Why are the Arahant aggregates suffering due to impermanence?

Thanks, Bhante.

A very helpful and clarifying summation. :pray:

In my opinion: those who believe parinibbana is a mere cessation (like you), they assume that there are only impermanent khandha’s, transient, conditioned, seen arising, ceasing and changing. They accept nothing else as real or as reality or as part of Buddha-Dhamma.

According them Nibbana realised by the arahant, the sa-upadisesa Nibbana , ends at the death of the arahant and nothing remains. So also this Nibbana is impermanent. They do not believe there is an anupadisesa Nibbana. at least, for them, that is just a word that refers to a mere cessation.

For them there is only samsara, only conditioned existence with its suffering. And the only way to ‘escape’ this (one cannot really call this an escape, i feel), is bringing this conditioned existence to a total end for oneself. This is whatt they see as what the Buddha realised.

In their understanding of Dhamma no one can ever experience the total end of suffering. Because then there is nothing. The total end of suffering is just something theoretical that no one will ever realise, feel, experience or know. It cannot be known. That is the consequence of their view, it can only be imaged. And it is imagined as a mere cessation, like the materialist do.

To really know that anything impermanent is suffering, one must know something that is absolutely no suffering and is not seen arising and ceasing. There is not other way.
Otherwise one is just a thinker, a philosopher.

Well, after all, they cognize an element in which there is no origin, change and cessation, the characteristic of which is complete rest. This property or sphere is cognized during the life of the arya in the state of phala-samapati, the achievement of fruition. Against the background of the nibbana element, the suffering/restlessness of all formations is understood.

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But what is the difference between the complete peace of the absence of aggregates and the presence of aggregates, but without clinging, except that the fact of their presence is associated with physical illness, danger, aging and destruction of the body? Anxiety of feelings and depression by the fact of occurrence? But we feel and experience the suffering of these states with a painful mental feeling.

That is, depression, burdensomeness, boredom, anxiety, and so on are a manifestation of a mental painful sensation with which we feel an unpleasant phenomenon. But it is said that an arahant does not have this feeling, since there is no attachment. Or is subtle mental dukkha still present in enlightened beings, what do you think? For some reason, the Theravada tradition takes the “supramundane mind” beyond the category of truth about suffering. How could we show the suffering of even this type of mind, what is this suffering connected with?

That is, how does this samsarity, and therefore the connection with dukkha, manifest itself?

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Seems like you just answered your own question.

Which is utterly free of all dukkha, free of any “disturbance” – living unattached to the aggregates but still experiencing pain (which includes physical and mental aspects; if we’re not conscious there’s no experience of pain), or the complete absence of the aggregates, of all experience, of all that?
This applies to final nibbāna.

i also think like this, but not the people who believe parinibbana is a mere cessation because they do not accept such an element.

You think that this element is some kind of super-normal citta. But we are talking about peace, the cessation of all formations, in which nothing arises or is destroyed. This peace is known while living in phala-samapati. At the time of the death of the arahant, the mind no longer takes this peace as an object, since the mind reaches cessation. The experience of parinibbana is similar to nirodha-samapati. In nirodha-samapati the mind achieves peace by completely ceasing. In Phala-samapati the mind experiences this same peace of cessation by contemplating it and comprehending it through wisdom.

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if the mind achieves peace by completely ceasing how do you know it achieves peace?
What is there to feel, know, taste this peace?

In phala-sampati consciousness does not cease as such. But all objects of consciousness cease, including consciousness itself as an object. This cessation of objects is experienced as the absolute peace of cessation. You see this peace directly and taste the highest stability of nibbana, you experience it directly. And in Nirodha-Samapati you are also completely immersed in it.

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Great teachers talk about it this way. Yogi’s. Those deeply involved in stilling, in meditation not in books, texts. You can make me or them ridiculous or present them as fools, but be careful, maybe you are misled?

Anyway, what they all teach is that one can have a direct experience of the pure nature of mind, but never as object of vinnana. One must become it. This nature of mind is said to be unborn. It is described, from experience, as an ultimate emptiness, peace. But is not a mere emptiness. It also suffused with intelligence, a kind of awareness or sensitivity but one must not pick up these words and attack them because that is all nonsense.

It is not local.

It is not that i just blindly accept all those things. But i see it taught by many teachers, and always those oriented upon meditation practice and not scholar like types. Scholar like types always seem to protest and seem to know everything. Sorry, it just not oke.

I have already answered this to you. Teachers are wrong, they are not Buddha. The Buddha did not recommend relying on teachers. Read the suttas I referred to in my post.

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If this mind were unborn, unemerged, then it would exist constantly, nothing would pollute it, since the unborn and unchangeable cannot be conditioned, polluted by anything, and in a state of unconsciousness, when viññana is temporarily suppressed, this consciousness must be clearly present. But we know that when coma, deep sleep or loss of consciousness occurs and viññāna is suppressed, there is no awareness, there is a gap, unconsciousness. This means that besides viññāna there is nothing, there is no other eternal, permanent, unconditioned citta. If, in your opinion, it still needs to be manifested and purified, then this is not an unborn, unconditioned phenomenon, but quite something that requires creation and conditioning, appears one day.

Once again, if there were such a trans-samsaric permanent, unborn mind, then it would not disappear into a state of unconsciousness. This is very important to clarify.

Yes, of course, the whole world is reveling in bhava-tanha. The second half of the world revels in vibhava-tanha. The former believe in a transcendent existence after death, the latter believe that there is no existence after death. You appeal to mass character, but the teachings of Buddha go against the flow of the world.

