition that samma samadhi = 4j, when we see 4j on its own (without being explicitly defined), we make that connection in our mind, and we treat as a complete comprehensive definition as samma samadhi. It is not. It is a big part of it, but it’s not the whole thing. So the point of the thread is, when I actually looked through every single reference to samma samadhi in the suttas (rough estimate 400), only in 4 suttas is it explicitly defined as 4j. The point of the thread is for other people to share passages I may have missed, other EBT parallels. If you want to broaden the search and see where samadhi is expilcitly tied to 4j, (and not just samma samadhi), be my guest.
samadhi-sam-bojjhanga, compared to samma samadhi, is clear and explicit that samadhi, is a factor that leads to awakening (bojjhanga = bodhi + anga), and Buddha is a conjugated form of bodhi. As far as I know samadhi sambojjhanga never is explicitly tied to 4j, and I have looked at every passage I an find. In that sense, like samadhi-indriya, that’s excellent because the non definitive-ness makes it clear to the student to stay alert and not assume samadhi is only 4j.
samma samadhi, the samma on its own, doesn’t make that reinforcement so obvious. One has to think about it, and make connections with other suttas to see that 4j on its own is not samma samadhi.
I fully agree. Sammā-samādhi is usually defined as the 4 jhānas and this never made total sense to me. How can someone work on the full Eightfold Path when his meditation is not yet developed enough to reach jhāna? Before one reaches jhāna, the factor of sammā-samādhi is left “in the air” and undeveloped?
Good non-jhānic concentration is without a doubt important to develop insight regarding the teachings and one’s own mind, as well as basic composure; whether one has reached jhāna or not. Surely there are other wholesome and beneficial—as well as important—levels of concentration other than jhāna.
Note: Full jhāna is still a large portion of sammā-samādhi, as well as being highly important and beneficial.
While jhāna does have other benefits, it is still predominantly a means to an end, being to develop wisdom (paññā) and the factor of Right View (sammā-diṭṭhi). Jhāna not connected to the other factors is just pleasant sensations (and one doesn’t even have to be Buddhist to develop jhāna). More so, if jhāna is only used and developed for the resulting pleasant states (and not to develop wisdom), then it is an unwholesome attachement like attachement to any other type of sense object (being sense-objects of the mind, rather than of touch, taste, etc.).
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