Because IMO, to say that Alexa ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’ is sakayaditthi … an identification of ‘Self’.
It could mean that. It could also mean that there is a certain arrangement of matter in an electronic device. I don’t think “exists” in English, either in ordinary speech or philosophical discourse, really has the substantialist meaning that it seems to in the suttas. This is particularly so in relation to ordinary objects.
Contra what the (Gelugpa) madhyamikas seem to think, I don’t think that people actually think that ordinary objects have some sort of core essence that persists through time. Their refutations of inanimate objects as having a self seem to be vigorously attacking a strawman.
On the other hand, it does seem that people think that sentient beings have some sort of essence. Ie, they think that they are more than an aggregate of psychological events. They think that there is (or that they are) some sort of container for all of these psychological events. They think that there is some further fact beyond the psychological events which unites them all. Ie, they are not reductionists about persons.
IMO, it is better to state that ‘Alexa’ is an emergent phenomena based on underlying processes such as hardware and software based on which ‘Alexa’ arises and ceases in accordance with iddapaccayata, the Law of causation/conditionality.
You actually seem to be asserting that “Alexa” is something separate from the processes of a computer. It doesn’t arise from these processes. It is these processes. I assume this is what you meant.
However, what is found is hardware, software, electric current, logical processes and subprocesses… none of which can be clearly demarcated as ‘Alexa’. " This <<pointing to the motherboard, the chip, the battery… >> is not Alexa". Going through it all, no ‘Alexa’ can be found.
Of course it can’t be found in any of the parts, it’s a composite entity. All it is is the parts. All that this demonstrates is that there is no “bearer” of the parts. This doesn’t mean “Alexa doesn’t exist”. What it does mean is that asserting “Alexa exists” is just asserting that some arrangement of matter exists.
To use a different example, chariots do exist. “Chariot” refers to a collection of parts. When I say “there is a chariot over there”, I’m asserting that there is a collection of parts over there. I’m not asserting that there is some collection of parts which are united by some sort of bearer of all the parts. This is a reductionist view about chariots.
An eliminativist view would be that chariots don’t exist at all. There is nothing in reality to which ‘chariot’ refers. “Chariot” doesn’t even refer to a collection of parts. This is clearly false. If it were true, then it would be impossible to account for the fact that our words mean anything at all. We’d just be blurting out sounds randomly in response to various stimuli.