But there were and are other practicing teachers who deny such a supra-samsara mind. Pa Auk Sayadaw, Ledi Sayadaw, Mahasi Sayadaw, Mogok Sayadaw, Webu Sayadaw, Ajahn Brahm and others. They are also practitioners and yet they deny such entities. I don’t understand why you constantly preach this eternalistic doctrine? The Buddha said that those teachers who preach complete cessation of existence border on non-craving, and those who teach that complete cessation of existence is not possible border on craving, clinging, grasping. What’s not clear here? Those who teach complete cessation, such as Bh. Sunyo, Brahmali Bhiku and Bh Sujato, and everyone who supports them on this forum, are a priori closer to the truth of nibbana than those who preach the impossibility of cessation of existence. Well, what happens in reality - you need to find out from your own experience. Any fabrications will only interfere, especially eternalistic ones.

https://suttacentral.net/mn60/en/bodhi?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false

The view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is no cessation of being” is close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to holding, close to clinging; but the view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is cessation of being” is close to non-lust, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-holding, close to non-clinging.’ After reflecting thus, he practises the way to disenchantment with being, to the fading away and cessation of being.

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But there is still some perception in this attainment – the perception of nothingness.
The complete cessation of consciousness while still alive is only attained with saññavedayitanirodha.
As in MN43, SN36.11, MN59, AN9.44

This is exactly the achievement I mean - nirodha samapati is a shortened form for saññavedayitanirodha. I didn’t mean ‘natthi kiñcī’ti ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ

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In phala-samapati, if that is what you mean, the object “there is nothing here” is not contemplated. It is not the contemplation of a sphere without forms.
AN 9.37, AN 11.7

The fact that the aggregates themselves are also a form of suffering. They are a type of pain compared to that peace, although in a lesser sense than we usually use the word ‘pain’ (or ‘suffering’). However, the Buddha uses the word to challenge people’s perceptions. Unless one is a noble one, one will be unable to see all types of experiences as suffering. That’s why people get attached to states of boundless consciousness and such: because they can’t see the suffering in them. “What others speak of as happiness, that the noble ones say is suffering.” (SN35.136)

Yes, even though it is not taken personally. There are three types of dukkha: “Suffering of pain, suffering of what is created (or ‘conditioned’), suffering of change.” (SN45.165) Enlightened one do not experience suffering due to mental pain anymore (i.e. depression and such), but there are still mental conditions and mental change. So the latter two types of suffering still exist.

I mean, take the jhanas. They are also said to be suffering in the suttas—without any qualification of needing to be attached to them for it to be suffering. The Buddha still experienced the jhanas, so there was still suffering for him.

But in my view it’s the contrary. :slightly_smiling_face: What actually can’t be proven through experience, what actually is just theoretical, is any type of permanent consciousness or mind. Because unless we live till the end of time, whatever experience we have, can’t be shown to last forever. Any belief that such an experience is permanent, is just a conceptual idea added to the bare experience.

The problem is, some experiences are so subtle and sublime, people who mistake them to be permanent will think their views aren’t conceptual, but on some level they still are.

If, however, we see all consciousness and experience completely cease, then we can clearly conclude from that that there is no permanence in these things. We don’t have to have them cease forever to realize this. If it all disappears even for a moment, we can derive that it all doesn’t last. This isn’t just theoretical; this is a direct encounter with how things are. And through such an encounter, everything in the possible scope of experience can be understood as it really is: to be impermanent.

And because such cessation can happen through complete (temporary) detachment from everything, we can come to the realization that all impermanent things have arisen through attachment. Then we can conclude that if that attachment completely ceases, all these things also come to an end.

This is exactly why the Buddha always kept coming back to impermanence and not to permanence; why he again and again mentions the mind and consciousness to be impermanent, and never says such a thing is permanent or lasting.

Funnily enough, in DN1 the Buddha calls those who hold view of an eternal mind or consciousness “rationalist” and “thinkers”. I think that’s because of what I just explained: such views are usually just theories.

PS. If you keep implying that those who disagree with you are just “scholar like types” without experience, don’t be surprised if the conversation doesn’t flow. It’s best to argue against views, not against persons.

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I am jumping in here, and am not committing to any “side” in this debate, but I just thought I would make the following comment:

You argue that one can never prove that something is eternal, it is always speculative and based on theories. Indeed.

Likewise, though, you cannot logically conclude from viewing that all consciousness ceases temporarily when attachment ceases that such a cessation of consciousness would permanently remain if attachment was completely destroyed.

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I would disagree. We can come to this conclusion (even though “logically” probably isn’t the right word).

Let’s say, your whole life you had a nail in your finger that caused you pain. When you take it out for a minute, you see that the pain ceases. You stick it back, the pain comes back in. Then it’s not a farfetched conclusion to say the pain will cease forever when you take out the nail forever. This isn’t a perfect analogy, but the point is that insight can come from inference as well as direct experience.

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The problem is that the only way to experience something unpleasant is to feel it. We experience impermanence as suffering through mental pain. The restlessness of the senses is also painful for us due to the fact that we respond to them with mental dukkha. The second problem is that arahants are supposed to completely cut off types of mental pain, and this is the meaning of nibbana with a remainder. We should not completely neutralize the meaning of nibbana with remainder and reduce everything only to nibbana without remainder.

This is what is strange, because in your opinion it turns out that the arahant is hit not by one dart (physical pain), but by two (physical and mental in addition)

But these types of suffering need to be clarified. Impermanence is painful because there is despondency when we lose something pleasant to us, or because something pleasant is replaced by something painful. Or even because the very fact of variability opens the way for the existence and experience of pain as such. As for the suffering of conditioning, it is not very clear. There is an explanation that these are the sufferings and difficulties that a being undergoes in order to construct some kind of happiness, for example, the world of brahma is achieved through the hard practice of jhanas and austerities. In general, these two types of dukkha one way or another come down to direct dukkha, dukkha-vedana, or not this way?