Hi Sarath
Before I analyse the relevant provisions in DN 15, I’d like to bring up MN 38. This sutta is dear to me, as it gives the Buddha’s commentary on the Dependant Arising catechism in SN 12.1. It’s rather different from the analysis in SN 12.2, as that gives a word-analysis of the 12 nidānas. What MN 38 does is very different. Instead of analysing the meaning of the words for the nidānas, it is actually analysing the nature of the law governing the relationship between the nidānas.
It starts with a brief exposition of the first three Noble Truths -
Bhikkhus, do you see: ‘This has come to be’ (bhūtamidaṃ)?”—“Yes, venerable sir.”—“Bhikkhus, do you see: ‘Its origination occurs with that as nutriment’?”—“Yes, venerable sir.”—“Bhikkhus, do you see: ‘With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation’?”—“Yes, venerable sir.”
Notice, that the past participle bhūta is used. It does not say “this comes to be” (bhavati). The First Noble Truth is framed in terms of a very real phenomenon/event that has happened, and not applied in an abstract fashion.
Next, comes the analysis -
So, bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, formations come to be; with formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, mentality-materiality; with mentality-materiality as condition, the sixfold base; with the sixfold base as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.
“‘With birth as condition, ageing and death’: so it was said. Now, bhikkhus, do ageing and death have birth as condition or not, or how do you take it in this case?”
“Ageing and death have birth as condition, venerable sir. Thus we take it in this case: ‘With birth as condition, ageing and death.’”
“‘With being as condition, birth’: so it was said. Now, bhikkhus, does birth have being as condition or not, or how do you take it in this case?”
…etc etc
Notice how the Buddha first cites the short catechism of Dependant Arising from SN 12.1. Then, He proceeds to analyse it with a very specific modality -
From A, B comes to be. Does B have A as condition or not?
When you ask if B can come to be without A, in syllogistic logic that is asking “Is A a necessary condition for B to come to be?”
Are you with me so far?
If so, you can see how this is repeated in DN 15. The passage in question also starts with a recapitulation of the SN 12.1 catechism, and then proceeds to analyse the relationship of “condition-ness” -
It was said: ‘With birth as condition there is aging and death.’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way: If there were absolutely and utterly no birth of any kind anywhere—that is, of gods into the state of gods, of celestials into the state of celestials, of spirits, demons, human beings, quadrupeds, winged creatures, and reptiles, each into their own state—if there were no birth of beings of any sort into any state, then, in the complete absence of birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging and death be discerned?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for aging and death, namely, birth.
I would like to draw your attention to the bit I have italicised. I think you will not disagree that this follows the MN 38 reasoning of using syllogistic logic to assert that birth is a necessary condition for aging and death. What makes it even more exceptional as a syllogism is how the bolded text is expressed in the Pali -
Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā
in the complete absence of birth, with the cessation of birth
Jātiyā is the locative case of the noun jāti. Sati is the locative case of the present participle of atthi (exists). Together as one grammatical unit, it called a locative absolute. It forms the language of Stream Entry, when which one awakens to this Dhamma -
Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati.
Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.
Among its several appearances, you find jātiyā asati appearing in SN 12.49-
Atha kho, bhikkhave, sutavato ariyasāvakassa aparappaccayā ñāṇamevettha hoti: ‘imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati. Avijjāya asati saṅkhārā na honti; saṅkhāresu asati viññāṇaṃ na hoti
; viññāṇe asati nāmarūpaṃ na hoti; nāmarūpe asati saḷāyatanaṃ na hoti … pe … bhavo na hoti … jāti na hoti … jātiyā asati jarāmaraṇaṃ na hotī’ti. So evaṃ pajānāti: ‘evamayaṃ loko nirujjhatī’ti.
According to AN 3.61, this is the Third Noble Truth. Can you see that the Second Noble Truth is being “proved” by the Third Noble Truth?
What, therefore can you deduce from these?
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The Second Noble Truth is not applied in the abstract, but to “what has come to be” (bhūtamidaṃ) as part of the First Noble Truth;
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As such, the Second Noble Truth is not intended to predict what happens when A exists, but to explain that B must have A as a necessary condition to come to be.
Can you now see why it was unnecessary to discuss the Six Bases in DN 15?
Of course, you will find many traditional interpretations of the Second Noble Truth as an exercise in prediction, but all of these stem from the different Abhidharmas.